We Are What We Think - Essay Example

We are what we think The Psychology of World Views: It is rightly said that the eyes are the windows to the world and it is a well know fact that each individual’s view is unique and different. The words of Byrom (1976/1993, p.1) drives this point further home by stating that – We are what we think. All that we are arises with our thoughts. With our thoughts we make the world! Each and every individual’s world view is comprised of their own set of assumptions of their physical and social environment that directly or indirectly has a great impact on the cognition and behavior of an individual. Therefore defining Worldview has always been a subject of hot controversy in the field of Psychology and research. In lieu of this, certain parameters have been drawn up or outlined by involving ones personality traits, culture, background, cognition, motivation and behavior. Poets and artists have tried to interpret this phenomenon through their works. For example, Marvin Hill an artist, in one of his wood block prints has expressed, “The eye forms the world/ the world forms the eye.” There is certainly great dearth in the indepth theoretical formulation of what comprises a “world view. As Anaı¨s Nin observes, “We don’t see things as they are, we see them as we are.” This is because our behavior patterns and human cognition are powerfully impacted by our deep assumptions and beliefs regarding life and reality. “World View” is derived from the German equivalent “Weltanschauung” which means a view or perspective of the universe or world ““used to describe one’s total outlook on life, society and its institutions” (Wolman, 1973, p. 406). “A set of inter-related assumptions about the nature of the world, is called a worldview” (Overton, 1991, p. 269). Many researchers like James Myers (1990) Kahoe (1987) and many others in their findings on world view placed great importance on epistemology. Royce (1964) considered epistemology to be the crucial defining aspect of different worldviews. The other school of thought gives more importance to spiritual versus material ontology in their discussion of world views. According to many of them, Differences in ontology result in different approaches to life and imply different paths in counseling and therapy (Bergin, 1980a, 1980b; Ellis, 1980; Goldfried & Newman, 1986, pp. 47–49; P. S. Richards & Bergin, 1997; Walls, 1980) World view is therefore based how individuals approach life and reality which in turn is influenced by their own beliefs, customs, religion, culture, physical and social background, differences in cognition and values and their affect on behavior and attitudes. All these dimensions of human nature can be viewed as either good, evil, a combination of both good and evil or could be considered as morally neutral. Meditation: Stress has become the order of the day and has become part and parcel of our lives. In fact the number 1 killer today is stress. Therefore, the fact remains- what are we dong about it? The answer to this question is simple – Meditation. In ancient times, meditation used to be only for sages and monks, but in today’s world, it seems to be a sort of a life line running through our lives helping to relieve us from the harsh rigors of our day – to – day life. Meditation is by no means a laughing matter. It involves complex mental processes that bring about changes in our hormones, autonomic activity, our perceptions and even our cognition. Meditation is also widely used in a variety of psychological, physical and mental disorders. However, our vision or understanding of the rudiments of the biological mechanisms, involving the various aspects of the brain in co-relation to meditative experiences is somewhat limited. However, current literature updates us by giving us a clearer picture in explaining about the integrating neurotransmitter systems and the latest advancements made in brain imaging techniques involving the complex process of meditation. One of the key areas of research today is meditation because it opens out a fascinating window that delves into our mental states and brings to the surface our emotional, cognitive and psychological experiences involving human consciousness. By working across the Metaphysical divide in collaboration with the State and Spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, Neuroscientists of the University of Wisconsin are striving to find significant answers to the many questions that face us. The new W.M Keck Laboratory for Functional Brain Imaging and Behavior costing $ 10 Million with the Richard Davidson’s team made use of EEG to compare the different activities of the brain using beginner volunteers and well accomplished Buddhist practioners while they meditated on “unconditional compassion”. The experiment resulted in the experienced practioners showing a high amplitude of gamma waves (usually associated with learning, attention and conscious perception) primarily in the left prefrontal cortex (usually associated with inhibition of anxiety or fear, positive emotions and anti- depressant activity). Those well experienced practioners who were not meditating too, showed increased gamma wave activity proving that meditation is capable of causing permanent change to all brain activity. In yet another study carried out by Davidson who had teamed up with the founder of a Stress reduction Clinic, Jon Kabat – Zinn, found that highly depressed patients reported more positive impacts and reduced levels of anxiety after meditation, showing a shift occurring in the left pre-frontal cortex involved with brain activity. Therefore, there is no doubt that Neurostimulation could be used in patients suffering from deep depression for positive outcomes. The Two Approaches to Religion: There are two unique and distinctive approaches towards religion. The first approach is Neuro theology and the second is religiobotany. Though both these potential approaches run alongside each other, yet they have not had the good fortune to meet. The neurotheological approach explores how the activities of the brain produce different kinds of religious experiences, while the religiobotany approach investigates the part played by entheogenic plants together with their psychoactive derivatives during any religious experience. Both these approaches offer enlightening perspectives that involve mystical studies. In case they do marry, they would lay at rest the arguments put forth by researchers in the 20th century (Roberts & Hruby, 1997) who were of the opinion that “mystical experiences are not a peripheral aspect of human religiousness, but its very taproot.” In a book titled “Why God Won’t Go Away” written by the authors Andrew Newberg, professor of religion and medicine at the University of Pennsylvania and the late Eugene D’ Aquili, professor in the Department of Psychiatry who is also an authority on mystical experiences together with freelance journalist and writer Vince Rause suggest an approach involving both the brain as well as botany. In a review of this book by Thomas B. Roberts who referred to Chapter 6 called “Mysticism: The Biology of Transcendence,” and applied some of these neurological insights to various mystical experiences, says that there are two areas in our brain which are of significant importance because it provides us with our spatial senses. The left cerebral hemisphere which is the area of orientation association helps to mediate our sense of self, the location of our ego and our body. The right hemispheres orientation association area helps to locate us in this world that is outside of ourselves and which is not a part of us. Based on whether these particular areas are either normal, quiescent or hyper-aroused, our perceptions would differ about ourselves and its boundaries. In a research study that was conducted, it was found that there existed “biological reality” behind the experience. Though many critics passed it off as fake, recent research has shown that when people speak in tongues, there are significant changes that take place within the brain. In 2006 a team from the University of Pennsylvania headed by Andrew B. Newberg, a professor of radiology, psychiatry and religious studies, conducted a research and found that the frontal lobe area of the brain, that is generally associated with language skills and voluntary control of the body retracts into low gear whenever individuals engage themselves in ecstatic prayer. Explaining this phenomenon, Newberg states, "Our findings are very consistent with what people say they are feeling and they are not in charge of what is happening and are experiencing an intense sense of themselves in relation to God." (Andrew B. Newberg, 2006) Examining the Liar’s Paradox in his book “Why God Won’t go Away”, Newberg and Waldman assert that “Truth cannot be entirely known, for no matter how much evidence you collect, your knowledge will always be incomplete.” (Newberg and Waldman, 2001) They are of the opinion that individual reality is essentially guided by an amalgamation of various sensory perceptions which are again a prey to other influences and beliefs that are distorted. In another book he co- authored titled “Why We Believe What We Believe”, Newberg enumerates on the biology behind this belief. In a study conducted using five women from the same Pentecostal church as subjects, neuro-imaging was used to track the blood flow to the brain while they spoke in tongues and sang a gospel song. The scans found that when the subjects spoke, the frontal lobe showed less blood flow and lower activity than it did during the singing. But in another study conducted by Newberg on Buddhist monks in meditation and Catholic nuns in prayer, scans showed the frontal lobe lit up with more activity -- the exact opposite to those who spoke in tongues. Therefore, Newberg cautions against using the study as proof that God speaks to people through tongues and states that, "It talks about the biological reality of the experience. It does not address whether there is a supernatural reality," he says. "That question is still left open." (USA Today, 2007) GOD AND THE BRAIN In the 21st century an important field of study for neuroscientists is the phenomenon of religious experiences. In this area of study investigations are being carried out from a scientific and evolutionary perspective. According to Boyer (2001) and E.O. Wilson (1998) religion developed as a result of evolutionary process caused by natural selection. A relevant question in the present day is that of the role played by a person’s brain when he or she experiences God. In depth research is being carried out to find out whether religious experiences are similar to or different from non-religious experiences. Another pertinent question is whether the experiences of religion are neurologically similar to other experiences or different in context only. To understand the involvement of the brain in so far as religion is concerned, we have to first understand how the brain functions with regard to experiences of different types. It is a well established fact that the brain is the nerve centre of all human experiences and behavior .Just as there is a specific area in the brain which is devoted to locomotion so also there are specific areas exclusively for thinking and emotions. With the help of brain imaging Neuroscientists propound the theory that emotions play a vital The old school of thought perceived that emotions played no role in our reasoning Process. Haidt (2001) However established a link between emotion and reasoning .Even before a rational input is provided for a decision , emotional inputs acts upon it .Decision based on emotion uses reason for it’s justification .Emotions play a fundamental role in religion. Examining a person’s expression of emotion, one can gauge and measure the source and essence of his religiosity. Theory of Mind: Theory of Mind (TOM) is arguably the defining difference between humans and all other species, and has been thoroughly studied by psychologists during the last 25 years, but is currently receiving serious attention only now. Rebecca Saxe and Simon Brown Cohen, as guest editors, thought the time was ripe for bringing together all the varying divergent views on this subject along with leaders in this field, for discussion. The following editorial is a summation of their personal overviews of the papers received by them. Domain General or Domain Specific: TOM has been tested making use of the “False Belief” task (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer &Perner, 1983) in hundreds of studies, but yet it remains a controversial issue because success depends on using reasoning about other peoples minds. Stone and Gerrans (this issue) are of the view that children have to use general cognitive abilities, including general perceptual and linguistic representation, working memory, and motor representations of their own response. The theory questions whether domain general mechanism has to be clubbed with domain specific mechanism for reasoning of beliefs and desires. The debate about domain specificity centers around normal developing children and children with autism. Success in false belief tasks depends on the ability of children to juggle between two concepts of reality, while at the same time trying to inhibit the compelling incorrect answer. The success ratio between false belief tasks is almost on par with positive results on logically equivalent problems in non –mental false representation. It can be assumed that the understanding is not specific but rather one of understanding representational relationship i.e. being capable of meta-representation, However, Children with autism show clear signs of passing false belief tasks, representing their mental states as attitudes. However, Stone and Gerran have opposing views as they believe that false belief task performance is not dependent on domain general mechanisms for inhibition control or meta-representation. The duo also do not favor an additional domain specific mechanism for belief attribution, instead they engage neuro scientific methods to test the hypothesis that reasoning about other minds depends on distinct neural mechanisms, which is backed by three papers which make use of fMRI to investigate and bring to light the claims made on domain specificity. Targeting this premise, both Stone and Gerran as well as Perner and his colleagues, agree that any mechanism representing beliefs has to specifically meet three criteria. A. A robust and replicable response to stories that do require belief attribution. B. A significantly lower response that closely matched control stories that only require representing non-mental representations. C. No difference among non-mental stories that do or do not demand meta- representation. Evidence supplied by Perner and colleagues (this issue) point to one area in the brain which reportedly meets these criteria: This area is the right tempero – parietal junction (RTPJ). This part of the brain is activated upon reading simple stories about beliefs but not for physical representations like maps or photographs, or even stories about maps and signs. This reveals that RTPJ reflects a specialized domain specific mechanism for belief reasoning. On the other hand, Perner and colleagues found that both mental and non mental representational tasks could be performed by the left TPJ. Saxe and colleagues assert that reasoning about beliefs is dependent on both domain specific and domain general mechanisms, housed in different regions of the brain and also that belief reasoning stimulates activity in domain general mechanism. False photographs also elicit the same response. But there are additional regions of the brain used only for belief reasoning. Saxe and colleagues conclude that domain specific response was observed in the right TPJ. (Saxe, R., Kanwisher, N., 2003)They also found that human adults were quicker to respond to beliefs by using reasoning. These findings reinforce traditional research in evolutionary psychology. According to Cosmides and Tooby, (1997) ‘reasoning problems can be solved more accurately and speedily if presented in terms of social obligations rather than abstract terms. Pemer and colleagues using fMRI support the theory that though brain regions are psychological, they also have a functional profile. To unravel the mystery, whether one cognitive function such as language is bound to another e.g. belief attribution, social scientists use other methods too. The Role of Language in TOM: Beliefs and desires, being abstract entities of the mind cannot be directly observed nor is there a co- relation between mental states and behaviour. One way to learn about them is to listen to how other people talk about the mind. Verbal communication is an important aspect of developing TOM. Dunn and colleagues stress on language ability for success in false belief tasks, at any age as well as in healthy children and those with autism and other developmental disabilities. Language a “print out’ of the human mind enables us to read thoughts, feelings, intentions etc. A developing child searches for a speaker’s intention by following his gaze when told a new word, making TOM facilitate language acquisition (Baron-Cohen, Baldwin& Crowson 1997; Bloom, 2000). TOM development is considerably much slower if language input is reduced as in the case of deaf children, (Peterson & Siegal 1999). This delay is not due to language demands (Figueras-Costa &Harris, 2001) but is also dependent on the mother’s proficiency in sign language especially in her use of mental state words (Moeller & Schick 2006). Non – verbal false belief tasks are impacted by the age at which learning began, not the number of years of studying it (Morgan& Kegl, 2006), and so deaf children of native signers show no delay at all (de Villiers 2005). So there is no doubt that TOM is thus influenced by linguistic exposure. Roland and Plomin in their study of 9 year old twins, using monozygotic and same sex dizygotic twins have made a clear distinction between genetic influences on development from that of shared and non – shared environment. TOM task performance in late childhood is moderately heritable (Folstein & Rutter 1988). The environmental aspect of TOM reflects the role of language and from Roland and Plomin’s data it shows that this can be divided into 3 groups- 1. Social skills 2. Communicative skills 3. Repetitive behaviour. Only the communicative skills impacted the false belief tasks showing the tight link between TOM and language acquisition. This study fits in well with the domain specific view of TOM as seen from fMRI studies. The relationship between TOM and language is parasitic. Mental state concepts need complex grammatical structures to be represented verbally and to linguistically represent another person’s belief we use “the syntax of sentential complements” (de Villiers 2000, de Villiers & de Villiers 2000, de Villiers & Pyers, 2002). The way people talk, is used by children to construct mental state concepts. In this way TOM development could be facilitated by verbal communication (the communicative hypothesis- (Baldwin &Saylor 2005; Harris 2005). The parasitic hypothesis holds grammatical representation responsible for mental state concepts, while the communicative hypothesis holds language responsible. But a mature TOM can function even in the absence of language. Siegal & Varley, in order to test this hypothesis, studied two patients with “dense” aphasia and reported lower TOM competence in them. They are supported by Apperly and colleagues who say that a mature TOM does not need language. Thus the link between TOM development is communicative and not parasitic. Precursors: Intentional Action and Gaze Direction: Apart from language, human face and body movements give a lot of information. This can be processed by key visuo-cognitive precursors of TOM, but they raise the question whether these are perceptual or motor in nature. One brain region, the right posterior superior temporal sulcus – (PSTS) - distinguishes whether a human motion is controlled by the person or the environment. Three studies, using unpredicted hand, eye or body movement showed enhanced response in the STS. Senju and colleagues have identified an ERP component having the same functional profile as the PSTS, as well as in the brains of 9-month old infants. This study is important in three respects 1. Shows enhanced response for unpredicted actions. 2. Uses EEG which gives higher temporal resolution than FMRI. 3. Shows consistency from infancy to adulthood. Kaplan and Lacoboni have investigated the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) a pre- motor region, which is used to both execute and observe actions. They found that the IFG pattern is opposite of what is commonly observed in the PSTS. Senju and colleagues claim that perceptual mechanism in the PSTS is consistent from infancy to adulthood. But Carter and Pelphery in a study of 7-10 year olds found that the youngest children in the group showed no biological motion effect in the PSTS. These studies thus pave the way for newer studies in the developmental trajectory of specialized brain mechanisms for social perceptions. Cognitive v/s affective empathy: Many papers highlight the difference between cognitive and affective empathy. Affective empathy consists of both recognizing and responding to another person’s feelings which depends on distinct mechanism from core TOM. While feelings may be expressed by facial expressions, people’s beliefs are not. Again, seeing someone experience strong emotion can lead to ‘contagion’, i.e. the observer feels the same emotion. The neural basis for such mechanisms is nowadays under consideration. Observations made on people with brain damage to the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), gives evidence of differences in cognitive and affective empathy. Shamay - Tsoory through tests have shown that subjects with VMPFC lesions scored lower on tasks that required emotional judgment. They conclude that the mechanism for understanding others feelings is distinct from understanding others thoughts, and that it is located in the VMPFC. Kipps and colleagues as well as Mojzisch and colleagues also converge on this point and say that social – emotional responsiveness in an online interaction is associated with activity in the VMPFC. Chakrabarti and colleagues are of the view that distinct brain mechanisms respond to distinct emotional expressions. They argue that in case of a single unified psychological mechanism, response to empathy and emotion would converge on the same brain mechanism, which is an interesting contrast to Kaplan and Lacoboni’s studies. Both identify the IFG as the locus of co-relation between empathy, but while Chakrabarti and colleagues suggest that the neural substrate of empathy is complex, Kaplan and Lacoboni report a right lateralized effect. AUTISM: Autism which has historically been associated with deficits in attributing cognitive rather than effective states (e.g. Blair 2005) can make use of these theories to understand it. Ashwin and colleagues in a test carried out on adults with autism, showed deficit in recognizing negative emotion, specially fear, although they had less difficulty in recognizing the cognitive expression of surprise, leading us to believe that autism may in part reflect abnormalities in the amygdala function. However, Leslie and colleagues have shown that while children with autism fail in false belief tasks, they perform well in simple tests of moral reasoning, almost as well as normal 4 year olds. Those with the Asperger syndrome were shown to care passionately about moral issues and their empathy deficits did not lead to psychopathy. They have a strong sense of right and wrong and the neuroscience of moral development may help to distinguish between the two empathy conditions of autism and psychopathy. Therefore, the range of methods used to develop theories on the psychological and neural basis of TOM is astounding, but that the neuroscience of TOM is much more than what has been ascertained here. In case TOM is genetic, studies in molecular genetics need to be done. The candidate gene related to development of TOM needs to be identified. The development of TOM and empathy can also receive a boost from androgens since regions of the brain associated with TOM are rich in androgen receptors. The role of early environment in growth or inhibition of empathy (Bowlby, 1969) will also help to produce an integrated model of the development of TOM. Mental States: LTJ Lesions: In neuroscience literature the ability to process others’ mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions is known as ‘theory of mind’. The said function is carried by the frontal lobes. In the given case study, evidence is provided to support the theory, That the left temporoparietal junction is also vital and important for reasoning about the beliefs of others. The tasks generally used for examining mental state reasoning requires the said subject to infer, whether someone has a belief that is false or that someone is joking or telling a lie .In the recent findings made by researchers, it has been highlighted that in such form of reasoning the brain activation of the frontal lobes is intact in neurologically “intact adults” (Fletcher, 1995, Gallagher, 2000) and impaired by lesions to the frontal lobes (Stone, et al, 1998, Rowe et al, 2001) Imaging studies of patients who participated in and performed the task of mental state reasoning showed activation in the posterior regions, more specifically in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) The exact reason for TPJ activation is not clear. The first issue dealt with in this study, attempts to show that TPJ damage causes impairment in mental state reasoning which is necessary for social cognitive activity .Therefore we can come to the conclusion that it would also impair higher level social reasoning. An attempt to resolve these issues have been made by studying the activity of brain damaged individuals. Tests were conducted on patients with LTJ damage who were made to undergo a story based and video-based false belief reasoning task. The video tasks were non-linguistic in nature. The three patients while performing the two tasks did not achieve performance, beyond chance-level .It could have been due to the difficulties faced by them such as remembering the event-sequence, or understanding and integration of the stories .The video based tasks were designed in such a manner that the participants did not know that one of the characters had a false belief, yet they did not perform well, thereby proving that there was no inhibition on their part while undergoing the trial. So the theory that inhibition obstructed false belief inference is discounted. Another alternative explanation given about patients’ false belief reasoning errors is that there is a deficit in reasoning in general. In such cases, the patients would have made the same mistakes. “Counterfactual reasoning” (Riggs K.J. et al, 1998, Peterson D.M et al, 1999) is very similar to false belief reasoning. 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