Political Communications - Essay Example

In the contemporary technological era, the role of communication and information becomes more important than ever before. In fact, the appearance of newspapers in the previous centuries is only the beginning of the long process in establishment of the communication between political leaders and public. Nowadays, with the rising number of paper media, television, radio, and the Internet increases the importance of investigations on communication is even higher. In this context, the direct impact of political communication on both the political system and the lives of ordinary people in the state is evident. In the recent years, the real consequences of media influence on the public opinion were shocking. Precisely, the cases of genocide in Rwanda and El Salvador and ethnic cleansings in former Yugoslavia are challenging the theory of political communication. In this context, the aim of this essay is to represent the contemporary appearance of political communication theory and the approaches it uses to explain the humanitarian disasters in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and El Salvador. For this aim, the role of media, its propagandistic effect, and reconciliatory potential represent the way in which political communication theory deals with such severe conflicts. To start with, the role of media is crucial in explanation of the key drivers to ethnic conflicts. At the very beginning of political communications theory development, comparative politics was not interested in researching on media; although, communication discipline included it as essential element (Esser and Pfetsch, 2004, p. 3). Moreover, the very understanding of such an important channel of political communication as media was hardly connected with political global context. Because of this, it was a long way before it was possible to investigate ethnic conflicts in different parts of our planet with the help of certain criteria. Currently, political scientists acknowledge this factor in political communication analysis. For instance, Norris (2000) proposes to investigate the dependence between media trends and public opinion changes (p. 36). Even though this approach seems hard to use, it acknowledges the fact that people know about politics not only with the help of media but also from interpersonal communication (Lang, 2004, p. 171). In the given communications, scholars mostly concentrate on certain visible manifestations of public attitudes. For instance, Bar-Tai (2000) discusses “societal beliefs” as “society members’ shared cognitions on topics and issues that are of special concern for society and contribute to their sense of uniqueness” (p. 353). Correspondingly, Kellow and Steeves (1998) determine the close link between the media and “historical, cultural, and political-economic environments in which they function” (p. 108). In other words, instruments of political communication cannot operate in cultural vacuum, since they face the necessity to reflect certain stable attitudes and perceptions. At the same time, media has power to shape people’s attitudes. For this purpose, the role of media itself is highly specific; precisely, it should have “a diffuse, long-term, and cumulative influence on the political culture” (Norris, 2000, p. 37). However, it is problematic in terms of different levels of development in political culture across the world. In particular, Esser and Pfetsch (2004) highlight such a diversity in the statement, “Cultures constitute communities of values in the broader sense” (p. 7). In other words, it is even not accurate to concentrate on the differences between participant and parochial political cultures, but it is important to take into account wider understanding of different worldviews. Furthermore, Kellow and Steeves (1998) discuss the ability of media to form agenda setting and framing (p. 110). Due to these features, media gains more influence than any other incorporated in social fabric institution. Although, political environment determines the intensity of attitudes’ shaping. In this context, Esser and Pfetsch (2004) noticed the importance of democratic development within the country as an important factor of media’s behavior. In their own words, “the interrelations and consequences of political communication clearly wary according to the duration and the traditions of the development of democracy” (Esser and Pfetsch, 2004, p. 5). In the given circumstances, established by the developed countries media companies in the developing countries (Lang, 2004, p. 160) are questionable. In other words, once introduced “media conglomerates” (Esser and Pfetsch, 2004, p. 5) meet the real crises resulted from different types of political communication outside their internal borders, they face difficulties in rapid constructive reaction to these challenges. For instance, before the genocide in Rwanda international media either ignored this country or discussed the conflict in terms of ethnic struggle (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 112-113). Consequently, political communication as the phenomenon is complex and changeable; hence, it can serve as the field for both propaganda and reconciliation. Because of this, the role of media in ethnic conflicts led to such unexpected consequences as empowering genocides and ethnic cleansings. Concerning the appearing cases of cruelty in certain countries, political communication revealed itself in the preliminary stage of genocide or ethnic cleansing through the well-established media propaganda. In general, it is evident that media uses propaganda through the simple repetition (Oberschall (2000, p. 993); thus, it appears in all the societies. However, Herman and Chomsky (2002) noticed that “inequality of wealth and power” (p. 2) is the driving force for propaganda, since the more people have access to protect their interests openly, the harder it is to shape unified perception in the huge group of population. In other words, nondemocratic government can use both ethnicity and media as a tool to protect its influence in the society (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 115). In general, the problem with the access of nongovernmental and oppositional groups to the media is a common fact for the most of the countries in the world (Lang, 2004, p. 170). At the same time, the very reliance on the information gained from media dramatically increases in the circumstances while society suffers from the lack of confidence in political stability, economic prosperity, or environmental safety (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 110). Consequently, the propaganda potential of media increases in such non-favorable circumstances. In this context, the case of Rwanda reveals the blurring ethnic division in contrast to the clear contrast in wealth and political influence between local ethnic groups, Tutsi and Hutu (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 113). In addition, the low literacy, strong tradition of authoritarianism, and population’s poverty empowered radio as an oral tool of information in these unclear circumstances (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 116). In general, the common belief that “local stations are … means to protect cultural and linguistic diversity of ethnic or regional groups” (Lang, 2004, p. 170) did not prove its sustainability with the appearance of hate radio during Rwanda genocide (Kellow and Steeves, 1998). In general, the intergroup conflicts like genocide and ethnic cleansing differ by the purpose of conflict (religion, ideology or race), involved actors (different ethnic groups or different states) and the outcome specifics (division or forced unity) (Bar-Tai, 2000, p. 355). Moreover, Oberschall (2000) distinguishes ethnic cleansing from genocide by the members of the conflict; in the latter case, they are neighbors, but ethnic cleansing is the conflict between army or other state institution and civilians (p. 982-983). Because of this, generalized theoretical concepts usually do not reflect the full state of political communication in each certain case. For instance, the taken for granted notion that there exists “the obvious trend towards professionalization of political and public communication” (Lang, 2004, p.177) is not working in the circumstances of non-democratic political regimes. In this context, the local media in Rwanda is an illustrative example, since it carries accusations in leading to ethnic violence for the sake of political competition in by bringing fear, hatred and panic among the population (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 107). In the same manner, situation of uncertainty after Yugoslavia’s collapse enabled nationalists to launch crisis frame in Balkans. In fact, they used similar fears: “fear of extinction as a group, fear of assimilation, fear of domination by another group, fear for one’s life and property, fear of being a victim once more” (Oberschall, 2000, p. 990). Although, propagandistic potential of media is working even in Western societies. In USA, local media hardly meet the interests of low-income and ethnic minority groups (Norris, 2000, p. 64). In this context, Herman and Chomsky (2002) rely on the “right-thinking personnel” as well as on “the editors’ and working journalists’ internalization of proprieties and definitions of news-worthiness” (p. xi) in building their propaganda model for media. For the means of current analysis, they found out the manipulative usage of term “genocide” in the cases of Kosovo, East Timor and Turkey. In their opinion, “the double standard reflected in… the media regularly focusing on the abuse of worthy victims and playing down or neglecting altogether the plight of unworthy victims” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002, p. xxiii). In the given circumstances, media shaped the wrong perception on the conflicts in other countries in order to lead to favorable consequences in civic actions (meaning involvement in the conflict as the third party). In other words, the impact of political communication within all the involved parties is rather manipulative and propagandistic. However, the extent of these propagandas is different. While the directly involved in genocide media use “risk and danger” or “kill or be killed” frames (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 124), the outcomes of Western propaganda are not that vital. Nevertheless, it also leads to severe problems. For instance, it results in the lack of coordination between the involved actors complicate the situation, as it happened in case of the World Bank, the IMF, and the U.N. in El Salvador (Soto and Castillo, 1994, p. 72). Following Soto and Castillo’s (1994) metaphor, “it was as if patient lay on the operation table with the left and right sides of his body separated by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side” (p. 74). In this situation, such an ambiguity and disorientation of the third party requires the support from local government for its effective involvement (Holiday and Stanley, 1999, p. 19). Moreover, it leads to the appearance of international help dilemma, meaning the doubtful usefulness of the reliance on third parties in resolution of internal conflicts (Holiday and Stanley, 1993, p. 2). Notwithstanding its necessity, it is evident that political communication uses propaganda model in any political and social circumstances. Finally, the effectiveness in falling back on political communications in solving ethnic problems is crucial due to the severity of the discussed problems. In Montville’s (1993) words, “the losses from these conflicts are painful in terms of lives, sometimes territory, and always a sense of safety and justice” (p. 112). In the context of a long history of hatred before these humanitarian disasters’ aftermath, political communication theory not only analyzes the conflict outcome as its resolution but also discusses different opportunities of reconciliation between the former opponents. In this context, Bar-Tai (2000) introduces the concepts of “conflictive ethos,” which causes the danger of ethnic clashes to reappear, and “peace ethos,” meaning effective reconciliation. In Oberschall’s (2000) terms, it means changing cognitive frames from crisis to normal one (p. 989). In the discussed instances of “intractable conflicts” (Bar-Tai, 2000) like genocide and ethnic cleansing, the end of an open armed conflict does not surely means the end of the problem. On the contrary, “formal conflict resolution is only a necessary phase on the rocky road of peacemaking” (Bar-Tai, 2000, p. 355). In practice, the comprehensive sets of agreements between El Salvador leaders – on transfers to conflict areas, demilitarization, empowering civilians, and structural reforms (Holiday and Stanley, 1993, p. 5) – was not enough to stop the negative attitudes within the society. Moreover, El Salvador’s dilemma demonstrated that stabilization and peace processes “lived under separate roofs” (Solo and Castillo, 1994, p. 72). In other words, with the appearance of cruel civil war in El Salvador, the international community had no knowledge of how to deal with such a complex problem as dealing with consequences of genocide propaganda. By summarizing previous researches on the topic, Montville (1993) stresses on the necessity to change either political attitudes, or political beliefs, or complete belief systems (p. 133) in order to start the process of reconciliation. For this purpose, the range of instruments to use goes far beyond the limits of media. In fact, psychological devices are more effective, meaning problem-solving workshops, constructing historical record, encouraging acknowledgement of mutual fault and forgiveness, therapeutic strategies and other methods (Montville, 1993). In practice, scholars agree on that the appearance of Rwandan genocide took a long period of psychological preparation to fear and hatred between the neighbors (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 123). In this case, the proposed by Norris (2000) and Lang (2004) importance of public interactions is included. Correspondingly, Bar-Tai (2000) stresses on the necessity of simultaneous change in the complex of “particular perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and motivations” (p. 352). In the case of El Salvador, the Truth Commission worked on the creation of appropriate social conditions for further reconciliation. In particular, it aimed to guarantee mutual acceptance of certain judgements on the twelve-year struggle (Holiday and Stanley, 1993, p. 15). In general, all of the mentioned conflicts demonstrated the power of media in the circumstances of public distrust (Holiday and Stanley, 1993; Kellow and Steeves, 1998; Oberschall, 2000); therefore, the comprehensive grassroots approach is needed in order to rebuild the normal relations between the former and the new neighbors. Finally, the role of political leadership is also crucial in the process of fixing the ethnic problems. Among the other factors, it represents the high degree of significance, since “there is empirical evidence that thoughtfully designed initiatives in providing cognitive data – new information from credible sources – even is dissonant with existing beliefs, can effect constructive change” (Montville, 1993, p. 123). In this context, the key media accused in Rwandan genocide, radio RTLM, was closely linked to the government (Kellow and Steeves, 1998, p. 117); thus, the most part in starting the conflict lies on the political leadership even in the part of media influence. In other words, the role of governmental communication with public via media sources remains the key element in a reconciliation process in the same way it had been a main basis of hatred to spread before. Nevertheless, the essence of the leadership’s actions is important. In the case of El Salvador, the declared by leaders of government and opposition satisfaction with peace was not supported by the identical arguments (Holiday and Stanley, 1993, p. 1). On the contrary, the internal situation within Tito’s Yugoslavia had proved that people that lived through two Balkan wars and civil conflicts in the two World Wars can live peacefully in a one state (Oberschall, 2000, p. 989). Consequently, political leaders should realize that the process of reconciliation is a long-term process that requires comprehension of all the grassroots problems. In order to sum up, it is evident that severe ethnic conflicts like genocide and ethnic cleansing encourage political communication theory to investigate the role of media and propaganda in provoking and reconciliation potential in solving them. In fact, it is evident that media is the key instrument for both of these processes, since it has a severe power in all of the societies in terms of framing and setting the agenda of public opinion. In this context, media can even reshape interpersonal relations, even though it is deeply incorporated in social fabric. However, the extent to which it can happen depends on the political regime within the particular state. In the selected cases of Rwanda, Yugoslavia and El Salvador, conditions of non-transparent democracy and fear of uncertainty created favorable environment for media propaganda of hate and violence. Even though propaganda is an inevitable flaw of each media, the cultural conditions of ethnic clashes and political necessity empowered the existing cleavages to the extent of genocide or ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, political communication proposes numerous ways of conflicts’ reconciliation. Among them, psychological techniques and political incentive are the most important means. On the one hand, numerous workshops can restore mutual trust between the former enemies. On another hand, political leaders of post-conflict country should realize the depth of the problem and continue the conflict’s resolution. In any case, the growing number of genocide and ethnic cleansing cases enables political communication to meet the dangers of media propaganda in advance and make these types of ethnic conflicts rather an exception than a rule. References: Bar-Tai, D., 2000. From Intractable Conflict Though Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis. Political Psychology, 21(2): pp. 351-365. Esser, F. and Pfetsch, B., 2004. Comparing Political Communication: Reorientations in a Changes World. In: F. Esser and B. Pfetsch (eds.), 2004. Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 3-24. Herman, E. and Chomsky, N., 2002. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy and he Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books. Holiday, D. and Stanley, W., 1993. Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador. Journal of International Affairs, 46(2), pp. 1-28. Kellow, C. and Steeves, H., 1998. The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide. Journal of Communication, Summer, pp. 107-128. Lang, S., 2004. Local Political Communication: Media and Local Publics in the Age of Globalization. In: F. Esser and B. Pfetsch (eds.), 2004. Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 151-183. Montville, J., 1993. The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution. In: D. Sandole (ed.), 1993. Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Pp. 112-127. Norris, P., 2000. A Virtue Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Obershall, A., 2000. The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation and War in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(6), pp. 982-1001. Soto. A. de and Castillo, G. de, 1994. Obstacles to Peacebuilding. Foreign Policy, 94, pp. 69-83. Read More