Re-Emergence of Russia as a Great Power under Putin - Essay Example

Re-emergence of Russia as a "great power" under Putin On 31st of December 1999, the resignation of the then Russian President Yeltsin brought Vladimir Putin, the elected Prime Minister, to power and he proceeded to win the 2000 presidential elections (Berman 2013, p.3). Vladimir suppressed the Chechen insurgency and through his term, the Russian currency has gained stability through high oil prices, increased domestic demand, consumption, and investments, leading to increased economic growth, enhanced living standards, and domination of Russia in the global arena (Hedenskog et al 2005, p.1). Putin’s leadership has seen the return of order, stability, and progress has endeared him to the hearts of many, winning him a lot of popularity and admiration in Russia; despite that, the western nations have often criticized most of Putin’s reforms terming them undemocratic (McFaul and, Stoner 2008). The western governments, mass media, in addition to leading democracy and human rights bodies have always criticized Russia’s political system and management of human rights issues; according to them, Russia has few democratic attributes and allows few political rights and civil liberties to its citizens. In this respect, Russia has a multifaceted foreign policy, and as a successor to a former superpower, the country’s geopolitical status has always been subject to debate in relation to unipolar and multipolar views on the global political system. Nonetheless, Russia is conventionally a great power, but a considerable number of global leaders, scholars, commentators, as well as politicians have recognized the country as a potential superpower. Despite all the criticisms from the western governments, mass media, and political or human rights advocates, there are considerations of the re-emergence of Russia as a great power under Putin; in that respect, this paper offers a critical assessment that accounts for the extent to which Russia has re-emerged as a "great power" under the leadership of President Putin. Russia, officially known as the Russian Federation and geographically located in northern Eurasia, is a federal semi-presidential republic with 83 federal subjects; the country shares land borders with notable countries such as Norway, Finland, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Norway, China, and North Korea. Russia is the largest country in the world by land area since it covers over one-eighth of the world’s inhabited land area, and it is the 9th most populous nation in the world with over 143 million people by 2012. The Russian Federation took over from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic after the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, and is the recognized legal face of the union state. Russia not only has the biggest energy reserves, but also the prime mineral reserves worldwide, which make the country one of the leading global manufacturers of oil and natural gas; the country has the eighth largest economy by nominal GDP and sixth largest by purchasing power equality. Additionally, Russia is one of the five nuclear weapon states with heavy artillery of mass destruction, a great power, and a permanent member of several international organizations such as the UN Security Council, G8, G20 summit, and Council of Europe, among others; however, does this confirm Russia’s claim to a remerging economy really? This has been a common question from political analysts and pundits all over the world, giving rise to a divided opinion; those who are highly in favour of Russia’s re-emergence as a great power have stated their case to some considerably logical extent, insofar as the debate is concerned. Following the implosion of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar order, the international global system entered a transitional period of fluctuation of power with no specific name; whereas the US leadership is a significant precursor of the future global order, some analysts favour a multipolar order as the most appropriate regime for future international relations. Nonetheless, one thing that is clear is Russia’s strong will to re-establish its international position as a great power and a significant player in the new order under Putin’s leadership, and there is no doubt that it is headed for the top. Since he took the reins of power, re-emergence of Russia, as a global superpower became Russia’s single most important political priority since according to it, the future international order is on multi-polarity as opposed to the unilateral US domination. Presently, Russia has already made remarkable progress towards re-establishing itself as a significant global player in the international order (Roger 2007, p.223), with its great military power, developing world oil and gas prices and awareness of power in the president hands. Moscow’s preference for a multipolar world system where the US does not dominate has seen it oppose any American or EU’s interference in all its territories and areas it considers its zones of influence (Averre 2007, p.173). For instance, in the recent EU Summit in Vilnius, both the Armenian and Ukrainian governments declined an Association Agreement with EU thereby highlighting the weaknesses of EU’s policy, and inescapability of Russia’s influence for countries in the post-Soviet space (Tolskdorf, 2013). Russia’s strong influence on Ukraine that informed its decision to suspend signing the Association Agreement illuminates the emergence of Russia as a great power with influence; the Ukrainian government had no choice but to bow to pressure from Moscow. Russia has exerts a lot of influence on the CSI area (Perovic 2005, p.61), and urged by its rapid economic growth, the country has turned to Latin America and all other areas of former USSR influence; Russia has even taken the Soviet Union’s position in the Middle East. The zone of the post-Soviet republics of the CSI remains to be areas of fundamental Russian interests and Moscow has consistently asserted its domination of the area by opposing the CSI state’s independence efforts. Recent ‘colour revolutions ‘ in the CSI area, particularly in Ukraine and Georgia, perceived to have been motivated by the US, have further strengthened Russia’s nervous reactions to western interference in Russian zones of influence and Moscow’s support for separatist movements in the area. For instance, Moscow’s foreign policy towards separatist Transnistria in the republic of Moldova and the separatist Abkhazia, as well as South Ossetia in Georgia has maintained these CIS zones as unresolved frozen conflicts (Mankof 2009, p.1), thereby strengthening Russia’s position while weakening presence of other international players in the area. With increased EU focus on resolving the conflict, Moscow has threatened to recognize Transnistrian independence; besides the ‘Saber-rattling policy, Moscow also has a softer ‘purse policy’ that it uses to control Georgian economy by monopolizing the country’s energy distribution and transfer system. Russia has also tried its best to balance its relations with the USA by collaborating with Europe and jointly addressing challenges in relation to the EU through relations with the most powerful EU members; additionally, Moscow’s relations with China have balanced off its relations with the west considerably. The perception of Russian security has evolved considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union, from the initial emphasis on soft security issues and internal sources of threats to the conventional military perception of security under Putin’s regime (Simes 1994, p.67). Russia has increasingly demonstrated a lot of flexibility and soft policy attitude despite reservations that the country is not yet a great power in the essence of soft power, the capacity to attract, persuade, and contribute with peaceful proposals. For instance, in the Syrian case, Russia took a stand and made a direct appeal to the US, that a US military attack against Syria would potentially spark a new wave of terrorism (BBC News Middle East, 2013); the US had threatened strikes against Syria accusing its regime for killing hundreds in a poison-gas attack on 21st of August. Russia had a strong effect on the incident when it proposed that the Syrian government relinquishes its chemical arsenal, prompting the US to put the Military action against Syria on hold. Russia insisted that the imminent US strike on Syria would potentially result to the loss of more innocent lives, and even spread the conflict further beyond the Syrian boarders. Russia also expressed its sentiments that the UN could end up like the League of Nations, if it allowed influential states like the US to proceed with military action without permission from the Security Council. Furthermore, Russia’s decision to grant asylum to Mr Edward Snowden, the US intelligence leaker (BBC News Europe, 2013), speaks of the country’s growing political assertiveness even when it comes to dealing with world’s leading powers like the US. Mr Snowden has accused the US government for undermining international law by charging him for leaking its details of electronic surveillance programs; Russia has declined to hand Snowden over to the US through extradition and president Putin has reiterated that instead, he can receive asylum in Russia as long as he stops leaking US secrets. Despite Russia’s consistent efforts to regaining influence in the global sphere, critics have observed that Russia’s re-emergence as a great power on the global stage, something of a co-equal to the US, is nothing short of an elaborate façade and it is destined to a catastrophic end since the country cannot pretend for so long (Keck, 2013). According to these opposite views, president Putin’s public defiance of Washington on high-profile issues that are of limited strategic importance to the US such as the Syrian Civil war or the Edward Snowden case, is all but pretence. By publicly defying Washington, Putin aims to show other countries that Russia is now a great power and they can turn to it for help if they ever cross paths; unfortunately, one cannot fake prowess for so long since soon their weaknesses are bound to emerge when they are suddenly called to test. In this respect, Russia may pose as a great power by competing with real global powers, but when they will be called to test, they will certainly be exposed, like the Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union learnt bitterly. The present world order gives a lot of emphasis on both soft power and hard power assets like military power and wealth, both of which are tangible, concrete resources that cannot be faked; in this regard, Russia cannot pretend to have a powerful military for long since along the way, they might be called to test. Given President Obama’s stand on chemical weapons, the US is gearing up to take action against Syria without paying heed to Moscow’s position at all, thus, putting Russia’s credibility on test; in this regard, the US’s disregard of Russia’s position and Russia’s inability to impede the impending US strike thoroughly highlights Moscow’s weakness. Moscow lacks the ability to attract, persuade, and contribute with peaceful proposals, and is bound for future tensions with western governments, due to the conflicting western interests, and Russia’s goal to regain global influence. Soft power skill is a fundamental ingredient to becoming a global superpower (Roger, 2007, p.124), something that Russia does not seem to have, particularly because the increasing role of the country in international relations is nothing but soft (Sherr 2013, p.4). The fact that Russia has always exhibited forceful ambitions to regaining its former glory through military capacity and not soft skills ability underscores its weakness too. Furthermore, besides military power, Russia’s claim to great power is based on the growing economy that is dependent on the rising global oil and gas prices; the country lacks sufficient advanced technology and only depends on the increasing exports of raw materials, thus, cannot claim stability. In as much as Russia has not yet fully regained a superpower position, all indications show that the country has indeed made remarkable developments towards achieving a great power status (Neumann 2008, p.128). Since the country retains a significant nuclear artillery capacity, and is one of the leading nuclear powers, Russia automatically becomes a significant player in global and regional affairs and perhaps it is about that time that the Russia threat is taken more seriously (Murray, 2013), particularly by the unilateral relations-focused US. Furthermore, given that the country’s economy has experienced significant growth over the past years under Putin, it is likely that the continued expansion of its economy coupled with the military capabilities will cement the country’s influence on global affairs in the near future. Russia’s profound resolve to regain its great power status has been greatest motivation as witnessed in the leadership of president Putin, and there is no doubt that the country has achieved this goal already. References Perovic, J. (2005). From disengagement to active economic competition: Russias return to the south caucasus and central asia. Demokratizatsiya, 13(1), 61-85. Averre, D. 2007, “Sovereign Democracy" and Russias Relations with the European Union", Demokratizatsiya, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 173-190. Simes, D. 1994, "The return of Russian history", Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 67. McFaul, M. and, Stoner K., (2008). The myth of the authoritarian model; how putins crackdown holds russia back. Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 68-84.  Neumann, I. B. (2008). Russia as a great power, 1815-2007. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(2), 128-151. Roger E. 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