Rise of Putins Dominant Position in Russian Politics - Essay Example

How would you explain the rise of Vladimir Putin and the dominant position he has occupied in Russian politics since 1999? How secure is this position today? In the contemporary international system, Russian Federation is the cause of constant trouble and concern. With the disputes over Russian invasion in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the issue of Putin’s leadership style appears as one of current scientific interest. In particular, the previous reprisals of Chechnya, Georgia and Russian internal opposition can be analyzed as a sequence these days with this new Ukrainian example of enormous Putin’s ambitions. Moreover, the fact that Russia is one of the key countries for the Western world in terms of natural resources makes Russian case even more troubling for contemporary leaders. In a democratic world, the concentration of power is unacceptable. Nevertheless, Russia which is claimed to be the part of this world is not only accepting its leader but widely supports his wars in Chechnya, Georgia or Ukraine. And so, the present contradiction when Putin is behaving in a really rude manner and still enjoys dominant position in his country requires an explanation. Thus, in a given essay the background of Putin’s presidency is analyzed in order to find the answer to this question. In particular, Putin’s regime is evaluated in terms of post-Soviet economic inequality accompanied by empowerment of secret police, promotion of fear by restriction of alternative thinking, and the certain traits of Putin’s personality that enabled him to become a leader in such social and political environment. To start with, the circumstances that defined Russian reality before 1999 made the appearance of such an unremarkable and cruel personality like Vladimir Putin possible. At the very beginning of Russian Federation appearance, the fact that huge and powerful Soviet Union had collapsed in 1991 was shocking for the majority of its population in all social structures. As for Russian part of this united country, this event was even more unbearable as the capital city Moscow was situated on its territory. Consequently, the main part of Soviet heritage in terms of culture, values, and achievements are associated among all with contemporary Russian Federation as it is still the largest country in the world. In fact, Soviet glory and resources were mixed with severe losses in this case. In fact, catastrophic economic hyperinflation and feelings of insecurity and social inequality had already appeared in the early 1990s (Gessen, 2012, p. 12). Moreover, such a huge crisis was accompanied by the strengthening of organized crime. Therefore, with the rise of oligarchs in the new social reality of Russia former KGB officials were still needed in the new state (Soldatov and Borogan, 2012, p. 24). All this together enabled the preservation of secret police in the contemporary Russian Federation, even though ideological Cold War disappeared with the USSR collapse. And so, current Russian cult of state security is closely linked to the role of FSB in general and Vladimir Putin in particular who became the head of this structure in May 1999 (Fedor, 2011, p. 15). In other words, Putin before openly entering Russian politics in the end of 1999 as a head of FSB was ruling one of the most popular institutions in the country. In this context, the very opportunity of Putin to become a president seemed to be beneficial for secret police above all the other institutions. In fact, such a unity with politics returned the privileges lost by Soviet collapse for it. Therefore, the fact that Putin gained power had nothing to do with liberal ideals of independent branches of power and freedom of choice. In the given circumstances of economic stagnation, insecurity and inequity, values of survival was determining Russian existence. Here, the issue of terrorism gave Putin and FSB the necessary agenda for the appearance of state security priority. Right before Yeltsin quitted politics, September 1999 was a scary month for Russians. Then, chain of explosions in shopping mall in the center of Moscow, apartment block in Buyanksk, bedroom neighborhood in Moscow’s suburbs and Volgodonsk’s street appeared (Gessen, 2012, p. 21). In fact, the strict sequences of these events supplemented by reducing interval between each of explosions from five to three days allowed to suppose that it was a planned action. That days, Chechens were blamed and the cruel and long war in Chechnya openly started. Nowadays, mass panic of 1999 can be considered as a key element in rise of Putin’s authority. In fact, central part of his rhetoric is still based on nuclear defense from espionage. As Masha Gessen (2012) noticed, right after explosions “on September 23 [1999], a group of twenty-four governors – more than a quarter of all governors in the federation – wrote a letter to President Yeltsin asking him to yield power to Putin, who had been in office as prime minister for just over a month” (p. 23). Moreover, years of Putin’s Russia are closely linked to FSB empowerment. Hence, the way Russian history turned after resignation of former President Boris Yeltsin was caused by structural changes in social and economic post-Soviet environment and by the certain ability of FSB to promote its candidate in political system formerly controlled by oligarchs only. Furthermore, constant fear can be determined as the base of Putin’s regime of controlled media and ideological struggle. In the given background, his oratorical style of strictness and cruelty in seeking revenge was highly appreciated by Russian society. In fact, the type of regime which appeared in Putin’s Russia can be titled as “low-caliber democracy” as “despite the presence of institutions to ensure popular support, there is little accountability of officialdom to society” (Fish, 2001, p. 226). For instance, Anna Politkovskaya (2004) noticed the spread of secret courts over Chechens that caused the phenomenon while “almost everybody believes the judiciary is subordinate to the executive branch of government” (p. 29). In other words, the type of governing that has been created by Vladimir Putin personally and the whole secret police structure he belongs to makes him responsible for the further Russian development. And the revealed facts of “FSB using torture to fabricate cases to suit its ideological needs, implication the courts and the prosecutor’s office as its accomplices” (Politkovskaya, 2004, p. 46) are troubling in this case. Moreover, the process of foreign charity and human rights organizations’ elimination was applied as they were accused in espionage (Soldatov and Borogan, 2012, p. 36). In particular, it means that Putin by promoting democracy and European choice made in practice everything to turn back to Soviet times. So, the economic transformation in Western capitalist terms was accompanied by showing “deep distrust of the major democratic institutions and an open desire to keep tight control over society” (Shevtsova, 2005, p. 4). In this context, rivalry with USA is a crucial part of Putin’s rhetoric. For instance, the support of President Milosevic’s regime in Serbia was the challenge for Western leaders in ideological terms (Roxburgh, 2013, p. 4). In addition, recent conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have shown that Russia and America are supporting different sides in it. Thus, the idea of independent Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya (2004) who was murdered by Putin’s regime that “outcome has been determined on ideological rather than legal grounds” (p. 4) is fitting these observations in Putin’s Russia. In this situation, the popularity of sport achievements became the significant part of state doctrine. In fact, the very idea of sport is similar to Putin’s set of values of survival and suffering for the distant ambitious goal. Correspondingly, Putin’s judo passion and love affair with Olympic champion Alina Kabaeva promoted in public demonstrate the significance of sports for the Russian leader. And so, recent victory in Sochi Winter Olympics both increased Putin’s support and gave him internal authority to invade Ukraine. In other words, Putin found the justification of his murders in ideological field that is shared with Russian population via state-controlled media. Finally, Putin’s personality and behavior is fixed in such a framework and the changes of circumstances can cause the immediate breakdown of his regime. In this context, as Roxburgh (2013) describes Putin, he is “the democrat who doesn’t trust democracy; the Westerner whose understanding of the West is flawed and limited; a fiery believer in the Russian state, with the icy, ruthless attitude of the ex-KGB man towards its ‘enemies’” (p. 14). So, the small fact that reveals Putin’s blame or failure can easily destroy the power he is currently exercising. Nevertheless, the countless failures of resistance to Putin show that this is rather a theoretical assumption than reality in the near future, Moreover, managerial skills of Vladimir Putin illustrate his ability to find the easiest way to gain popularity with no moral limits. For instance, it is a biographical fact that Putin had no excellent knowledge but was the only student who owned the car in 1970s (Gessen, 2012, p. 46). So, this indicates of his ability to become outstanding and remarkable solely with the help of inequality in social and economic environment. Moreover, his personality can be described as ambitious. In this context, Gessen (2012) supposes that joining secret police for career was the decision driven by the willingness “to rule the world from the shadows” (p. 49). Another significant Putin’s passion is sports. In addition, this fondness is common for the whole FSB leadership. An illustrative example in this case is the appearance of FSB director on internal Russian volleyball game the same day Nord-Ost siege finished (Soldatov and Borogan, 2012, p. 84). Thus, it is reasonable to state that Putin’s style of governing was inevitable as he can be described as pragmatic leader with no moral limits and with clear passion to get what he wants no matter how much suffering it may cause for the others. And his closest surroundings and FSB structure prove that he is not unique in this characteristic. In order to sum up, the dominant position of Vladimir Putin was a logical outcome of Russian background in the first years after the collapse of Soviet Union. In this context, the shocking insecurity and inequity in the brand-new Russian Federation enabled the appearance of new oligarch elite who used former secret police of KGB for its protection. And so, several years later the head of this structure turned into the most popular candidate for ruling the country. Then, such a leader by having a cruel and purposeful personality understood that the only way he could achieve his ambitious goals is to create an atmosphere of eternal fear. In this case, ideological struggle invented by Soviet leaders was again introduced to Russia in order to physically destroy everyone who does not support Putin’s regime. Nevertheless, the striking fact is that Vladimir Putin in his public speeches reveals himself as democratic progressive leader. But, the fact that he is highly supported by Russians shows that these people really need such a leader. And so, Vladimir Putin is safe in his country while his people are ready to die for his ambitions but are still afraid to fight for their own rights. References: Fedor, J, 2011. Russia and the Cult of State Security: The Chekist Tradition, From Lenin to Putin. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Fish, M. C., 2001. Democracy and Russian Politics. In: Z. Barany and R. G. Moser, eds., 2001. Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Conclusion. Gessen, M., 2012. The Man Without a Face: The Unlike Rise of Vladimir Putin. Toronto: Riverhead Books. Politkovskaya, A., 2004. Putin’s Russia. London: The Harvill Press Roxburgh, A., 2013. The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia. Second ed. London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd. Shevtsova, L., 2005. Putin’s Russia. Second ed. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Soldatov, A, and Borogan, I., 2010. The New Nobility: Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB. New York: PublicAffairs. Read More