Political Islam in Turkey - Essay Example

Since the origination of the democratic society, Turkey strives to balance between the secular and religious affairs. The process of the secularization has been performed without the proper attention to the details thus creating a phenomenon where the religion has been moved away from the central hubs of social regulation but remained an important part of the lives of the people. The origination of the AKP as the political force that could secure the place of the religion in the society thus protecting the rights of the believers that formed a majority of suburban electorate swiftly attracted the attention and support of the various parts of the society. For someone, it could provide the certain freedoms restricted before, for the others could become a protection from the nationalist parties. Nevertheless, the country remains divided beyond the secular modern and religious traditional culture. The different parties protect their own goals while the military and legislation strive to preserve the secularity, which is now not represented by the majority and yet needed to maintain the proper diplomatic relations with the other countries. People wish to have a freedom of confession and yet they are majorly afraid of the need to reject the advantages provided by the modern life in favor of the religious regulations. The main point of this essay is to observe the balance between the secularity and the religion in the Turkey and evaluate the specific role of the Islam in the Turkish society.

The attempts to unite the social affairs and the religion have a long history. This tradition goes back to the period of the Ottoman Empire, where the Westernization went hand in hand with Islam (Rabasa Xiii). Basically, the tradition prescribed that the religion should be controlled by the state administration (Rabasa 3). The Ottoman Empire has been a caliphate and a center of the Muslim culture in the 20th century (Rabasa 4). Since the 17th century, the power of sultan started declining and the part of his functions were handed to religious leadership, or ulema, thus starting a tradition of the authorities responsibility for religious affairs in particular (Rabasa 3). Until 1920, there was a variety of religious and ethnic minorities in the country. The first parliament included 69 Muslim people and 46 non-Muslims (Rabasa 9). Thus, the majority of power belonged to the Muslims and yet the minorities were to the certain extent protected by the government. The secularization erased or hidden the majority of traditions of the past retaining only the governmental observation of the religion. The autonomous development of the religious groups could be considered as a threat to the secularization and modernization of the state.

The need to create the modern state that would be able to cooperate with the European Union influenced the Turkish government’s attempt to encourage the secularity in the society. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 attempted to make the so-called revolution from above where the new traditions replaced the old customs without the cooperation with the state itself. The elite and military minority transferred their vision of the modern country to the society that adhered to the traditional way of life (Rabasa 32). The process was nearly forceful and somehow hostile to the society, particularly to its religious minorities that thus remained unprotected and, more importantly, sometimes unclassified, as their religious life was closely bound to their common affairs. The new government canceled the caliphate, secularized the schools, the Latin alphabet was accommodated instead of Arab letters, the foreign words were displaced with the national ones, traditional attire became limited and the religious affairs totally controlled. Nevertheless, as the central towns became secularized, the suburban area majorly remained devoted to the old traditions. The Directorate of Religious Affairs could control only the part of the religious life it could track thus leaving a certain part of local organizations without the supervision. Islam continued to develop being partly illegal and partly subordinate to the state (Rabasa 33). Being removed from the sight, the religion started evolving, particularly through the creation of the schools, charity organizations and thus the origination of the pro-Islamic parties and their popularity was predictable. The minorities wished more freedom and self-expression while the anti-western ambitions started growing. At these conditions, the religion could become the needed way of uniting and self-expressing. At the same time, the secularity remained an official course of the government and attempts to develop the religiously-based party or organization were restricted.

In 1946, the multiparty system has been created thus depriving the CHP, a Kemalist pro-secularist party of the monopoly. Moreover, the society required the implementation of more Islam-friendly laws. The new middle class originated and it was majorly represented by the pious people. The DP was the first party that attempted to weaken the secularist order and provide the Islamic freedoms, decentralize the state economy (Rabasa 36). Such activities caused the military intervention and the cancellation of the power. This precedent caused the creation of the National Security Council that protected the secularism. Also, the reforms that allowed more freedoms were prescribed in 1961. From the one side, new religious parties originated, to collapse later, from the other, the state policy provided the access to the Islam for the people thus protecting them from the communistic values (Rabasa 37). Turgut Özal being a prime minister made it possible to both create more religion-friendly laws and the cash inflow, creation of the thematic television. The secular and pious parts of the society started interacting. Necmettin Erbakan started his attempts to create the Islamic party. His attempts failed for multiple times and yet each time created the new organization. Meanwhile, the modernists created AKP that, unlike the strictly religious or secular parties strived to balance between the Muslim values and the modern society. A majority of its dominant figures including Erdogan began their activities in the Islamic organizations like Nakşibendi thus creating a threat of invisible Islamization of the state.

Particularly, some people are afraid of even minimal symbols that can demonstrate the tendency towards the Islamization and see them in the freedoms required by the religious people. For example, the Imam-Hatip Schools are quite popular inside the religious society, and yet there is a controversy whether such schools can be considered as an equal alternative to the secular schools (Rabasa 63). Particularly, can they give an equal right to attempt to study in the university besides the theologic specialty? The Headscarf issue is the other little and yet troublesome issue (Rabasa 6). Earlier it has been recommended to ban the people from the possibility to wear such accessories in the public places, particularly in the official meetings. Nevertheless, the need for the religious teens to enter the educational organizations created an issue whether it is, for example, appropriate for students to wear the headscarf.

The reasons to be afraid of the Muslim traditions are grounded particularly in some tradition connected to the Osman Empire, which is often referenced by Erdogan and his Wife, carelessly or consciously. For example, the statement that the harems are the school of life can trouble people as it was proclaimed by the first lady and at second that it serves an example of female and male prostitution accepted as something traditional. Moreover, cross-dressing and pedophilia was also associated with the traditions of the elder times (‘The New Caliphate Under Erdogan’). And the fear is not abstract. Nowadays, the practice of young marriage when the underage girl is taken as a bride and sometimes is forced to give birth at the young age is seemingly illegal and yet nearly unpunished (Tremblay). The government promises to protect the underage girls from the tradition that is commonly called as the pedophilia by secularists, and yet the practice does not go too far. The president’s wife herself is one among the former young brides and this fact partially also describes the situation. The other case of the indescribable behavior concerns the Ozgecan Aslan case. The woman resisted the attempt of raping, has been stabbed and then beaten to death. The criminal attempted to hide the body in the river Tarsus. The case is that the father and a friend of the dead woman helped him doing it (Davidson). A plenty of women started protesting for the sake of the protection of their own rights. The Twitter campaign included the experience sharing activities where women described the own experience of being threatened and the tag became the third popular tag of the day.

The organizations closely connected to the political majority, AKP, also are majorly connected to the dubious if not criminal activities. The Ensar Foundation has been indirectly accused of putting boys who search for religious studies under the governmental officials. The BirGün Newspapers names as much as 45 boys raped by the teacher in the facilities ruled by Ensar Foundation and Imam Hatip Graduates. The attempts to address the issue through media were represented as the attempts of the leftist parties to undermine the image of the AKP (‘Turkey Islamic Justice’). At the same time, the organization also received the undeclared sums of money from the definite individuals and institutions, ant they remained improvable.

The tension also exists between the pro-Islamic parties. The conflict between the Gulen and AKP parties created a situation when either side winning would create an imbalance of the power inside the system. The issue began with the ideological differences such as cultural versus political Islam implementation and ended up in straight accusation of the corruption from Gulen party (Akyol). The governmental party preferred to accuse Israel as the one who created a provocation, and describe the money as the income from financial cooperation with Iran.

Basically, people consider themselves both Turkish and Muslim and only one-third of them are secular. Nevertheless, more than a half of the society prefers to be modern despite the religiousness (Rabasa 23). Moreover, their adherence to religion is not political: less than 20 percent people would tolerate the implementation of the religious laws. The president is preferred to be modern, secular and Muslim. The tradition of the religiousness in the society, in theory, is healthily separated from the secular affairs thus creating the room for both freedoms of belief and secularity. Theoretically, the AKP is also strictly democratic-Muslim and not pro-Islamist, despite the ambiguous speeches of its main representing people, their organizations of origin and the cautiousness connected to their presumed attempts to desecularize the country.

The leftist parties in Turkey also exist, but their development has undergone the different way. This movement became more or less active only since 1917. The Kemalist regime since its origination canceled the attempts for the USSR to interfere. Presumably, the nationalism and secularism have been more preferred than the socialism. The 1960th made it possible to legally invent the leftist party with an anti-communistic and secular worldview, and it even gained some votes. Nevertheless, there were no historical events that could make people feel sympathetic to the leftist philosophy, and thus, the required popularity was not achieved even within the coalition. The party turned to be ineffective and untrustworthy in the afford reforms, and its slogans resembled the Moscow ideology (Ciddi). The ideas addressed by the leftists did not respond to the needs and beliefs of the society, meanwhile the religious parties of the time addressed the issues that the nation overwhelmed by secularization needed to address in the everyday life. The lack of connection between the parties of the current flow and their followers, disability to secure the trustworthy and socially required program also has been mentioned. At the same time, it is presumed that moderate nationalists from MHP can create the healthy concurrence to the AKP majority, gaining the sympathy of the electorate from both left and right wings (Akyol). Yet, without the powerful and energetic ruler, this party remains an indecent concurrent at the AKP.

Despite the religious orientation of the nation, the majority of people decline the idea of the radical movements. Yet, the society is not totally free from the Salafi ideologies. Presumably, the movement came to Turkey from the Europe (Rabasa 26). In 1980, Cemalettin Kaplan received a political asylum in Germany and organized a group that aimed to create the theocracy in Turkey. His son was the self-proclaimed extremist caliph until the extradition to the Turkey. The current sources of the radicalism in the Turkey are al-Qaeda and Turkish Hezballah, only first of which retains the certain power. The leader of Hezballah has been killed in 2001; the detaining and prevention of the criminal actions by al-Qaeda has been performed for numerous times. Particularly, the equipment similar to the one used during Istanbul bombings in 2003 was found.

The attitude towards the religion is different among the people in the society, which makes the balance between the secular and religious society even more fragile, same as the mood in the society in common. The stable corruption, domestic and external conflicts ended up in Gezi Park Protests in 2013 and the rising discontent in 2014. The ruling party lost 9 percent of votes. The 55 percent expressed the dissatisfaction with the course taken by the government, 67 percent received damages from the crisis (‘Turkish Perceptions Survey’ 5). 47 to 47 percent witnessed the worsening of the economic in the past years. People also majorly predict things to get even worse. The most troublesome issues mentioned by people were economy and unemployment. The third place with much lesser attention was taken by the terrorist danger.

Despite the influence of the ruling party and its presumed adherence to the Islamic values, people are uneager to accept the religion as the basis of their everyday life. Only about 12 percent of the population supports the implementation of the religious law. Nevertheless, 44 percent believe that it should be applied to all people regardless of their religion, even under the consideration that approximately 97 percent people are Muslim. In 90 percent of cases, the woman has a right to decide for herself whether to wear a headscarf or not. To 38 percent people, the conflict between the religion and the society exists (Filiu), approximately the same amount found the conflict between the science and religion. The 50 percent stated the negative influence of the religion in the politics. The majority represented the wish for democracy and freedom prevalent to the religiousness of the ruler.

There is at least one event in the modern history that describes the discontent with the issues of the governing. The protests in Gezi Park began as the local act of protection of the area and ended up as a full-scale conflict of discontent with the ruling power. The thoughtless rebuilding of the center gathered a peaceful protest that, under the condition of provocative and forceful actions of the police, ended up in the gathering of unbelievable amounts of people and activation of media and social groups. There were 235 protests in 67 cities, 4,177 injured according to the medical data (‘Timeline of Gezi Park protests’). The protests continued raising both a number of engaged people and victims. Summary there are 8,000 injured, 8 dead, a plenty of jailed or under the trial or lost their jobs (Letsch). Once again, the government represented the unwillingness to address the people’s opinion regarding the issues that are directly concerned foremost with the social welfare. According to the word of people, finally, they found the way to search for the alternative beyond the two ruling parties.

It can be concluded that the Turkey is a country with a very specific way of social cooperation. The religion is tightly bound in the lives of the people with the secular practices, and, despite the regulations from above, neither the religious nor secular side of the life managing does not prevail. According to the statistics, people want to see their country as the deeply religious society, and yet not the society subordinate to the religious law or the old rites. The political situation in the country remains uneasy as each new government obviously lacks the dialogue with the nation, beginning with the forceful creation of the republic and ending up with the Gezi Park. The parties that strive to give people what they want to achieve the majority of the votes, and yet the trust can be easily destroyed when the promises are not fulfilled. The remnants of the past sometimes are scary, secular or traditional, thus making the people need to consider wisely. The balance between the modernity and religiousness is yet to be found.

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