Why United Russia Dominates Russia's Party System - Essay Example

Why United Russia dominates Russias party system Introduction This essay aims to examine the social, economic, as well aspolitical transformations that have taken place in the post-Soviet Russian federation in the global context while discussing Russia’s overall trajectory or future direction in the context of globalization as well as integration pressures in the international order. Precisely, this essay will be focus on exposing whether Russia is it becoming a ‘capitalist’ and ‘democratic’ state while identifying some of the major challenges the country presently faces. That is, the main concentration of this paper will be on the basic political developments within Russia in a global context and on the changes in Russian foreign policy. Nature and complexity of contemporary Russia Russia is a federate state with a republican government that comprises of 89 republics and other subnational jurisdictions, each of which have their own governments; United Russia is the country’s current ruling party with a majority of 238 of the total 450 seats in the State Duma (White 2011, p.43). After the sudden and surprising collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of its component republics, the Russian Federation emerged from the wake of the Union’s demise as the largest country in the world. Russia’s first president Yeltsin Boris declared the end of the Soviet Union by introducing various reforms through “shock therapy,” thereby setting the country on the path of democracy and a free market economy (Shleifer & Treisman 2005, p.156). However, Yeltsin occasionally reverted to an authoritarian rule, which led to the takeover by a group of family members who led the country as an oligarchy and invited ills such as economic and political corruption. The country enacted a new constitution in 1993 setting the foundation for regular and competitive elections (Shiraev 2013, p.2); Vladimir Putin was elected unanimously as Russia’s president in 2000 and 2004 subsequently despite the continued strong influence of oligarchy. In 2008, Putin’s two terms as president ended and he ushered in the new president Dmitri Medvedev, but he continued on as the Prime Minister under the new president, but he continued to exert significant influence on policymaking, raising concerns over the state of democracy in the country (Wegren 2013, p.1). Modern Russia is not only a complex but also a largely dynamic and unpredictable nation with its high inexperience with both democracy and the free market economy further accentuating the perceived complexity and spontaneity. Russia’s historic roots have such a strong influence on nearly every aspect of life in Russia, thereby casting doubt on many issues regarding the new country; for instance, it is not clear whether liberal democracy is taking root or whether the old historic authoritarianism is slowly creeping back (Valdai Report 2013, p.7). Critics are also wary of the degeneration of Russia into an illiberal democracy with direct elections and other democratic structures but without a reinforcement of the democratic ideals such as civil liberties and rights, independent judiciary and the rule of law (Vladimir 2003, p.98). Nonetheless, the global democratization trend sweeping across a vast majority of the world’s nations today and Russia’s desire for modernization and domination in the world order are inherent influences on the country’s political trajectory. Russia’s constitution grants the president massive powers which are checked through popular election and by the power of the legislature; the country’s stability has been rocked by numerous coups and intense conflicts in the past. Generally, Russia’s geographical setting, cultural orientation, as well as conflicting attitudes towards the state have greatly contributed to its present political culture; its big size, Russia comprise mixed many different ethnicities, as well as climates. Socio-economic and political transformation of Russia since 1991 The complex and dynamic nature of Russia’s political contexts presents numerous challenges for the evaluation of its political transformation using theory, especially because a vast majority of the existing models of transitions to democracy are not complete and sufficient for the analysis of regime changes in Russia. Presently, Russia comprises of various fragmented social and political groups, thus, this frustrates the democratization process and the growth of democratic political institutions altogether (Esra 1998, p.2). The transition theory provides significant insights on the political and economic transformation process in Russia; traditionally, Russia has largely been conceptualized as an oligarchy due to the dominance of powers among a few people. Russia’s transition period persists due to its unorganized complex organizations, as well as associations, which gives the country the aura of a movement society rather than an established society. The modernization theory is also essential in explaining Russia’s transition since 1991 since modernization essentially entails destruction of the old and establishment of the new just like the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 set the way for a new regime. Even so, the modernization theory has been criticised for failure to account for the variation between the country’s modernization and westernization; critics observe that Russia’s main challenge is mis-development in economic and political spheres rather than underdevelopment. Economically, the country has inappropriate technology and besides wasting resources, its production systems are responsible for greater environmental damages while reinforcing social inequality levels among the population leading to declined living standards across Russia (Shleifer & Treisman 2005, p.155); politically, the country’s organizations like parties resemble those in the west but have different content. Russia’s transition has been regarded as revolutionary since it neither has rules nor organizing principles and there is no civil society to foster organized pluralism, factors which greatly foster uncertainty while impeding development of a democratic system; evidently, by the end of Putin’s second term in 2008, Russia’s formative democracy was in great crisis (Sakwa 2011, p.1). The persistence of socioeconomic challenges such as high inflation, high unemployment rates, delayed pension and wage payments, as well as the ever declining social welfare system have great implications for consolidation of democracy in Russia. From a liberal perspective, Russia is expected to follow the trajectory of other democratic states by integrating into the international economy through democratic transformation and capitalist marketization, what has been the country’s major focus since 1991. On the other hand, the neoliberalism construction of international relations insists on countries’ participation in the international order through membership in international institutions to take advantage of the solidified benefits of international economic as well as security cooperation. From a neoliberalism’s perspective, Russia is an unstable or illiberal democracy due to the massive conflicts that characterize its political and economic transition process; the neorealist perspective explains the logic of Russia’s positioning in the global power structure, which favours the policy of accommodation of the preeminent West while seeking to establish a multipolar power structure. Russia does not seem to transit to capitalism as previously thought by many as its western-stimulated neoliberal evolution strategy has led to the rise of a non-capitalist destructive or extractive system rather than primitive accumulation. This promises not only continued technological regression, but also demographic catastrophe, dictatorial rule, and even a possible collapse of the Russian state (Kotz 2001, p.157). Russia’s transformation in a comparative context Russia’s transformation since 1991 is nothing like what happened in authoritarian states in Southern European countries since the country’s government in the post-soviet era is largely viewed as a product of the compromise among the largest economic groups over power distribution. That is, the traditional Russian political culture is characterised by conventional patterns of centralization, bureaucratisation, as well as risk of avoidance, which contributes to the absence of foundations for communicating prevalent anxieties, and the highly consolidated and indefinite authoritative leadership unlike in authoritarian states. Similarly, the lack of organised pluralism in Russia has been a great let down for the transition process since without rules or consensus on organizing principles of both society and economy fosters uncertainty thereby impeding successful transition to democracy as is expected in the case of an authoritarian state (Esra 1998, p.2). Despite the existence of many political parties in Russia, there is no viable multi-party system in place, partly due to the lack of confidence in political parties, the persistent legacy of the authoritarian rule, absence of party traditions; similarly, the lack of strong parties with professional and economic interests as well as the existence of rivalry and jealousy between political parties hinders the emergence of a feasible multi-party system. Given that the United Russia party gained prominence in from 2001 onwards, it has been suggested that the party drew influence from his governance; nevertheless studies have indicated a different possibility. It is argued that the party transcends political influences and in a radical departure from the traditional perception of “party power” United Russia is more of a powerful civilian executive whose functions and operations are beyond any one party. Ergo, United Russia is dominant not among other reasons because it structurally, it is designed to be virtual party hegemony embodying the intention and capacity of non-traditional party power holders to exert and project their influence upon the traditional party-agents. In the last two elections United Russia has managed to garner a majority of seats in parliament, in fact before the year 2011 it has the two thirds majority that made it possible for them to alter the constitution should they so wish. In 2011, they still had majority seats although they did not achieve the two third majority, nonetheless the party’s power to weather crisis from the opposition remains, this is not only because they have enough seats to push motions in the DUMA but also because they have an overwhelming majority of the Russian populace behind them. A poll carried out by the nation’s top polling agency after 2011 elections showed that almost a third of the voters associated with United Russia while the rest were divided between the communist and other smaller parties (Rapoza, 2011). Taking to account the numerical dominance within and without the DUMA, Putin’s United Russia government would be an almost impossible opponent to defeat in the prevailing political environment given the overwhelming support it seems to have received from its citizens and parliamentarians in most of its activities. Lack of free and independent media disfavours the development of democracy in the country; the country’s newspapers are not free to play their role in the transition process since they rely on the government for support, due to economic difficulties. The political leadership of Russia also controls all its TV channels through its structures of censorship to favour one sided stories thereby hindering objectivity and pluralism (Esra 1998, p.3). Unlike post-authoritarian states, which due to the existence of a civil society, professional state bureaucracy and high level market economy only need to develop democratic institutions, post-totalitarian states like Russia require a transformation of both economic and political systems. In that respect, unlike the transformation of post-authoritarian Southern European states, which only entailed the establishment of democratic political institutions, the transformation of Russia entails both restructuring the economy to a free market as well as changing the political system. The establishment of a representative government outfit with popular sovereignty and rule of law has been compromised by the challenge of economic modernization since the two are intricately tied together in complex association; nonetheless, since economic problems are common for all Russians, both the support for, and survival of the Russian regime depend on the performance of its economy. Russia’s transition is mired with lots of conflicts between the central authority and the regions, partly due to economic, political, as well as ethnic problems, which greatly impede the establishment of a clear national identity while accentuating the divide between democracy and order. Like most established democracies, the Russian military is under civil control and has no direct involvement in politics (Mathers 2010, p.246), and the existence of established civil-military relations is a great advantage for the democratization process. The country has also had a group of political elites and visionary leaders like Yeltish who have clearly steered it towards democratization and the market economy through numerous political and economic reforms. Analysis of Russia’s foreign policy since 1991 Russia’s foreign policy has remained to be a complex phenomenon in the modern international relations since it is deeply anchored in the legacy of the USSR hegemony during the Cold War, especially due to the present day globalization and integration challenges (Wieclawski 2011, p.170). Russia’s foreign policy reflects the concept of the state’s primary role in international relations, the aim of state power and national interests, as well as the significance of power politic in global matters. Russia perceives the state as the central player on the international stage and conceives international relations as the relations between sovereign states and the role of other players such as International bodies and multinational corporations as limited. This attitude has been witnessed through its continued problematic relationships with foreign NGO’s, as well as foreign investors, as the country has always been wary of the presence of foreigners in its territories; although this attitude is slowly shifting given Russia’s gradual economic cooperation with foreign partners, the country is still cautious about uncontrolled activity on its territories since independent foreign players are often perceived as threats to Russian interests. Putin’s regime enacted a restrictive law on NGO’s in 2006, which aims to protect the state from money laundering, terrorist, as well as foreign spy groups under the guise of NGOs through a restrictive and intrusive scrutiny procedure for registration of NGOs. Russia has been receptive only to those international governmental organizations it deems to have beneficial for its interests such as the United Nations but continues to ignore those that it considers to be a potential source of interference in its domestic affairs as a whole. As a permanent member of the UN Security council, Russia has been able to resist any international authorization for numerous U.S. global operations as in the case of the Iraqi war; similarly, through its membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the country hopes to influence a future pan-European political and security order. Russia’s foreign policy does reflect a clear focus and priority on it national interests as reflected in all important state documents, its concept of foreign policy, as well as its military doctrine; thus, Russia’s foreign policy is an outright declaration that the country has the least incentive in international cooperation if it does not satisfy its national interests. In that respect, the country has always been keen to protect its interests even in its cooperation with the U.S., the European Union, as well as other foreign partners; this attitude underscores Russia’s self-help nature of Russia’s foreign policy, which aims to secure the country’s security and interests. Conclusion Ultimately, since the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian federation that emerged out of the debris has undergone three major transformations including ideological, political, as well as economic transformation. Russia and its elites have generally succeeded in transforming the state at a relatively minimum cost, but instead of the capitalistic free market economy that was anticipated in the wake of the new nation, Russia has created a whole new and distinctively peculiar market. The overall condition of Russia’s market economy, state governance and society are critical and a vast majority of the Russian population are very discontent over the state of affairs in the present. Despite the country’s high individual consumption, the country is yet to overcome the investment depression that has plagued it since 1990s, and its capital investment remains far below the Soviet level. Great uncertainty regarding Russia’s political and economic trajectory have roused serious disappointment, apathy and discontent among the Russians, besides triggering the flight of intellectuals and capital, which are inevitably the most fundamental assets in the 21st century. Socioeconomic developments in the country have tragically been slowed and the adjustment of the country’s prevailing institutions has been a tough undertaking particularly due to resistance from numerous interest groups. Russia’s transition from the transitional market institutions of the 90’s to the rule of law, which is an indicator of the completion of transformation, has been problematic due to institutional obstructions, which consequently hinder modernization of the Russian economy. Essentially, Russia is not transitioning to capitalism as often assumed, despite the presence of some basic features of capitalist modes of production since the working population in the country benefits greatly from the revenues from non-capitalistic relations rather than labouring on wages to produce surplus value for the capitalist class. Russia’s western-inspired neoliberal transition strategy has led to the emergence of a non-capitalist predatory or extractive system rather than primitive accumulation, and this promises not only continued technological regression, but also demographic disaster, authoritarian rule, and even a possible collapse of the Russian state. References Wieclawski, J. 2011. Contemporary Realism and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2(1): 170-179 Kotz, David M. 2001. Is Russia Becoming Capitalist? Science & Society, 65(2):157-181. Valdai Report. 2013. Russia’s Economy: After Transformation, before Modernization. [online] Available from: http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Russian%20economy%20after%20transformation_ENG.pdf Shleifer, A. & Treisman, D. 2005. Normal Country: Russia after Communism. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(1):151-174. Esra, H. 1998. The democratisation process in Russia. 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