Views of Simpson and Echevarria on the Relevance of Clausewitz to Conflict in the 21st Century - Assignment Example

Student’s Name Grade Course Tutor’s Name Date Q. How do views of Simpson and Echevarria differ on the relevance of Clausewitz to conflict in the 21st century? The major difference between Simpson’s and Echevarria’s views seems to be in their interpretation of conflict in the 21st century and the relevance of Clausewitz’s views on the same. On her part, Simpsons appears to hold the belief that contemporary conflict may not necessarily fall within Clausewitz’s description of war. According to the Simpsons, Clausewitz understood that war was defined as decisive, brutal and finite. However, the current proliferation of conflict does not seem to fit into Clausewitz definition of war because some countries are potentially being dragged into endless conflict that exceed their initial intended political utility both in the human- and financial-related costs. Specifically, (Simpsons 63) states that “Clausewitz’s analysis was not intended to describe circumstances in which armed force was used as a direct extension of political activity outside war”. In other words, as long as it is not war, Clausewitz’s analysis cannot be applied. In case of the Iraq War for example, Simpsons observes that a US army general effectively stating that Iraq was an operation rather than a war (63). On his part, and using the example of the war on terror, Echevarria holds the belief that Clausewitz’s views remain relevant to date (217). Echevarria argues that Clausewitz’s trinity has wrongly been used to refer to the military, government and the people, rather than the principal tendencies namely purpose, hostility and chance. In his argument, Echevarria states that the latter ‘principal tendencies’ are represented in the former ‘institutions’, i.e. the military, government and people, something that he says that most analysts do not understand hence their contrary views regarding Clausewitz’s theory application in contemporary conflicts (217). True to Echevarria’s views, Simpson has at some point indicated that the taxes obtained from the populace would ultimately be needed to sustain strategic choices made by governments regarding military deployments; yet, the public is rarely engaged in discussions regarding whether to go to war and cannot therefore be said to be driving the emotion that inspires governments to act. Based on the Echevarria comment above regarding holders of contrary opinion not understanding the application of Clausewitz theory, one could therefore ask, did Simpsons or even Echevarria really understand what Clausewitz meant? Well, perhaps none of them did, or perhaps all two analysts were right in their interpretations since after all, the interpretation of meaning is different among people. Echevarria seems to be more open to the possibility that War is not a definite concept and that even Clausewitz had stated that it would be strategically important for one to “recognize correctly the kind of war one is about to undertake” (Echevarria 211). According to the author, war can be political or cultural in nature. Clausewitz’s views on the nature of war according to Echevarria therefore seem to suggest that people or governments use war for different purposes. Whatever the purposes however, Echevarria seems to link wars with either political or cultural reasons. Using the example of terrorism, the author observes that acts or terror “as with many other forms of war, may emerge from existing political conditions, and thus may be a continuation of political activity” (213). The military according Echevarria is only a tool that is used to perpetuate political and religious or secular beliefs. Another difference between Simpsons’s and Echevarria’s views is that the former seems to suggest that polarity does not exist in most 21st century conflicts thus compromising the “Clausewitzian conception…from the outset (Simpsons 54). Specifically, one gets the impression that Simpson does not hold the belief that there is a difference between political and military activities anymore since governments/liberal powers and the military/armed forces have blurred the lines of powers that were initially identified by Clausewitz’s trinity. On his part, Echevarria appears to hold onto the concept that the trinity (of hostility, chance and purpose) is still relevant, and as such, Clausewitz’s perceptions should not be perceived a mere indication that wars are just continuation of policies. Echeverria specifically suggests that instead of being perceived as a means through which policy could be continued, war (between countries or even communities) should be perceived as an outgrowth of prevailing political, cultural or even technological conditions. On one part of his narrative for example, Echevarria states that Clausewitz had described war as a “smaller crashes or engagements” thus meaning that wars did not necessarily have to be between two nation states (199). On his part, Simpson commenting about the involvement of the UK in Afghanistan observes that it was a case of “misalignment between policy and method”, which was a result of unclear military deployments and differences in interpretations regarding the government’s decision regarding the deployments (41). Interpreting Clausewitz’s views and applying them in the 21st century conflict scenario, Echevarria evidently holds the opinion that the war on terror is political in nature and as such, requires a political approach. Reading Echeverria’s views, one gets the impression that he thinks military actions will be counterproductive to state policies if the war on terror is not perceived as being political in nature. Specifically, he uses a quote where it is indicated that “war as a whole always has an ultimate political purpose” (Echevarria 201). In some wars, a limited purpose is sought, while in others, conquest would be the main aim. Notably however, and unlike Simpson, Echevarria holds the opinion that Clausewitz was right in indicating that although the times and forms of war may change, it logic would remain the same. Using analogy, Echevarria notes that Clausewitz had in his work likened war’s objective and subjective qualities to the colour changes that a chameleon undergoes; its internal makeup does not alter as a result (203). In his chapter concluding statement, Simpsons states that Afghanistan is an example of how “Clausewitzian war” can be confused with “armed conflicts outside war” (66). This is unlike Echevarria who as indicated above believes that Clausewitz concepts of governments and states can also include warring communities. This then means that such concepts can still be applicable within the boundaries of national states. Simpsons also observes that contemporary wars feature the “absence or more typically the compromise, of the two prerequisites that bound the circumstance of war, and thus allow war’s mechanism to function as a political instrument” (Simpson 66). Notably, the two prerequisites that Simpson (66) is referring to are polarity between the conflicting sides, and the strategic association of audiences with each of the conflicting sides. In his view, Simpson appears to hold the view that the two prerequisites in contemporary conflict are compromised, thus his opinion that the war or conflict’s ability to give outcomes are also compromised. Simpson further supports his position by arguing that if two sides can justifiably claim victory after war, then the latter should be perceived as a redundant political instrument through which parties to the conflict can reach a decision (67). In reference to the strategic association of audiences of audiences with each conflicting sides, Simpsons seems to be relying on the conflicting opinions that Afghans had during the NATO-led invasions into their country, where some were said to perceive the war as pitting them again the West, while others believed it was a war to restore local issues and democracy. Although Echevarria has not directly commented about the division of audiences (or the populace) towards war, the precedence created by his observations indicate that he would most likely identify the groups of populace into (maybe) insurgents and the non-insurgent population who wanted law and order restored in Afghanistan. The political outcomes would then depend on the support or resistance that the NATO-led forces would receive from either or one side of the population divide, and based on such an argument, Echevarria would still consider the Afghan war as being within Clausewitz war theories. Overall, Echevarria is among the proponents of the idea that some of Clausewitz opinions regarding war are still relevant in the contemporary world. Simpsons on the other hand is of contrary opinion and evidently believes that contemporary conflicts lack the polarity and the strategic audiences needed to enable wars obtain political outcomes as suggested by Clausewitz. An analytical look at the two authors however arguably shows that it is just a matter of perceptions and interpreting what Clausewitz really meant in his writing. For the most part however, it is likely that each author will uphold their diverse opinions on the issue, something that is likely to happen even with other authors and scholars in future. Possibly, there is no right or wrong about whether Clausewitz opinions are relevant to conflict in the 21st century; as proven by Echevarria and Simpson, supporting one’s point of view is what really matters because after all, War is not exactly a science. Notably, and as indicated by Echevarria, Clausewitz left many gaps in his concept of the nature of war, and as such, researchers, scholars and authors should perhaps focus on developing “verifiable knowledge of war”, which would fill such gaps (218). Works Cited Echevarria II Artulio J. “Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror.” In Strachan Hew and Andreas Herberg- Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 196-218. Print. Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Print. Read More