The New Security Agenda: A Paradigm Shift - Essay Example

The New Security Agenda: A Paradigm Shift? The contemporary international security environment is made up of more state actors than ever before; the explosion of state actors in the present security environment has had profound implications for the contemporary security climate (Rotberg, 2002). There are just as many types of states (as there are state actors) with different types of governments in the world today; a vast range of the 200 states in the 21st century can be classified as weak, failed or failing (Hanlon 2011, p.1). The principle difference between failed states and strong states is that the latter are tense, conflicted and dangerous while the former exert a strong control over their territories while delivering high order political goods to their citizens. Failed states are characterized by a prevalence of criminal and political violence, civil war, weak institutions, insufficient infrastructure, and a dearth of border control, in addition to high ethno-linguistic, religious and cultural hostilities, among other aspects (Rotberg 2003, p.4). Significantly, the preponderance of fragile states is at the core of the continuously evolving complex security landscape; this paper explores the sense in which the new security agenda calls for new thinking and new policy responses with reference to the phenomenon of weak and failing or failed states. The phenomenon of weak and failing states is particularly worrisome in today’s increasingly interconnected global society because it has dire consequences for international peace and security. Weak and failing states are not only a threat to themselves and their neighbors, but also to the rest of the world; in that respect, preventing states from crumbling and supporting those that have failed are the core strategic and moral obligations in the new security agenda. The vacuum of power in weak and failed states poses a great threat to international order, particularly to the stability of the global system of integrated nation states that relies on independent state’s capacity to assert sovereignty within their own borders. Weak and failed states endanger international peace and security (Ottaway & Mair 2004, p.1), primarily because they act as the breeding grounds for instability, widespread migration and mass murders, among other ills. In the global system, national governments play a significant role in ensuring global order; international security inevitably relies on every state’s capability to guard against chaos within its boundaries and to prevent lawlessness from spreading to the rest of the world. Conventionally, economic, ideological, or military competition between rivalry states has been the principle threat to global peace and security (Baker n.d, p.85); however, that is no longer the case today, in the milieu of bourgeoning weak and failing or failed states and global terror. Prior to the 9/11 attacks on the US soil, western policymakers often viewed weak and failing or failed states in purely humanitarian lenses (Stewart 2006, p.2); nevertheless, Al-Qaeda’s ability to spread terror throughout the world while basing their operations in Afghanistan significantly altered that view. In the aftermath of that horrendous assault on the US soil, policymakers the world over were convinced that the greatest threat to international peace and security was not really the conquering states, as was thought before, but the weak and failing or failed ones. Significantly, the view that the greatest threat to peace and security the world over is undoubtedly the weak and failing states has been reiterated over and over again in the new security agenda that calls for new thinking and new policy responses. Increasingly, communal tensions among rival forces, extremist groups that pursue radical political agendas and wavering regimes that are clinging to power while fervently pursuing their military ambitions are the new driving forces on the increasing global disorder. Both the United States and the European Union agree on the fact that the risk for external meddling from Al-Qaeda and its varied offshoots is particularly high in weaker and failing or failed states (Dempsey, 2012). Notably, President Bush’s first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) increasingly focused on failed states, thereby underscoring the fact that such states are rich havens for the bourgeoning terror organizations (Rice, 2003). US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once stated that countries that cannot exercise responsible sovereignty have a spillover effect in terms of terrorism, and spread of weapons, among other threats. Similarly, the European Union’s security strategy considers weak, failing and failed states to be an alarming phenomenon (The Economist, 2009). The EU expresses the view that weak states and dysfunctional societies pose critical challenges for Europe. Models of weak and failing or failed states abound around the world today; Afghanistan, Sierra Leon and Somalia are classic examples of failed states that are incapable of projecting authority and asserting sovereignty within their boundaries (Rotberg, 2002; Mahapatra, 2013). On the other hand, North Korea is a typical model of a failing state with an inward-focused government that has a negative view of the rest of the world and this greatly spurs anxieties that threaten the world order. North Korea is actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, as a result of its own deep seated anxieties and fear of a potential US incursion; evidently, this has only served to further heighten its isolation from the rest of the world and worsened existing tensions. Sudan is yet another significant example of a failing state with the greatest risk of a civil conflict that has traditionally inhibited international intervention in the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the Darfur region. Lebanon is an archetypal case of a weak state that has not been so successful in asserting its sovereignty, despite having cast off nearly 15 years of Syrian military occupation. Hezbollah seized that moment of weakness in Lebanon’s governance and successfully asserted itself as an independent state within Lebanon with dual authority centers, in the regime and in the south. Pointedly, internal weaknesses in these countries have not only worsened the risk of nuclear proliferation, but also triggered interstate conflicts while exacerbating the terrible state of humanitarian crisis in those areas. Evidently, the new security agenda has already resulted to far-reaching policy and institutional consequences; for instance, the US’s defense, intelligence, diplomatic, developmental and even trade initiatives are now being informed by the new strategic orientation of fragile states. This is a great leap from the previous National Defense Strategy’s focus on interstate conflicts; the US military is now shifting its attention to strengthening fragile states’ sovereign capability to control their borders. This shift in approach is informed by the new thinking that a sovereign state will have the legitimacy to assert its authority, thereby effectively combating internal threats of insurgency, terrorism, and organized crimes. The pentagon has recommended the training of foreign security forces as well as a comprehensive US strategy focusing on the ungoverned regions of the world; the central intelligence agency (CIA) has already identified 50 such areas. The State Department has commissioned a whole new office, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which dedicates its efforts towards conflict prevention and mitigation initiatives in states at risk of collapse. On its part, the US Agency for International Development has come up with the Fragile States Strategy, which seeks to promote states that are at an increased risk of breeding mass terror, organized crime, instability and diseases, thereby threatening international peace and security. US’s trade liberalization policies such as the Central American Free Trade Area, which was launched by the Bush administration, was justified on the grounds that it would help in preventing state failure and its allied threats to the international order. While identifying state failure as the primary threat to Europe, the European Security Strategy also acknowledges that the threat is not purely military and cannot be addressed by purely military means (Bendiek 2006, p.3). State failure has often been associated with deeply entrenched problems of socioeconomic development. In that respect, the EU’s security and development goals have increasingly become interlinked and integrated; consequently, the European Security Strategy calls for a new security culture that promotes early, rapid, and robust intervention when necessary (Haine 2004, p.107). The European Security Strategy, therefore, adopts a preventive engagement approach that entails deployment of a vast range of long and short term instruments including political, diplomatic, military as well as economic development assistance (Batt 2004, p.3). Similarly, the preventive engagement approach entails supporting the establishment of a functional institutional capacity while promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU boasts of being able to effectively address the issue of fragile states such as Kosovo and Kabul outside its borders, through a unique combination of hard and soft power (Korski & Gowan 2009, p.21). Coercion, militarily or otherwise, and persuasion through trade, diplomacy and humanitarian aid have been central to the spread of positive values (Stefanova, 2005, p.51); the EU frames its global security strategy through the 1999 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which outlines an EU’s comprehensive framework. The EU’s ECDP emphasizes the importance of integrating both the civilian and military tools in the new security agenda, to address external security challenges in the present global environment (Duna 2010, p.20). The EU has pioneered many civilian missions since 2003, which can be categorized into three main categories; the first category of missions seeks to manage the legacy of Yogoslav wars. For instance, the EU has concentrated its efforts on establishing competent police forces that are acceptable by diverse ethno-linguistic groups in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo (Celador 2009, p.231); this intervention is informed by the thinking that unbiased policing and justice could potentially stabilize volatile states. The second category of EU’s civilian missions abroad have been dedicated to capacity building in the middle east; the EU has launched small police reform programs, both in the Palestine region and in Iraq while at the same time trying to send a bigger police outfit to Afghanistan. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the EU forces work alongside US forces (Silve 1997, p.88); although the EU has often supported the US strategy in these two regions, the EU attempts to distinguish its actions from the presence of the US military in the region. The EU has also backed up the UN in Africa, particularly by participating in police training while attempting to reform the continent’s security sector, especially in hot spots such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, the EU’s civilian missions in Africa have always remained in the shadows of the broader UN peacekeeping missions that aim to promote peace and stability on the continent, thereby promoting sustainable economic, political, sociocultural and technological development that is critical for stability of the region (Powell & Tieku 2005, p.937). The British Prime Minister’s strategy unit has been quoted advocating for a wide ranging government-wide approach to ensuring stability of fragile states that are more likely to harbor international ills such as global terror and organized crime. Understandably, besides incubating transnational terrorism, fragile states may also be incapable of or less inclined to effectively control their stocks of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or ensure the integrity of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or WMD-related technology. The UN reform proposals have called on all sovereign states to address international security, which led to the endorsement of a new Peace-building Commission that targets fragile regions of the world by UN member countries in 2005. Analysts and policymakers the world over have intensified their energies in the exploration of the unconventional cross-border security threats that are driven by non-state actors in fragile states (McKay 2006, p.2); all these efforts highlights the thinking that the world’s collective security relies on the security of the most fragile regions of the world. Ultimately, the new security agenda inevitably calls for new thinking and new policy responses, particularly in the milieu of fragile states and global terror; policy makers have come to the realization that it is not the conquering states but the fragile ones that pose the most serious threat to international peace and security. This has necessitated a paradigm shift in the thinking and policies on international peace and security; the European Security Strategy adopts a preventive engagement approach that entails deployment of a vast range of long and short term instruments such as political, diplomatic, military as well as economic development assistance. Similarly, the preventive engagement approach entails supporting the establishment of a functional institutional capacity while promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Weak and failing states are not only a threat to themselves and their neighbors, but also to the rest of the world; in that respect, preventing states from crumbling and supporting those that have failed are the core strategic and moral obligations in the new security agenda. References Baker, P.H., n.d. Fixing Failing States: The New Security Agenda. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations. 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