Is direct military action the best way to deal whith problems of terrorism - Essay Example

?Is Direct Military Action the Best Way to Deal with Problems of Terrorism? Introduction Counterterrorism debates are centered round two strategic philosophies: deterrence and a rational choice analysis of terrorism.1 Deterrence arguments take the position that counterterrorism strategies require a holistic approach to the underlying economic, cultural and political factors that cause terrorism. The idea is to make terrorism less attractive by targeting motivations for terrorist attacks.2 In other words, removal of the root causes of terrorism is believed to be the most effective counterterrorism strategy. On the other hand a rational choice analysis of terrorism argues that the complex configuration of terrorist networks internationally requires special intelligence and repressive strategies by specially trained military forces for the identification and destruction of terror networks.3 This research paper examines the arguments for and against direct military action as an effective counterterrorism strategy. This paper begins by examining the definition and main characteristics of terrorism as a means of establishing how direct military counterterrorism strategies can respond to terrorism and how it might not be compatible with the nature and definition of terrorism. The research study then analyses direct military action as a valid counterterrorism strategy. Terrorism Definition and Concepts A definition of terrorism is necessary for understanding and analyzing appropriate responses to terrorism and the threat of terrorism. For the most part, there is no universal or comprehensive definition of terrorism.4 Even so, common themes in various definitions of terrorism can be strung together to describe terrorism as “politically motivated violence” committed in a “clandestine manner against noncombatants”.5 Terrorism is also understood as violence that is aimed not only at creating fear among victims, but also widespread fear among the public.6 In general, terrorism is conceptualized in various disciplines in such a way as to bring it into the sphere of unconventional crimes and violence, thus implying that conventional criminal justice is not conducive to counterterrorism initiatives and strategies. Essentially, from a legal perspective, terrorism is segregated from other crimes. The reality is experience informs that any conceptualization or definition of terrorism reveals that it is vastly similar to peacetime war crimes.7 Today there is a growing perception that terrorism is growing more and more dangerous particularly with the aid of new technologies. Terrorists today are said to be more disorganized than in previous years and more inclined to use weapons of mass destruction and to bring about more catastrophic consequences. Moreover, it is largely believed that terrorists are comprised of “amateurs”, ad hoc and “transitory groups” with the result that “state sponsorship” is no longer necessary.8 In other words, the new structures of terrorism today make it more difficult to use traditional counterterrorism strategies to combat terrorism today. Counterterrorism Strategies Conventional Counterterrorism Strategies Before and After September 11, 2001. The complex and dangerous nature of terrorism today was demonstrated by the terror attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. Internationally, countries have come to the realization that traditional counterterrorism mechanisms are insufficient for preventing and deterring terrorism. As a result, there has been a proliferation of counterterrorism reforms, particularly in Western jurisdictions.9 Many of these reforms however, merely involved the expansion of laws that were directed at defining and prosecuting terrorism.10 Since September 11, 2001, and particularly since the terrorist bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, counterterrorism has been among the European Union’s (EU) top policy concern. For the EU this involves balancing security against human rights. 11 The EU’s legislative measures taken in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks are a manifestation of the belief that terrorism, unlike conventional crime requires more extensive and more strategic approaches to combatting terrorism. It requires going beyond mere detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of offenders. The EU’s framework for fighting terrorism is founded on a four dimensional framework. The EU’s four dimensional counterterrorism framework aims to prevent terrorism by safeguarding against individuals becoming terrorists; protecting individuals and infrastructure by heightening security; identifying, investigating and prosecuting terrorists and responding effectively to terrorist attacks with a view to minimizing damages.12 This represents a different approach to the EU’s previous counterterrorism strategies. Terrorism was deeply entrenched in European history and it was typically countered via the criminal justice system and by treating the root causes of terrorism.13 The September 11, 2001 terror attacks ushered in a “new phase of the challenge of terrorism” not only for the US but internationally.14 Clearly traditional counterterrorism strategies are insufficient since terrorism has only intensified and become more dangerous over the years. Combatting terrorism via conventional criminal law has not had a deterrent impact and has arguably only emboldened terrorist. However, charting alternative approaches to counterterrorism strategies can be complicated. This is because terrorism itself is fraught by two paradoxes. One paradox exist from the perspective of terrorists themselves and the other paradox exist from the perspective of those who orchestrate responses to terrorism. From the perspective of terrorists, terrorism typically commits acts calculated to make political statements and to capture the attention of the public. However, acts of terrorism rarely attract sympathetic public attention and thus only strengthen opposition to the political goals of terrorists. From the perspective of responders, the methods used in response to terrorism can “increase support for the terrorist”.15 At the same time it is largely considered: Inhuman and absurd to resist engaging terrorists in ways other than those we assume are deserving of the acts of cowards.16 It is therefore more practical and more acceptable to take action calculated to “immediately” punish terrorist than to attempt to redirect terrorist activities or the root causes of terrorism.17 The current trends in counterterrorism strategies are aimed at deterrence. Deterrence seeks to maximize the cost associated with terrorists’ activities and thus reduce incentives to commit acts of terrorism.18 Since September 11, 2001, governments have spent unprecedented sums on increasing security and police forces and on programmes intended to combat terrorism.19 Many academics and political scientist scholars are questioning whether or not alternative counterterrorism measures might be more effective.20 One area of inquiry is the utility of direct military action as a more effective alternative counterterrorism strategy. Direct Military Counterterrorism Approaches Direct military action against terrorism must be distinguished from armed conflict with states that are believed to be sponsoring or supporting terrorists’ groups. The US War in Afghanistan illustrates the futility of fighting states that sponsor or facilitate terrorism. While the terror networks are disbanded and destroyed in the state where the war is being conducted, the terrorist simply regroup and relocate to other locations. For instance, while the US military were fighting in Afghanistan, searching for Al-Qaeda terror cells and networks and actively hunting for Al-Qaeda leader Bin Laden, the latter had moved to Pakistan.21 It therefore follows that indirect military action as a counterterrorism device can be entirely futile. Not only is there the risk that terrorists will merely escape the war zone unscathed, but they will also relocate and take up their activities and planning in a fresh and safer haven. Therefore indirect military action would have to be conducted in all locations where terrorist are likely to find a safe haven. These wars would have to be conducted simultaneously and perpetually otherwise, terrorist will only have to go underground until the wars end before resurfacing and commence their activities all over again. Be that as it may, the US and its coalition’s decision to wage war against Iraq and Afghanistan was characterized as a war against terrorism. Nesi explains: The term ‘the war against terrorism has been used to describe the whole campaign against terrorism, including military, political, financial, legislative and law enforcement measures.22 Nesi argues that direct military action against terrorism raises some significant questions and issues. To start with, against whom should the military action be directed? How does international law accommodate military action against civilians who are criminals? The number of issues are endless. There are concerns about universal human rights that confer upon anyone suspected of a crime to have the opportunity to defend himself and requires that the state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Direct military action against terrorism would automatically act upon the presumption of guilt which runs counter to the universal human rights presumption of innocence. Taking direct military action against terrorism would be tantamount to convicting an individual without a trial.23 The fact is, terrorists are criminals and as such should be prosecuted before they are condemned. States typically cope with terrorism within their borders by reference to criminal laws defining and punishing terrorism. When terrorism is on an international level or rather when terrorism is planned and orchestrated from a remote location, states cooperate with one another in sharing investigative and detection information and otherwise coordinate efforts to “bring the terrorist to justice”.24 International cooperation and coordination typically occurs via international conventions and/or bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements.25 Since direct military action against terrorism appears to run counter to international law and international human rights, indirect military action appears to be the only viable alternative to conventional counterterrorism strategies. Indirect military action can not only be an appropriate response to terrorism or the threat of terrorism, but can also be entirely necessary. Nesi explains that when states fail to cooperate or coordinate counterterrorism strategies: It is open to the Security Council to require, under Chapter VII of the Charter, that a State hand over to justice suspects who are sheltering in its territory, as was done in respect of Libya after the Lockerbie disaster.26 It is disingenuous however, to expect that conventional criminal justice systems and international cooperation and coordination in this context is sufficient to prevent and deter terrorism. Nesi suggests that military action should always be a viable option. After all the UN has publically stated that terrorism is a threat to world peace and security, thus it is anticipated that in appropriate cases military action may not only be warranted, but also justified. For instance, when terrorists are known to be operating in a particular state and that state either cannot not or will not resolve the issues, military force may indeed be the only reasonable course of action.27 The war in Afghanistan which began in October 2001, was preceded by a number of efforts to resolve terrorism problems without the use of military action. UN Security Council Resolutions 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) called for Afghanistan to turn Usama Bin Laden in and to close down terrorist cells. However, Afghanistan did not comply with any of these UN Security Council resolutions and in 2001, Al-Qaeda launched a devastating terrorist attack on the US. Thus, the US was at liberty to take the position that military action against Afghanistan was justified on the grounds that if Al-Qaeda continued to operate from Afghanistan, the US could expect further devastating terrorist attacks.28 As Nesi explains: The military action was forward-looking to prevent imminent future attacks, rather than a backward-looking act of retaliation for what had gone before.29 It therefore follows that when military action against states that sponsor or facilitate terrorism can be justified on the grounds of a pre-emptive strike, it would be less likely to foster sympathy toward terrorists. It would be regarded as a necessary evil to save the lives of innocent civilians. However, if military action is used for pure retaliatory action, it is less likely to direct sympathies away from the terrorists. Meggle cautions against the use of any form of military action against terrorism.30 Meggle explains that one of the main problems with terrorism is the death toll among civilians who typically have nothing to do with the political or religious issues that terrorists are striking out against. However, military action itself typically causes the death of civilians also and in fact, does so at a far more alarming rate than any terrorist attack has. When compared to civilian deaths resulting from military action: There have not been many terrorist course of action whose lethal effects among innocent people have reached comparable dimension. Surely, there have been some terrorist acts of that dimension; the attack on the Twin Towers is a case in point, yet its dimensions are the exception, not the rule.31 It would therefore appear that military action as an alternative counterterrorism strategy is counterproductive. Certainly, it should have a deterrent effect in that it shuts down terrorist activities in one location and forces terrorists to relocate and strategize elsewhere. However, this might be viewed as a mere temporary set-back as terrorist committed to their respective causes are entirely likely to have no difficulties starting over again elsewhere. Moreover, it must be remembered that military action can backfire for two important reasons. When civilian lives are lost at the hands of military action, it might very well gain support for the terrorist factions and outrage and dissatisfaction with military action in response to terrorism. Secondly, terrorist have proven themselves to have little regard for human life, including their own as manifested by the recruits who have been willing to sacrifice their lives in the course of committing acts of terrorism. Military action against terrorism should therefore not function to deter future terror attacks by terrorists. If terrorists are willing to sacrifice their lives in the course of committing terrorist attacks, they would be more than willing to put their lives at risk under the threat of military action. Israel stands a good example of the futility of military action against terrorism. Ever since the 1970s, Israel’s military has “assassinated” countless terrorists.32 In addition, Israel’s military has gunned down or blown up several Palestinian radicals suspected of having planned and executed terrorist attacks. Not only is this kind of counterterrorism policy “senseless” but it is also unlawful.33 As Luft explains: It is deemed to be operationally senseless because assassinating Palestinian militants only brings harsh retaliatory action, resulting in even more Israeli casualties. 34 Israel’s military action against is regarded as illegal because it disregards the sovereignty of another political state and confers upon the military the authority to determine who should be executed “without due process”.35 Even more importantly, the killing is senseless and without a legal basis because clearly the military action against terrorist have not proven to be “effective in reducing the terror menace.”36 It can be argued however, that Israel’s military action against terrorism is not futile because “true terror persists despite the assassinations”.37 While Israel’s military action against terrorism has its flaws and is demonstratively illegal since it disregards due process, there is logic to this approach to counterterrorism. As Luft explains: What is less apparent is the profound cumulative effect of targeted killing on terrorist organizations. Constant elimination of their leaders leaves terrorist organizations in a state of confusion and disarray. Those next in line for succession take a long time to step into their predecessors’ shoes. They know that by choosing to take the lead, they add their names to Israel’s target list, where life is Hobbesian: nasty, brutish, and short.38 Be that as it may, life does not appear to be a valuable asset to terrorist operating in the Gaza Strip. New reports of constant suicide terrorist attacks demonstrate that these terrorist think nothing of facing death and will obviously have little or no fear of Israel targeting them and placing their names on lists of terrorist to eliminate. The willingness of terrorist to die for the cause therefore informs that military action either direct or indirect is not a deterrence for terrorist activities. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflicts demonstrates that military action actually fuels increased aggression and heightened levels of terrorism. It therefore follows that military action causes more harm than good by costing human lives and placing additional financial burdens on citizens who inevitably fund the use of military power against terrorism. Conclusion The 21st century has ushered in a new dangerous strand of terrorism. The death toll in the US on September 11, 2001 demonstrated that conventional methods of treating terrorism as a crime and dealing with it within the criminal justice system were futile. Obviously, terrorist were not deterred, but rather reenergized and committed to their political causes. Internationally, governments reformed counterterrorism approaches, but largely left terrorism within the criminal justice system. While the US and its coalition waged war against state sponsors of terrorism (Afghanistan and Iraq), terrorists and insurgents have continued to relocate and complicate the efforts of the US. The Israel experience with direct military action has also proved to be just as counterproductive as the US’s indirect military action. It would therefore appear that counterterrorism cannot be satisfactorily deterred by military action. It might be wise to focus attention on programmes that redirect the youth who are susceptible to recruitment. Providing young people with viable and legitimate alternatives appears to be the best approach to counterterrorism at far less expense to innocent civilians. Military action has proven to be just as costly to civilians and perhaps more so than terrorism. Bibliography Textbooks Cortright, David and Lopez, George, A. Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. (Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007). Mahan, Sue and Gristet, Pamala, L. Terrorism in Perspective. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 2008). Meggle, Georg. Ethics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 2005). Nesi, Guiseppe. International Cooperation in Counterterrorism. (Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006). Siegel, Larry, J. Essentials of Criminal Justice. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009). Articles/Journals Berrebi, Claude. ‘The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-choice Theory Helpful?’ 151-208. Cited in Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, (Eds.). Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009). Bossong, R. ‘The Action Plan on Combating Terrorism: A Flawed Instrument of EU Security Governance.’ (2008)46(1) Journal of Common Market Studies, 27-48. Coolsaet, Rik. ‘EU Counterterrorism Strategy: Value Added or Chimera?’ (July 2010) 86(4) International Affairs, 857-873. de Wijk, Rob.‘The Limits of Military Power.’ (Winter 2002)25(1) The Washington Quarterly, 75-92. Frey, Bruno S. and Luechinger, Simon. ‘How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence’. (December 2002) Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper Series No. 137, 1-35. Frey, Bruno, S. and Luechinger, Simon. ‘Decentralization as a Disincentive for Terror.’ (June 2004) 20(2) European Journal of Political Economy, 509-515. Gibbs, Jack, P. ‘Conceptualization of Terrorism’. (June 1989) 54(3) American Sociological Review, 329-340. Horgan, John. ‘The Social and Psychological Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists.’ pp. 44-54 Cited in T. Gjorgo (Ed.). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2005). Luft, Gal. ‘The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing, ‘ (Winter 2003) Middle East Quarterly, 3-13. Lum, Cynthia; Kennedy, Leslie, W. and Sherley, Alison. ‘Are Counter-terrorism Strategies Effective? The Results of Campbell Systematic Review on Counter-terrorism Evaluation Research,’ (2006) 2(4) Journal of Experimental Criminology, 489-516. Monar, Jorg. ‘Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counterterrorism Strategy and its Problems.’ (Summer 2007) 42(3) Government and Opposition, 292-313. Ruby, Charles, L. ‘The Definition of Terrorism’. (December 2002) 2(1) Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 9-14. Schmid, Alex, P.‘The Response Problem as a Definition Problem,’ (1992)4(4) Terrorism and Political Violence, 7-13. Tucker, David. ‘What’s New About New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?’ (Autumn 2001) 13 Terrorism and Political Violence, 1-14. Zimmermann, Doron. ‘The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal,’ (2006) 29(2) Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 123-144. Read More