Strategies of Coercive Diplomacy in Pursuing International Security - Research Paper Example

How effective are strategies of coercive diplomacy in pursuing international security? Coercive diplomacy is simply being said to be forceful persuasion or diplomacy of threats. It does not rely on negotiations and sometimes the diplomats will threaten the people with serious consequences if their demands are not met. Coercive diplomacy works sometimes but sometimes it fails and can result to civil war. In this paper we are going to look at the deeper meaning of coercive diplomacy and all it entails. We have seen that coercive diplomacy is successful in some instances and unsuccessful in others. We are going to look at situations where coercive diplomacy is successful and how it can be used in pursuing international security. International security comprises of the measures taken by nations and international organizations like the United Nations to ensure peace across the world. In an effort to pursue international security nations and international organizations take measures like military action, diplomatic concords like conventions and accords. Without national security there will be no international security in the global arena international security is National security. The study of international security was seriously taken after the end of World War II, previously international security was studied independently then it was absorbed in the as a sub field of the study of international relations. The study covers topics like strategic and securities studies and also peace studies. The present study of coercive diplomacy initiated by academic strategists Thomas Schelling (1963; 1966), Alexander George (1994), Oran Young (1968), Glenn Snyder (1977), and Robert Art (1980; 2003), is impelled by a fundamental apprehension with the political uses of force. In particular, the highlighting is on intimidation to use force and the limited applications of violence that lend credibility to such threats. To avoid having to impose “brute force” and instead to be able to get one’s way through the manipulation of threats, promises, and political relationships, is the point. Yet, in the study of coercive diplomacy there has been a tendency to downplay the diplomacy of isolating an adversary, despite such diplomacy’s potential to coerce by creating and increasing a target’s expectations of escalating costs. If leaders understand that their country is more vulnerable to military force when it is isolated, then the diplomatic process of losing support and being isolated will put coercive pressure on them. It is a good assumption that most political leaders, lacking the expertise to judge fine gradations of military advantage or disadvantage, put heavy weight on alignment conditions, and dramatic shifts in them, because they can easily grasp how such shifts may influence their exposure to the costs of fighting. The isolation of adversaries is an important form of coercive diplomacy. Because countries that are isolated are more vulnerable to military force and more exposed to the costs of fighting, the diplomatic process of being isolated puts coercive pressure on them. This paper focuses on the theory and practice of such diplomacy in what I call “coercive isolation.” In an attempt to see how effective the strategies of coercive diplomacy are in achieving international security I will first present a conceptual model of the strategy, which highlights the logic of how it works. Then we examine three different ways in which it can be used immediate prevention, blackmail, and corpulence and discuss the costs and difficulty of succeeding in these contexts. Historical examples of each of the three scenarios are examined to illuminate important dimensions of the model. From this discussion we also draw several conclusions about the conditions that favor the success of coercive isolation strategies. First, we present the abstract conceptual model of the coercive isolation strategy, identifying the “critical variables of that strategy and the general logic that is associated with its successful use. (George 1993, 118). Then we look at when coercive diplomacy is successful how can this success be defined. Form the abstract model of coercive diplomacy I will look into the three general coercive situations in which coercive diplomacy is used in achieving international security. The three situations are instant deterrence, blackmail, and corpulence and discuss the cost and difficulty of succeeding in these perspectives. In defining the abstract model of coercive isolation or diplomacy we direct our concentration to fundamental actors, methods of influence and interactions. With coercive diplomacy one influences the population by increasing its approximation of the costs of fighting in a particular way, by changing its prospect of support or opposition in a military disagreement. The focus of the strategy, then, is to influence alignments which are defined as patterns of “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions”. This lowering of a target’s outlook of support adds up to an armed hazard that follows from a foundational understanding of the role of force in international politics where states exist in a persistent state of war in which the resort to force to resolve disputes is always possible (Waltz 1979, 103; Doyle 1997, 113-114). In these state of affairs, anything that can be manipulated to make states more vulnerable to force are thus likely to pay a higher price for fighting is a form of armed coercion that can affect the will and behavior. In order to achieve international security through coercive diplomacy we must know how to influence both the primary and the secondary targets. In order to control the primary target the coercer must influence secondary targets, whose grouping of choices establish whether and to what scope the primary objective is isolated. This entails a reversed order of precedence in the chain of influence: the secondary target comes first and the primary target comes second. In short, a necessary condition for success against the primary target is some degree of success with reference to the secondary target. In light of this, it is worth noting down two things. First, the type of pressure used toward the secondary target will likely be very different than that used toward the primary target. The approach to the secondary target especially when it is closely aligned with the primary target will often emphasize selective accommodation and acknowledgments more than conflict and intimidations. The uncomplicated logic of harmonizing is the basic idea behind this. To divide two potential adversaries that are already in alignment, it is generally counterproductive to threaten them both simultaneously. Second, in this framework, the coercive diplomacy attempt might work by separating the primary target but be unsuccessful to influence its behavior in the preferred way. This may simply be due to the actuality that the propositions of segregation are not valuable enough to prompt an alteration in behavior. It may also be the case that isolation of the primary target influences its behavior in counterproductive ways that frustrate the coercive objective. We can now look at the effects of coercive diplomacy in attaining international diplomacy. There are two kinds of coercive diplomacy effects risk and denial. The denial effect stems from an instantaneous interruption of the flow of aid to the target that reduces its resources available for preparing and practicing military defense, which may prompt it to recalibrate its plans. The risk effect is more political and psychological, operating in the realm of expectations and decision-making, where beliefs about future levels of support shape and reshape the target regime’s intentions. A degradation of a state’s alignment position will increase its vulnerability to force, and this should weaken its ambitions and resolve. While common sense suggest that denial effects are the more significant ones, for leaders who think about international politics in broad gauge terms, the political shock of having important partners alienated from them, and the implications of this shift for their strategic intentions, may very well carry more weight. Now we look at the three situations blackmail, deterrence and compellence. The distinction between deterrent and compellent purposes helps us to discern the uses of coercive diplomacy and its prospects. It is about the divergence between reinforcing a situation and changing it. Deterrence tries to influence an opponent not to change his present behavior while compellence tries to convince an antagonist to change his behavior. This broad distinction provides a benchmark for estimating the degree of complexity implicated in an authority attempt. Deterrence is in general held to be easier than compellence. Thus, we may inference that coercive diplomacy is more likely to succeed in producing compliance when the goal is to deter the primary target from doing something undesirable, than it is when the goal is to get the primary target to change its behavior. Within the category of compellence, there are also two kinds of influence attempts to consider blackmail and compellence narrowly understood (Jakobsen 2013, 242). The first is positive it tries to impel the target to commence an action, some new course or measure it otherwise would not. The second is imprudent it tries to impel the target to stop doing something it is already doing and would not otherwise stop doing. There are several important implications of the difference in context. In principle blackmail will be easier if it allows the primary target to take the action in a way that leaves open the possibility that it took it for reasons other than coercive pressure. By contrast, compelling a target to stop and undo a violent or destabilizing action it has already started will be harder both because the reputational costs will be higher and because it is likely to have anticipated a counter reaction and to some extent decided it is willing to accept the costs. Additionally, the ST will likely be harder to pry away, because the primary target will have likely consulted with it and taken steps to solidify its support prior to escalating the conflict. We may assume that the level of difficulty increases as we move from immediate deterrence to blackmail to compellence. The abstract model of coercive isolation in three strategic contexts. coercive isolation objective DETERENCE BLACKMAIL COMPELLENCE Attempt is Reactive Proactive Reactive Minimum change in ST’s Alignment Necessary to Coerce primary target Neutralization: If PT will only escalate challenge with ST’s support. Realignment: If PT will escalate challenge with ST’s neutrality Neutralization: If PT will initiate desired action if it loses ST’s support. Realignment: If PT will not initiate desired action if it loses ST’s support Neutralization: If PT will stop or undo undesired action if it loses ST’s support Realignment: If PT will not stop or undo undesired action if it loses ST’s support. Level of Difficulty of Influence Attempt Easier -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Harder We now look at where and when coercion diplomacy is successful. From what we have already studied we know that for coercion diplomacy to succeed there must be threats to influence behavior and actions. This influence is by making the people choose to comply rather than directly forcing them to comply. The three type of threats used in coercion diplomacy we have mentioned above are compellent threats that are made to make an opponent to stop a current action. The other is deterrent threats that make an opponent not to take a certain action and on that basis discuss compellent threats. Others include both deterrent and compellent threats as two types of coercion. To achieve coercive diplomacy we must understand the role that is played by force. Force is mainly used when deterrence fails. The actual use of force, except for minor demonstrations of resolve, means that coercion has failed. Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility, whether the target believes that the coercer will execute its threats and persuasiveness, whether the threats will have a great impact on the target. Credibility normally depends on whether the coercer has a reputation for carrying out threats that it makes. Persuasiveness comes from the ability to threaten great damage to something the target considers vital. Threats are not automatically both credible and persuasive; they can also be one but not the other. For example, in the context of a trade dispute a threat of nuclear attack would be very persuasive but not very credible. Schelling distinguishes compellence from brute force in that the coercer credibly threatens the opponent that if the action in question is not stopped, or a desired action is not taken, force will be used to induce compliance. If the opponent does not comply, force is applied. The coercer then hurts the opponent but not as much as it might, leaving open the threat of even more pain if the opponent still does not comply. In contrast, “brute force” is simply getting what one wants by violence, as much as it takes. The outcomes of conflicts involving coercive diplomacy might be restricted to a double definition of either a success or failure. The limitation with this approach is that it fails to incorporate degrees of success that might have been achieved. For instance, while trying to coerce an adversary into compliance, a coercer may settle for partial-compliance. Hence, coercive diplomacy has neither failed nor succeeded but its effect is located in between the two ends of the spectrum of failure and success. This illustrates that coercive diplomacy might result in partial-success due to the lessening of the coercer’s demands. Thus, three separate conflict resolution processes of coercive diplomacy that canvass success, partial-success and failure are discussed below. The outcomes of conflicts involving coercive diplomacy might be restricted to a binary definition of either a success or failure. The limitation with this approach is that it fails to incorporate degrees of success that might have been achieved. For instance, while trying to coerce an adversary into compliance, a coercer may settle for partial-compliance. Hence, coercive diplomacy has neither failed nor succeeded but its effect is located in between the two ends of the spectrum of failure and success. This illustrates that coercive diplomacy might result in partial-success due to the lessening of the coercer’s demands. Thus, three separate conflict resolution processes of coercive diplomacy that canvass success, partial-success and failure are discussed below. 1. A case of success in coercive diplomacy. On December 19, 2003, the then Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi stunned the world with his decision to dismantle and surrender his regime’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This significant development effectively ended Colonel Gaddafi’s isolation and is the strongest case for successful coercive diplomacy since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis [Kim, 2010, p. 422]. This dramatic development only nine months after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 suggested to some that Libya had acquiesced and surrendered its nonconventional weapons programs and renounced terrorism as a consequence of the Iraq invasion and removal of Saddam Hussein. While this view gained some popularity, it overlooked the deliberate and long-term US policies toward Libya that produced the conditions for Tripoli to reverse its clandestine WMD programs and support for terrorism (Burweila, 2005, pp. 5–6). The United States’ successful exercise in coercive diplomacy against Libya was a strategy that began with the administration of George H.W. The normalization of ties was a product of carefully calibrated carrot-and-stick diplomacy and can be traced to four key policies. The first policy advocated a change of Libya’s policies rather than seeking a regime change. Second, the effective enforcement of economic sanctions imposed multilaterally and sustained over time allowed them to become effective and apply continuous pressure on Gaddafi’s regime. Third, having a wider multilateral strategy as opposed to a unilateral one was instrumental in containing Libya. Fourth, offering inducements and assurances step by step produced the milieu for bolder concessions. The four policies were implemented in stages over the next fourteen years with deftness and most crucial were the limited objectives to get Libya to change its policies rather than threaten Gaddafi with regime change. 2. A case of partial success in coercive diplomacy. Between March and June 1999, NATO’s ‘Operation Allied Force’ bombed selected targets in Yugoslavia to compel the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to stop Serbian hostilities against Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. The seventy-eight day aerial bombing campaign in coercive diplomacy achieved its result, though only partially. Both NATO and Milosevic claimed ‘victory’, with the latter proclaiming that the agreed peace plan guaranteed Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and also closed the issue of possible independence of Kosovo. On the other hand, NATO won the war but it was a limited victory and it did not achieve it quickly as it had planned [Solana, 2004, pp. 119–120]. This case shows us coercive diplomacy achieved only partial-success. 3. A case of failure in coercive diplomacy Crisis between India and Pakistan erupted following the attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, perpetrated by two Pakistani terrorist groups. In response, India mobilized its military and its offensive strike corps along its international border with Pakistan to compel its neighbor into renouncing terrorist activities and cross-border infiltration against India. The conflict de-escalated in October 2002 without India’s four key demands being satisfied. This case shows us coercive diplomacy failed. We can now look at the advantages and disadvantages of Coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is an attractive strategy that offers prospect of stopping or reversing the actions of an adversary at a low cost. The disadvantages are; high risks and failures can be costly, coercer either has to implement the threat of force or back-track and lose face, thereby undermining its international reputation and ability to successfully utilise such a strategy in the future. Coercive diplomacy delivers mixed results. The varying outcomes presented from success and partial-success to failure – demonstrates the difficulties faced by coercers when attempting to skew the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus in their favor. Yet despite its mixed results, this strategy nevertheless serves as an important instrument under circumstances that necessitate coercive states’ ability to absorb higher costs for favorable strategic outcomes. As illustrated in the three case studies, coercive diplomacy’s unique characteristic is its capacity to fuse the threat or the use of limited force with inducements and reassurances. In doing so, it fills a clear gap in the states’ strategic toolbox. Thus from a theoretical perspective and as a policy option, it seems likely that the employment of coercive diplomacy will persist particularly when states can generate domestic and political support to respond to security threats and strategic challenges and to convey more forcefully their resolve to a targeted state. Most instances where coercive diplomacy has failed it leads to war. Notes Compellence can be defined as the use of threats or limited force to induce the opponent into giving up what is desired by the coercer. Compellence aims to affect the enemy’s will rather than its capabilities and hence it is a politico-military strategy and a test of opposing wills At the heart of coercive diplomacy lies the cost–benefit analysis model, which attempts to evaluate and alter the adversary’s perception of risks and rewards. However, it fails to provide insight into the adversary’s valuation of goals and priorities, thus making it difficult to use the cost benefit model to reach an informed decision on whether the adversary can be forced into compliance. This is particularly important since coercive diplomacy is a dynamic two-party activity and the manipulation of the cost benefit model will certainly generate resistance from the adversary, so it must also consider the adversary’s decision calculus. References Robert. To What Ends Military Power, (first published 1980), 3-35. Burch, Jonathon. (2012) “Syria Clashes Intensify Near Turkey Border,” Reuters.com newswire, October 9, 2012. Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. (2002) the Dynamics of Coercion (Cambridge University Press). Timothy Crawford, ‘The Strategy of Coercive Isolation’ New York Times (Washington, 23 Feb. 2014 ) Patrick c. Burweila, ‘When is coercion successful?’ (2005) accessed 24 Feb. 2014 Solana. 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