Professional Work As A Rational Activity - Assignment Example

Is professional work a rational activity Rationality is a powerful mode of thought of conduct in the modern world. Its emergence in the early twentieth century offered a clear vision of social order as a panacea for inefficiency and chaos, replacing former ideologies such as Social Darwinism, welfare capitalism, and religious discourses of labor. Common wisdom -- in academic and popular circles alike -- asserts that managerial rationality represents the American industrial way, a natural extension of economic progress, and the inevitable outcome of universal business practices. In the first place, how we think about ourselves and our political world from the outset exerts a pervasive influence over our political behavior. In this respect, attachment to the ideal of a rationally governed society is no exception. The acceptance of the basic norms of the model carry implications for the ideologies that shape the way we see our world and for the conceptions that govern our individual modes of political activity (Spragens, 1990). In ideological terms, the ideal of a rational society has distinctive but not entirely determinate implications. It clearly disqualifies some ideological conceptions. It tends to crosscut certain other conventional ideological cleavages. And it leaves some ideological space open as an area in which reasonable people may differ. Some ideologies seem clearly unable to qualify by the norms of rational practice. In these cases, it is either/or: one either must renounce the intrinsic norms of rationality or forfeit the ideological orientation. The overt antirationalism of fascist ideologies, for example, would seem to disqualify them immediately. One cannot deprecate the power or validity of rational discourse; argue for forms of political authority grounded in purely emotional appeal and manipulation rather than rational consent, and convert natural differences of race or ability into political hierarchies without decisively abandoning key standards of rational practice (Spragens, 1990). The ideal of a rational society crosscuts liberalism, conservatism, and democratic socialism -- each of these being a part of the larger tradition of Western liberalism in the broadest sense. It incorporates some of the leading values and goals of each of them. The liberal, for instance, would consider the rational society's insistence upon individual rights and civil liberties the most important part of the model. The socialist would emphasize the elements of equality and community. And the conservative would find the role of the human good and the norms of civility quite consistent with his or her dominant political concerns. The bearing of the conception of a rational society on these ideologies, then, is not so much to single one of them out as superior to the others. Instead, it would suggest that each represents a somewhat narrow and parochial conception of the good society -- one in which some aspects of the good society are given undue ascendancy while others are unnecessarily subordinated or forgotten. In sum, acceptance of the rational process conception of liberal democracy exercises a broad influence over political practice by constraining ideological affiliations and shaping political self-images. Many possible orientations to the world of politics are precluded, obligations are mandated, rights and privileges validated -- all in ways that exert a pervasive control over what can be seen as acceptable political behavior. As we turn now to examine some more specific institutional patterns and policies suggested by the norms of rational practice, it is worth remembering that these more subliminal influences on our actions may be the most important of them all (Spragens, 1990). The heart of a rational society is democratic discourse about the common good. A society committed to the norms of rational process will therefore give continual and careful attention to measures that can sustain and strengthen this central social institution. A democratic society that wishes to govern itself in accord with the norms of rational practice also needs to give serious attention to the quality of political journalism. Technical advances in the communications media have made the role of the journalist increasingly central to the dynamics of democratic decision making. Communications between leaders and citizens, between the government and the larger society, and between contending political groups are conveyed and filtered through a media screen. The abilities and predispositions of those who report, interpret, and comment upon political happenings are thus increasingly important. If their reports are unilluminating, their interpretations misleading, and their commentaries obtuse, the quality of public deliberation and discourse is seriously impeded. Conversely, skilled and thoughtful journalism can vastly enhance the ability of political leaders and ordinary citizens alike to make sense of their common world and to reach sound judgments about it (Spragens, 1990). Accordingly, a rational society should foster serious and responsible political journalism in any way it can. Philanthropic institutions can offer funds to support and improve journals of political analysis and social commentary. And they could establish "think-tank" centers where journalists could -- like academics on sabbatical -- share ideas and deepen their knowledge. Universities can, as Harvard and Duke among others have done, create programs that allow journalists to explore academic resources useful to them. Awards can be made to those who achieve distinction in political journalism. And so on. These are social efforts, not specifically governmental ones -- for obvious reasons. And their goal is a simple one: to help journalism make a vital contribution to the quality of democratic discourse (Spragens, 1990). Professional Work and Rationality There is a fundamental rationale for professionalism, hence professional organization cannot simply be curtailed or ended as if it was an optional extra to the way in which we choose to institutionalize our socio-economic practices. This set of common roots allows us to talk of professionalism as a single set of institutionalized practices. Obviously these practices may blur at the edges, but we can be guided by the epistemological principle that the exceptions prove the rule (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). We should not oversimplify the nature of professionalism; rather it is a diverse set of practices. This diversity is based on two factors. First, different professions have to grapple with particular conditions that are not common; to put it bluntly nurses, accountants and architects have particular jobs to do. Second, much professional practice, in all spheres, is based on informal norms as well as explicit rules. These norms are embedded in wider social practices and hence reflect the ways in which we differ by class, sex, race, region, age, parental status to name but a few factors. It follows that, for example, different teachers might perceive the nature of professionalism, in all its subtle detail, in different ways. If we recognize both the common roots and the (sometimes subtle) diversity of professionalism we are in a good position to understand the current era of change. Inevitably this change is contradictory in terms of the new practices involved because it brings to the surface the differences in existing relationships. The informal becomes apparent because of the way in which it clashes with an emerging set of practices (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). Finally, we should be aware of the dynamism of the current era. The way in which the fundamental rationale for professionalism works itself out in practice depends on particular historical conditions. It follows that there is no single, a historical set of professional practices. At the same time, however, we should guard against viewing historical change as simply happening in a linear manner. A shift from one set of institutional practices to another requires change agents, without which extinction will occur. Hence the changes we are experiencing may be initial responses to environmental shifts and reactions to these shifts. This fluid situation should not be confused with reinstitutionalised practices. What finally emerges may be very different, but the current disturbance may be viewed (in retrospect) as necessary (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). The modern status of professionals is perhaps based more firmly in the nineteenth century where the links to the church are perhaps echoed in the sense of 'Victorian' responsibility with the rigid social hierarchies this involves. Clearly this fertile breeding ground for the early professions produced a strong emphasis on social status. Professional status was rooted in the notion of the 'gentlemanly conduct' of those who were members of the group. This was seen to be a guarantee of the integrity of the professional providing services to a public who were not knowledgeable purchasers. Indeed, some work on the early professional history of the accounting profession suggests that broader moral lapses as much as lapses in professional competence were at the root of the generation of a code of discipline (Walker, 1996). In general, institutional, scientific and social developments had direct impacts on key professions: for example, law, accounting, medicine, engineers, and chemists. These ideas of professions still linger in our collective consciousness, but we should be aware of the ways in which they have been channeled by the twentieth century (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). As we have implied above, the evolution of professionalism in the twentieth century cannot be understood without reference to key developments in the societal contextual tapestry that have occurred and which form a backdrop for the particular changes. One such contextual factor which has perhaps affected professional development is the advent of 'scientific management' or Taylorism. This was based on a philosophy of separating conception and execution of tasks, that is to say differentiating 'thinking' from 'doing'. This is called a philosophy rather than a set of practices for two reasons. First, there was an almost universal defense from the 'doers' from the developing trade union movement, as well as skepticism from some of the employers who worried about labour unrest; hence the control which Taylorism sought to impose was always contested. Second, it was never a universal practice: for example, it was highly appropriate in car manufacture, but largely inappropriate in machine tools manufacture. The basic difference between the two situations is that in one case the knowledge necessary for 'thinking' is separable from the 'doing' and in the other is not. (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997) Hence, whilst Taylorism as a set of specific practices was never universal it did inform a management philosophy: that manager had a right to manage. In the early years of this century this 'right to manage' only affected the craftspeople and the working classes. Arguably, scientific management both promoted and was promoted by a belief that there was a distinction to be made between conception and execution-thinking and doing. The implication for professionalism was that this allowed a 'scientific' rationale for professional status and autonomy in an era when Victorian ideas of social status were becoming largely obsolete. Professionals were 'thinkers' who were not subject to the managerial control which scientific management introduced (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). A final contextual issue to be considered is the growth of the public sector and in this respect we can consider the way in which the Keynes-Beveridge consensus (as it is called in the UK) linking economic and social welfare reforms was implemented. In the development of the welfare state, institutions which took up the organization of a number of professional services were born. In this process the professional status and autonomy of existing and developing professional groups was embedded in hierarchically organised welfare services. It was in these bureaucracies that a different notion of professionalism developed from that of the independent and ancient professions of, for example, law and medicine which had existed previously. The differences have resulted in a division between private and public sector professionalism that Perkin (1989, 1996) has consistently argued is central to the development of professions. In the public sector nominal hierarchical superiors were effectively impotent in terms of control of both detailed strategies and operations. The lack of direct control was suffered by both the suppliers of finance (i.e. the relevant level of the state) and users of services who were meant to gratefully accept the specialist activity supplied. The users of the services, the equivalent of Taylorist 'doers' in the private sector, had neither the equivalent of trade union power nor specialist knowledge to counter professional power. The post-war development of health services and school education in the UK where clinicians and teachers respectively controlled areas of their activity in a relatively autonomous way is illustrative here, as are the later developments in university education and social services. The case of medicine is particularly revealing as the new Health Ministry had to submit to the power of the British Medical Association in a way that ensured a continuing professional status. The implications of current reforms which have challenged this situation are equally revealing, as will be discussed shortly (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). In summary, a brief overview of some of the currents from the first three-quarters of the twentieth century illustrates some of the ways in which professionalism can develop, although it should be recognized we have given a mere gloss over the complexities involved. One element of this development which we see as important and which has been presented here is the extent to which professionalism and Taylorism appear to be intertwined. Early notions of scientific management provided no challenge to professionalism and indeed provided it with some legitimacy. More recently the ideas of Taylor have been seen as providing a template for approaches by which to control professional activity. However, these ideas have, since their inception, been under fairly constant attack. Economic criticisms emphasize the ways in which scientific management is demotivating and inappropriate in a dynamic and complex world (Broadbent, Dietrich, & Roberts, 1997). Professional Practice and Social Work Practice Social Work Practice Historically, one of the struggles in the profession has been to define what is central to social work practice. Although many practitioners may view this as purely an academic debate, the effects of including and excluding concepts in the definition of practice are far reaching beyond mere hyperbole. The definitions of the three types of social work practice by degree levels (BSW, MSW, and clinical social work) would include these functions. 1. Baccalaureate in social work: * Application of social work theory, knowledge, methods, and ethics * Restoration or enhancement of social or psychosocial functioning of individuals, couples, families, groups, organizations, and communities * generalist practice that includes assessment, planning, intervention, evaluation, case management, information and referral, counseling, advocacy, supervision, consultation, education, community organization, and the development, implementation, and administration of policies, programs, and activities. 2. Master's in social work: * Application of social work theory, knowledge, methods, ethics, and professional use of self * Restoration or enhancement of social, psychosocial, or biopsychosocial functioning of individuals, couples, families, groups, organizations, and communities * application of specialized knowledge and advanced practice skills in the areas of assessment, treatment, planning, implementation and evaluation, case management, information and referral, counseling, advocacy, supervision, consultation, teaching, research, community organization, and the development, implementation, and administration of policies, programs, and activities. 3. Clinical social work: * Application of social work, theory, knowledge, methods, ethics, and the professional use of self * Restoration or enhancement of social, psychosocial, or biopsychosocial functioning of individuals, couples, families, groups, organizations, and communities * application of specialized clinical knowledge and advanced clinical skills in the areas of assessment and diagnosis of mental and emotional disorders and conditions; treatment methods, including the provision of individual, marital, couple, family, and group psychotherapy; counseling; treatment planning; implementation and evaluation; case management; supervision; information and referral; advocacy; consultation, teaching, research, community organization, and the development, implementation, and administration of policies, programs, and activities. Two economic perspectives, monopoly and public interest, explain credentialing of social workers and other professional and trade groups. Monopoly theory suggests that regulation of the practice of any professional or trade group is a response to the demands of interest groups. These interest groups are usually composed of professionals who seek to maximize the incomes of their membership by restricting the practice of the profession or trade. With this view, licensing of a profession is a "charter of autonomy" (Gross, 1978) to a professional group. A professional is regarded as a person who "derives aims and methods from a professional body, works independently, and ... commands the privilege to autonomously determine what should be done and how it should be done" (Bucher & Stelling, 1969). The monopoly view supports professional credentialing as a restraint of trade. The professional group seeks to establish that selected members of the profession itself are in a position to define the scope of professional services and determine on a case-by-case basis which individuals can engage in professional practice. The profession protects its members by limiting entry into practice to those who meet the criteria established by the profession itself. Second, these professional groups seek the police power of the state to enforce exclusion of the unqualified practitioner from practice. Credentialing of a profession also protects the organizations that sponsor the legislation. Professional organizations work in the political process to protect their self-interest. When government regulation of an occupational group is achieved, it tends to incorporate the goals of the professional association (Colebatch, 1989). Professional organizations serve as interest groups seeking legislation to preserve the autonomy of professional practice and recognition of the claim as the sole provider of a service to consumers. In achieving this level of autonomy in the selection of practitioners, the professional group accepts the responsibility for enforcing its own code of ethical conduct. Credentialing in the form of licensing does not, however, protect the public against unethical and unlawful practices unless the regulations provide consumers with the mechanisms for initiating complaints and requesting investigation of suspected unlawful or unethical practices. Furthermore, protection of the public interest does not occur if consumers cannot or do not make use of these procedural safeguards. Unless the public is afforded protection, credentialing statutes serve to protect the regulated practitioners (Dawes, 1994). The stated goal of the model social work practice act is to promote, preserve, and protect the public health, safety, and welfare by and through the effective control and regulation of the practice of social work; the licensure of social workers, the licensure, control and regulation of persons, in or out of this state that practice social work within this state (AASSWB, 1997, p.6). From a policy perspective, it is easy to see that professional credentialing is subject to the criticism of being a self-serving movement on the part of professional organizations to protect professional practice. The history of credentialing in the social work profession is replete with evidence of this criticism. The social work profession has had some form of legal regulation in all states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories since 1992. The evolution of these public statutes incurred criticism from the profession with regard to the motives of social workers and professional organizations that lobbied for public regulation of practice. Today actions on the part of professional organizations to alter definitions of social work practice by amending statutes should not proceed without opportunities for practitioners affected by these potential changes to debate potential effects. These changes, along with the expansion of the profession's code of ethics, affect social workers regardless of area of practice. In the model statute, such changes would have the greatest effect on entrance into employment after completion of professional education and in the client-social worker relationship (Biggerstaff, Marilyn A., 2000). Knowledge in Modernity and Post-Modernity Modernity is basically about order: about rationality as well as rationalization, creating order out of disorder. The supposition is that creating more rationality is favorable to making more order, and that the more structured a society is, the better it will function. Since modernity is about the chase of rising levels of order, modern societies continuously are on guard in opposition to anything and everything tagged as "disorder," which might disturb order. Therefore modern societies rely on repeatedly setting up a binary opposition between "order" as well as "disorder," so that they can declare the advantage of "order." But to do this, they have to have things that symbolize "disorder"--modern societies as a result repeatedly have to produce/construct "disorder." In western culture, this disorder turns into "the additional"--defined with regard to other binary oppositions. As a result anything non-male, non-white, non-heterosexual, non-rational, non-hygienic, (etc.) becomes part of "disorder," and has to be eradicated from the structured, rational modern society. The means that modern societies go about creating categories tagged as "order" or "disorder" has to do with the attempt to attain stability. Francois Lyotard associates that constancy with the thought of "totality," or a totalized system. Totality, as well as stability, in addition to order, Lyotard argues, are preserved in modern societies through the way of "master narratives," or "grand narratives", which are stories a culture enlightens itself about its practices as well as beliefs. A "grand narrative" in American culture may be the story that democracy is the most progressive (rational) form of government, and that democracy can and will escort to universal human happiness. Postmodernism is deals with questions of the association of knowledge. In modern societies, knowledge was associated with science, and was compared to narrative; science was good knowledge, and narrative was bad, prehistoric, and illogical. Knowledge, on the other hand, was good for its own sake; one gained knowledge, via education, so as to be well-informed in general, to turn into an educated person. This is the ideal of the liberal arts education. In a postmodern civilization, nonetheless, knowledge becomes functional--you study things, not to know them, but to utilize that knowledge. There are no definitive explanations for the meaning of 'modernity' or of 'postmodernity', different writers have different ideas about what they mean and whether it is possible to distinguish between the two, consequently some authors prefer the term 'late modernity' to 'postmodernity'. However, the term 'postmodern' is so widely used that avoiding it seems impractical, and there do seem to be broadly accepted guidelines when talking about modernity and postmodernity http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/1669.htm. Western Society can still be described as an 'information society', and a 'consumer society', but its confidence level is not what it once was. The paternalism which was once part and parcel of western Christian mission, and political and military action, has to a certain extent given away to a partnership mentality, and the realization that the Two-Thirds World is not as easily impressed as it once was. The Enlightenment love affair with science which was so constant in the era of modernity still lingers in the so called era of postmodernity, consequently many regard postmodernity as an extension of modernity. The Great War and the following events have exposed the shortcomings of the view point which assumed that knowledge and science would solve all problems. As Enlightenment reason became prevalent and people became absorbed in the means and the process of existence, instead of spreading hope and confidence it became the primary cause of despair and apathy, since, by slight of hand, science had mad it appear that life had no meaning, and existence was without purpose. The Darwinian idea of 'the survival of the fittest' has been used to support the most horrific atrocities of both left and right wing totalitarian regimes. In the last century we have seen science make men into animals http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/1669.htm . Both modernity as well as postmodernity, as sets of social occurrence understood within particular hypothetical frameworks, shapes the modern world in both hidden as well as overt ways. By understanding their individual impacts on society all together, it is possible to value why certain beliefs in addition to values are accepted as self-evidently true. Reference: http://www.jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/1669.htm Jane Broadbent, Michael Dietrich, Jennifer Roberts, 1997. The End of the Professions The Restructuring of Professional Work Routledge. Thomas A. Spragens, 1990. Reason and Democracy. Duke University Press. Walker, Roland. 1996. "Language assessment, development assessment: a community development approach." Notes on Literature in Use and Language Programs 47 Perkin, Harold, (1989). The Rise of the Professional Society: England since 1880. London: Routledge. Perkin, Harold, (1996). The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World. London: Routledge. American Association of State Social Work Boards. (1997, June 16). Draft AASSWB Model State Social Work Practice Act. Culpeper, VA: Author. Biggerstaff, Marilyn A., 2000. A Critique of the Model State Social Work Practice Act. Social Work; 3/1/2000; Bucher, R., & Stelling, J. (1969). Characteristics of professional organizations. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 10, 3-15. Colebatch, H. K. (1989). The concept of regulation in the analysis of an organized world. Law & Policy, 11, 71-88. Dawes, R. M. (1994). House of cards: Psychology and psychotherapy built on myth. New York: Free Press. Gross, S. J. (1978). The myth of professional licensing. American Psychologist, 33, 1009-101 Read More