Free Will vs Determinism - Essay Example

Running Head: Free Will vs Determinism Free Will vs Determinism of the of the Free Will vs Determinism The debate about controversy between free will and determinism has been continued for long. Almost every area οf science is based on cause and effect, order, and a structured protocol οf operation, but the Quantum Mechanics is different. All matter is made up οf atoms, and all atoms are made up οf electrons, neutrons, and protons. These in turn are made up οf quarks. The movement οf quarks, and the emission οf photons as electrons skip shells seem to be totally random. If this is true, then what are the implications on the free will/determinism debate? It may seem like an obscure point, but if you look at the definition οf determinism, it says that all things are caused, and if there is one single uncaused event, then determinism must be false. So if you find one random event, then determinism is nothing more than a myth, but, in light οf this evidence, a determinist only has to claim that we just have not found the reason yet. This is a dangerous response, no matter how true, because οf two things: contradictory arguments, and empirical theories. The contradiction comes into play only because οf a previous argument. Daniel said that we have seen enough over the years to infer that determinism is true, and claims that we have not fully explored the possibilities enough to accurately infer anything. When it is said quantum mechanics proves a random event, and the reply is that we just have not found the cause yet, then the determinist is going against the fundamental logic behind his strongest argument. For one argument the determinist says that we have seen enough to infer, but in a response to free will evidence, they simply say that we have not found it yet and that to infer that this is a random event is completely ludicrous. These are clearly contradicting and should not be considered because they negate themselves. (Bargh 2008) The second problem with saying, "We just have not found the cause yet," is that it deems the theory οf determinism no longer empirical. For a theory to be legitimate, it must possess the ability to be proven wrong. By saying there is a cause, but we just do not know what it is, you rule out any chance οf proving it wrong, and therefore is no longer a valid theory. All in all, determinism has a very strong foundation that you could base a sound belief on, but it does have its holes. There is real compelling evidence for determinism, and if you believe all οf the evidence then the holes seem very minor. Considering the evidence it seems that determinism could, certainly, be true. But before we close the debate, the free will theory should also be explained. (Campbell 1967) To start, free will needs a value. What free will really is, is the ability to consciously and willingly choose between options and act upon those decisions completely under your own control. Free will is the belief that nothing is caused, and that man is completely free from all constraints to do as he wishes. There are two main arguments presented by Daniel for believing in free will: we should believe that we have free will based on our experiences οf deliberation, and the idea that we could have chosen and acted differently from what we actually chose and acted upon. Every day we have to make decisions, and how do we do this? We deliberate. Deliberation is the act οf weighing the advantages and disadvantages οf all the choices, and picking the one that would most benefit us and our needs at that particular point οf time. There are no constraints on us, so what we choose is strictly a free choice, and thus we have free will. The problem with this argument, as pointed out by Carolyn and Daniel, is that it is based upon the way we feel. We only think that we are deliberating, and that there are no constraints on us, but we are only aware οf external constraints. I breathe and my heart beats, but am I aware οf the mental processes that drive my every breath and heart beat? No, I am not, and there may be many internal constraints that we are not aware of, controlling our every thought and action. Every action we have may be caused by something embedded deep in our psyche that we have no control of. (Wegner 1999) Therefore, just because we feel that we are deliberating, that does not necessarily constitute free will. We could feel that we are deliberating, but it is already determined what we will do. The very steps οf our deliberation may be caused by past experiences. If we are under post-hypnotic suggestions, we are not aware that what we are thinking is not οf our own. Under a situation such as that, we are controlled, but we still feel as if we are free. (Libet 1986) Daniel then replies to this by saying that that is not deliberation. Deliberation presupposes that we are able to choose differently than what we actually chose, but if it was determined what we would "decide" then it is truly not deliberation. Danial’s second argument for free will is that we could have chosen differently. If one was at a candy machine, there is a choice as to what he will get. (Bank 2007) If he chooses a Butterfinger, that’s great, but he could have chosen a Snickers under the same circumstances. And, according to determinism, things could not come out any other way given that the circumstances are the same. Another example οf this principle is if one was walking home, and there are two identical paths, both are the same distance, both are equally as scenic, and neither is more advantageous over the other. Here is a definite choice. There should be no reason why one would choose this road over that road. It would be clearly a free choice. In reply to this Daniel and Carolyn point out that these two paths are not empirically identical. Though they are the same distance and look exactly the same, one is on the right, and one is on the left. For them to be exactly the same they would have to be in the same exact location, and if they were in the same place, then there would be only one path to take. (Bargh 2001) Thus, if all the circumstances were the same, there can only be one outcome. References Bank, W. P., & Pockett, S., (2007). Benjamin Libet’s work on the neuroscience οf free will. In M. Velmans, & S. Schneider, (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, pp 657-671. Bargh, J. A., & Morsella, E. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 73-80. Bargh, J. A., Gollweitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Troetshel, R. (2001). The automated will: Unconscious activation and pursuit οf behavioural goals. Journal οf Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1004-1027. Baumeister, R. F., Brastlavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal οf Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252-1265. Baumesiter, R. F. (2008). Free will in scientific psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 14-20. Campbell, C. A. (1967) In Defence οf Free Will, in In Defence οf Free Will , London: Allen & Unwin. (Famous statement οf the libertarian position that finds scope for exercise οf free will especially in situations οf moral conflict.) Carolyn, Merchant, “Gender and Environmental History,” Journal of American History (March 1990): 1117-1121 Daniel, Speak. (2005). “PAPistry: Another Defense,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy Gailliot, M. T., Baumesiter, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., & Tice, D. M. (2007). Self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal οf Personality and Social Psychology, 12, 200-210. Hobart, R.E. (1934) Free Will as Involving Determinism and Inconceivable without It, Mind 43. (Influential rehearsal οf a Humean compatibilist position.) Libet, B. (1986). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role οf conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 529-566. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. Wegner, D. M., & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources οf the experience οf will. American Psychologist, 54, 480-491. Read More