Decline of US Hegemony in Global Security Relations and the Rise of Security Governance - Term Paper Example

Decline of US Hegemony in Global Security Relations and the Rise of Security Governance DECLINE OF US HEGEMONY IN GLOBAL SECURITYRELATIONS AND THE RISE OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE Introduction Hegemony, generally, refers to the leadership of one country over other countries within the international system. As a specific form of international order, hegemony can be differentiated from a non-hegemonic order that involves manifestly rival powers with none having the power to establish legitimate influence and legitimacy of its dominance (Westwell, 2011: p417). Because the US is taken as the world’s only hegemon, understanding whether strength is an adequate condition for hegemony or whether something else is needed is important for the direction of future US policy on global security. In the last 20 years, the global governance concept has come up as a fundamental theoretical approach, which has suggested a move away from the Cold War era’s state-dominated bi-polar nature in international security. Instead, this shift has seen the emergence of a new multi-lateral and multi-polar international security architecture where international, non-state, and state actors collaborate to craft and implement security policies. Moreover, the 9/11 attacks in the US and the Iraq War have made the discussion of the nature of US hegemony and the unipolar international system’s stability more likely (Westwell, 2011: p417). In an attempt to understand the clash between US hegemony and global security governance, this paper will seek to achieve three aims. First, it will examine theoretical assumptions that underlie the governance and hegemony concepts. Secondly, it will investigate the respective and competing hypotheses that the two theories propose in relation to international security. Finally, it will discuss how the events of the last 15 years since the 9/11 attacks are either indicative of US hegemonic strategy or balancing behaviour by major powers or the eminent rise of security governance. Hegemony and Security So as to comprehend the whether the world is evidencing the decline of US hegemony and the effects of such an event on international security, the concept of hegemony must be defined as it relates to IR theory. Hegemony Literature concerning the pre-eminence of US military and political dominance in the recent past has been characterized by an array of inter-related but confusing concepts and terms, such as imperialism, primacy, unipolarity and hegemony. There is seemingly no clear consensus about which concept can be applied to the US in the international security environment, especially following the end of the Cold War. The polarity concept refers to the relative capabilities distribution within the international system and can be classed as a structural concept (Balogun, 2011: p72). While the Cold War was ongoing, a bipolar system existed, which was characterized by the US and USSR’s overwhelming economic, military, and political resources as the two world superpowers. The collapse of the USSR left the US as the world’s only superpower, as well as the sole “pole”, which resulted in a unipolar system where no other country could match the US in political, military, and economic terms. Hegemony, on the other hand, can be distinguished from unipolarity as being a relational, rather than structural, concept. While hegemony is also defined in relation to capability distribution in the international system, these capabilities are matched by influence over a majority of members in the international system (Balogun, 2011: p72). Hegemony was attached to the US during the Cold War’s bipolar conditions with regards to its major allies in NATO and Asia. Currently, this hegemony still seems to persist with an enlarged NATO. Conversely, imperialism can be defined as the implementation of policies in addition to the influence and capabilities under hegemony (Watson, 2010: p244). Imperialism is founded on hegemony and unipolarity, especially in its suggestion that the willingness to shape international security relations is just as important as influence and capabilities. An imperial power, unlike a hegemonic power, will seek to expand capabilities and influence, while also preventing others in the international security system from challenging their dominance and pre-eminence via interventions and conquests. Based on these distinctions between hegemony, unipolarity, and imperialism, it becomes possible to interpret America’s standing in influencing international security affairs since the end of the Cold War. While unipolar conditions have remained relatively unchanged, shifts in policies and influences are determinants of whether the US faces hegemonic or non-hegemonic unipolarity (Watson, 2010: p245). Hegemony in Neorealist Theories It is, likewise, important to understand how hegemony and unipolarity fit within the theory of international relations, as well as how this contributes to comprehension of conflict and security in the international system. The neo-realist tradition offers the most extensive and exhaustive discussion regarding hegemony and unipolarity within the context of international security. As a result, this paper will rely and focus on neo-realist literature. There are two major assumptions that neo-realism is built on. First, in international security, the main actors are the states. Traditionally, this concept is grounded on monopolization of legitimate use of military ability that saw heightened institutionalization in the 20th century via the professionalization of national arms industries and national armed forces (Carranza, 2010: p418). As a result, states emerged as the core political authorities, excluding all other players. Another assumption contends that the international system is of an anarchic nature, whereby states pose the greatest threats to each other. Thus, following from the previous assumption, monopolization of the right to use legitimate violence by states means that peaceful cooperation and coexistence at the international level cannot be enforced by any overarching authority. In addition, other than states, no other actors have political, economic, or military capabilities to threaten the state. In neo-realist theory, the survival of states is the central tenet (Carranza, 2010: p418). What follows from the two assumptions is that states have to deter one another from attacking or threatening them, specifically to ensure their own security. National political, economic, and military capabilities are the major determinants of ability to deter such actions from rival states (Van der Pijl, 2010: p8). Additionally, states also set out to enhance their capabilities relative to other states through temporary alliances created to band-wagon with more powerful states in order for them to offer protection or to balance their fundamental capabilities and, thus, also lessen the threats. Neo-realists have traditionally been sceptical concerning the maintenance of stability and security in a unipolar system. In fact, Van der Pijl (2010: p8) argues that there is an inherent instability in a unipolar system due to a lack of power balance in such an international system with other states inevitably threatened by a superpower being dominant, which they attempt to counter. Moreover, there is a threat of inter-state wars emerging as other states attempt to challenge such hegemonic influence and power. The hegemonic power, however, can do little to prevent the emergence of such conflicts within the international system (Van der Pijl, 2010: p9). However, not all neo-realist theory proponents are as pessimistic concerning the possibility of security internationally in a unipolar system. Specifically, Ikenberry (2002: p47) contends that the hegemonic power could utilize its capabilities and influence to appease or deter any challengers. This would involve expansion or maintenance of its political and military capabilities, especially since this will be more likely to discourage the challenger if the gap in capabilities relative to the hegemon is increased. Secondly, the hegemon could use political influence to champion for the creation of international institutions that benefit the international order and its allies. Still, although hegemonic strategies may improve international stability and security in a unipolar system, it could be threatened by imperialism. As noted by Ikenberry (2002: p48), the more the US moves towards liberal hegemony, the more incentivized other states will feel to cooperate with the US, while a tilt towards imperial hegemony will incentivize other states to move away or resist the influence from the US. Using this line of thought, imperial hegemony by the US endangers peace because it increases perceptions of threats among allies and foes. No state can really feel secure when the US as an imperial hegemony has the capabilities, influence, and willingness to apply its resources in preventing any emergence of challengers (Chomsky, 2013: p90). In addition, the imperial hegemon will show less willingness to appease its allies through support for international institutions or support for multilateral cooperation. Because the imperial hegemon power possesses the capabilities to implement security policies unilaterally, cooperation with other states would simply be seen as a distraction or delay from other national interests. Neo-realism proposes a number of hypotheses regarding international security under conditions of hegemonic and non-hegemonic unipolarity. On one hand, non-hegemonic unipolarity tends to be more unstable, and it could result in wars between states as other powers emerge as a challenge to the lone superpower. There is more stability in a hegemonic unipolarity, which could avoid war between the hegemon and other states, including allies. However, the latter cannot prevent the emergence of threats from major powers not allied to the hegemon. Imperialist hegemony, on the other hand, makes for the least stable system as it enhances the perception of threats among foes and allies, encouraging policies aimed at counter-balancing their power and influence (Chomsky, 2013: p90). Governance and Security Recent literature on international security has recognized that integration and fragmentation are characteristic in the creation and implementation of policies aimed at influencing international security. Security governance as a concept best grasps the consequences and origins of this development. There are several assumptions supporting the suggestion that a security governance system has emerged since the end of the Cold War to replace the hegemonic system, which are significantly distinct from neo-realist premises. First, states no longer exist as the fundamental threat to international security with an increase in the number of transnational and intra-national conflicts and threats. Taylor (2010: p517) uses data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute to show that, although there is a decline in the frequency of interstate conflict, other newer threats such as terrorism, transnational crime, and civil wars are on the increase. The second assumption holds that there is an increasing need for cooperation between various actors and states because of the complexity and transnational or internal nature of the emerging threats. These actors include private corporations, NGOs, international organizations, and other states (Taylor, 2010: p518). This diversity and multiplicity of current threats to international security have exerted increasing strain on resources possessed by states, while these states also have to grapple with the inadequacy of sovereignty-bound policy formulation arrangements in addressing security issues of a transnational nature (Clark, 2011: p19). Thus, private actors and international organizations have emerged to counter security issues to military protection and training, refugees, monitoring of human rights, and humanitarian aid. A third assumption is that legitimacy of the state no longer relies on its monopoly regarding the provision of international and national security. On the basis of such neo-liberal governance norms like free markets and privatization, replacing government with governance has fundamentally altered security policy. From these hypotheses, three assumptions related to international security can be made. First, this move towards governance lends encouragement to functional and geographical specialization to enable non-state and state actors to provide security in a cost-efficient manner (Clark, 2011: p19). Secondly, states are required to collaborate more often in relation to international security because of increasing fragmentation of their capabilities. As a result, actors will use multiple organizations simultaneously to attain maximum benefits from each others’ remits and capabilities (David & Grondin, 2012: p45). Thirdly, a decrease is expected in free-riding on hegemonic powers and their security provisions as transnational threats will impact on everybody in a world that is increasingly globalized, which will necessitate transnational cooperation. In sum, the security governance theory lends credence to various predictions regarding international security today. The number of wars between major powers will decline because of functional and geographical specialization. There will also be increased sharing of responsibility in relation to the provision of international and national security between hegemons and other major powers, as well as other non-state and state actors (David & Grondin, 2012: p45). Alliances like NATO will be replaced by flexible and dynamic coalitions of the willing due to contemporary diversity in capabilities, interests, and security threats. International Security in the 21st century After discussing the hypotheses and theoretical assumptions that are linked to governance and hegemony respectively, it is now possible to examine evidence from the policies of major powers and the US in the 21st century in support of either perspective. To begin with, this section, will discuss the policies of the US in the 21st century and whether, these evidence either non-hegemony or hegemony. In addition, the section will also analyze how allies of the US and other major powers have responded to US strategy in the 21st century. Finally, it will also examine the extent to which the policies of the US and major powers match propositions under security governance, rather than hegemony. US International Security Strategy in the 21st Century On the basis of the earlier definitions of hegemonic, imperialist, and non-hegemonic unipolarity, widespread perception seems to point to US international security policy going through a fundamental shift after the 9/11 attacks. Substantial concurrence exists pointing out that the US is militarily pre-eminent in a contemporary unipolar international system. Ross (2011: p490) indicates that 23% of global GDP is from the US, while the US also devotes at least 3.5% of its GNP to defence, in comparison to China at 2.3%, Russia at 3.8%, and France and the UK at 2.5%. As of 2010, the US ranked first in defence spending at $335.7 billion, while China, India, Russia, and France spent $142.9, $66.5, $55.4, and $36.8 billion respectively. Moreover, other than capabilities, the US also possesses significant influence regarding international relations, which have given it the ability to pursue imperialist and hegemonic policies simultaneously. For instance, the US dominates a majority of international organizations and has close multilateral and bilateral relations with minor and major powers, especially South Korea and Japan that are still reliant to some extent on protection from the US. In addition, the US also has soft power, which Layne (2011: p477) describes as a nation’s reputation, socio-economic influence, and diplomatic capabilities that enable it to dominate international relations-based coalitions. The administration of President George Bush Jr. Increasingly showed a willingness to exert their influence and use the US’ soft power unilaterally, preventing emerging challengers to its hegemonic position by using pre-emptive intervention (Prys & Robel, 2011: p257). While international security policy under the Obama administration shows some evidence of a shift towards multilateral and bilateral decision making, recent actions to unilaterally exert additional sanctions on Iran and Russia despite concerns from the EU, shows that the US is still willing to go it alone. This unilateral element has definitely defined US policy in the 21st century, especially following the 9/11 attacks. This can be seen in the decision to invade Iraq unilaterally to stop the government of Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction. This intervention and current policy to unilaterally slap sanctions on countries that do not agree with the US, have, according to Prys and Robel (2011: p257), seen the US move away from being a hegemon to being an imperialist state. These actions have been taken despite concerns from such major powers as Germany, France, China, and Russia. Reactions by other Major Powers to US Strategy Major Powers had somewhat contradictory reactions to the decision by the US to take unilateral actions regarding international security after the 9/11 attacks. Ikenberry (2010: p517) observes that international relations scholars normally think of two fundamental strategies that states use to confront hegemonic and predominant states, which are band-wagoning and balancing. Whereas the former refers to the strategy of acquiescence and appeasement, the latter refers to the classical strategy building counter-balancing alliances. Although neo-realist theory posits that the US’ declared imperialist stance after 9/11 should enhance balancing behaviour among major powers, the US found many allies in its war on terrorism. The US was able to invoke Article 5 of NATO that requires collective defence for members under threat. In fact, even China and Russia band-wagoned with the US, despite the US carrying out operations in Central Asia that fell within their sphere of influence (Ikenberry, 2010: p518). For example, Russia allowed the US to use its airspace and approved military bases in former USSR states during the invasion of Afghanistan. However, major powers, both non-allied and allied, elected to pursue a balancing strategy after the US identified the next target of its war on terror as Iraq. China, Russia, Germany, and France, especially, opposed pre-emptive military action and insisted on the use of the inspection teams from the UN to establish the presence of WMDs (Ledwidge, 2010: p620). These countries even threatened to veto any resolution from the US and UK in the UNSC. In addition, these countries led international protests against the US’ actions. Possibly, the most astonishing balancing evidence was from an erstwhile ally of the US, Turkey, which historically was a strong ally of the US in NATO. Turkey refused to allow the US to use its military bases on the Iraq-Turkey border, despite a promise of $24 billion in loans and grants to lessen the impact of the war for Turkey. As a result, China and Russia, which were the first countries to oppose increasing US imperialist hegemony, have joined India, Brazil, and South Africa in forming an alliance to counter US dominance of international security agreements (Ledwidge, 2010: p620). Decline of US Hegemony and Rise of Security Governance The security governance theory offers an alternative concept of international security, specifically through its proposition of three hypotheses that seek to explain contemporary security policies at international and national level. First, it posits that states are increasingly endorsing functional and geographical specialization and moving away from the units suggested under neo-realism. In addition, there is no overbearing need for states to compete, instead progressively accepting the need for collaboration between non-state and state actors (Prys, 2010: p486). Finally, hegemonic stability is increasingly being replaced by flexible and dynamic coalitions of the willing. International security policy by the US and other powers in the period since the 9/11 attacks are, therefore, interpretable in a different manner. Specifically, the theory of security governance shows that contemporary interventions are increasingly complex beyond the US’ clear leadership role in most interventions (Prys, 2010: p486). Recent interventions in Libya are evidence of division of labour among major allied powers, in which the US undertook initial security and military operations, while other members of NATO offered aid. A similar situation was witnessed in Iraq, in which a number of major powers supported intervention by the US, before contributing to peacekeeping missions following the US’ completion of its invasion. In the post-Cold War period, a general trend seems to have emerged where the US and other major powers like the UK and France as countries with superior military capabilities arrange peacekeeping missions, while other states with manpower but inferior military capabilities provide personnel for the operations, for example in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia (Maull, 2011: p178). Additionally, looking past the war on terror, it is increasingly clear that the geo-political interests of a hegemonic US is becoming increasingly limited. Therefore, the US government does not averse to security management issues on a regional level by specialized organizations, for instance AMISOM in Somalia and ECOWAS in Liberia. There is also ample evidence of increased cooperation between US and other non-state and state actors despite the current unilateralist rhetoric. The US sought the mandate of the UN in Iraq and Afghanistan, while also extensively consulting non-allied and allied states. While this did not eventually influence the US’ decision to intervene in Iraq unilaterally, it did indicate increasing awareness by the US of the need to cooperate on issues of international security (Maull, 2011: p180). This can be seen in the decision by the US to ask for an increased role by NATO in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which was an acceptance of the strain placed on their armed forces. Moreover, while there was a clash between the US and other non-allied and allied powers concerning the intervention in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, it is important to note that this did not lead to a threat of inter-state war. In fact, as argued by Ikenberry (2010: p153), it seems as if the US has chosen not to take the imperial hegemony route as it will suffer great costs. Beyond military operations, US reliance on the resources and capabilities of other actors is becoming increasingly apparent. Recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have increasingly drawn on the financial aid and military personnel of countries other than the US. Particularly, Germany, France, China, and Russia have offered aid and personnel, despite initially being opposed to any military intervention in Iraq. In addition, current deficits in the US budget, fuelled by defence spending on the interventions, are evidence that even a hegemon like the US that produces 23% of global GDP cannot afford to unilaterally make decisions on international security, especially where interventions are required (Ikenberry, 2010: p153). The US armed forces have become overstretched, effectively prohibiting more major military interventions until full withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq is secured. The only way this seems possible is through their replacement by international peacekeeping operations. In addition, the US, during its interventionist international security policies, depended heavily on the capabilities of private security companies in support of its national armed forces (Norrlof, 2010: p65). For example, logistics and airlifts are currently the work of private organizations, instead of the US military, while current stability missions use private contractors extensively for external and internal security. For instance, Brown & Root Company was extensively used as a private contracting organization in Yugoslavia and, to show its independence from the US state hegemon, it was accused of grossly overcharging the US military in relation to services and supplies in Iraq (Norrlof, 2010: p67). A similar accusation was levelled against Black-Water in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, evidence also exists to show that hegemonic leadership in stable alliances has progressively been pushed aside in favour of “coalitions of the willing”. As a result, NATO divisions regarding intervention in Iraq failed to be overcome by the hegemonic status that the US enjoyed during the Cold War (Newman & Posner, 2011: p599). However, this refusal to cooperate with the US within the NATO framework, rather than being an identifier of a return towards instability and multi-polarity, would seem to be part of a more dynamic and flexible approach towards international institutions and alliances. This approach identifies international organizations and alliances as tools of peacekeeping, as well as, in particular, instances where there is agreement between the US and other actors, but not all (Newman & Posner, 2011: p599). As a result, the ability of the US to remain hegemonic has declined in the post -Cold War period as coalitions of the willing become the norm. Conclusion This discussion set out to clarify whether the world is returning to power balance politics where the US, as the sole superpower, can continue to impose hegemonic policies on other states regarding international security or whether the era of security governance that began after the Cold War is still in effect. The findings of the paper seem to indicate that, although the international security system is still unipolar, and some security policies pursued by the US may be seen as imperialist hegemony, neo-liberal perspectives on security may neglect equally important evidence that could offer a different vision on global security issues. Evidence indicates that the US’ influence in international security has been generally overestimated, while the US is more dependent on collaboration of other state and non-state actors. The theory of security governance helps to highlight complexities facing the US, along with other minor and major powers, in international security issues. This theory posits that functional and geographical specialization accounts for differences in international security policies on the basis of national capabilities, as well as regional interests. Moreover, it also helps shed light on why non-allied and allied states may elect to collaborate on some issues with the US, while choosing not to on other issues, despite its dominance and pre-eminence. Finally, this theory also shed light on the dynamic and flexible nature of international organizations between coalitions of the willing that are issue-specific and military alliances. Security governance theory expects a future in which American hegemony will gradually give way to cooperation with minor and major powers to address contemporary transnational and internal threats. References Balogun, M. J. (2011). 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