A Critical Evaluation of How Muslims Living in Britain Can be Both British and Muslim - Essay Example

?A Critical Evaluation of How Muslims Living in Britain Can be Both British and Muslim Introduction Defining ‘British Muslim’ seems quite easy on thesurface. But in reality, defining being both a British and a Muslim is very difficult. It involves a long history of political, social, cultural, and economic struggle. Issues of identity in Britain have largely centred on the concept of ‘otherness’. Muslims were considered ‘aliens’ in the 1950s and 1960s. The term ‘alien’ means otherness, and also means difference, threat, and inequality (Ahmad and Sardar, 2012: 2). Towards the latter part of the 20th century, cultural difference became very popular and otherness became the latest thing. Difference is no longer intimidating; and otherness today is valued for its commercial aspect, the exoticism and delight it could provide. Still, identity has been one of the most important concerns for Muslims living in Britain. Contrary to earlier thoughts on identity, which view it in quite permanent terms, the present belief is changeable and continuously influenced by the evolving environment. This essay critically evaluates how Muslims living in Britain can be both British and Muslim. This essay analyses the historical events, social and political aspects, and cultural factors that contributed to the creation of a distinctive Muslim identity. The different features of identity class, ethnicity and religion are believed to be subjected to historical dynamics, and it is viewed as being continuously reinterpreted and recreated according to external and internal factors. The diverse and worldly characteristic of British society is believed to create various opposing identities. A large number of Muslims living in Britain have had to harmonise their religious and ethnic features at the individual and societal levels. All have been made difficult by drastic cultural and social transformation in the latter part of the 20th century, forcing them to adjust and compromise (Norcliffe, 2004). As the impact of the cultural and societal norms from which they came from on behaviour and beliefs has disappeared with the appearance of a bigger population of Muslims born and educated in Britain, they have become more and more integrated into the British society. Being British and Muslim A national narrative that includes Islamic history would allow Muslims, especially younger generations of Britain-born Muslims, to understand how much of their own traditions are an important aspect of British traditions. This would help present and future generations gain a strong identity as British Muslims. However, there is a much larger benefit to be gained from Britain’s acceptance of its Islamic influences and the acceptance by British Muslims that British traditions are an important aspect of Islamic culture. Diasporas have historically influenced Islamic societies. Even the Prophet Muhammad moved from his homeland; and the community he formed in Medina were shaped by a diaspora (Ahmed, 2012). The historical Islamic culture was formed not by Arabs but by groups from Africa, the India, and central Asia. The Abbasid caliphate, widely viewed as the high point of Islamic learning and wisdom, was the product of a diaspora. The autonomous Muslim states that were built in the 20th century, like Malaysia and Pakistan, were usually formed in Britain by a diaspora (Gould, 2011). British Muslims can take advantage of this history to change Islam, as well as Muslim societies across the globe. The British Muslim scholars consider Britain as a perfect site of change. The study of Waqar Ahmad shows that British Muslim scholars have a dream of a democratic and diverse Islam. There are major internal changes that reveal “the fruition of a tangible Muslim consciousness among Muslim communities” (Ahmad and Sardar, 2012: 8). Muslims adapt to socially created and faith-oriented identities, and carefully choose how they define themselves. They made use of British history to defend their status like on Islamic schools, they formed their public representation, and they organised themselves to make sure their thoughts are heard in the political sector (Fetzer and Soper, 2004). The identities of Muslims are not submissive or stagnant, but “contain may social layers that are independent of scriptural texts” (Ahmad and Sardar, 2012: 8). All over Britain, Muslims are taking part in political activities, taking part in industries, showing their dedication to equality and promoting anti-discrimination campaigns. All these require a thorough understanding of the definition and identity of a British Muslim, and an effort to find out a wider significance of Islam. Ali and Gilliat-Ray, in their research on Muslim clerics, gives more illustrations of how Islam is being recreated. Muslim clerics all over Britian offer religious services in universities, hospitals, and other organisations. This is a new vocation and a new trend, “a new and important category of social actor in British public life” (Ahmd and Sardar, 2012: 8). Ali and Gilliat Ray argue (Ahmad and Sardar, 2012: 8): The Ministry of Justice/Prison Service is now probably the largest single employer of Muslim religious professionals in Britain. Over 200 Muslim chaplains work in British prisons on either a full-time or a sessional basis, and within this figure there are 12 women, mainly serving in all-female establishments. Similarly, there has been a substantial increase in the number of Muslim chaplains in the National Health Service (NHS), and the emergence of these opportunities has provided a further avenue for women to take up professional religious roles in public institutions. The authors offer an interesting illustration of how this new religious thought among Muslim clerics is resulting in a reinterpretation of Islamic principles. Chaplains are frequently faced with circumstances that oblige them to reflect and behave in new ways. For instance, they often have to interact with women (Gilliat-Ray, 2010). However, according to Ali and Gilliat-Ray, majority of Islamic law schools, “regard any physical contact between unrelated men and women (even a simple handshake) as sinful, and contrary to the teachings of Islam” (Ahmad and Sardar, 2012: 90). But this taboo can create “particular challenges in the mixed-gender context of a British prison or hospital, where conventional norms of formal greetings are likely to include shaking hands” (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 136), and refusing to engage in the practice can be viewed as “discriminatory and misogynist” (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 136). Thus, identifying British Muslims may appear apparent on the surface. But the term ‘Muslim’ may not consistently be significant to those labeled ‘Muslim’. Similarly, ‘Muslim’ as a self-definition can be essentially important at various times in a person’s life (Hopkins, 2009: 99): The stereotype of Muslims assuming an identity that is religious above all else and that is incompatible with the secularised, modern public sphere belies the highly variable ways in which Muslims practice and conceive of relationships between religion and politics and between cultural difference and membership in the public. Therefore, identities of Muslims in Britain are being created against an idea of negative stereotypes about Muslims. It is growing as an identity of ‘alienation’ in a culture of struggle and against dominant British identity. Historical Injustices against Muslims and the Making of Muslim Identity Muslims, until the 1980s, were largely classified within ethnic groups and as an issue in race relations discourse. The Muslim identity was regarded of less value. Ethnic identities Arab, Pakistani, Asian which established nationality, racial affiliation, and language rather than religion were viewed in society as the major markers of group and individual diversity (Malik, 2004). However, structural developments in the political arena of Britain in the 1980s had an important effect on race relations debate and formed a perspective where in Muslim identity became important. The New Right, supporting a mainly culturally and discriminatory policy, began a fierce attack on the independence of local government, weakening the authority of ethnic minority leaders that had become influential in local politics (Malik, 2004). The movement against multiculturalism and its substitution by a pluralism where in autonomy prevented cultural ‘contamination’ and promoted cultural uniqueness forced several ethnic groups to draw upon religion in their pursit of a solution to social injustices. This New Right movement had strengthened a Muslim consciousness which attacked racial affiliation as a kind of central recognition and stressed religious and cultural history (Sinno, 2009). Forced to think that they do not belong, numerous British Muslims, particularly the youth, discovered a useful reference and another type of identity in religion. There was a purposeful attempt to shift from national and ethnic identities towards being recognised mainly as Muslims. The construction of this identity emerged in reaction to global and local concerns where in Islam was considered to be the focal point, as well as to growing anti-Muslim attitude in British society expressed in hatred and injustices nationally. There were three major historical occurences that shaped Muslim identity, namely, the 1857 uprising, the establishment of the schools of Deoband and Bareilly, and the chaos of Partition. These occurrences were characterised by historical injustices against Muslims, but they also formed early Muslim identity. For the British and the Muslims of northern India, the 1857 episodes were a tragedy. The violent British repression of the uprising, with its demolition of Delhi as the heart of Muslim community, and the slaughter and expulsion of Muslim, finally pushed Muslim intellectuals to recognise not simply that the British were settling in India, but also that they planned to seize power over the land (Hardy, 1972). British historians are usually unable to understand how slight British hegemony had influenced the thoughts and sentiments of Muslims in India prior to 1857. Aware that there was intense disagreement over whether the British must meddle with Indian religious and cultural traditions or whether they must bring in English learning, British historians generally fail to see how British culture was viewed by Indians and especially by Muslims prior to 1857. Those who drank wine and ate pork, who displayed their women, designers of clumsy buildings, worship their wealth and scornful of things they cannot understand, the British inserted vulgarity and conceit, immoral tolerance and disgusting practices to their obvious unfaithfulness (Hasan, 1997). Hence, it is not unexpected that prior to 1857 Muslims in India were more interested in cleansing their own religion than in copying or observing a repulsive culture. Within the British point of view, the impact of 1857 was to raise their awareness about Muslims and to instill in them a shared political identity which the British believes Muslims do not have (Metcalf, 2006). For many British scholars in 1857 a Muslim represented a mutineer. The usual British outlook was recently explained by Dr. Metcalf (2006) (Hardy, 1972: 62): The first sparks of disaffection it was generally agreed, were kindled among the Hindu sepoys who feared an attack upon their caste. But the Muslims then fanned the flames of discontent and placed themselves at the head of the movement, for they saw in these religious grievances the stepping stone to political power. In the British view it was Muslim intrigue and Muslim leadership that converted a sepoy mutiny into a political conspiracy, aimed at the extinction of the British Raj. However, it was Sir William Muir who contributed much to the popularity of the stereotype of the Muslim as always carrying a Qur’an in one hand and a weapon in the other (Hardy, 1972: 62). Muslims in India were disheartened after the unsuccessful 1857 uprising. Muslims felt defeated and secluded. British intellectuals continuously attacked Islamic traditions as incompatible to the modern period (Ahmed, 2012). These fierce criticisms infuriated and terrified Indian Muslims. Indian Muslim intellectuals, in reaction to these criticisms, stepped in to defend their faith (Ahmed, 2012). This pushed them to explore the history of Islam. In response to Western insult they created their defence, supported by historical realities, that Europe’s growth is indebted to the works of Muslim intellectuals. The contributions of Muslims to science, literature, and art, hence strengthened human culture. Visions of the exploits of the Seljuks, the greatness of the Moors of Spain, and the triumphs of the Abbasids, brought back their pride. However, while praising the history of Islam, they overlooked the history of Mughal India and Delhi Sultanate (Hasan, 1997). For them, the remote past was more appealing than the history that was originally passed on to them. According to Spielvogel (2011), the nationalist historians of India recreated the grandeur of Muslim India, and its fight against British hegemony. It was in the field of education that concepts of Indian identity and constructions of Muslim identity were most productively cultivated by Indian scholars. After ‘the Despatch on General Education in India’ in 1854, continuous attempts were initiated to link colleges with the approach of London University (Gould, 2011: 53). Colonial discourse since the 1860s focused on the potential scale of ‘anglicisation’ and the aspiration to endorse colonially constructed ideas of ‘oriental’ education. For Islamic societies, the madrasa institution grew in the latter part of the 19th century, and the Deobandi and Barelvi schools in Saharanpur and Bareilly paved the way from the latter part of the 1860s and kept on defining in general terms various perspectives of Islamic learning in colonial India (Gould, 2011, p. 53). Numerous examples of the dual indigenisation process and determination of the Indian Muslims during this period can be mentioned. Numerous Muslim groups began looking for their native origins. Several of them successfully found their lineage in the communities of Mahabharat and Ramayan (Gould, 2011). The increasing fame of the Bareilly school in contrast with the Deoband school suggested a similar pattern. Meanwhile, the Partition of India resulted in the movement of a massive population of Muslims from India to Pakistan, Hindus from Pakistan to India, and the extermination of a huge number of people (Hasan, 1997). The partition widened the gap in India between those who call themselves as Muslim and Hindu. In the view of Pakistan, partition resolved hardly any of the issues of Muslims identity in the area. In the view of India, partition has made the issue of Muslim identity in the area an issue of external affairs, although it mostly remains an issue concerning the character of India’s identity (Hasan, 1997). The partition was not a smooth separation. Hindus and Muslims had lived interrelated, even though not constantly harmonious, lives. In essence, the partition was a painful event that seized the wealth, interests, and lives of millions of people. The agony of partition was worsened by India’s economic programmes and violence againsts Hindus in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2012). But this event only strengthened the determination of Muslim communities to rediscover their roots and establish their identities. Social and Political Aspects Studies show that in present-day Britain, the extent of political participation of Muslims in the dominant political arena has grown. Their participation has been driven by the idea that the principles of justice and equality, which are very much respected in Islam, could be encouraged by means of democratic policies. For a long time, it was culture and ethnicity, instead of religion, that ruled the manner in which Muslims took part in the public arena (Seddon, Hussain, and Malik, 2002). As interests broadened in the recent decade, Muslims took part more widely in the public arena but still based on individual community groups, whose formation was sometimes promoted by the government as part of the aim to display the growing plural, multicultural British society. By the latter part of the 1980, a dynamic participation in the local political arena was emerging as younger generations of Muslims understood that absence of involvement was harmful to Muslim wellbeing (Abbas, 2005). Existing data show that British Muslims have not taken part in elections based on religious affiliations alone. Consecutive election outcomes revealed that Muslims did not only choose Muslim nominees. Since 1974, most British Muslims have endorsed the Labour Party. However, wealthier Muslims have turned their support for the Conservatives (Ansari, 2002). The value placed on family life, home rights, and self-employment by older Muslims is reflected on the Conservative Party’s ideology. Still, the involvement of British Muslim in national politics has increased gradually since the 1970s (Malik, 2004). A large number of Muslims have realised that they have to take part in broader institutions to defend their rights. Yet, Muslim policymakers have not been a uniform faction as regards ideology, countries of origin, and approach towards ‘Muslim’ claims. They know that they have been voted for to stand for all their constituents (Ansari, 2002). Even though numerous British Muslims have shown their dedication to the ideologies of pluralist, democratic society, other British Muslims have endorsed ‘withdrawal into cultural ghettos’, and there are those promoting ‘mass conversion to Islam’ (Ansari, 2002: 20). Some have even proposed integrating the Islamic legal doctrine –Sharia- into the legal paradigm for Muslims in Britain. During the 1990s, the Muslim Parliament proposed the establishment of an independent political structure in equal footing with the mainstream political system. However, the Muslim Parliament, viewed unreasonably nationalist and extremist by numerous Muslims, only gained approval from a very few British Muslims (Moore, 2010). Even so, most Muslim organisations in Britain believe that Muslims should take part in British politics and consider the presence of Muslim policymakers an encouraging accomplishment in their quest for British and Muslim identities. Since 1945, an enlarging population of Muslims in Britain have shifted from seeing themselves as short-term migrants to long-term residents. British Muslims have tried to adapt to and embrace current practices and traditions, trying and dealing with the imagined and real principles and necessities of British society, and the traditions and demands of Muslims (Sinno, 2009). The reality that, in several regards, British and Muslim principles and identities have been at odds, or have been viewed to be at odds has made the challenges confronting Muslims in Britain more complicated. Opportunities for Muslims in Britain have been limited due to their low level of education, poor skills, and low social standing (Kepel, 1997). They have been blamed for destroying communities. In numerous instances, British Muslims are viewed as ‘outsiders’ and ‘second-class’ citizens (Ansari, 2002: 17). Discrimination against Muslims in Britain tended to focus on racial issues. Together with other ethnic communities, Muslims suffered discrimination in public life, welfare and social services, employment, education, and housing. There are current reports that Muslims have been experiencing religious discrimination as well (Atay, 2012). The extent and prevalence of such discrimination was explained by the Home Office paper, ‘Religious Discrimination in England and Wales’ (2001), which emphasised the media, employment, and education as being the domains where in it was most probable to take place (Ansari, 2002: 25). The document stressed the unjust experiences of Muslims in terms of housing, and mentioned instances when planning authorisation was rejected for burial locations, schools, and mosques. In terms of employment, discrimination was revealed in selection and recruitment procedures, disrespect for religious practices, and dress codes (Ansari, 2002). More generally, violence against Muslims has ranged from maltreatment and discrimination to physical hostility. Cultural hindrances in social and health services can also marginalise Muslims and other ethnic communities. Cases of discrimination show that neither social nor health services agencies sufficiently fulfil the demands of Muslims in Britain (Ameli and Merali, 2006). Hence, the general condition of British Muslims is still depressing: prevalent anti-Muslim sentiments, discrimination, hostility, and social exclusion still exist. A large number of British Muslims harbor hatred and anguish, and it is not unexpected that many of them are still excluded from the British society. European Muslim Network Muslim organisations have become more influential in the political domain since the latter part of the 1980s. Institutions and government tried to endorse cultural identities through resource allocation and policy, promoting the building of networks on ethnic terms (Fetzer and Soper, 2004). With the emergence of the New Right the financial support for multicultural programmes was reduced, which motivated Muslim networks to step up. By the latter part of the 1980s, a number of Muslim organisations had identified the need for national cooperation on matters like education and food (Sinno, 2009). The British institution pressured Muslim communities to form a consolidated Muslim network which could represent their objectives and needs. The formation of the Council of Imams and Mosques (COIM) and Council of Mosques in the UK in the 1980s were examples of such effort (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 109). The Rushdie affair reinforced attempts to consolidate or unify British Muslims. The discouraging outcome of this event revealed to the Muslims that, without harmony, it is impossible to gain support or influential voice in the economic and political communities (Abbas, 2005). In order to realise this, they had to form a national alliance based on shared concerns. Organisational solidarity among British Muslims may not be attained in the 1990s. Throughout the Gulf War, Muslim networks were not able to mobilise and coordinate successfully in their claim for an end to what they viewed as the hostility of the Western-ruled coalition against Muslims. The greater importance they give to the Muslim community over national welfare went against the belief of most British people, for several of whom this seemed as good as treason (Abbas, 2005). A number of Muslim groups voiced out opinions which merely created public insights that weakened community relationships. According to Marechal (2003), British Muslims tried to come together, from time to time, to fight challenges to their profoundly embraced principles, but this solidarity was weak and, when the challenges declined, unity disappeared. Attempts to form a national organisation which was not directly associated with any specific ideology, which operated within British society, and which the State of Britain would be willing to recognise, regained energy by the 1990s. In May 1996, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was built. Yousuf Bhailok, the Secretary General of the MCB, later on proclaimed that it was “the largest umbrella organisation of Muslims” (Abbas, 2005: 94). Yet, it did not proclaim to be the only representative of the entire British Muslim population or genuine Islam, even though it did include an array of ethnic communities. The demands of British Muslims have been inadequately addressed and badly financed. According to the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR) (Ansari, 2002: 21): “the building and maintaining of mosques, Islamic schools, Muslim community centres and facilities and the wide range of Muslim institutions that help to cater for British Muslim needs, preserve Muslim identities and keep the Muslim community together, are essentially an achievement of Muslims themselves with little support from mainstream funding sources”. The Cultural Difference In the latter part of the 1990s, an increase in Britain’s unlawful immigrants alongside continuous social inequalities and anxieties over linguistic and cultural disintegration led to heightened discomfort about the presence of multiculturalism in the country (Atay, 2012). A traditional community in Britain, Muslims kept on experiencing severe economic immobility, poor health, and unemployment, especially among women. Their unique cultural norms and religious principles had been in conflict with the modern liberal principles upon which the British society is founded on (Hopkins, 2009). A specific feature of the Muslim community that was heavily criticised was their obvious failure or reluctance to assimilate into British society. Their Islamic values and traditions were viewed as mismatched with the liberal democracy of Britain, particularly, their treatment of women and beliefs about sexuality. Such attitudes were intensified by the alleged ‘veil row’- a widely known public discussion over the suitability of Muslim women putting on the veil in the contemporary period (Julios, 2008: 42). The veil was eventually viewed as tantamount to separatist ideology. Earlier surveys had already demonstrated how Muslims considered both women’s role and putting on Islamic dress as the two most important markers of social and cultural difference between the liberal ideology of Britain and the Islamic ideology (Norcliffe, 2004). Muslims living in Britain have carried their religious distinctiveness to an unfamiliar cultural and social environment, which has created an array of difficulties for them. Britain-born Muslims have become heirs to the challenge of defending their own status and space in the British society. They were compelled to put their best efforts to preserve their religious traditions, because the secular British society has been inclined to make it more and more unimportant (Hopkins, 2009). However, the more that Islamic populations have become established in Britain, the more Muslims have tried to create systems that would allow them to live in harmony with their own knowledge of Islamic traditions. According to Ahmad and Sardar (2012), public space has been ‘expanded’ to accommodate Islam, and structures are now present in Britain allowing Islamic traditions to be performed in varied ways. Conclusions The Muslim community is global in nature. Islamic culture is not confined to a particular place. Muslims in Britain have to form their own distinctive British Muslim individualities and traditions that are appropriate for them in their British home. On the other hand, when looking at the British society, it is vital to bear in mind that it is multicultural in nature and that the British state is willing to raise equality for its people irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliations. Interaction and cooperation through concrete activities that resolve issues and forge a more unified nation is the key towards better appreciation of diverse traditions, cultural norms, and knowledge. Through such activities, the integration of British Muslims into the mainstream British society will be greater. References Abbas, T. (2005) Muslim Britain: communities under pressure. London , Zed Books. Ahmad, W. & Sardar, Z. (2012). Muslims in Britain: Making Social and Political Space. UK, Routledge. Ahmed, A. (2012). Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin. UK, Routledge. Ameli, S. R., & Merali, A. (2006). 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