International Relations Theories - Liberalism and Realism NATO and the Intervention in Libya in 2011 - Case Study Example

International Relations Theories: Liberalism and Realism NATO and the Intervention in Libya in Introduction In March of NATO took over operations in Libya as the people struggled against an oppressive regime. The uprising was meant to be peaceful but President Muammar Gaddafi reacted violently against his own people, causing a global outrage of the slaughter of his people by his armed forces (Issac, 2012). The League of Arab States (LAS) had already suspended Libya’s membership and now, the League called for an international community to intervene in the tragedy (Maessen 2012). Libya, it should be noted, is a member of the LAS, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and the African Union (AU). The United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1973 which authorized member states, nationally or through regional groups, to step in and protect the people, using whatever means available. Under this resolution, there was an imposition of a no-fly zone, a ban on flights, enforcement of an arms embargo, and all assets were frozen world-wide (Issac, 2012). This operation was called Operation Unified Protector. Applied to this venture was the Right to Protection (R2P) as well (Yoshida 2013). In looking at this event through the theories of liberalism and realism in international relations, an overview of the process for determining how NATO intervened and the reasons for intervention must be examined first. There are a number of factors involved: 1) the Arab community was concerned about the instability of Libya as regards the slaughter of people and that the revolt and subsequent war would spread to other countries; 2) that resources in petroleum would be compromised; and 3) that the world would reduce investment in the Arab nations if they were viewed as a financial risk. Aside from those reasons, Libya was in close proximity to the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Maessen 2012). There was a responsibility to protect the region and Libya, consequently, for a number of reasons and not all of them were humanitarian. Indeed, if one were to look at that situation and then compare it to Syria, the question would be “Why Libya and not Syria?” 1. The Global Viewpoint: NATO and the Players The players in the operation were four countries who chose to directly involve themselves in NATO’s efforts: Qatar, Jordan, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The countries who supported the intervention were France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Those who opposed it were Chin and Russia, along with countries who abstained from voting on the resolution of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), which were Brazil, Germany and India. Countries who supported the resolution were Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Columbia, Gabon, Nigeria, Portugal and South Africa (Maessen 2012). In such a situation, the Secretary General of the U.N. and the Special Advisors, do not act or support national interests, but instead make a case for moral reasons only when presenting a case for resolution (Maessen 2012). This would indicate why in terms of conflicts and intervening in such cases, NATO must leave once it has accomplished the objective of the intervention and the resolution. Once the violence had ended and Gaddafi removed, NATO pulled out of the region, leaving the National Transitional Council (NTC), Gaddafi’s opposition group, in charge of restructuring the country. As additional members in the fight, Britain and France assisted in the operation, mainly in the Mediterranean region. The supporting role of the United States was to provide 97 per cent of the Tomahawk missiles used and 755 of the aerial refuelling operations in the region (Issac 2012). As understood by the original R2P, this had now ended once the people were no longer in danger (Yoshida 2013). The intervention process for NATO was having the first step completed by the United Nations Security Council in passing the resolution and invoking the R2P that legally enabled everyone else to step in (Yoshida 2013). The main agenda for going in was to protect the people, based on Humanitarian Laws which are observed by NATO and the UN and its members. 2. Realism or Liberalism in Intervention Was it realism or liberalism that instigated the movement by the UNSC and NATO to proceed on the Libya operation? NATO had already inserted a presence in the region in opening discussions, first with the Mediterranean Dialogue (North African countries) and then with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) for the Gulf States since 2004. In light of this knowledge, there may have been a two-fold theoretical basis for why the NATO operation was put in place. First, Libya was in a strategic location and has tremendous oil resources and noting this, the concept of military action, based on location, practically ensured a successful outcome. Oil resources would of course, appeal to those with significant investments in the area, including neighbouring Arab oil-producing countries and the Europeans, who conducted oil operations in partnerships with Libyan companies. In effect, we would say that realism was the motivating factor for moving in. It was essential to protecting financial investments in the area, including those partnerships being conducted with NATO and the Arab countries. Yet liberalism also has its place when considering the global community where countries interact with each other, particularly in business dealings. The ability to have freedom to move beyond a political government’s ideology such as Communism, allows for a certain liberal ability to bypass such principles, for the most part. 3. Realism The principles of realism in international relations are that the states or nations are at the centre of the issue and that they act in ways that focus on their welfare and national interests first before anything else (Yoshida 2013). Power is also measured in how a state or nation can get another entity such as other states or the U.N. to conduct actions in support of their case and argument which they cannot do by themselves. Realism is, therefore, reflected through power and security (the military) in regards to national interest (Maessem 2012). In reality, most nations see that they cannot do everything by themselves and that they must get others to assist them to accomplish goals, such as in the case of the LAS who made the approach to the UNSC for help. The use of the R2P is also important because it labels the intervention as a humanitarian venture which allows the international community to respond in a legal manner to provide peace in an area (Yoshida 2013). 4. Liberalism In the case of liberalism, the focus is not so much on power as it is on the goals of economic prosperity and stability in the region. The manner in which these are achieved is through consolidation with international institutions such as the U.N. and NATO, thus relieving the pressure of conducting affairs of the nation by oneself (Maessem 2012). Therefore, realism is based more in working through not only the state, but through the international communities. Realism is based more in the self-interest of the state as a more narrowed focus and maintaining rule over the nation. Consequently, when NATO goes in to assist in putting down an armed conflict situation, it acts within the liberalism theory. When it has completed its mission, the realism theory takes over as NATO leaves the nation. Rule of the nation is, then, back in the hands of that nation. Both liberalism and realism are said to be in play in the case of NATO’s intervention in Libya (Maessem 20120. 5. Humanitarian Interventions and International Laws The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the International Human Rights Law (IHRL) provide for the protection of people in a non-international armed conflict. As initially presented within the United Nations Conventions, these laws were originally set up during internationals wars and conflicts in order to reduce or stop the genocide of a nation’s people (RULAC 2013). This would have been most evident during World War II (WWII) in the case of mass murders of the Jews. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provision was created in 2001 to allow the United Nations to oversee what was happening in a country, such as in the case of Libya and also in Syria. Many laws which assist nations or allow international organizations to observe or oversee conflicts, were created after WWII because of lessons learned during this war. These laws are most often referred to when application for intervention is made to the UNSC, and certainly in the case with Libya (RULAC 2013). Conclusion In retrospect, the Arab Spring, as we now call it, started with the self-immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia, who was protested the humiliating treatment he had received from the police, instigated a country-wide protest which was to be the first of many across Arab countries in the next few months (Jude 2012). Egypt was next and so it went until it got to Libya where things took a turn for the worse. With the response of the UN and supporting nations, the killings of the Libyan people came to an end. The transitional government took over and it appeared that things went back to normal. Yet, what was missing from the whole intervention was how the new government would be set up, and would there be a problem with who ended up in charge once elections were over. In light of intervention policies, there must be another section added into this mixture that requires an international group to create an infrastructure that protects a nation while it is going through the changes of one type of government to another. It would seem that to intervene in humanitarian terms, requires a humanitarian ending as well (Jude 2012). When leaving a country, there must be infrastructure put together so that operations continue as before but there is a clear path made that the country can follow to implement its new changes. This has been seen time and again with Iraq and Afghanistan where wars have been waged, yet when the dust settled and new governments were installed, there was a lack of infrastructure in place to accommodate those changes. Consequently, people still suffered, although in other ways. If intervention is approached in humanitarian terms, whether liberal or realist principles are observed, it would seem that humanitarianism must also be applied to the end result as well. While there was an interim government in place in Libya, it was not sufficient to overcome infrastructure problems that arose in the next few months, including the influx of the Muslim Brotherhood which essentially, put the nation back into another type of dictatorship that they had just gotten out of. Future interventions must take into consideration in the future just how this might be accomplished. Otherwise, intervention in any shape or form and whatever guise, will never succeed. Bibliography Davidson, J 2012, ‘Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Corce for Good?’, POLIS Journal, vol. 7, pp.138-164. Available from . Fermor, C 2013, ‘NATO’s Decision to Intervene in Libya (2011): Realist Principles or Humanitarian Norms?’, Journal of Policies & International Studies, vol. 8. Available from . Halabi, SF 2012, ‘Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in Historical and Theoretical Context’, American University International Law Review, vol.27, 2, pp. 320-390. Available from . Issac, SK 2012, ‘NATO’s Intervention in Libya: Assessment and Implications’, IEMED, Panorama, Jude, SC 2012, ‘Saving Strangers in Libya: Traditional and Alternative Discourses on Humanitarian Intervention’, European Institute, Available from . Kaarbo, J, Lantis, JS and Beasley, RK 2012, ‘The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective’, CQ Press, SAGE Online, Available from . Maessen, J 2012, ‘The Libyan Intervention, Triumph and Downfall of the Responsibility to Protect in One,’ Master Thesis, Department of Political Science, Universiteit Leiden, Available from . RULAC 2013. ‘Applicable International Law: Libya,’ Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC), Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Online. Available from . Valentino, BA 2011, ‘The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention’, Foreign Affairs Online, vol. 90, 6. Available from http://people.umass.edu/charli/docs/ValentinoFA.pdf. Yoshida, Y 2013, ‘A Theoretical Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention and R2P’, e-International Relations Online, Available from /. Read More