Violence After the General Elections in Kenya - Case Study Example

Violence after the General Elections in Kenya 2007/08 Electoral violence is not a new concept in global geopolitics. In fact, in some regions, it is almost always anticipated that violence will follow any electoral processes. Electoral violence offers many case studies in conflict resolution, reconstruction, and negotiation. This paper will provide a comprehensive outlook of conflicts and conflict resolution, with emphasis on Kenya’s experience with post-poll violence in 2007/2008. The paper will explore issues ranging from the causes of electoral violence, conflict resolution, strategies, and lessons to be learned from electoral violence. A summative conclusion will be followed by logical and pragmatic recommendations that propose a way forward in dealing with electoral violence across the world. Introduction Conflict appears to be one of the preoccupations of mankind. Mankind’s history is littered with definitive conflicts that go back as far as the Bible. Psychologists have argued that conflict is an inherent part of the human psyche; it is a reflex reaction to ire, competition, injustice, or even envy. Electoral violence has been a staple in many countries around the world, and it can also be explained from a psychological perspective. Scholars reckon that electoral violence is a progressive concept; it does not occur randomly (Hummel, 2012:26). Evidence appears to indicate that it is very rare for electoral conflict to catch people completely by surprise. There are always patterns, no matter how subtle, that can be reflected upon. Some people see these patterns while others do not, and this creates the contrast in opinions when debating the spontaneity of electoral conflict. It is a fact that electoral conflict and conflict, in general, is more prevalent in Africa compared to other continents. Democracy, economic development, tribal divisions, and leadership have been cited as the main underlying issues in variations in global conflicts (Abrahamsen, 2013:32). Consequently, it would be safe to assume that addressing these issues can make Africa a more stable and conflict-free continent. Analysis History of Electoral Violence in Kenya Kenya has a pattern of electoral violence that goes back to the early post-independence period. In the first few elections after independence, minor cases of violence were reported in a few parts of the country. However, this cannot be dwelled on much since the country was still young, and this should be interpreted as part of its teething problems (Beaulieu, 2014:53). Many new countries have had similar experiences and, to be factual, many new African countries that secured independence in the early 1960s faced the same challenges. 1992-2007 is the period that offers a critical insight into Kenya’s struggle with electoral violence. 1990 heralded the advent of multiparty politics in the country, and a return to the first two decades after independence, when Kenya was a multiparty state. In two successive general elections – 1992 and 1997 – electoral violence was witnessed in volatile parts of the country (Omeje, 2013:72). It is interesting to note that electoral violence in the country has always been more widespread and destructive after the announcement of results, compared to before or during voting. Many experts think that the 2007/2008 episode was the culmination of decades of simmering conflict, and rightly so (Whatling, 2012:41). Decades of pent-up anger, frustrations, and divisions finally came to a head in 2007¸ravaging the country in a way that had never been witnessed before. In summary, the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections should be considered to be the ideal case studies in electoral violence in any context, not just in Kenya (Peled, 2011:64). In the 2013 polls, the divisions were visible but they did not spill over, plus people did not want to re-enact what is potentially the darkest period in the country’s history. Dynamics of (Electoral) Violence Conflicts stem from a myriad of issues, but the central theme has always been a response to aggression or any form of provocation. Electoral violence comes from the same place. In Kenya, like most countries, electoral violence has been used by belligerents to settle old and new scores. Spontaneous violence, which is often rare, is usually a reflex reaction to fresh differences in opinion or ideology (Waithaka, 2012:31). On the other hand, premeditated violence often results from drawn-out tensions and hostilities that have been poorly managed in the past. Conflict resolution experts should understand the history of conflict to conduct effective mediations. Some people seem to think that electoral violence is primarily caused by results, but this is a misconception (Kuperman, 2014:43). Electoral conflict is almost always planned to destabilise certain voting blocs to favour some candidates, dislodge certain factions from contested areas (e.g., resource-rich regions), settle old scores, or to position certain parties strategically after polls. The results are just a coverup for premeditated actions. All cases of poll violence in Kenya bear the marks of one or more of these catalysts. In 2007/2008, the leading opposition candidate alleged to have been the victim of rigged polls and even went as far as claiming victory in the elections. Around the same period, in Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo was accused of manipulating results to deny the opposition candidate (Alassane Ouattara) a much-deserved victory. In both cases, violence was the aftermath. However, it is interesting to note that in both cases, there were murmurs of possible retaliations if there were to be any hints that polls were manipulated (Dundas, 2014:16). In Kenya, it seemed like peace rested on victory for the opposition. Defeat was not an option; the incumbent had to lose or “there would be consequences.” Just like in 1992 and 1997, socioeconomic issues played a key role in Kenya’s post-poll violence in 2007/2008. The largest and most politically relevant tribe, the Kikuyu, were painted as a threat by other tribes like the Kalenjin and the Luo; this was reciprocated by the Kikuyu (Swain, Ojendal, & Amer, 2013:59). In 1992 and 1997, land issues were at the centre of the conflicts. The Rift Valley province, which the Kalenjin tribe has traditionally considered its ancestral land, had witnessed an influx of Kikuyus from Central province, which other tribes view as their traditional stronghold (Mehler, Melber, & van Walvaren, 2012:18). These geographical divisions based on tribes have created problems in Kenya whenever hostilities arise because every ethnic group runs back to its vantage point (Ahrens, 2011:24). As such, there has always been a feeling that the “invasion” of tribe A’s ancestral lands by tribe B is enough cause for violence. Political and economic marginalisation has also been instrumental, not just in Kenya but also in other countries. In Kenya, other tribes have felt that the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins have been dominating the country’s politics and economy for too long at the expense of others (Mansley, 2014:81). In the 2007/2008 polls, Kikuyus were seen to be on their own. The general election was, in essence, just a tribal contest. Other ethnicities thought that they were finally going to dislodge Kikuyus from power and get to enjoy the trappings of power. The anger and frustrations were already there; it just took “unexpected” results to release these emotions (Frere, 2011:58). Scholars claim, rightfully, that elections only cause conflict in countries with poor democratic structures. In stable democracies, elections are exercises meant to choose the right leaders, not racial or tribal competitions aimed at getting back at other factions. This is what most African countries are yet to learn (Pfefferle, 2013:79). Conflict Resolution Strategies Mediation The 2007/2008 post-poll violence in Kenya showcased the power and impact of mediation in conflict resolution. It showed that mediation was an ideal tool for ending current violence and preventing future conflicts (Hornsby, 2013:47). Different parties were involved in mediating the Kenyan case, but it was the efforts of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that finally bore fruit. Previously, a panel of current and former African leaders, Western diplomats (Condoleezza Rice), and religious leaders had unsuccessfully tried to bring the leaders of the warring factions to the table (Maphosa, DeLuca, & Keasley, 2014:104). With Annan’s appearance on the stage, it seemed that something different had been brought to the negotiation table, and herein lies a lesson that other conflict resolution experts can heed. In many ways, Mr. Annan was competent and suitable for this case. Firstly, he was African. This gave him an advantage because the conflict was African. An African solution to an African problem eliminated perceptions of neo-colonialism and incompetence among African leaders (Platte, 2013:14). Mr. Annan understood African problems and was ready to solve them on behalf of “his continent.” Secondly, he was respected. Having been a former Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Annan commanded fear and respect among the warring parties (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2013:82). Unlike other African leaders who had tried to create a solution to the crisis, Annan was more powerful and senior in every way. As such, the parties involved in the negotiations understood the magnitude of the problem and the need to reach a compromise soon. Other Strategies Western countries showed that political and economic pressures are effective strategies when applied in the right contexts. British and American governments, who are Kenya’s long-time allies in the international arena, exerted significant pressure on the incumbent (Mwai Kibaki) and the opposition leader (Raila Odinga) to reach a deal and prevent then country from becoming more unstable (Zwier, 2013:37). In fact, it would be a good guess to claim that Mr. Annan came bearing the messages of the UK and US governments. Before the start of formal negotiations, Kenya saw a slashing of the economic aid normally given by the EU, the US, and the UK. Further, Western nations urged their citizens to leave the country to avoid being caught up in the violence, regardless of whether the regions they were based were insecure or not (Schwarzmantel & Kraetzschmar, 2013:25). This put a lot of pressure on Kenya’s tourism sector (a major economic catalyst) and, by extension, the economy. Some countries imposed temporary trade embargoes that would not be lifted until a peace deal was reached. The combination of active mediation strategies and passive political and diplomatic tactics were instrumental in pushing all parties to strike a deal and end hostilities (Atim, 2013:29). It is also interesting to note that the solution, a political agreement laced with diplomatic strategies like Truth and Reconciliation tribunal and reforms, was the perfect remedy. Since the problem was mainly political, it made sense to appease the belligerents and their supporters first before any other problems were addressed. Lessons Kenya’s 2007/2008 post-poll violence showed the importance of creating feasible solutions to conflicts. It showed that many factors ought to be considered during negotiations to increase the chances of developing comprehensive remedies to conflict (Kagwanja & Southall, 2013:56). For example, anyone can mediate in a conflict, but the dynamics of a conflict must also be considered. It would have been retrogressive for the EU to mediate in a conflict that clearly had an African dimension and which was better understood by fellow Africans. When mediating, only the most relevant parties should be involved (African Development Bank, 2011:17). Sometimes competence is not important. Warring factions need people or someone who understands them and their problems, and for whom they have mutual respect or admiration. This case study also illustrates the importance of approaching mediations with long-term perspectives. The agreement reached stipulated widespread changes in the judiciary and other key state organs over a period (Agamben & McCuaig, 2013:34). It also required the two candidates to form a coalition government and work together for five years, a hitherto unimagined prospect. It must be stated that although Kenya has not fully recovered from the violent episode, the structures put in place by Mr. Annan paved way for a more stable and secure future for the country; one which attracted as little violence as possible. Conclusion History shows that conflict resolution has prevented mankind from experiencing worse cases of violence than have been witnessed. From the First World War to the Bosnian War, mediation has proved to be a lifesaver and benevolent cushion against societal degradation as a result of violence. Electoral violence can occur in any country. Before 2007/2008, few people thought that Kenya could experience post-poll conflict worse than the 1992 and 1997 episodes. Later events proved otherwise and emphasised the need for sound democratic structures, socioeconomic policies, tolerance, and forgiveness in any society. Inequalities exist in every country, but they should never be allowed to morph into animosities and murderous hostilities. Conflict resolution is a core aspect of contemporary global geopolitics, so it must be approached with the utmost commitment. References Abrahamsen, R. (2013) Conflict & security in Africa, Woodbridge, Suffolk, James Currey. African Development Bank (2011) African economic outlook 2011: Africa and its emerging partners, Tunis, OECD Publishing. Agamben, G. & McCuaig, W. 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