The Feud between Congress and the President - Case Study Example

Introduction

According to Tiefer (2015), politicians, pundits, and scholars have raised the flag over the unilateral powers given to each institution as stipulated in the constitution. With such assertions, the Congress and the Presidency have been at constant loggerheads, with resistance from either institutions pointing at the existence of imperial control of the oversight role played by each institution. As such, in the context of political science, the main theme that fuels the discussion over the expansion of these unilateral powers is examined not through the unilateral actions but through the relative paucity displayed by each institution.

Political scientists have noted, therefore, that institutional weaknesses of the Presidency and the Congress are a common observation given that these two institutions are bent on immersing overboard authority against the other. In as much the constitution was created to facilitate the oversight role and minimize the abuse of power, all indications are that certain circumstances often display acts of impunity as portrayed in the actions of either institution. So severe has been the trend that the legislative efforts aimed at undoing the unilateral initiatives that promote balance of power have failed.

Perhaps the above outline was the argument that guided Douglas Kriner to discuss the conflict between the presidency and the Congress. In his well-argued book, the author depicts the extent to which politics has interfered with the cardinal roles of each constitutional institution enshrined in the scope of his work. To be more specific, the author expands his argument to consider the military policies in making decisions involving the use of the military. In line with this argument, this paper will give a detailed analysis of selected readings within the book, hence establishing the course of arguments as portrayed by the author, and the effects caused by politicization of institutional roles.

Analysis of selected readings

At large, the author cements an opinion that the conflict between the Congress and the President is inevitable. Referring to earlier studies, it is evident that the interactions between the executive and legislative institutions have been instrumental in shaping the military expeditions in the US. The primary argument by the author, nonetheless, is that the legislature has powers to influence the position of the President as the figure of the country on matters concerning foreign policy. Therefore, the legislature has powers to determine the start or continuation of military interventions. Through the legislature moreover, the military acquires the costs used in funding such interventions. Consequently, the earlier settings of this book attract adequate attention to people interested in learning more about the Congressional powers, further pointing out the role of the Congress in determining the ability of the President in making a war.

In Chapter 5, "Sitting Ducks": Marines in Beirut, I982-84, and the author begins by explaining that previous chapters have demonstrated the correlation between the actions of the Congress and the periods in which the US was involved in major military expeditions. This chapter provides a case study of the politics surrounding the 1984 withdrawal of the US Marines from Lebanon (Kriner, pg 195, 2010). The conflict between the President and the Congress, as explained in the book, was evident when President Reagan was widely opposed to the Congressional action that aimed at removing the army from Lebanon.

Primarily, the actions of the Congress are depicted to be strong, and that these actions conflict independent effects on the decisions made by the administration. It is evident; furthermore, that the indirect pathways of the conditions and influences by the Congress have proven the role of the Congress in determining the military policy making of the country, in line with the reconstruction processes towards removing the US troops from Lebanon. The President’s initiative on the War in Lebanon was different from that of the Congress, with the opposition viewed by the author as one primarily driven by politics. While the Congress argued that the cost of sustaining the war was unbearable, the executive branch officials were determined to continue the mission. The political ramifications of the continued military expeditions in Lebanon threatened to destabilize the re-election prospects of the country’s ruling party.

Military involvement in Lebanon is considered among the trail of activities that the US has used to ascertain its continued fight against International terrorism. Through this chapter, the author aims at highlighting the politics surrounding the commitment of the American military in Lebanon and how the Congress may have instigated consequences on the current fight against global terrorism.

The conflict between policy makers on the best way to prevent the occurrence of the looming Arab-Israeli conflict was the primary reason for the involvement of US in Lebanon. In this conflict, President Reagan had analyzed the effects of the Lebanon conflict, coupled with those clashes between the PLO and Israel. However, upon Israel’s invasion of Lebanon n 1982, the policy makers proposing for military intervention cemented their argument.

The subsequent encounter between the Syrian and Israel forces in 1981 would prompt Reagan to send an emissary to the Middle East to fast track the process of averting the war. However, his efforts failed. After a temporary ceasefire agreement, all these parties strengthened their positions, only to facilitate a larger dispute later on (Kriner, pg 209, 2010). The invasion of Syria by Israel exposed divisions in the Reagan administration, with others seeing no substantive need for the US to pressurize Israel’s withdrawal in Syria. Such conflict, coupled with the escalation of other events in the period between 1982 and 1984, depicted the conflict between the executive and the legislature.

Consequently, the administration policies were reversed when militants mounted severe and intense attacks on the US Marines in Lebanon. Clearly, Reagan had a mission to use the military to stop the impending crisis, whereas the opposition from the Congress was instrumental in undermining the mission as set by President Reagan. The case study involving Beirut and the subsequent dramatic withdrawal of the US army from the war illustrates that the Congress has the ability to influence the military activities, especially considering public outcry and the conditions presented to the troops on the ground.

Immediately after the attack on the US army barracks in Beirut, the public opinion remained dominant in support of the mission by Reagan. Reagan had political opponents in the Congress who were bent on ensuring that his mission failed, though the public opinion played a central role in reducing the effects of political interference from these opponents. Besides, lack of Congressional support owing to the political differences between the Congress and the President is largely taunted for the conditions experienced by the military on the ground in Beirut.

The presidential decision-making, as depicted in this week’s reading, is a subject to the formal and informal Congressional actions (Kriner, pg 227, 2010). The Congress, through the frequent vocal opposition, painted a negative picture of the President as one who abuses the power given to him by the Constitution. In as much as the President was aware that the operation in Beirut had generated positive incomes, at the back of his mind he was relatively aware that the political pressures from the Congress would limit the likelihood of proper implementations of these benefits. Therefore, the decision to remove the troops from the Middle East was not due to the deteriorating conditions on the ground but the increasing opposition directed towards the President’s choice to employ military intervention. Therefore, the case study about Beirut paints a picture of how politics affected the involvement of US in Lebanon.

As such, the author begins week six reading by stating that the actions perpetrated by the Congress in relation to the military only manifest through policy making (Kriner, pg 234, 2010). In as much as the presidential course of action is stipulated in the Constitution, the activities of the Congress determine the decisions that the President makes in the course of a military venture. Even more compelling is the application of manipulative techniques by the Congress to ensure that the conduct of the military actions is partly and largely so left at their disposal.

The theoretical framework established by the author in Chapter 2 of the book is revisited. In line with this framework, it is evident that the legal authority to declare war lies with the Congress. However, the Congress has consistently failed in availing any tools to oversight the role of the President as the Commander In Chief. Despite the inability of the Congress to apply these tools, it has increasingly proven its relevance by exerting indirect influence of considerable measures on the decision making of the executive branch led by the President. Primarily, the author explores the various techniques that the Congress employs in playing this function, either such as persuading the public opinion and using the vocal oppositions to signify an America that is disunited or in dire need of resolutions.

Among the questionable trends of the congressional activities in the process of challenging the presidential application of the military conduct are the timing and frequencies of these challenges. While the author acknowledges that some of these challenges accrue from partisan incentives, he also highlights that these incentives may be driven by opportunistic mindsets geared towards achieving milestones in the political environment.

In line with analyzing the partisan trends of the Congressional challenges, the author notes that the Congress has members who are elected on political parties, which make them subject to the ideals of these parties. Owing to this argument, the Congress may attack the President’s use of military conduct blindly based on the differences fostered between their parties and that of the President.

However, looking back at earlier studies, one can notice that both the legislature and the executive rely much on public opinion to exercise their unilateral authorities. Therefore, partisan politics, especially when directed to the President, often depends on the approval ratings that the President commands across the public. The tendencies of the Congress to use military involvement in reducing the popularity of a President are also exposed in this reading. In order to gain political mileage, Kriner (pg 242, 2010) writes, congressional opponents may use popular shifts in the support of a military action to undermine the President’s policy, as was the case in President Reagan’s forced withdrawal of troops in Middle East. As such, military expeditions are affected by the political landscape, since the military is the benchmark through which the public builds its opinions on the ability of the President to make favorable policies that suit the interests of the country.

In the wake of the ongoing Iraqi War, the policymaking relating to the American military has significant links with the global war on terror. Besides, Kriner (pg 236, 2010) notes that the Congress and the President have come into agreement rarely, pointing to the recent agreement to apply force against the regime of Saddam Hussein. In as much this agreement was unanimous across the divide for these political constitutional institutions, the dramatic changes experienced in the political environment later presented cracks as opponents of the President challenged his conduct in the war. Therefore, the Iraqi invasion by the US military has attracted numerous diverse viewpoints. Among these interpretations is the possibility that the Congress did not influence the President’s decision.

Though the Congress commonly endorsed the suggestion of military expedition in Iraqi, even larger uncertainties were exposed concerning the best way that the US military would fulfill its resolution. Public opinion indicated that the President had no moral authority of using military expedition at the comfort of his necessity. This raised more gaps in the constitutionality of both the Congress and President’s resolution.

Furthermore, the author refers to the end of the empirical analysis in which it was established that the Congress had contributed less in its position of policymaking in relation to the Iraqi conflict. This formed the basis of President Bush’s reelection contest that focused majorly on the decision to invade Iraq (Kriner, pg 271, 2010). The Democrats subsequently launched verbal opposition against the President in the Congress, as momentum grew against the manner in which the President handled the war.

As depicted, therefore, the Congress had little effects on the decision made by the President to launch attacks on Iraq. Therefore, this theory exposed the possibilities of an imperial presidency, one that does not encounter any oversight hurdles especially in implementing policies related to military action. At some point, the democrat opposition grew too strong, further cementing the argument by the author that most second term presidents often encounter realities that relate to manipulation of legislative powers by the Congress. The author points out, furthermore, that the achievements of President Bush in the final two years of his reign are incomparable to those of his predecessors, who were unable to make any significant policies relating to military conduct.

Conclusion

In the analysis of the selected weekly readings, one theme that is persistent across the board is that the public opinion alone is not enough to guarantee the Presidential decision to indulge in a military action. However, this decision is majorly determined by the congressional activities, which have been evidenced in chapter five and six of the book. Even more interesting in these readings is the role-played by the Congress in determining the decisions made by both President Reagan and President Bush in the Lebanese and Iraqi wars respectively. In conclusion, the role of the Congress in determining the military policy course of the country is largely motivated by the political environment and the shifts in the public opinion driven by vocal opposition of the Presidential military decisions.