The Impact of the Israel Lobby - Case Study Example

ENG 204 First Full Draft: Influence of Israel Lobby on U.S. Foreign Policy

Mohamed Faragalla

American University of Sharjah

First Full Draft

Influence of Israel Lobby on U.S. Foreign Policy

Introduction

Steven Rosen former AIPAC official once illustrated his lobby’s power to a journalist from New Yorker’s Jeffrey Goldberg by putting a napkin in front of him and saying, “in twenty four hours we could have the signatures of 70 senators on this napkin” (Goldberg, 2005). In addition to highlighting the potential influence of said lobby, the other connotation discernible from this statement is the attention paid by various stakeholders to U.S. foreign policy. Regardless of the geographical distance separating the U.S. from other nations, the country has immense impact on global issues and relations through its foreign policy. Arguably, no place around the world has experienced this influence more than the Middle East. America seems intent on building and safeguarding its interests in the region. However, the country’s foreign policy in relation to the Middle East continues to raise questions, since it seems to revolve primarily around the U.S.-Israeli association. In this paper, I attempt to evaluate influence of Israel Lobby in molding American foreign policy. The analysis seeks to determine whether the Lobby is “better than anyone else lobbying in this town”, as President Bill Clinton once mentioned or if it lives up to Newt Gingrich’s, a former speaker of the house, hyperbole that it is “the most effective general interest group across the entire planet” (USIBP, 2009). It is common knowledge that the purpose of lobbies is to influence domestic and foreign policies by advocating for the interests of the parties they represent. Nonetheless, the chief point of interest is what makes the Israel lobby unique, instigating suppositions of wielding greater influence than others do. First, the paper examines the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as the focal point of a pro-Israel petitioning network, which according to authors such as Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), usually succeeds in compelling policymakers to support its interests. A former U.S senator once mentioned that “you can’t have an Israel policy other than what AIPAC gives you around here” (Wallace-Murphy, 2016), further stoking interest in this subject. The principal question that propels this study is whether AIPAC and the Israel Lobby at large, wields as much influence as claimed and which past incidents illustrate purported power. The primary argument is that, the Israel Lobby significantly influences U.S. foreign policy, with negative effects on America’s interests and prospects for peace in the Middle East.

The Israel Lobby

Prior to examining the impact of the Israel Lobby, it is important to understand what it is and the manner in which it works. According to Mast (2014), the Israel Lobby is a group of organizations and individuals specially created to promote Israeli interests, particularly in the U.S. It includes organizations like it includes organizations like the anti- defamation league, Christine groups like Christine United for Israel and publications like the wall Street Journal, the Weekly Standard and the New Republic (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Perhaps the most predominant governmental establishment that lobbies for Israel is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It is rated as one of the most influential lobby groups in America, and is responsible for drafting legislation for consideration by congress members. Research has shown that majority of both Democratic and Republican legislators often endorses legislation proposed by AIPAC to Congress. AIPAC maintains an estimated donation of $100 million and yearly revenue of approximately $60 million, two to three million dollars of which is spent annually in petitioning Congress to pass laws that protect Israel’s interests (Mast (2014). AIPAC does not directly disseminate campaign funds. Rather, the prominent lobby group utilizes a network comprising of about 30 Pro-Israel Political Action Committees (PACs). It is this entire network that constitutes the Israel Lobby, tasked with the primary responsibility of furthering favorable policy conditions for the country.

Inception of Pro-Israel Lobby Influence on the U.S

According to Quandt (2004), the United States and Israel share strong ties that have shown incremental growth in strength since the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973. In the 1967 war, Israel gained victory over the Arab nations of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, and effectively occupied its enemies’ territories thus; Israel acquired a unique bargaining position politically and strategically. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) indicate that it was after the wars that the U.S policy concerning the now victorious Israel shifted toward ensuring that the country got significant economic, political, and military support. Both Quandt (2004) and Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) further illustrate how the U.S. and its newly formed ally resorted to using the occupied areas of Gaza, Sinai, Golan Heights, and West Bank, as bargaining tools in exchange for acknowledgment of Israel, security, and peace from neighboring Arab nations. These factors demonstrate the degree to which Israel’s triumph over the warring Arab countries forged its relationship with the U.S., while subsequently increasing its security significance and geostrategic value to America (Quandt, 2005). This is because defeating Arab nations at the height of the Cold War portrayed Israel as a potent ally against the influence of Soviet Russia in the Middle East and as a counterforce to Arab nationalism, both considered threats to U.S. interests.

Influence of Israel Lobby in the Iraqi War

Just like the previous scholars, Sharp (2008) denote how pro-Israel lobbies, individuals and groups continued to use the country’s post-war status and strategic position as bargaining tools to foster favorable policy conditions. The author provides a comprehensive example, of how the lobby played a role in pressuring the Bush administration to launch the ‘War on Terror’ by invading Iraq, which was, at the time, governed by the volatile and dictatorial Saddam Hussein. Prior to the invasion, tensions had been rising between Iraq and Israel, with the Iraqi leader openly expressing disdain for and potential decimation of Israel. As a result, when President Bush used classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents indicating that the country had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and an ongoing chemical weaponry program to justify war on Iraq, the Israel Lobby was quick to support the move. Similarly, Mast (2014), highlights the role played by the Lobby in the Iraq war, by citing the resolution published by the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO); a conglomerate of Israel Lobby groups’ leaders. The resolution affirmed support for Bush and the U.S. government in the war against terror worldwide. The statement also expressly stipulated that, in the struggle against terrorism, Iraq posed distinctive dangers by possessing biological and chemical weapons, and as widely reported, could easily develop its nuclear capacity. The Israeli Lobby resolution further indicated that these weapons could be availed to terrorist networks with capability to affect the entire globe, including those that had targeted America and other nations. Both Sharp (2008) and Mast (2014) seem to reach the consensus that, by issuing this statement, the Israel Lobby possibly nudged the U.S. to eliminate a potential threat toward Israel’s interests. Along with Sharp (2008) and Mast (2014), Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell's former chief-of-staff, asserts the lobby influence and affects they had on Bush administration and decision making to invade Iraq (VPRO, 2007). Moreover, Mearsheimer in VPRO (2007) demonstrates the previous scholars argument, by mentioning a written piece by Israeli general named Shlomo Bran, which confirms that Israel was a full partner in this scheme to convince the public in the United States that Iraq was an imminent threat.

Israel Lobby Influence Modalities on U.S. Legislators

The Israel Lobby primarily gets its way by influencing U.S. lawmakers. This is demonstrated by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), who assert that one of the chief ways in which the Israel Lobby influences the U.S foreign policy is by persuading the representative lawmakers and legislators, especially members of Congress and the House of Senate, to pass laws that are favorable to Israel. Some of these laws are outlined on AIPAC’s website; with one of the most notable being The Iran Sanctions Act. The latter is a law that comprises of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Another pro-Israel law advocated for by AIPAC is the Combating BDS Act of 2016 (S. 2531 and H.R. 4514). This Act seeks to increase efforts to counter economic warfare targeting Israel at local and state levels. The U.S. and Israel also signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that assures Israel of $38 billion from the U.S. in form of security aid for financial years 2019-2028 (AIPAC, 2016). Further, by choosing to focus more on Congress than on the State Department, the Israel Lobby portrayed and continues to portray the intention to have a direct impact on the law making process as opposed to following conventional means available for advocates of other countries to present their interests (Sharp, 2008). Not only that, the lobby according to The University of Chicago (2015), in the past 30 years AIPAC particularly, and others have helped drive a number of politicians out off office that opposed the U.S. special relation with Israel including, but not limited to Paul Findley, Pete Mccloskey, Charles Percy, Cynthia Mckinney, Roger Jefferson and Lincoln Chafee. One cannot help but wonder whether the intent focus by Israel and the pro-Israel lobby on the country’s security, from perceived threat comes at the expense of amiable relations with the rest of the Middle East countries, particularly its immediate neighbor, Palestine. It seems unfair of Israel, with the support of America, to overlook the strife of Palestinian civilians, in pursuit of authority.

Mast (2014), on the other hand, argues that the Israel Lobby does more than simply inform lawmakers and legislators about Israel’s concerns. This author points out that, even though AIPAC does not make any direct political contributions since it is legally barred from doing so, the Lobby uses its vast resources to link incumbent and potential Congress members with pro-Israel sponsors (Mast, 2014). This is equivalent to gift giving, since the Lobby’s is currently estimated to have a $3million yearly promotion budget, In addition, irrespective of ethics laws in the U.S. that forbid elected officials from receiving gifts, including free travel packages, from lobbyists or their organizations, the Israel Lobby has regularly funded such trips to Israel for decades (Mast, 2014). For example, AIPAC recently took several newly elected congressional representatives to Israel, in an attempt to derail the nuclear agreement that Iran sought to obtain, although not successful, the trip demonstrates the degree to which the Lobby will go in an effort to advance its objectives (Ho and Demirjian, 2015). Nearly 10 percent of overseas congressional trips taken between 2000 and 2005 were to Israel. Most are paid for by the American Israel Education Foundation, a sister organization of the AIPAC (Abourezk 2007).This image of strength showcased by the Israel Lobby encourages U.S. officeholders and political candidates to accept contributions from pro-Israel donors, fearing that even if they turn the offers down, other political aspirants especially their opponents will take the opportunity and advance in their careers (Mast, 2014). Findley (2008) puts emphasis on the negative implications of this kind of influence, by highlighting the fact that the Lobby uses legal loopholes created by confusing rules and doubtful exceptions to continue influencing legislators to further its agenda. . Examples of such ambiguities include continued sponsored congressional tours to Israel, despite extant rules requiring pre-approval of all trips by the House Ethics Committee, as well as, acceptance of campaign donations disguised as gifts to evade the legal limits to funds that lawmakers are allowed to receive (Abourezk, 2007). Jim Abourezk (2007), a former democratic senator from South Dakota stated that these trips are defended as "educational", yet “in reality, as I know from my many colleagues in the House and Senate who participated in them, they offer Israeli propagandists an opportunity to expose members of Congress to only their side of the story” (Abourezk, 2007). On the other hand, Jimmy Carter, a former president of United States stated clearly that “very few congress respresentatives would ever dare to visit the Palestinian cities of Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, Gaza City or even Bethlehem and talk to the beleaguered residents” (Carter, 2006).

Israel Lobby Economic Influence

The influence of the Israel Lobby on U.S. foreign policy is further evident from the burden imposed on American taxpayers in form of a considerable financial aid given by the U.S. gives to Israel annually. The extra monetary assistance aid given by the U.S. to Israel, compared to other recipients, without evidence of reciprocal benefits continues to increase questions about the strategic importance of Israel to America. According to Murad (2013), the U.S.-Israel dynamic is an exceptional example of using financial aid, as a tool to mold foreign policy. The author illustrates how Israel has incrementally received fiscal assistance not solely for military or humanitarian needs of the Israeli people, but as a result of the country’s geopolitical and strategic significance to the U.S. Murad (2013) further points out that, America did not start and does not continue spending billions in economic and military aid to Israel simply because of a sense of moral responsibility, but because Israel became an asset of strategic importance after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Nonetheless, instead of promoting better relations between the Middle East and America as its chief ally in the region, animosity toward the U.S. has grown. This is perhaps due to the supposition that the U.S. often takes Israel’s stance. Besides, Murad (2013) denotes that Israel’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP), which is a primary indicator of a country’s economic performance, ranks it among the top 40 richest countries in the world, it’s not a poor country like Nepal. The key implication from these statistics is that, Israel is not so poor as to justify U.S. fiscal aid. Likewise, Twing (1996) denotes that in addition to receiving substantial amounts of funds, Israel, unlike other recipients of America aid, is exempted from some conditions associated with this privilege. For example, all nations that receive financial assistance from the U.S usually get the granted amount on quarterly basis. Contrastingly, since 1982, Israel has received its grant in its entirety at the beginning of every financial year. In addition to getting financial aid as a lump sum, Israel is allowed to reinvest the money it receives in U.S treasury notes. As a result, the country earns a large amount of money in form of interest, which is paid by American taxpayers, further perpetuating the idea of Israel being an economic burden (Twing, 1996).

Viability of Israel as a Strategic U.S. Partner

Refuting Israel’s position as viable partner Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) point out that Israel would serve as a strategic asset to America if it provided a cost-effective approach to dealing with issues unfavorable to the U.S. For instance, since the strategic logic that defines the U.S.-Israeli association seems to primarily focus on security concerns, Israel should prove its position as a counterforce against radical powers in the Middle East, characterized by violent extremism and radical Islamists. They also indicate that Israel would be strategically important to the U.S. if the relationship would guarantee greater security for America and provide advantages that outweigh financial as well as political costs incurred. Mast (2014) supports the argument by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) by outlining incidents that have negated Israel’s strategic importance for the U.S. For instance, Israel’s overly oppressive approach to governing in the Middle East in the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union was seeking influence, pushed extremists to the USSR hence against America. Secondly, the inclination to view Middle East from a Cold War outlook has prevented creation of peace thus continued Arab-Israeli conflicts (Mast, 2014). This is because such perception continues to view neighboring Arab nations as enemies, thus creating barriers to peace talks and diplomatic resolution of issues affecting the region.

Unlike Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) and Mast (2014) who explore the strategic importance of Israel to the U.S from a chronological outlook, Murad (2013) examines the same from the perspective of the two countries’ interests. The scholar posits that the U.S.-Israel association is undoubtedly complex and it is virtually impossible for the two nations to have identical national interests or strategic concerns. For example, Israel is primarily focused on ensuring its safety in an environment where it is surrounded by volatile countries, tribes, and sects, among other factions, most of which are against it. As a result, maintaining a relationship with a global power like America ensures that its enemies, both current and potential, are kept at bay. Conversely, the U.S. seeks strategic placement within the global context, in a bid to sustain political, social, and economic benefits. This calls for amiable diplomacy with all strategic partners, democratic affiliation, and minimal conflicts in general. However, affiliation with Israel draws perceptions of resentment from other nations in the Middle East toward the U.S. Consequently, the U.S. has continuously lost the allegiance of would-be strategic partners and inflamed factions that consider the country an enemy, to the extent of instigating violent attacks against its interest at home and internationally. This perspective seems to adopt an understanding tone for the disparity between the two countries and calls for consensual agreement to find the most appropriate middle ground that can be mutually beneficial (Murad, 2013).

Impact of Israel-U.S Connection on U.S. Security and Global Image

According to Findley (2008) findings that drew responses from several congressmen, his experience as a lawmaker, and the U.S.-Israel connection, heightened by the Israel Lobby could be responsible for undermining the U.S. national security and harming the country’s image globally. The outcome of the study showed that, receipts of political contributions from the Lobby or pro-Israel lobbyists by lawmakers and legislators create an image of a corrupt and materialistic government and apparent favoritism of Israel make it seem like the U.S is unprejudiced. Further, such acts erode people’s trust in the U.S. government, both locally and globally. Flibbert (2006) agrees on the detrimental impact of the Lobby promoted U.S.-Israel relationship, by showing how the Bush government’s attempt to change administrative structures in the Middle East to adopt democracy, accentuated antagonism toward America. Forcing democracy, particularly in Iraq instigated an insurgency, paving way for an unprecedented increase in oil prices throughout the world. The conflict further triggered several terrorist attacks such as the London, Amman, and Madrid bombings, as well as, violent conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza that resurge every now and then. Findley (2008) and Flibbert (2006) both argue that these cases of violent terrorism and constant fighting are possible incidents of the region’s rebellion toward U.S. foreign policy, which presently revolves around maintaining a supposedly strategic position with Israel. In this context, it is arguable that Israel, the unmistakable U.S. ally in the region only serves to exacerbate the negative view of America.

Conclusion

In summation, evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Israel Lobby has immense influence on the U.S. foreign policy. It is apparent that the Lobby has in the past pursued, and continues to advocate for policies that barely make sense strategically, morally and economically for the U.S. Strategic interests, coupled with the effort to gain supremacy over the then Soviet Union, have instigated a wide array of interventions in the Middle East by the U.S. ranging from cordial diplomacy to full-scale war in some countries like Iraq. However, the U.S. foreign policy targeting the Middle East is hinged on its relationship with Israel. The connection between these two nations strengthened after the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, at which point the U.S. government’s financial aid to Israel began increasing significantly. The questionable nature of the relationship and its influence is aggravated by the constant incidences of law violations by Israel without reprimand from the U.S. and continued provision of financial aid despite America’s economic constraints. The relationship has fuelled resentment toward the U.S., to the detriment of its national security and economic interests. Ultimately, if America is to maintain a positive image and productive relations with the Middle East and the world at large, it should adopt a participatory approach to foreign policy, as opposed to solely embracing a single ally’s stance.

Read More

Both Quandt (2004) and Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) further illustrate how the U.S. and its newly formed ally resorted to using the occupied areas of Gaza, Sinai, Golan Heights, and West Bank, as bargaining tools in exchange for acknowledgment of Israel, security, and peace from neighboring Arab nations. These factors demonstrate the degree to which Israel’s triumph over the warring Arab countries forged its relationship with the U.S., while subsequently increasing its security significance and geostrategic value to America (Quandt, 2005). This is because defeating Arab nations at the height of the Cold War portrayed Israel as a potent ally against the influence of Soviet Russia in the Middle East and as a counterforce to Arab nationalism, both considered threats to U.S. interests.

Influence of Israel Lobby in the Iraqi War

Just like the previous scholars, Sharp (2008) denote how pro-Israel lobbies, individuals and groups continued to use the country’s post-war status and strategic position as bargaining tools to foster favorable policy conditions. The author provides a comprehensive example, of how the lobby played a role in pressuring the Bush administration to launch the ‘War on Terror’ by invading Iraq, which was, at the time, governed by the volatile and dictatorial Saddam Hussein. Prior to the invasion, tensions had been rising between Iraq and Israel, with the Iraqi leader openly expressing disdain for and potential decimation of Israel. As a result, when President Bush used classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents indicating that the country had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and an ongoing chemical weaponry program to justify war on Iraq, the Israel Lobby was quick to support the move. Similarly, Mast (2014), highlights the role played by the Lobby in the Iraq war, by citing the resolution published by the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO); a conglomerate of Israel Lobby groups’ leaders. The resolution affirmed support for Bush and the U.S. government in the war against terror worldwide. The statement also expressly stipulated that, in the struggle against terrorism, Iraq posed distinctive dangers by possessing biological and chemical weapons, and as widely reported, could easily develop its nuclear capacity. The Israeli Lobby resolution further indicated that these weapons could be availed to terrorist networks with capability to affect the entire globe, including those that had targeted America and other nations. Both Sharp (2008) and Mast (2014) seem to reach the consensus that, by issuing this statement, the Israel Lobby possibly nudged the U.S. to eliminate a potential threat toward Israel’s interests. Along with Sharp (2008) and Mast (2014), Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell's former chief-of-staff, asserts the lobby influence and affects they had on Bush administration and decision making to invade Iraq (VPRO, 2007). Moreover, Mearsheimer in VPRO (2007) demonstrates the previous scholars argument, by mentioning a written piece by Israeli general named Shlomo Bran, which confirms that Israel was a full partner in this scheme to convince the public in the United States that Iraq was an imminent threat.

Israel Lobby Influence Modalities on U.S. Legislators

The Israel Lobby primarily gets its way by influencing U.S. lawmakers. This is demonstrated by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), who assert that one of the chief ways in which the Israel Lobby influences the U.S foreign policy is by persuading the representative lawmakers and legislators, especially members of Congress and the House of Senate, to pass laws that are favorable to Israel. Some of these laws are outlined on AIPAC’s website; with one of the most notable being The Iran Sanctions Act. The latter is a law that comprises of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Another pro-Israel law advocated for by AIPAC is the Combating BDS Act of 2016 (S. 2531 and H.R. 4514). This Act seeks to increase efforts to counter economic warfare targeting Israel at local and state levels. The U.S. Read More