The Existence of Mental States - Case Study Example

Mental s I would contend that the patient has mental s and contest the view that an organic brain is necessary for the existence of mental states and challenge the view that the absence of an organic brain necessarily implies the absence of a non-material soul. Mental States I would contend that the patient has mental states. On this view, I would back the position taken by Doctor 2. I base my argument on two main points. First, I dispute the argument that an organic brain is necessary for the existence of mental states. Secondly, I challenge the view that the absence of an organic brain necessarily implies the absence of a non-material soul. The patient lacks an organic brain but has a computer in its place. From the observations of the doctors and from my own assessment of the patient, I would quickly argue that the computer fulfills all the roles that an organic brain could. I would like to think of an organic brain in terms of some physical matter that enables certain physical functions in the body. It does not bear any other qualities other than the physical or biological processes. Therefore, if something else that can function in precisely the same way were replaced in the human skull, then I would expect it to fulfill the roles played by the organic human brain. The replacement would operate just the same way as any other organ transplant functions or some metals inserted into accident victims to perform tasks that had been performed by missing or damaged body parts. Therefore, I would expect the computer to facilitate the existence of mental states in the patient just the same way as the organic human brain does. At this point, I would adopt the position that it is difficult to tell whether somebody has mental states. This matter cannot be determined with absolute certainty. However, I still hold onto the view that determining mental states remains a complex issue and could only be subject to matters of observation. The patient has shown some remarkable ability to act in a normal way and good memory. She also behaves in a manner that is logical and determinate. It is important to consider some of the factors that determine the existence of a soul outside the condition of an organic brain. This brings into perspective the question of the soul and body. I hold the view that the mind and body are not entirely connected. The mind is independent of the body. The soul relates to the body through some kind of a complex relationship that may not necessarily relate to the organic brain. On this note, it becomes necessary to inquire into the relationship between the immaterial soul and the body. Such an inquiry could also involve a study into the relationship between the mind and the body. A non-material soul could exist even in the absence of the non-organic brain. This is because there is no absolute evidence that links the non-material essences of existence to the material. The relationship could be more complex than the presumed correspondence between the mind and the body. On this matter, it becomes necessary to investigate the precise relationship between the mind and the body from the dimension of their points of contact. The organic brain does not have any other qualities other than the material. It lacks any special qualities that could make it have some kind of exclusive connections to the non-material soul. The mind and the body differ significantly. The body, like Descartes argues, is the corporeal, three-dimensional substance that feels. In essence, the body is divisible. On the other hand, the mind is the thinking and indivisible element. Both the mind and the body are finite substances, and can exist on their own. Although the mind and body are distinct entities, the two have some kind of connection. I support Descartes arguments that the mind and the body have a causal interaction that operates both ways. Occurrences on the mental plane usually trigger occurrences in the physical realm. In the same manner, occurrences in the physical state have the capacity of causing occurrences in the mental realm. Although it is not precisely clear the point at which they interact, the connections between the world of experiences and the mental space illustrate the existence of this kind of connection. Descartes identified some specific part of the brain, which, according to him, enabled the interaction between the mind and the body. The computer in the patient’s skull could easily replicate the functions of the organic brain. The fact that the patient is able to act in perfectly normal circumstances is a clear indication that the computer in her head is able to accomplish the tasks normally assigned to the organic brain. If the computer can accomplish some of the observable tasks such as socialization, memory, and interpersonal communication, as it is evidenced in the interaction between my friend and me, and my friend and the doctors, why should it not accomplish any other task? It is only logical to expect the computer to accomplish the other tasks including the facilitation of links between the material world and the non-material world. I would argue that some element of harmony that unites the processes of the mind, the body, and the soul governs human actions. Any kind of disconnection or disruption in the chain of harmony between all or any of the connections would inevitably result in abnormal processes. Irrational states of mind are illustrations of the effect of disharmonious connections between these components of a human being. The fact that the patient acts normally shows that all the three components are intact. This gives proof of the existence of mental states. The computer in my friend’s head has not affected her status as a human being. She does not seem to act like a robot. If she can feel and appreciate my company including expressing her wishes to go home, then it follows that she is acting in the same way any human being can act. A computer cannot express wishes because it is a machine. It also cannot appreciate or recognize company. This implies that forces, which are larger and more complex than the organic brain, control most of the issues relating to mental states. My friend in hospital is able to behave in the same way that a normal human being acts. Therefore, we can argue that she is also capable of having mental states. She cannot have the capacity to feel and express wishes and then lack the capacity to have mental states. From the state of my friend in the hospital, I hold the view that the human body acts as a whole and that all its processes are connected. A range of factors that are not necessarily linked to the brain alone determines the existence of mental states. If mental status is controlled exclusively by the non-material soul, then I adopt the position that the soul does not depend on any particular part of the body for it to function. The capacity of the soul to coordinate mental states is therefore tied to something that is more complex and possibly beyond the comprehension of an average human. Dr 3 acknowledges the fact that the computer in my friend’s skull works in a perfect condition. However, he appears to support the idea adopted by Dr 1 regarding the impossibility of my friend to have any mental states because she has a non-organic computer instead of a brain. I find this position contradictory. If a human being acts in a perfect condition, then there should be no limitations with regard to mental states. One can only act in a normal position or abnormal position. Since I have not detected any limitations in the mental functions of my friend in the hospital, I do not think that she is lacking in any other qualities that are assigned to humans. One other important thing is that the doctors have noticed that they are the only ones aware of something peculiar in the skull of the patient. They say that she behaved normally before and after the accident. This supports the view that that the computer in my friend’s head has not transformed any aspect of her being. She is a perfectly normal human with the capabilities of having mental states. The ability for humans to engage in discourses beyond the material things to matters of value is evidence of the existence of the souls and immaterial minds. Human perceptions extend beyond instinct and reflexes, which are more synonymous with animal actions. Humans are more developed in the sense that they can interpret, analyze, reflect, and engage in other aspects of the mind. They can also connect with metaphysical processes. This provides evidence of the presence of the soul and mental processes. I would adopt Descartes distinction of the mind and the body in my attempt to determine the nature of the patient concerning the capacity to have mental states. The mental states are created from the interaction between the mind and the non-material world but the two are distinct (Pollitt, 2012). Descartes argued that the mind is a corporeal substance (Rozemond, 2002). According to him, only the mind could coordinate the processes of consciousness. As a result it is possible to argue that my friend had her intelligence supplied by the computer but could still have her mind and non-material soul to control the processes of consciousness. This state of consciousness would then transform into the mental states. Up to this point, I hold the view that my friend in the ward is capable of demonstrating a high capacity of mental states and that she has a non-material soul. However, it is not possible to establish the point of connection between the soul and the body. Doctor 1’s argument is governed by functionalism theory. Functionalism theory holds that mental states have a causal relationship with other mental states, behavioral outputs, and various types of sensory inputs. Doctor 1 believes that the patient lacks mental states because she does not have a non-material soul. Doctor 2’s argument is guided by the theory of behaviorism. The theory insists that human character should be analyzed from observable traits, and not with the unobservable matters that occur within the mental realm (Staats, 1996). Doctor 2 is more interested in the outward behavior of the patient and does not seem necessarily affected by the internal connections. On the other hand, the argument by Doctor 3 is based on identity theory. This theory holds that some types of mental states can be associated with certain kinds of brain types. Identity theory supports the view that brain type identity corresponds to certain mental orientations. The doctor observes that lack of any brain type in the patient implies lack of mental states. References Pollitt, K. (2012). The Mind/Body Problem. New York: Seren Books. Rozemond, M. (2002). Descartess Dualism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Staats, W., W. (1996). Behavior and Personality: Psychological Behaviorism. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1996 Read More