Why did the Oslo Peace Process fail - Dissertation Example

?Why Did the Oslo Peace Process Fail? Chapter 2: What was agreed at Oslo (1993-1995) The Oslo I Accord or simply Oslo I, which indicates the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), set in 1993, was an attempt to establish a framework which would seek the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It marked the initial face-to-face agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The activities surrounding the agreement arose from the Madrid Conference of 1991, carried out in Oslo, Norway, supported by the Fafo institute and cleared on the 20th of August 1993 (Brown, 2003). The Accords were then officially set to writing and signed during a public ceremony in Washington, D.C on the 13th of September 1993 before Yasser Arafat (PLO Chairman), Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, and President Bill Clinton of the United States of America (Brown, 2003). The documents were also supported and signed by other official signatories, including Mahmoud Abbas for the PLO, Shimon Peres, foreign minister for Israel, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the US as well as Andrei Kozyrev, the foreign minister for Russia (Brown, 2003). The Accord supported the establishment of a Palestinian interim self-government, including the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). This PNA was set to bear responsibility for the management of the territory within its control (Brown, 2003). The Accords also supported the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from various regions of the contentious Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It was expected that the arrangement would cover a five-year interim period where later a more permanent arrangement would be established, especially on issues like Jerusalem, Palestine refugees, Israeli settlements, and borders (Weinburger, 2007). This Oslo I was followed by Oslo II. In both accords, no independence was anticipated for Palestine. In general, the agreement emphasized the withdrawal of Israel personnel from different areas of the Gaza Strip as well as the West Bank. It also supported the right of Palestine for self-governance in these regions through the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (Weinburger, 2007). The term of the Palestine was set to last for five years, at which time, more permanent arrangements would have been established for the two territories. Major problems, including the issue of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, as well as security and border issues were to be managed in other negotiations and arrangements (Weinburger, 2007). Israel was ready to grant an interim self-rule to Palestine in stages. Aside from the principles, the two groups put into writing the Letters of Mutual Recognition, as the Israeli government supported the PLO to be the legal representative of the Palestinians and the PLO also supported the right declared by Israel to exist (McMahon, 2009). The agreement also rejected and condemned terrorism, violence, and activities set to destroy Israel. The goal of the Israel-Palestine talks was to secure a Palestine Interim Self-Government Authority, for the people of the Palestine region in the West Bank as well as the Gaza strip, during the transitional 5-year period (McMahon, 2009). Before Palestinians could manage themselves based on democratic principles, general elections were set for the Council. The coverage of the Palestinian Council was the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Exempt were issues which would be managed during the permanent negotiations (McMahon, 2009). The two parties perceived West Bank and Gaza to be single territorial units. The five-year transition period would be seen with Israel withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. Permanent status talks started soon enough between these territories (Quandt, 2001). A transfer of authority was also set between the Israel Defense Forces to the Palestinians on matters relating to education, culture, health, social welfare, taxation, and tourism. The Council would also secure an effective police force and Israel was recognized as still responsible for the management of external threats (Quandt, 2001). An Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee was to be set in place in order to secure and promote cooperation in the programs established in the protocols. Israeli military forces were redeployed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010). The Declaration of Principles also reached enforcement status after one month of its signing. The different protocols attached to the Declaration of Principles and those indicated in the minutes were to be considered part of the accord. The first annex indicated the conditions of the Palestinian Elections. It covered election agreements, including the system of elections, including the rules and regulations on election campaigns, agreements among the organizations on the mass media, as well as the possible licensing of a TV station in the area (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010). The second annex covered the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. This annex indicated that the Israel occupying forces would exit the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. It also included specific terms to cover the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area following the exit of Israel in the area (Watson, 2000). Internal security as well as other security policies was also secured; these forces included Palestinian police forces recruited from the locals and from foreigners (mostly Jordanians and Egyptians) (Watson, 2000). Those who were set to support the Palestinians police forces from abroad had to be trained as police officers. This annex also secured temporary international and foreign presence in the region. It also supported a join Palestinian –Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee in order to protect the security of both territories (Watson, 2000). The agreement also secured safe passage for individuals and general transportation between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. This annex also made indications for the coordination between the different parties, especially those relating to passages—between Gaza and Egypt and between Jericho and Jordan (Fisher, 2005). Annex three established the economic cooperation between the two territories. The two regions supported the creation of an Israeli-Palestinian Committee to support and manage economic cooperation, highlighting: cooperation in the fields of water, electricity, energy, finance, transport, communications, trade, commerce, industry, regulation of labor relations, social welfare activities; it also established an environmental protection plan as well as a cooperative agreement for communication and the media (Fisher, 2005). The fourth annex was focused on regional development. This agreement indicated that both parties would support each other in terms of securing multilateral peace efforts, especially in supporting the Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, efforts which were initiated by the G7 (Fisher, 2005). Based on the agreed minutes of the accords, minute A focused on general understandings. These general understandings indicated that most of the powers and responsibilities established for the Palestinians via the Declaration of Principles before the inauguration of the Council was liable to the same principles of Article IV (Freedman, 1998). Minute B was on specific understandings with Article IV indicating the Council jurisdiction. The understanding indicated that the Jurisdiction of the Council would also cover the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, except in terms of concerns which were to be agreed upon under permanent status negotiations (Freedman, 1998). Article VI (2) indicated the transferring authority. In this case, it was established that the relinquishment of authority would include, first, Palestinians informing the Israelis of the names who were authorized to take power in their behalf, including the roles and responsibilities which would be attributed to the Palestinians in relation to the Declaration of Principles in the following areas: education, culture, health, social welfare, tourism, and other aspects subject to negotiation and discussion (Gelvin, 2007). Article VII (2) covered the terms of their cooperation. This was mostly related to arrangements relating to coordination and cooperation. Article VII (5) referred to Israel’s powers, specifically the withdrawal of the government. This article however did not take away the power of Israel to exercise its powers and functions which were not relayed to the Council (Usher, 1999). Article VIII discussed the arrangements relating to the police. Based on the understanding for the Interim Agreement, arrangements for cooperation and coordination were indicated. It was also established that the relinquishment of powers to the Palestinian police was to be managed in phases (Usher, 1999). The accord indicated that Israel and Palestinian police would also carry out joint patrols. Article X made specifications in designating officials. This article supported the agreement between Israelis and Palestine delegates, mostly on exchanging of names for those authorized as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee which was set to eventually promote decisions based on agreement (Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007). Article XI of the minutes also discussed Israel’s continuing responsibilities. The agreement established that before the withdrawal of Israel forces, Israel would also be responsible for protecting external security, and for internal security as well as public order of settlements and Israelis. The Israeli police forces and the civilians allowed the safe continuance of road use within the Gaza Strip and Jericho regions (Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007). Basic assumptions and stipulations of the Accord also referred to Israel and the PLO supporting mutual recognition. Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, especially in terms of the PLO being a team for the implementation of the different specifications in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Catignani, 2008). The general basis of the DOP is the resolution of the UN Security Council 242 which generally called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories set in the war of June 1967. The accords did not include different provisions of international law and the resolutions relating to the conflict from over 52 years of relations (Catignani, 2008). The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 which required the division of the Palestine into two states and which established Jerusalem as corpus separtatum (under international jurisdiction). The UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which supported the right of the refugees to reclaim their homes and be compensated for their losses was also not supported. What was also cancelled was the different UN Resolutions which provided strong support for the Palestinian’s right to self-determination (Pappe, 2006). The accord also did not specifically declare Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem to be null and void and it did not condemn the Jewish settlement building to be unlawful. The Declaration of Principles also called for Israel to re-deploy its troops within areas indicated, including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; it also recognized the authority of the Palestinians to secure provisions in the management and implementation of these accords (Pappe, 2006). As such, it can be applied that Israel is not acknowledged as an occupying force, and as such, Israel does not perceive itself to be obligated to withdraw from the territories it has been occupying since 1967. It can also be implied that the conflict basically refer to negotiations between two equal parties, not of one party being liable to the international legal provisions. The declaration also does not cover all Palestinians, and it does not also seek to manage all the elements of the conflict (Clemens, 2004). It however covers all Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and cancels out the internationally supported human and national rights of Palestinians arriving in the region through diaspora. The principles also want to establish normal relations between the two parties (Clemens, 2004). The major challenge for the PNA and its security forces mostly refer to the management of the occupation of Israel. Based on the different maps and provisions set by the accords, Arafat and the PNA were asked to accept the existence of the Jewish settlements in the occupied areas. The divisions established by the Oslo II also provided the standards of a final settlement which would support the elimination of the disturbance of territorial integrity for the emerging Palestine state (Clemens, 2004). By establishing Israeli military control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the PA has supported the existence and legality of the Israeli presence in the area. The main task of the PNA police, including their security forces was to protect the Israel and its citizens over their Palestinian citizens. As a result, Arafat and PNA were placed in a situation of accountability to the US and Israel. Chapter III Why did the Oslo Peace Process Fail From the very start, the Oslo Peace Process was already flawed. Hence, it was more or less bound to fail. Instead of assessing the failure of the Oslo Peace Process as a limitation in the Liberal strategy in establishing peace, Pundak (2001) discusses that the failure of the Oslo Peace process comes from issues in implementation. He further argues that the peace process could have worked out well if the political leaders on both sides of the political argument did not make avoidable leadership mistakes (Pundak, 2001). These mistakes prevented the establishment of Liberal conflict tools which could have secured success for the peace process. Some analysts declare in fact that the Oslo Accord did not really fail, because the agreement was never implemented in the first place (Herzog and Hai, 2004)). Pundak (2001) also discusses issues in relation to failures in implementation. He points out that the crucial variable of mutual trust between the different leaders broke down because of poor leadership and inadequate leadership styles of the groups involved (Pundak, 2001). The leadership of Israel has been labeled as vulnerable as they were acting based on dominance versus the Palestinians. Pundak (2001) points out that Rabin compromised the Oslo spirit by appointing other officers, different from those who made the original deals in the White House ceremony in 1993. Netanyahu was even accused of deliberately wanting to compromise mutual trust by increasing settlements and wanting to delay the protection of Israeli goals (Kriesberg, 2001). Pundak (2001) also argues against Barak who has failed in terms of fulfilling Palestinian expectations. He also points out that by supporting the settlement, Barak compromised Palestine’s confidence in Israel’s desire to establish geographical agreements. Pundak (2001) also emphasizes out that Barak’s strict negotiation style compromised the trust of the Palestinians, especially in the condescending manner he had again Arafat. In general, the issues in the implementation of the CBMs seen in the primary conceptualization of Oslo is considered to be based on the issues of the Camp David Summit, including the spread of violence and the failure of the Oslo process (Pruitt, 1997). The Liberals also point out that mistakes made by the leaders led to the failure in securing public support for Oslo (Makovsky, 1996). In effect, Arafat has reprimanded for supporting the incitement to persist and for not ensuring sufficient actions against Palestinian terrorists. Both issues compromised Israeli confidence in the Palestine’s commitment to peace; as a result, support for concessions was decreased (Makovsky, 1996). On the other hand, the failure to secure support for peace among the Palestinian people was affected by Israel’s impositions of closure in relation to the terrorism response. The Liberal principles of peace-building were looking into the generation of a feel good facto within the economic realm pouring into the diplomatic realm. In general, Prime Minister Rabin, has not been a supporter of integration and as terrorists actions against Israelis increased from 1993-1995, Israel acted by returning to the closure policy (Beilin, 1997). In 1995, Israel sought a separation barrier. It also started to secure an increase in foreign workers to replace Palestinians. Under these conditions, the economic conditions in Palestine deteriorated from 1993 to 1996 with recovery seen to pre-1993 levels seen from 1999 to 2000 (Rynhold, 2007). Pundak (2001) also ignored the security application of the closures, perceiving these as a tool of indulging public opinion. In effect, the failure in the implementation of the Liberal model of economic cooperation is considered a major issue causing limited support for Palestinian cause. Malley and Agha (2001) also argue that the US can take some credit for the failure of the peace process. These authors point out that the US was not honest to both parties. Instead, it discussed its terms with Israel, allowing the latter to declare a timetable for the negotiation process (Savir, 1998). These authors also take issue with the insensitivity of the US in terms of Palestine interests, declaring that the Palestinians needed to accept Israeli terms made during Camp David (Savir, 1998; Malley and Agha, 2001). Moreover, they point out that the cultural bias of the US administration against Israel prevented the US from insisting on a breakthrough before the outbreak of violence in 2000. If the US did not act in that way, a better outcome would have been secured. Finally, reconciliation was not actually sought by Arafat, especially as incitement was seen in the PNA against Israel. The people to people policies were also not implemented on a wide scale or a significant base of participants for them to gain any sort of success on the issue. In fact, majority of the annexes of the Oslo Accords which covered the civilian cooperation were not actually implemented (Herzog and Hai, 2004). Based on the Liberal Approach, the Oslo process did not succeed as the Liberal conflict resolution processes which initially supported the process were not properly established and implemented. Realism focuses on conflict prevention, in contrast to the establishment or building peace. It considers political interests, as well as security to be the primary elements in international relations. On the other hand, Liberalism supports integration (Kaufman, 1996). Realism also seeks separation and they believe that open borders can lead to instability, including sabotage and infiltration. Moreover, realism points out that the safest way to negate endemic bloody conflict and chronic instability between the hostile ethnic groups relates to political separation (Kaufman, 1996). Realism also indicates that the better way to prevent bloody conflicts and instability between hostile groups is political separation (Kaufman, 1996). Realism does not cancel out the possibility for Liberal applications, including mutual recognition and economic cooperation to manage conflict, however, these elements are often considered secondary elements on national interests and security (Dunne, 1997). Based on the principles of realism, different changes in Israeli and Palestine policy must be initially based on the effects of the changes within the balance of power. In general, the Palestine intifada, seen first in December 1987, caused a shift in the balance of power, which is considered a significant element in the Arab-Israeli peace process (Dunne, 1997). In relation to the changes in the Palestinian position, the PLO had a weaker position already as 1993 rolled in. The initial intifada was led by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, it was not led by the PLO (Yaari and Schiff, 1990). Nevertheless, this led to the weakening of the PLO position in Palestine, mostly to the detriment of the Palestinians and the Hamas. In order to restore its leadership credibility, it had to recognize Israel and reject terrorism, as well as enter into a formal discussion with the US (Yaari and Schiff, 1990). Still, the PLO’s position was further weakened when Arafat supported Saddam during the 1991 Gulf War, disappointing the US and its Arab allies. As the Cold War and the Soviet Union collapsed, the PLO generally lost any source of support or political power. Based on these conditions, the PLO was ripe to enter into the negotiations (Rubin, 1994). In relation to the changes in Israel policy, it is important to emphasize various factors. Initially, the response of Israel to the intifada and Iraq’s Kuwaiti invasion prompted Rabin and other Palestinian leaders to conclude that Israelis were already strained from the conflict (Rabin, 1994). As a result, Israel’s power was compromised causing a more engaged approach to peace discussions (Inbar, 1999). The expanding issues on the radical states like Iran and Iraq based on the usual weapons led Israel to take more compromising decisions on the issue. In 1991, Iraq took advantage of the Palestine issue to attack Israel; the resumption of the peace process would decrease the possibility of this incident unfolding again. As the Cold War ended, Israel’s position as an asset for the US became a less significant position (Inbar, 1999). Based on these circumstances, the US and the rest of the international community were able to prompt Israel and other neighboring countries to compromise and to consider negotiations during the 1991 Madrid Conference. At this point, it was apparent the shift of power was based on various political elements which pressed Israel’s decisions in a dovish direction, to the point where even ideological leaders like Shamir already felt that there was no other choice but to enter into negotiations with the Palestinians (Rynhold, 2008). However, entering into the Madrid negotiations was not the same or was not as easy as assenting to the Oslo Accords in 1993. The US was not pressing Israel to discuss with the PLO and without the Labor power increase in 1992, as well as the entry of Liberal leaders like Peres and Beilin, the Oslo Accords would not have unfolded (Rynhold, 2008). The Liberals noticed that Liberal actions would press the Oslo process in the direction of conflict resolution. Labor realists, including Rabin and Barak were less enthused. In relation to the Realist approach to ethnonational discussions, both parties were aiming for the political and territorial separation as the best means of ending the conflict; as a result, both parties were also more inclined towards Israel’s withdrawal in principle (Rynhold, 2004). Still, Rabin perceived Oslo as a test to check whether the Palestinians really supported the establishment of a state within the practice while discarding terrorism and the aims of discrediting Israel (Rynhold, 2004). In the meantime, the Chief of Staff Barak did not favor the 1993 Accords during that time, as it feared that Israel was more or less giving up its various negotiating tools without understanding that the PLO was already headed towards compromise on the main permanent status considerations (Rynhold, 2004). As Prime Minister, Barak’s goals were more related to the establishment of a practical application of Palestine goals on the issue of permanent status. Consequently, Arafat’s goals were eventually unveiled, especially by rejecting Clinton’s suggestions, it is apparent that the 1993 Accords from his viewpoint was the fact that it did not need a definitive answer in relation to core permanent status issues, also pressing the gradual management of control over region of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thereby pushing the PLO towards a stronger position (Rynhold, 2008). Based on a realist perspective, changes in the balance of power provided the parties a major interest in the discussions and in establishing ways of resolving the conflict; however, they did not actually establish a strong direction towards the resolution of the conflict (Rynhold, 2003). The ripeness of negotiations is not in the same line as being ripe for conflict resolution. This was the case in the Oslo Accords. Even as both Israel and the PLO were ready to negotiate, there were still issues on how they reached permanent settlement (Rynhold, 2003). Mutual recognition in the Oslo Accords established such a critical issue in the Oslo process. Based on realism, the main issue does not refer to recognition, but how the parties manage the meanings of these discussions into more practical discussions of the interests. Liberals understood that mutual recognition generally called for negotiated terms especially as the core requirements of both sides were already theoretically agreeable (Ross, 2004). Accordingly, it was further understood that mutual recognition cancelled out the zero-sum quality of the conflict, which would reassure the encourage the involved parties about their goals and motivations, and therefore support the mutual trust needed during the conflict resolution (Ross, 2004). In fact, the issue of mutual recognition for the Oslo Process was that it had destructive vagueness. This vagueness covered the large issues for both sides in their conceptualization of what mutual recognition actually meant in the practice (Husseini, 2001). Instead of ensuring that the zero-sum game was ended, destructive vagueness increased the issues on the core objectives for both parties and therefore led to the establishment of a spiral of insecurity founded on mutual suspicion (Jervis, 1976). During the Accords, Israel acknowledged the PLO as the primary representative of the Palestinians and the Palestinians also acknowledged Israel. However, Palestinians did not support Zionism as a lawful movement; Israel also did not support Palestinians in their quest for statehood (Yaar, 1998). For most Israelis, supporting the peace process was not founded on Palestinian rights, but more on the importance of ensuring Israel’s identity as a Jewish advocate and as a state. This prompted Israeli’s to be more sensitive to the fact that the persistent settlement caused the Palestinians to believe that they would not gain a strong contiguous state, but more a series of Bantustans (Kelman, 1995). As this belief was supported in terms of the Israeli right, Rabin’s and Barak’s failure to end the settlement construction impacted on Palestine’s fears in terms of what was actually established in practice. Meanwhile, for the Palestinians, the primary narrative gravitated more towards the belief of Zionism being a colonial tool (Ripsman, 2005). This would mean that peace, not being associated with justice referred to capitulation or pragmatism. The option that Jews must later leave or lose their right of self-determination was left wide open (Adler, 2004). At which point, the political discussions directed towards demonizing and eliminating Judaism Israel persisted. As such options had practice applications in the negotiation processes indicated by both sides, they indicated a lack of ripeness, mostly on the issue of Palestinian refugees. On one side, Israeli opposition to a right of return for the Palestinian refugees and the migration of thousands of Palestinian refugees in practice was pressed (Arian, 1995). On the other side, Palestinians persisted in their demands towards a right of return for refugees. Even as they were ready to compromise implementation, such position indicated that Israel’s existence as a Jewish state was inferior the right of Palestinian refugees to opt for their primary choice of abode (Arian, 1995). This indicated that the long-term goals of the Palestinians was still on the elimination of Israel, mostly now on demographic conditions. Long-time moderate Palestinian Faisel Husseini supported this position in his public statement before his death (Husseini, 2001). In fact, informal workshops expressed that the issue of right of return was still being discussed, however, he did not believe it would be a major barrier especially on the context of recognition and reconciliation. The 1995 Beilin Abu Mazen draft seemed to secure a foundation for a compromise on the discussions; however, Abu Mazen did not agree to support the practice (Husseini, 2001). In actuality, he denied that he had anything to do with the plans. In the meantime, Arafat rejected the conditions set by Clinton for permanent settlement. Contrary to the Framework, Arafat insisted on the right to return, while also speaking out against the need for an international force in the Jordan valley and not wanting to compromise in relation to the Temple Mount (Sher, 2001). It has also been indicated that both sides were nearing agreement at Taba in 2001; however, primary participants for both sides contend that not much progress was made and in any case, Arafat did not authorize participants to enter into the deal (Sher, 2001). The issue is not simply a leadership issue. Polls have indicated persistent Palestine opposition, relinquishing the right of return for refugees and descendants to Israel (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2003). Under these conditions, based on the real permanent status discussions, Palestinian parties were prompted by public outcry from considering compromises on the refugee issue. In the interim, about 68% of Israelis did not want refugees at all to Israel, and about 16% more were prepared to allow a few thousand refugees (PCPSR, 2003). Israelis believed that the right of return was a major threat to their political value -- Israel as a Jewish state (Arian, 1995). Among Israeli Jews, support for the separation and a Jewish leadership is not simply based on the need to establish a specific identity; it is also based on personal and national security. Israeli Jews understand that Israelis and Palestinians cannot live with each other peacefully as a single state (Herman and Yaar, 1998). In any case, failure to establish a Framework Agreement on a Permanent Status (FAPS) in the interim period affected negotiations on the interim settlement so much so that it would impact on trust. The goal in the interim period was to secure time for liberal elements to secure enough readiness to eventually allow conflict resolution (Herman and Yaar, 1998). However without the permanent status agreement, the interim period caused mistrust for both sides wanting to place themselves in a leveraged position for permanent status discussions or a collapse of the processes. In addition, without clear resolution to the permanent status issues, the legitimacy for rejectionists was established. This led to issues in domestic politics, for the different leaders to consider actions which would have secured trust and supported the process including the major settlement freeze and the major issues against terrorism (Kelman, 1995). In effect, the lack of readiness caused mistrust. In addition, efforts towards the negotiations on compromise towards the core issues before any sense of readiness was secured within the public prompted rejectionists to uncover the possibilities of these symbols in prompting the public towards violence (Kelman, 1995). As elites have a significant role in managing ethnic conflicts, the real score is based on the commitment of the public. It is Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount which secured the opportunity for the initiation of violence. In effect, based on the realists, mistrust, not issues in implementation and it was the issues in function which caused problems in the Oslo peace process (Rynhold, 2008). It was a flawed process from the very start especially as the practical implications of mutual recognition was taken by the parties to be far from the conditions supporting practice application. Conclusion The Palestinian conflict with Israel unfolded as the latter invaded different regions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Efforts to remove them from these areas were generally unsuccessful, especially as Israel built various structures which would indicate their permanent occupation of these territories. The fact that many Palestinians were driven out of these occupied territories firmly entrenched Israel’s position on the conflict. Efforts to settle the conflict eventually were set through the Oslo Accords. These Accords were founded on initial mutual agreements by both parties. However, as time unfolded and mutual distrust was seen, the negotiations for peace failed. Oslo’s timetable was ended in 1999. A year later the Palestinians and Israelis established full settlement. Through a West Bank Palestinian population of about two million, the Palestinian Authority was in control of only about 17.25 of the area and in partial control of 23.8% of another area. Israel however, has full control of 59% of what is known as Area C. About 400,000 Jewish settlers now live permanently in 200 Jewish settlements in the West Bank. For the Gaza Strip, Palestinians established self-rule in about 80% of the area-about less than 29 miles long and 7-10 miles wide. About 6000 Jewish settlers occupy this crowded land where about 70% of the 1.2 million Palestinian population are refugees. Issues at the very heart of the conflict are still unresolved. Israel does not want to acknowledge itself as an occupying power, and is refusing to remove the illegal Jewish settlements, insisting on the retention Jerusalem and other parts of the land to be its eternal capital. It also refuses to acknowledge any blame for the refugee issue, refusing the implementation of UN resolutions indicating repatriation and compensation. In the past years, Israel has secured a harsh system in the occupied territories. Under favorable conditions, Israel would occupy about three settlement blocks in the West Bank, eliminating territories contiguity for Palestine, and further ensuring control over the areas. The refugees would not be able to return to their claimed territories. Some would actually be resettled in the so-called Palestinian territories; however most would have to resettle in other countries. 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