Decision-Making Bodies of the EU and Democratic Deficit in the EU - Essay Example

Overview of the key decision making bodies of the EU and evaluate the criticisms that the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit". University Name Course Name Date of Submission Overview of the key decision making bodies of the EU and evaluate the criticisms that the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit". The European Union was formed in a post-WW2 Europe that was ravaged from war and highly dependent on America for aid under the Marshall Plan. The EU, as it is has been called since Masstricht Treaty1993, was originally formed under the Treaty of Paris in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The aims of this ECSC were entirely economic in nature it pursued common ownership and control of all resources for economic rebuilding of Europe. The first treaty was signed by six initial member states, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy; these were the founding member states. The ECSC was transformed into European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 with the signing of Treaty of Rome that created a single market and aimed at removing all barriers to freedom of good, movement and trade. The EEC was hence a unique institution whose sole aim was to reduce barriers, decrease hindrances and increase integration within the member states. The EEC started off as a unique legal and political supranational institution that operates over and above the national governments of member states: it is an over arching government in itself that makes laws, takes decisions and creates circumstances for greater integration. This could not have been achieved with 27 member states without the presence of institutions: the treaty of Paris created four major institutions in 1951: a High Authority, Council of Ministers, European Assembly and a European Court of Justice. The Treaty of Rome 1957 followed this method and added to the list of institution a EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Commission) and renamed it as European Economic Community. However, the EU has gone through massive changes since then as subsequent treaties kept adding to the overall structure of it. The institutions as they stand now are as follows: The European Council, European Parliament, The Commission, European Court of Justice, The Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank. It is with EU’s structure that democratic deficit has been alleged to have seeped in. The term has been used since many years and according to Milev it has been accorded different meaning in all senses. The real meaning given to this term relates to alleged distance between the European government and the people that are rules: it is alleged that it neither has a proper democratic mandate nor proper democratic legitimacy that gives its actions validity. Initially the term was used to make way for direct elections to the Parliament, later on the debate kept surfacing repeatedly on different issues of constitutional importance, particularly where further integration and greater cooperation was concerned. Evidence is found in literature relating to the referendums, the rejected constitution etc. This democratic deficit has basically been seen because the key decisions that are taken in EU are taken within executive-controlled institution, the European Council and European Commission: there is no parliamentary form decision making with proper legitimacy and accountability. The European Council yields no legislative powers but has immense political powers as it comprises of all heads of the states, the ministers for foreign affairs, the president of the commission and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. The council is headed by a President of the Council who is elected through Qualified Majority Voting procedure for a term of two and a half years. Second, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the legal arm of the EU as it deals with all cases arising from and about EU law. The main function of ECJ has been enshrined in Article 19(1) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) as to ensure “that interpretation and application of Treaty law is observed”. It hears cases regarding the understanding and implementation of European Union law, and also caters to direct action from the member states. The Court consists of 27 judges each selected from member states who hold high academic and legal profiles in their own countries. Third, the European Commission is assigned with the duty of initiating legislation; it is the “guardian of treaties” and acts as a policeman for any breaches of EU law. It could be called the executive arm of the EU. It comprises of one Commissioner from every member state whose duty is to represent EU in foreign forums and to oversee and supervise that all EU policies have been duly implemented by the member states. The Commission can legislate unilaterally in a limited number of areas, apart from proposing and initiating policies. According to Featherstone, the Commission fails the test of democratic legitimacy on all grounds because it is neither elected nor has it been able to exert any political leadership. Fourth, European Parliament is the only institution that has gone through massive changes in the course of development of the EU since 1957. From being a mere “talking shop” to actually having proper co-decision powers in legislative matters, the Parliament has actually evolved. Its evolution and its relationship with the Commission an actually be credited to the continuous allegations of there being a “democratic deficit” in the EU, due to an absence of a democracy. Initially, the parliament only has consultative powers in law making: wherever the treaty required the Parliament should be consulted, otherwise, it had no real legislative powers. However, the first extension of parliament powers was carried out in the Budgetary Treaties in 1970 and 1975 that gave parliament relatively extensive powers in the adoption of budgets along with the Council. The Treaty of Lisbon further extends these powers to straighten the process and now the Parliament can now have much say in the adoption of budgets, and the Council has been obliged to not just consult but to accept the recommendations. Moving on, in 1979 direct election were held to the parliament and that abated much of the complaints regarding there being a democratic deficit as now, the member of parliaments were being directly elected and could be held accountable for their decisions and activities. These direct elections made parliament the only supranational institution in the world to have this kind of democratic mandate directly from the people it would rule. However, even though Parliament was directly elected and had democratic mandate it still lacked proper and comprehensive legislative powers: it was only consulted on legislative matters but could not initiate legislation on its own. Its powers extended to being consulted, or co-decision but this still could not be equated with powers of a national parliament. In a bid to make the role of the parliament more effective, the ECJ, for example, gave a landmark judgment in Roquette Ferers v Council (1980) that if a treaty required parliament to be consulted, it must be consulted and failure to do so would result in a breach of union law. This greatly strengthened parliament’s position as a strong institution with a democratic mandate. Similarly the ECJ later in a bunch of highly creative judgments granted the parliament the standing to bring judicial review to protect itself (under Article 263) and to be accountable should judicial review proceedings be instituted against it. This landmark step granted parliament not only the legal standing among legal institutions but also accorded real powers in a democratic sense. Moreover, the EU has been alleged to have democratic deficit even though the Parliament under all treaties possessed the power to dismiss the Commission with a two-thirds majority. As well as retaining the power to appoint the commission and approve the commissioners by majority vote. As Moravscik argues that Parliament has indeed gone through major changes, aiming to cover up for the democratic deficit in found in commission’s decision making. These are evidences that the EU did not always suffer from a democratic deficit and considerable steps have been taken to abate this crisis. Specially, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the parliament has been an active participant in law making powers and it has been given real powers in legislating. From co-decision powers given under the Treaty of Masstricht and later amended in the Treaty of Amsterdam as the procedure in all areas except EMU, this process has been made the ordinary legislative procedure in the Treaty of Lisbon. Bibliography Horspool and Humphreys, European Union Law. Moravcsik A., In Defence of Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, Journal of Common Market Studies 2002, Vol. 40, pp. 603 – 24. Mihail Milev, A Democratic Deficit in the European Union, Etude. Kevin Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the Democratic Deficit in European Union, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1994, Vol 32, No 4. Read More