Referent Objects: From the State to the Individual - Assignment Example

Referent Objects: From the to the Individual? Security, as ever, remains an essentially contested concept (Buzan 1991: 7). The paradigm of security studies emerged as a serious research program within the broader ambit of international relations and theory after the end of the Cold War in 1991, as the idea of security was – for the first time – conceptually widened and deepened. This new academic inquiry injected much needed life into the study of security took, as scholars began to challenge the traditional understanding of the subject. Growing discontent with the realist and liberal notion of security as fundamentally a military category redefined the agenda of security studies to suggest myriad alternatives. One of the primary questions that security studies seek to answer is whose security? It is imperative to note here, “without a referent object there can be no threats and no discussion of security because the concept is meaningless without something to secure” (Williams 2008: 7). Therefore, a referent object forms the answer to the above question and remains the focus of security. In theories of international relations, this focus has predominantly been on the state, though more recent (and novel) conceptions of the international have moved the focus to various other ‘objects’ such as the individual or the environment. It is the purpose of this essay to analyze and elucidate the most appropriate referent object for security, within the broader context of the evolution of international relations theory. The dominance of realism as an explanatory theory of international relations has been remarkable. The theory has itself become a research program within and about which there are many debates about its core and auxiliary propositions. However, most realists agree that the international system is anarchical, without any central organizing mechanism and populated by nation-states that are in permanent conflict. Nation-states have lexical priority over all other institutions and their national interests are defined in terms of power; every state aims at the satisfaction of these interests by maximizing power (Donnelly 2000: 7-8). In this schematic, the state is the constituent unit of the system; the sate both provides and is the referent object of security, which is militarily defined. For realists, the central concerns are power and security, making the theory essentially “statist” in nature. Insecurity is understood as inter-state conflict and security competition, which is fueled by the anarchical structure of international politics (Waltz 1959: 159-223; 1979). Most importantly, “…the units of the international system are functionally similar sovereign states, hence unit-level variation is irrelevant in explaining international outcomes. It is the third tier, the distribution of capabilities across units, that is…of fundamental importance to understanding crucial international outcomes.” (Dunne & Schmidt 2001: 169). Since the internal structures of states remain akin to a black box in realist analyses, it is but obvious that the state should remain the most important, and perhaps only, referent of security. However, as the Cold War drew to a close, there were a number of challenges to the fundamental realist assumptions: firstly, the theory could not explain the end of the Cold War; secondly, it advanced no concrete theory of internal war, which has been the most common kind of conflict in the post-Cold War era; and thirdly, realism had no sound theoretical response to transnational problems such as environmental and economic crises. At best, realism remained an ex-post explanatory theory (Wohlforth 1994: 93), and the above shortcomings paved the way for re-conceiving the idea of security. However, before we delve deeper into the expansion of security studies to critical and human dimensions, we must also consider the other dominant perspective in international relations theory: liberalism, especially the international political economy perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism. Neo-liberals argue that complex interdependence between nation-states arises out of multiple transnational channels of communications and transactions and the lack of hierarchy among inter-state issues, and this interdependence thwarts the use of military force (Keohane & Nye 1977: 24-29). This perspective was the first to speculate on the security imperatives arising out of the economy during the two oil-supply shocks of the 1970s; however, the onset of the New Cold War set back this line of analysis. Even though the ontological priority of the state as the referent object remained secure in this paradigm, liberals placed a lot more emphasis on the nature of domestic political systems, economics, and individual agency. Still, the military dimension of security could not be fully overcome, as liberals continued to think about international security as peace between nation-states, meaning the absence of conflict between contending militaries. The events of the post-Cold War era, though, demanded a dramatic reformulation of conventional thinking on security issues, and the first major – and perhaps the most important – such response came from Barry Buzan in his seminal work, People, States & Fears (1991). Buzan organized security in terms of different levels and sectors of analysis. For him, levels are ontological reference points, being both the origin of theoretical explanation and also its locale of outcome; the levels of analysis are the international system, the sub-systemic level, the unit (or state), the sub-unit, and the individual. The sectors of security Buzan identified were military, political, economic, environmental, and societal. The thrust of this new approach was not only the widening of the idea of security, but also that there could be a range of referent objects across different sectors, due to the inevitable inter-relationships between the different levels of analysis. However, Buzan was careful to maintain that “international security cannot and should not be reduced to individual security...[since] there is something important and distinctive about the security of human collectivities, whether states, nations, or some other kind” (2007: 3). Buzan’s analytical apparatus remains the signpost that has guided security studies since the end of the Cold War, by showing that the military is only one of the sectors of security, and given the nature of threat, any other sector could assume priority. This idea was formative to the development of the Copenhagen School of thought in security studies, which found another key proponent in Ole Wæver, who forwarded the idea of securitization. The latter argued that the social construction of threat had to be understood differently from an objective, capability-based, computation of threats. For Wæver, though, individuals form a valid referent object, identifying in this level certain select areas that demand securitization (1995). This perspective necessitates a multi-sectoral understanding of security, without any a priori bias for a particular sector. Buzan and Wæver succeeded in throwing open the agenda of security studies in the 1990s. The conventional idea of security came from the threats to the military sector. To bring in other sectors, there also had to be an accompanying (and serviceable) conceptualization of threats; otherwise, such an extension becomes invalid. Securitization emerges to rescue these extensions by providing that serviceable understanding of threats in each of the sectors. Traditionally, the actors of security remained diverse. In multi-sectoral security, there is an allowance for a whole range of actors to become legitimate actors of security, thereby providing multiple referent objects. Therefore, if the state is the referent object for the military sector, collective identities were the same for the societal sector, the constitutive principles of the state for the political sector, and so on. The development of the human security paradigm, however, although critical of traditional modes of thinking about security, sought to replace the state with the individual as the preeminent referent object. Indeed, “human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms – including common security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security – that encourage policymakers and scholars to think about international security as something more than the military [defense] of state interests and territory. Although definitions of human security vary, most formulations emphasize the welfare of ordinary people.” (Paris 2001: 87) As identified by the Human Development Report (1994: 230-234), there were seven primary threats to the security and well being of individuals: economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. The threats to human security operate at two levels, namely localized threats and global insecurities. Unemployment, hunger, and pestilence, violent crime, etc. are examples of localized threats to human security, while population growth, illegal immigration, inequalities in the distribution of wealth, and environmental hazards are some examples of global or transnational threats. However, it is important to bear in mind that this view of human security stands in contrast to two other narrower conceptions, rooted in basic human rights and their deprivation: the first is the liberal engagement with natural rights of men, and the second is the humanitarian engagement with those afflicted by war and violent conflict (Hampson 2008: 231). The basic problem of the broader understanding of human security is that it becomes too diffuse, thus losing focus and methodological rigor. Since the individual is the referent object, every time the individual is threatened, global security also comes under risk; such an idea may be theoretically appealing, but becomes complicated when devising appropriate responses to security concerns. Critical theory offers a more nuanced view of security by positing it as a derivative context, distilled from the political and socio-cultural contexts of one’s beliefs and ideas about her surroundings. Critical theorists are of the opinion that basing the understanding of security on seemingly universal and free standing principles has, in fact, contributed to greater insecurity in the world. Security is treated not as an end but as a process that helps individuals live safely. Therefore, critical theorists are not state-centric, and they regard states as means of security policy (Bilgin 2008: 93). The Welsh School of critical theory, sometimes also known as the Emancipatory School, posits that: “Security is what we make of it. It is an epiphenomenon intersubjectively created. Different worldviews and discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security” (Ken Booth, quoted in: Bilgin 2008: 98). This school endeavors, firstly, to deepen our understanding of security and, secondly, to “broaden our understanding of security in order to consider a range of insecurities faced by an array of referent objects” (Bilgin 2008: 98). Thus, the Welsh School does not place any emphasis on particular referent objects, but tries instead to unearth the political character of definitions of security. Krause and Williams (1997) advance a somewhat different brand of critical security studies by trying to distinguish, by following Robert Cox, between problem-solving and critical theories. The former, they claim, are status-quoist and the latter seeks to examine the given parameters within which political processes and institutions seemingly function (Krause & Williams 1997: xi). The agenda of critical security studies is the reconstructive theorization of security issues, not centered on states and citizenship, but expanding to plural perspectives, thereby generating – again – a range of referent objects. Finally, we must mention the feminist orientation to international security, which has tried to show that even though global security is supposedly gender-neutral in the various theoretical perspectives discussed above, most theories employ a set of gender assumptions (Whitworth 2008: 104). Gender relations are informed by, and reinforce, power relations, and these power relations influence the understanding of security within the relationship of men and women across various levels and sectors of analysis. Feminists remain the most particular in their discussion of referent objects, by focusing on women and their place in international security. In conclusion, it must be said that the above exploration of the changing nature of referent objects with relation to the theories of international relations validates the opening statement of this essay. The debate over the most appropriate referent object for security still rages, and perspectives multiply with the passage of time. For instance, many now claim that the security of social collectives should receive utmost priority, while others argue that it should be the environment. It is useful, however, that even though the concept of security has widened and deepened, the state still retains a fair degree of importance. The priority of human lives and their physical and material well being cannot be denied either. Therefore, the most appropriate referent object for security should be one that achieves a balance between these two (sometimes contending) positions and maintains a fair degree of flexibility in defining security. References Bilgin, P. (2008) ‘Critical Theory.’ In Security Studies: An Introduction. Ed. by P. D. Williams. New York: Routledge: 89-102. Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era [2nd Edition]. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Buzan, B. (2007) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era [2nd Edition]. Essex: ECPR Press. Donnelly, J. (2000) Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B. C. (2001) ‘Realism.’ In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations [3rd Edition]. Ed. by Baylis, J. & Smith, S. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 161-183. Hampson, F. O. (2008) ‘Human Security.’ In Security Studies: An Introduction. Ed. by P. D. Williams. New York: Routledge: 229-243. Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. New York: HarperCollins. Krause, K. & Williams, M. C. (1997) Critical Security Studies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Paris, R. (2001) ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air.’ International Security, 26, 2: 87-102. United Nations Development Program. (1994) Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press. Wæver, O. (1995) ‘Securitization and Desecuritization.’ In On Security. Ed. by R. D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press: 46–86. Waltz, K. N. (1959) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Whitworth, S. (2008) ‘Feminism.’ In Security Studies: An Introduction. Ed. by P. D. Williams. New York: Routledge: 103-115. Williams, P. D. (2008) ‘Security.’ In Security Studies: An Introduction. Ed. by P. D. Williams. New York: Routledge: 1-12. Wohlforth, W. C. (1994) ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War.’ International Security, 19, 3: 91-129. 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