The Defining of Terrorism: The Difficulties in an Otherwise Simple Definition - Admission/Application Essay Example

THE DEFINING OF TERRORISM THE DIFFICULTIES IN AN OTHERWISE SIMPLE DEFINITION (Take Home Quiz XXXX of {Professor} 11 February2013 I. Introduction This paper attempts to dispute the claims mentioned in the article, “Analyzing and Defining Terrorist Acts” by Fred Burton. it will briefly summarize the position of Burton’s, V.P. of STRATFOR (Global Intelligence), which argues this disagreeing by which the law enforcement does not to consider recent domestic acts as terrorism. In a broader analysis, specific references mentioned by Burton in regards to the specified act(s) should be easily labeled as terrorism by the US government. Burton provides specific examples in the article of recent cases that were not labeled terrorism. However, my own analysis contradicts Mr. Burton opinion in that the US government’s (current position) should remain as stated, not an act of terrorism. These events are just various individual acts of violence, though tragic and horrific as they may be. II. Article Summary The article is related to several individual past events that should have been otherwise categorized/investigated as terrorist acts. These specific cases mentioned are described as lone wolf type scenarios and are listed as follows: John Patrick Bedell (a single shooter at the Pentagon entrance) John Stack (crashing his plane in the IRS building) Maj. Nidal M. Hasan (Shootings on Fort Hood) Though they were individually referenced with respect to their individual characteristics by means of terrorism, Burton further details each specific event and compares it to the US Patriot Act (2001). The definition of domestic terrorism is provided as follows: ‘domestic terrorism’ means activities that—‘‘(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; ‘‘(B) appear to be intended—‘‘(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ‘‘(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ‘‘(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and ‘‘(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’’ 1 As Mr. Burton is currently employed by STRATFOR (an analytical global intelligence company) as the Vice President of Intelligence, he concludes, along with STRATFOR, in that he disagrees with the current US determination (‘s) in that each of these events are considered as not to be terroristic in nature.2 Burton further suggests that such acts of terrorism would then garner the needed attention they truly deserve. By not allocating these government resources and experience, any information gained about terrorist, or their activities, would then be otherwise lost. III. Article Analysis There can be an alternative view to Burton stating that the greater context of the broader efforts by the US government should be allowed to classify each event on its own merit. Mr. Badey was granted permission to re-publish the article, originally published by STRAFOR. However, STRATFOR posts on its website the article is titled “Terrorism: Defining a Tactic” which also list Mr. Burton as the primary author. Remarkably, a co-authorship is credited to Ben West.3 Mr. West is an analyst for STRATFOR; however no further information could be obtained about Mr. West at the time of this paper. Both articles, with Burton listed as the author and are similar in all other respects. Mr. Fred Burton is a well-respected intelligence analyst. As a formal special agent with the U.S. State Department from 1985–1999, he served as the deputy chief of counterterrorism at the Diplomatic Security Service that was responsible for investigating attacks against diplomatic personnel and facilities. STRATFOR details their efforts as placing a “focus on reducing risk and maximizing opportunities for clients”.4 STRATFOR also mentions that they routinely use open-source intelligence (OSINT) that can provide other strategic historical and cultural insights in order further their expertise, reducing risk and maximizing opportunities for clients. By having an investigation(s) become larger by utilizing other government resources, their company could piggy-back on free open sourced information obtained through an investigation without expending their own resources. By utilizing Request for Information (RFI) along with other government publications, STRATFOR can further exploit the information obtained at virtually no cost to “produce custom reports and deliver executive briefings” to their ongoing clients.5 Robert M. Clark, author of Intelligence Analysis - Target Centric Approach, wrote that “fine nuances in public statements can convey much to an experienced political analyst”.6 STRATFOR mission statement describes their goals as “to provide global awareness and guidance to individuals, governments and businesses around the world”7. Therein lays a conflict of interest, in which they contest the recent classifications for these specific events in that they should be considered an act of terrorism. STRATFOR’s argument can be viewed as not only self-serving for the company, but also for those they want to do business with in the future. There are considerable arguments in agreement with Burton that the Fort Hood Shooting, involving Maj. Hasan. This event, out of the 3 mentioned, carries the strongest argument of terrorism because of the communications with Anwar al Awlaki (known al-Qaeda terrorist). This belief can be further strengthened by applying the FBI’s own definition as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”.8 Herein lays the debate of what is terrorism or an act of criminal violence. This focus by Burton utilizes a comparison between the previously mentioned events to the actual definition of terrorism as prescribed in the Patriot Act (2001). This would determine that these three events fits the narrative definition of terrorism, which can be read in part, “a violent act…that in “violation of criminal law(s)…within the US which appears to be intended…to influence the policy of the government by intimidation…or by assassination”.9 Ironically, even the FBI acknowledges that there is no single definition for mass-murders. Generally “mass murder was described as a number of murders (four or more) occurring during the same incident”.10 Though any murders are devastating, each act must be considered on their own merits and unique circumstances. Following Burton’s logic, by applying The Patriot Act, any number of criminal acts could be applied to this definition. Just imagine a fictitious event if a person decides to write a letter threatening a US Postal Service (USPS) employee because he will no longer “receive first class mail on Saturday”.11 Then, after tragically murdering that employee (or anyone else), that individual could be accused of terrorism. By satisfying the definition of terrorism to this fictional event further underscores how broad and all-encompassing The Patriot Act has become. Burton infers that any new questions or revelations, that may arise from of the ongoing investigation currently undertaken by the Department of Defense Internal Investigation Unit (DCIS) would not be investigated to the fullest extent. This conclusion understates the efforts underway by hundreds of government officials currently involved in combating terrorism. Burton states by “not examining the possibility of terrorism in the first place risk over-looking important pieces of information that could prove useful in preventing the next attack”.12 Most notably, the communication with terrorist Anwar al Awlaki, would somehow be too difficult and expensive and otherwise inhibit that agency to examine these findings. This belief undermines all such efforts currently underway by the DCIS in that they, inferred by the article, are not capable of, or would not share their findings that other agencies. To the contrary, recent events and actions undertaken by the US Congress to establish the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) exemplify these ongoing efforts in cooperation and information sharing to better coordinate the US efforts to fight terrorism. Mr. Burton then postulates that this oversight, not having the appropriate agencies conducting terrorist investigation, due to perceived future lack of funding, could therefore affect future investigations. Again, this analogy is self-serving and does not take into consideration that such investigations, regardless of the lead agency, shares their findings in a professional manner. By having the DCIS conducting the investigation, all federal agencies can and do have access to the pertinent intelligence that is related to the case. As many as 20 emails were allegedly exchanged between Hasan and Awlaki, as reported by New York Times.13 Ironically, the monitoring and surveillance has been further extended under the FISA act under the direct control of the National Security Agency (NSA) until 2017.14 Both, the NSA and the DCIS (see Figure 1), fall under the direction of the Department of Defense.15 This makes any communications easier between the two agencies. The FBI would then be at a natural dis-advantage due in part to the inter-agency coordination and that the shootings took place on a US military base. Therefore, the continuance of the general court martial, United States vs. Maj. Nidal M. Hasan, by the DCIS should be allowed to proceed as planned. Though as regrettable events as they were, such as the shootings at Fort Hood, the mere fact that it happened at all re-enforces the idea that such events will continue to occur no matter how much care, effort, and expense are utilized to prevent such actions from occurring again. Terrorism, after all, is a label that is applied by those who are responsible for the detection and intervention of un-predictable events. Each agency has their responsibility in an ever increasing budget crisis that can place sever restrictions on expenditures. Though the war on terror is ongoing, a single “definitional debate is purely academic and political”.16 Therefore, I strongly disagree with Mr. Burton (STRATFOR) that these events, Bedell, Stack and Hasan should not be considered terrorism. There are numerous other laws in place that can be adequately applied that will achieve the appropriate punishment regardless of what label you may place on it. Rather than overemphasize specific cases, the US must maximize the current limited government resources now and in future. In order to engage in this long, protracted war on terrorism, each agency should utilize all the information gained among all terrorist agencies. This inter-communication and co-operation is the only way to insure greater effectiveness in fighting terror, foreign and domestic. IV. Conclusion Burton suggests that by re-examining the possibility of these acts labeled terrorism, places further risks on the limited resources needed to combat terrorism. Though Burton presents a somewhat convincing argument, greater importance in dealing with high security information should remain classified and out of the public arena so as not expend valuable resources. These resources, involving both financial and personnel, and the actions that would be otherwise squandered, could actually prove useful in preventing a future attack. Notwithstanding that the above mentioned events were tragic and confusing, terrorists and their activities remain elusive and expensive to combat. Trust the Intelligence Community (IC) and the Department of Justice is imperative in that the IC are uniquely aware of the situation. They will make the correct decision despite how confusing it may be for the public at large. All agencies within the IC are doing their best given the extreme nature of terrorism. Appendix Figure 1 Chain of Command for DOD (partial) Bibliography Bibliography Burton, Fred. “Analyzing and Defining Terrorist Acts, What Types of Attacks Should Be Considered Terrorism?” Violence and Terrorism 12/13, edited by Thomas J. Badey. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013, 5-7. Burton, Fred and Ben West, (11 March 2010). “Terrorism: Defining a Tactic.” STRATFOR. www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100310_terrorism_defining_tactic (accessed on February 7, 2013). Clark, Robert. Intelligence Analysis, A Target-Centric Approach. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010, 92. “Federal Bureau of Investigation Definition of Terrorism.” Federal Register 28:50 § 0.85(l) July 1st 2011. Federal Bureau of Investigations. National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Critical Incident Response Group 2. Serial Murder – Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives for Investigators (29 August 2005): 8. www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder (accessed on 8 February 2013). Hickman, Daniel J. “Terrorism as a Violation of the “Law Of Nations:” Finally Overcoming the Definitional Problem.” Wisconsin International Law Journal 29, no. 3 (2012): 461. Johnston, David and Scott Shane. “U.S. Knew of Suspect’s Tie to Radical Cleric.” New York Times, November 9, 2009. sec. A1. McKinley, James C. Jr.. “Major Held in Fort Hood Rampage Is Charged With 13 Counts of Murder.” New York Times, November 12, 2000, sec. A14. Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Department of Defense Organization and Management Planning.” Department of Defense. odam.defense.gov/omp/Functions/Organizational_Portfolios/Organization_and_Functions_Guidebook.html (accessed on February 8, 2013). Pear, Robert. “Federal Power to Intercept Messages Is Extended.” New York Times, December 29, 2012. sec. A12. Shane, Scott. “A Year of Terror Plots, Through a Second Prism.” New York Times, January 13 2010, sec. A1. STRATFOR. “About Us.” www.stratfor.com/about (accessed on February 7, 2013). STRATFOR. “Client Solutions.” www.info.stratfor.com/access (accessed on February 8, 2013). USA PATRIOT ACT 2001. Public Law 107 sec. 56. 107th Cong., 26 October 2001. US Postal Service (6 February 2013). “Postal Service Announces New Delivery Schedule.” about.usps.com/news/national-releases/2013/pr13_019.pdf (accessed on February 8, 2013). Read More