Impact of Congressional Resolutions on Syrian Chemical Attack - Case Study Example

Impact of Congressional Resolutions on Syrian Chemical Attack in Introduction The Syrian crisis has led to massiveloss of life and destruction of property as government and rebel opposition forces fight each other to take control of different points within the country. International attention and concern has grown over rampant violation of human rights in Syria especially by government forces that deliberately attack its civilians with military weapons. However, Ghouta attack of august 2013 demonstrated to the world how far the Assad regime was willing to go in an attempt to protect his hold of power. Opposition rebels were making advances into the suburbs of the Markaz Rif district and the government looked overwhelmed, with Damascus facing eminent threat against the rebel forces that sought to overthrow the government through the Arabian crisis (Blanchard, Christopher, Carlo and Mary 1). In response, the government used rockets containing chemical weapon sarin to attack rebel forces together with innocent civilians killing over 280 people and injuring more than 1700. The actions of the government shocked the world and increased attention on the conflict that was going on in the country as no chemical weapon has been used before since the end of the Iran-Iraq crisis. The United States government investigated the issues and a report was published by the United States congress which blamed the government for using the nerve agent chemical weapon against harmless and unarmed civilians. President Obama and his administration showed the willingness to take military actions against the Syrian government either through direct attacks or by providing military aid to the rebels in order to stifle the operations of the government (Blanchard, Christopher, Carlo and Mary 1). The report released by the United States congress on the use of chemical weapons in 2013 in Syria had massive impacts on the policies of the United States government and the direction of the Syrian internal conflict (Zeiler and Robert 216). Description of the issue The Ghouta suburbs close to Damascus is composed of Sunni conservatives and is home to more than three million people who Assad regime believe are funding the rebel forces. The decision of civilians in the eastern parts of the suburb which is held by the opposition rebels to take their side has given the Assad government illegitimate reasons to use all forms of forces and destabilize the opposition. Control of the region by the opposition since 2012 has cut the Syrian government from accessing hinterland, a situation that contributed to the use of chemical weapons in august of 2013. Apart from the use of chemical weapons, the government of Syria has previously used tanks and missile attacks to flash off the rebels from the region with little success. Exactly a year before the day that the government decided to use sarin on its people, president Obama had warned the parties to the conflict against using chemical weapons against each, highlighting the consequences that such actions will have. Though the use of chemical weapons have been suspected in previous attacks during the conflict, the attack of august 2013 was the only clear incident in which chemical weapon was used despite pressure from international community (Sterner 407). Apart from directly affecting the performance of the Lebanese economy, the Syrian conflict has also influenced the political directions in the country. The dynamics among political factions in the country has significantly changed due to the sectarian nature of the conflict, which has continued to be based on the Shiite and Sunni rivalries. The political fragmentation that has been witnessed among the Sunni community in Lebanon has been attributed to the Syrian conflict as some members of the community have directly engaged themselves in influencing the directions and outcome of the conflict (Blanchard, Christopher, Carlo and Mary 1). However, Sunni based political parties have been unable to adopt a common position on the mitigation of the political challenges of the conflicts in Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese Sunni politics has been fragmented as a major faction has openly shown its affiliation and ideological orientation with the opposition forces within the Syrian conflict. However, the Lebanese Sunni political formation has been unable to agree on the right response that can be used to address the aggression towards Sunnis within Lebanon and Syria during this conflict. For example, a car bomb that targeting the Sunnis in Tripoli killed over 45 civilians, prompting a faction of the Sunni political formation to demand for communal policing initiatives, a call that was opposed by other groups such as the future movement (Sterner 407). Within the Shia community, no transformation has been witnessed, as has been the case among the Sunnis though the participation of the Hezbollah group in the conflict has had political implications on the community. This has been the case especially among non-Shia members of the Shia political formation who believe that the move by the Hezbollah jeopardizes the formations’ ideals. Preexisting tensions within the political alliances that were formed after March 8 have been reignited by the Syrian war especially with Lebanon. This political formation involved political parties such as the Hezbollah, the anal movement and the free patriotic movement, which are major political parties in Lebanon with influence on the Syrian conflict. Most of these Shia political formations that entered into the alliance have disapproved the Hezbollah direct engagement in the war, citing lack of cooperation and engagement of other members of the alliance. The Syrian uprising has created significant risks to the security and stability of Lebanon as a country at a time when the Sunni and the Shiites are against each other in the country. The long border of Lebanon with Syria has opened it refugees and rebels from Syria who present significant challenges to the Lebanese security apparatus (Sterner 407). The risk faced by Lebanon has been attributed to number of factors, including the weak security system, high sectarian tension and extensive political conflicts and coalitions that serve individual and self-interests. The border classes in the country, high level of political assassinations, kidnappings and an inflow of refugees have made the country porous and more prone to a spillover from the Syrian crisis (Stahn 960). The Hezbollah have also contributed to the challenging security situation in Lebanon as their perpetual conflict with Israel affects the normalcy of the country. The Shia group has also moved into Syria to support Assad forces against the Sunni rebels who are currently trying to topple the government of Syria. Though the Shia group openly supports Assad, they are keen to ensure that the country is free from sectarian class fueled by the Syrian crisis. Sunni groups and political parties based in Syria have also openly funded the activities of the Syrian rebels though the parties have expressed desire to maintain internal stability in Lebanon (Freeman 17). The different positions taken by the political sides have the potential of creating a Sunni-Shia tension and conflict within Lebanon, a situation that will be blamed on the Syrian situation. This, political pundits blames on the dominance of the Hezbollah and their open relationship with the Assad regime that fights with Sunni rebels based in the north. The stakes that the conflict has on the position of the Hezbollah on the region’s politics has also fueled the crisis further in Lebanon. A win for the rebels will force the group to reconsider their strategies and position in the country’s politics while an Assad will strengthen their influence. Though Lebanon has been lauded for its refugee plan which has helped thousands of Syrian refugees, this gesture is threatening the Lebanese social fabric. The refugees are a blend of both Sunni and Shiites and treatment has been influenced by the political side that they support (Freeman 17). Tolerance for the refugees which was initially believed to similar values that the two countries share is slowly turning into resentment Congress involvement The United States congress was sucked into the Syria crisis immediately after Assad regime used chemical weapon against its people in august of 2013. Congress introduced the authorization for the use of military force against the government of Syria to respond to use of chemical weapons as a way of legitimizing any military action that would be taken against Assad. The resolution was aimed at giving president Obama the authority to use military action against Assad in an effort aimed at preventing further use of chemical weapons (Sharp and Christopher 1). Before the august strike with chemical weapon, a number of congress leaders were against the use of military forces against Assad or any form of intervention by the United States. Majority of the congress members were of the feeling that the crisis in Syria had no security implications to the United States and intervening would provide new affront against the United States (Blanchard and Amy 1). In August 2012, president Obama had issued a red line warning in which he stated that though there are intelligence reports on the use of chemical weapons, the movement and attack from any group using such weapons will create a need for the United States to intervene. In the event that Assad or the rebels used chemical weapons, Obama argued that the red line would have been crossed and therefore the United States will have no alternative but to invoke military intervention. Though political analysts argued that both sides in the Syrian crisis had crossed the red line, the use of chemical weapons in august of 2013, a year after the warning was issued by the ultimate action that would have seen the United States taking actions against Assad. However, the Obama administration wanted the involvement of congress through a resolution authorization the administration Obama to take military actions against the Assad regime. A motion was introduced in congress through the majority leader referred to as an authorization to allow for the use of military force against the Syrian government due to its use of chemical weapons in august 2013 (Murray 160). Obama indicated that he would only give the order for a strike against Syria if the congress gave such an action a green light through a volte. By using chemical weapons against its people, President Assad and his regime had made a mockery of the international community as a prohibition against the use of chemical weapons already existed. Such actions placed the United States, its regional allies and other countries neighboring Syria at risk of the chemical stearin that was used in the weapon (Sharp and Christopher 1). According to the provisions of the bill, president Obama administration was given limited and legitimate powers to use military intervention and target specific areas of Syria. Such an action was sanctioned in order to achieve only four objectives which the congress believed would be in the best interest of the United States. First, the action would be a response to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the Assad as a way of demonstrating to the world that no country can act in contravention of existing agreements and in a way likely to affect the security of other nations. Second, the action sanctioned by the congress was meant to deter Syria from further using the chemical weapons as a way of protecting the interests of the united states, that of its allies and partners against the use if weapons for mass destruction (Sharp and Christopher 1). Third, a military action by the United States government will also degrade the capacity of Syria to use such weapons in future as the stores would be targeted and destroyed. Finally, the resolution expected to reduce the possibility of weapons transfer between Assad regime and terrorists groups who are non-state actors in the Middle East region (Junk 535). However, this green light provided by congress has stringent requirements that the president had to meet and present to the congress before any military action can be taken against Assad regime. First, the government must demonstrate that it has exhausted all the possible diplomatic approaches which can ensure that the conflict is addressed peacefully before any deployment can be made. Second, president Obama government must also demonstrate that the government of Assad has conducted more than one military attack with the chemical weapons under its possession. That the use of military force is the only necessary approach in order to respond to the use of chemical weapons by the government of Assad (Sharp and Christopher 1). Fourth, congress also sought the president assurance that such an action was in the best national interest of the United States national security. Finally, congress demanded that president Obama demonstrate that the use of military force would be consistent with and further the goals of the United States approaches in dealing with the current and future crisis involving the government of Syria (Kriner 324). President had the support of congress in his pursuit to prevent further use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in the country or beyond. Such actions would affect the interests of neighboring countries, political and military allies of the United States and other interests of the country. Assad was therefore placed on military radar of the United States and an attack was now expected as the president consulted with his administration on the best approach to adopt. Key congressional leaders involved The decision to attack Syria after the use of chemical weapons involved a number of congressional leaders who either supported or opposed the motion due to individual reasons. Senate minority leader Harry Reid introduced the motion to the united states congressed and marshaled members to support it and ensure that the united states intervene in the Syrian crisis (Nikitin, Paul and Andrew 1). The response of the senators was varied, with support and opposition coming from across the political divide. However, some congress leaders were at the forefront in ensuring that the motion passes and the United States government intervene in the situation in Syria in order to prevent American security interests (Kriner 320). Harry Reid is the current senator for the state of Nevada where he has served since 1987 on a democratic ticket and current serving as the senate minority leader tasked with pushing the agenda of Obama administration in the senate (Sharp and Christopher, 1). Senator Reid was supported by Mitch McConnell, the senate majority leader on the need for military intervention to curtail the ruthless nature of Assad administration towards the revels. The bicameral bipartisan agreement on the resolution to attack was a rare historical unity in senate that gave president Obama the strongest indication that his intentions to attack Assad was supported by all Americans irrespective of political affiliation. Other senators who supported the resolution included Barbara Boxer of California, Ben Cardin of Maryland, Chris Coons of Delaware, Tim Kane of Virginia among others from the democratic side of the senate. A number of republicans also supported the bill include john McCain, rand Paul of Kentucky, Jeff flake of Arizona among other republican senators who believed that the actions were Assad would have security implications on the interests of the united states. However, a number of senators from both sides of the political divide voted against the bill arguing that the country could not support the second Iraq war. According to Senator Susan Collins who is a senior member of the United States senate intelligence committee, the resolution to attack Syrian government was in bad test and therefore ill advised. According to the senator, the attack on august 21st 2013 was just one of several chemical weapon attacks that had been orchestrated by Assad regime following the remarks of president Obama in which he drew the red line. However, the senator and other opponents of the resolution argue that this was a civil war and the involvement of United States armed forces will create a proxy war which pulls other forces which are ideologically opposed to the United States like the Hezbollah fighters or even the republic of Iran. Historical senate response to the issue The procedural history of the United States congress has defined its involvement in various incidences in which the executive seeks its support to engage the military in external aggression. The United States constitution states that the power to legitimize any external actions against the enemy can only be done by the United States senate following the request by the president. The first step is the submission of a draft resolution to the congress by the executive which is received and reviewed by the senate committee on foreign relations. During this stage, the committee reviews the proposal and determines its legitimacy and implications on the United States foreign relations and security. Once the joint resolution passes the senate committee on foreign affairs through an internal vote, it is sent to the flow of the house where further deliberations by other members are made. As a resolution from the government side, the leader of government business in the floor of the house who in this case was the minority leader introduces the bill. After further deliberations, senators are subjected to a vote in order to agree on the terms of the resolution, introduce amendments or to reject its provisions in entirety (Zisser 62). Apart from members of the United States senate, other influential members of the public attempted to influence the outcome of the resolution by organizing debates and sessions with the public. Republican campaign contributor Sheldon Adelson was a critical voice in support for the resolution to attack Assad as he appeared before American Israel public affairs committee of senate. Interest groups included pro-Israel institutions and individuals who believed that the use of chemical weapons by Assad was an affront to the peace agreement reached and the resolution on the use of chemical weapons. Assad had therefore crossed the red line and exposed other countries to the threat of the chemicals in total disregard of international agreements and charters on the use of chemical weapons. Works cited Junk, Julian. "The Two-Level Politics of Support-US Foreign Policy and the Responsibility to Protect." Conflict, Security & Development 14.4 (2014): 535. Zeiler, Thomas W., and Robert J. McMahon. Guide To U.S. Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic History. Thousand Oaks, Calif: CQ Press, 2012. Nikitin, Mary Beth D., Paul K. Kerr, and Andrew Feickert. "Syrias Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief (2013): 1.  Sharp, Jeremy M., and Christopher M. Blanchard. "Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress." Congressional Research Service: Report (2013): 1.  Blanchard, Christopher M., Carla E. Humud, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. "Armed Conflict In Syria: Overview And U.S. Response. “Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief (2014): 1. Blanchard, Christopher M., and Amy Belasco. "Congressional Research Service." Congressional Research Service: Report (2014): 1.  Stahn, Carsten. "Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment." Journal of International Criminal Justice11.5 (2013): 955-977.  Sterner, Eric. "Dictators and Deterrence: Syrias Assad, Chemical Weapons, and the Threat of U.S. Military Action." Comparative Strategy 33.5 (2014): 407. Freeman, Chas W., et al. "Symposium: U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East: Is There One?" Middle East Policy 20.1 (2013): 1-29. Murray, Donette. "Military Action but Not As We Know It: Libya, Syria and the Making of an Obama Doctrine." Contemporary Politics19.2 (2013): 146-166. Kriner, Douglas L. "The Contemporary Presidency Obamas Authorization Paradox: Syria and Congresss Continued Relevance in Military Affairs." Presidential Studies Quarterly 44.2 (2014): 309-327. Zisser, Eyal. "The Failure of U.S. Policy toward Damascus." Middle East Quarterly 20.4 (2013): 59-65. Read More