The Public Choice Account of How Power is Exercised in Public Policy - Essay Example

Public Choice and Power in Modern Politics and Elections The moral bankruptcy that has infested modern politics appears to confirm theoretical presuppositions of public choice theorists on the nature of politics and politicians. Corporations influencing public policy by supporting the campaigns of candidates, rampant vote-buying, untrammelled lobbying through the persuasive compulsions of money – these are things that infest our news and that we consider part of the realities of modern life. Indeed, there seems to be no doubt that the public choice theory has read modern politics correctly. But how does public choice account for power as a concept – that is to say, how are power and power asymmetries implicated in public policy using the lens of public choice? That is the question that this essay seeks to address. This essay begins by providing a brief background of the theory of public choice. After which, it will look at the core arguments posited by public choice theorists, from which it will tease out assumptions made about power vis a vis public policy in the context of elections, with the end in view of illustrating how power is deployed and wielded to influence public policy. Then, it will end with some reflections and conclusions. Before beginning, it is worthwhile to clarify some concepts that will be used throughout the text. it is imperative to first define what we mean by “public policy”. It is crucial to view public policy not simply as that which is reposed in written statute, but as Gerston put it, the “combination of basic definitions, commitments and actions made by those who hold or influence government positions of authority” (2010: 1) as well as an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is the determined by the content of the program being pursued and by the interaction of the decision makers within a given political administrative context.” (Grindle, 1980: 5.). At the heart of public choice theory is a critique of the conventional notion of politics as a conduit towards the common good, and the assumption that democratically-elected leaders – by the simple expedient of being voted by the majority – serve common interests. This conventional notion draws heavily from Jurgen Habermas, whose discourse, to quote Salhan (2003: 60) “affirms a democratic politics that harnesses communicative power in the form of law for purposes of regulatory countersteering against commercial power (without succumbing to commercial power”. At the very core of public choice theory is an inquiry into democracy itself – governance by numbers – and its equation with justice. The critique of this equation of democracy and justice is long-standing. Zahariadis (1999: 77), for example, pointed out that public officials often take note first of the “national mood” – acting only on policies that the surveys show to be supported, relying more on popularity than on wisdom. Berkowitz (2003:125) framed it in this wise: What is peculiar in the approach championed by contemporary political theorists is the compulsion they betray to equate what they contend are our true or rational interests with the imperatives of democracy. Similarly peculiar is their tendency to deny the name of democratic politics to political institutions and partisan positions that do not issue in, or fail to assure, laws and policies that reflect their vision of our true interests – or what amounts to the same thing, laws and policies that correspond to their vision of what is right and just and good. Theorists of public choice argue that while the theory of the Invisible Hand by Adam Smith might work for private goods, it will not work for public goods were resources are finite. The system is not self-correcting and the supply will not expand to meet the needs of an expanding market. (Felkins, 1997: Internet). Hence, it is not simply adherence to the will of the will of the majority that is required, but decisive leadership that will ensure that the gains of democracy are spread out and made available for all. This is not to be found, argues public choice theorists, in government bureaucrats. To quote Niskanen (1973: 29), these bureaucrats are merely motivated by “salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage... and the ease of managing the bureau.” The problem is exacerbated when politicians exploit the system for personal gain or self-interest. Here is where power comes into play: it is both the cause of and an outcome of the mutation of the system to serve the personal interests of the politicians. This paper will focus on elections – which is the heart of the democratic system. In a democracy, votes are among the most valued resources. They make or break politicians and political careers. They determine who among the individual candidates or political parties in the case of a party-centered political system win public office which brings along power and authority. As Geddis (2008: 141) puts it… Possession of such authority then brings a number of rewards. It confers status and respect. It allows for the selection of binding policies and enactment of general laws that are compatible with the officeholder‟s ideological preferences. It can be financially lucrative, either personally or to other individuals or groups in society. If such is the case, it is not surprising why politicians and political parties struggle to win the hearts of the voting public. In an ideal world, candidates compete in an equal playing field, and people choose based on the platform of government that best represents their interest, as well as addresses their varied needs and concerns. But then we live in the real world. Here, the playing field is never equal, and people choose not only based on policies and programmes, but also on popularity and charisma. Many are uninformed, and choose to remain uninformed, on the issues and policies that politicians bring – or should bring – to the table. Somin (1998: 413) has identified the consequences to democracy brought about by an uninformed electorate. To quote: An informed electorate is an indispensable prerequisite for democracy. Inadequate voter knowledge has two distinct negative implications for democracy. First, it prevents democratic government from reflecting the will of the people in any meaningful sense, undercutting the intrinsicist case for democracy as a government that reflects the voluntary decisions of the populace.... Likewise, voter ignorance imperils the instrumental case for democracy as a regime that serves the interest of the majority, since ignorance potentially opens the door for both elite manipulation of the public... and gross policy errors caused by politicians’ need to appeal to an ignorant electorate in order to win office. The problem intensifies when elections become an auction for votes, with the highest bidder claiming the prize – public office. This brings us to the subject of electoral clientelism, which is a favoured way by which cynical politicians exploit the democratic system and cynical voters allow this exploitation for personal gain. For purposes of this paper, I am using the terms clientelism and electoral clientelism to refer to one and the same thing---“a particular mode of „exchange‟ between electoral constituencies as principals and politicians as agents in democratic systems…[such an] exchange is focused on particular classes of goods, though the feasibility and persistence of clientelistic reciprocity is not determined by the type of goods exchanged” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 7). Clientelism has three components including i) contingent direct exchange, ii) predictability, and iii) monitoring. Explaining further, the exchange between candidates and voters is contingent and direct, and involves goods from which non-participants could not benefit or enjoy. By contingent, this means that a candidate delivers goods contingent upon the behaviour of some members of the voting public, that is, they have either delivered or promised to deliver votes to such a candidate. Secondly, the exchange only becomes viable from the candidates‟ points of view if there is some degree of predictability that the voters will accept the clientelistic offers without being opportunistic, or without free-riding. Thirdly, in cases where candidates do not have voters‟ spontaneous and voluntary compliance to the clientelistic exchange, they can resort to monitoring by investing in often complex and organisational structure. (Ibid: 10). De Wit and Berner (2009: 934) have presented that in a number of emerging and fledgling democracies, electoral clientelism has become an important feature upon which such democracies depend. In these situations, they added, candidates influence or even coerce their voting constituencies, or “buy” votes not only through physical cash, but also through a menu of “incentives” and “presents”. This should not be understood, however, that electoral clientelism exists only in budding democracies. Cases illustrating clientelistic relationships also exist even in advanced democracies like the United States of America. In the same manner, electoral clientelism should not be seen as happening only in less industrialised democracies. Kitschelt and Wilson (2007: 3) are among those who argue that “clientelistic structures seem to have remained resilient in established party systems in advanced industrial democracies like Italy, Japan, and Belgium”. It is interesting to understand and study the many permutations of vote-buying as a discourse and as a practice, and how it is a misuse of power to distort democracy. A very interesting conundrum is how to distinguish between vote-buying and normal election promises that are a function of democratic elections. In vote-buying, the voter is offered a self-interested reason to vote; while in election promises, the voter is offered a non-self-interested reason, say, a pro-life policy that promotes only natural contraceptive methods (a policy that obviously pleases many Catholics especially in the Philippines). The “non-self-interested” part becomes blurry if a candidate promises to uphold a policy reflecting the interests of certain groups of people in exchange for the latter‟s votes. It is worth noting that this practice is not unusual. Many candidates make policy choices not on the basis of principles or ideology, but for the sheer intent of obtaining votes. (Ibid: 129; with author‟s additional point, i.e. the example on policy against reproductive health). Rasmussen (2011: 144) has posited that the differential attitudes towards vote-buying and election promises are arbitrary because both can to distort democratic deliberation and influence voters‟ choice. Also, both practices create or increase political inequality. In the case of vote-buying, the rich or better-financed candidates have more capacity to purchase votes. In the case of election promises, on the other hand, the incumbent candidates are in a better position to make electoral promises compared to the non-incumbents or challengers. Nichter (2008: 19) has made the conception and discourse more nuanced by warning that what we and most scholars consider vote-buying, may actually be turnout buying. He has explained that most scholars implicitly maintain that candidates offer rewards to indifferent voters or opposition-supporters in the hope of influencing the latter‟s vote choices. This assumption, however, fails to acknowledge the supporters who are simply not inclined to vote, thereby ignoring turnout buying. Picking some insights from other scholars (e.g Stokes 2005; Schaffer and Schedler 2007), Nichter stressed that vote-buying clearly cripples democracy in that it undermines the playing field by allowing rich or well-funded candidates to buy the votes of the poor; hinders the conduct of fair and free elections; and turns democratic accountability into a farce. Turnout buying, he said, is far more complicated because while it encourages some members of the electorate to vote, it also commoditises the election process and tolerates, if not exacerbates the clientelistic use of state resources. Schaffer (2007:19) has identified three ways by which voters’ compliance are sought and achieved. The first is Instrumental Compliance, which, If successful, recipients alter or maintain their behaviour in exchange for material benefits. The second is Normative Compliance. If successful, recipients alter or maintain their behaviour because they see the candidate as good and trustworthy, or because they somehow feel being normatively obliged to vote for that candidate. The third is Coercive Compliance, in which recipients are bullied into changing or maintaining their behaviour. If successful, recipients develop a fear of retribution if they refuse an offer, or if they do not vote as expected after the offer has been accepted. Schaffer and Schedler (in Schaffer 2007) have also discussed ways by which candidates could obtain any of the aforementioned types of compliance, along with anecdotes from various countries. For instance, they have presented that one way of obtaining instrumental compliance is by giving rewards that are dispensed conditionally or only if the candidate wins. Amusing examples include 20th century France where half of the banknotes were distributed before the elections, and the other half were only given if the candidate won. Other places applied the same strategy using pairs of shoes. Chandra (in Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 86) has offered theories of candidate and voter behaviours in a patronage democracy which she defined as “[a] democracy in which the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and services, and in which elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state”. Some of the theories of candidate behaviours are discussed here. One theory pertains to what is quite obvious in a patronage democracy, that is, politicians have an incentive to collect rents which take the form of votes in the case of the poor, and bribes or under-the-table payment in the case of the rich. Government officials who have the discretion over what village gets a road, who benefits from the state-subsidised housing program, whose son gets a job in the bureaucracy, whose wife gets access to a bed in a public hospital are in the position to extract rents from beneficiaries. This theory supports Rasmussen‟s (2011) earlier point that election promises exacerbate political inequality in that incumbent candidates, especially those in patronage democracies, are in a better position to make electoral promises and actually dispense government resources to extract rents. Another theory states that politicians have an incentive to target benefits to groups rather than free-floating individuals. Targeting benefits to groups yields a broader impact for the politician because it sends the signal to the entire group membership that they can rely on the politician for future assistance. Meanwhile, groups are easier to monitor since they are easy to infiltrate, and their voting behaviour is easy to trace using the candidate‟s machinery. Why do voters, especially the poor, sell their votes? De Wit and Berner (2009) have provided some valuable answers to this question. Based on their extensive work in the different slums in India, they have found out that (ibid: 929)… Severe scarcity [of resources and access to basic social services] inevitably creates a situation of competition between and inside urban poor communities, a stumbling block for attempts to organise collective action on a supra-community level. Positioning for patronage then becomes the main strategy to be successful under conditions of such desperate competition. Judging from the findings of both scholars, one can infer that patronage, and its close cousins, electoral clientelism and vote-selling are important survival strategies of the poor. Putting an end to these practices will deny the poor of an important survival mechanism. One theory states that voters in patronage democracies use their votes as a means to obtain material benefits. For the majority of voters in patronage democracies, the most important motivation for voting is to be able to secure even just a small fraction of the vast material benefits at the disposal of the incumbent candidate. Needless to say, the vote is their most powerful means through which they can secure such benefits for themselves. Another theory states that voters will be in a more advantaged position if they organise as a group in pursuing individually distributed goods. This is an important approach of magnifying the purchasing power of ones vote. It should be noted that one vote is negligible, and as such, a candidate may not see any incentive of giving money, goods, or services to an individual voter. However, a number of votes comprising a vote bloc could not be ignored. Politicians will be compelled to give favours to those that comprise the vote bloc. Schaffer and Schedler (in Schaffer 2007) have forwarded the point that vote-buying as well as the currency (i.e. money, rewards) used in exchange for votes may not actually mean the same to the giver and the recipient of the offer. They presented a catalogue of meanings that the offer may hold not only to the giver, but more importantly, to the recipient (ibid: 23 and 24)... (i) Payment. An economic transaction, or exchange of money or goods for vote, or a quid quo pro arrangement wherein the recipient may not choose to honour. (ii) Gift or Favour. Something that comes with no strings attached. It does not oblige the recipient to reciprocate at the ballot box. It may or may not yield feelings of gratitude or obligation. (iii) Wage. Something that is earned for rendering a service. It may or may not generate feelings of gratitude or obligation towards the candidate. Both scholars (ibid: 24) further explained that whether the offer comes in the form of payment, gift, or wage, it also creates a range of symbolic meanings to the recipient. For one, the offer may appear as a threat that which cannot be refused as doing so will endanger one from the candidate‟s or his/her operative‟s retaliation. It may also mean reparation, a means of making amends for the wrongs done in the past. As earlier mentioned, some voters see election as a time to get something from people in the government; an opportunity that must be maximised in that it enabled them to claim support from their supposed representatives. Likewise, the offer may indicate winnability. Interestingly in Nigeria, voters who wish to support a candidate view the offer as evidence that he/she is powerful and has strong backing from the elites. Such piece of information is valuable because backing a loser will deny voters access to state resources. Lastly, the offer may insult the voters because to accept it will hurt one‟s self-respect. In Mexico, for instance, many rural poor voters regard acceptance of an offer as an attack to their dignity; while in Manila, Philippines, some urban poor voters consider the act as surrendering their right to vote or giving up their principles. Some implications have already been discussed in passing in the previous sections, but I will try to elaborate them here. As discussed in Rasmussen (2011: 136–138), vote-buying distorts democratic deliberation. How or in what way? Election is supposed to be the time when voters reflect on the performance of incumbents, deliberate impartially who among the candidates can serve them better, and then vote on the basis of the deliberation results. Vote-buying messes all these. The money or rewards offered to voters may taint their voting decision with self-interest and the obligation to fulfil their part of the deal. Another problem is that vote-buying creates problems in representation, with the truly marginalized finding that their sentiments are not represented because the person elected would rather recoup investments made rather than push the interests of the poor, especially those who do not belong in organized groups. In fact, even without vote-buying, there are already errors in representation in “working democracies”. Says Pennington (forthcoming, 165): The problem of inaccurate representation is not significantly alleviated when the representative function extends beyond the narrow circle of politicians to include civil associations such as women’s rights groups or anti-poverty campaigners. The vast majority of women and poor people do not join such organizations, and there is little reason to suppose that the representatives of such groups will have anything more than a partial understanding of the values, needs, and identities of those who don’t – or even those who do. Also discussed in Rasmussen (2011: 138–142) is that vote-buying creates or increases political inequality. This happens when “resource differences between people translate into comparable inequalities of goodness of opportunities for exercising political influence [such as] unequal degrees of control over the political agenda or access to campaign financing” (ibid: 143). De Wit and Berner (2009: 931) have stressed that while horizontal and vertical personalised relations have become an important survival strategy of the poor, they have also constrained their chances of breaking the chains of poverty. Moreover, they have explained that patronage and clientelism (as well as electoral clientelism and vote-buying) sustain dependency among the poor, exploitation, and inequality, thus undermining democracy (ibid: 935). Conclusion and reflections This paper reflected on how public choice theory accounts for or perceives power in public policy. It used the example of vote buying during elections to exemplify how public officials, using their power (be it economic power or political power) to capture the democratic vote. In the process, it sustains the dependence of the poor, does not lead to transformative public policy and legitimizes transactional politics. Sadly in vote-buying, the sellers (i.e. the poor) are often seen as the problem, the bad people because they resort to auctioning their votes to the highest bidder. We tend to forget the buyers (i.e. the candidates) who are equally guilty for dangling such inducements as money, goods, and services in their bid for public office. The problem with these biased views is that liability falls only on the shoulders of the sellers, and the buyers often find themselves getting off the public scorn. Equity demands that we see both sides of the equation. Word count: 3558 References Berkowitz, P. 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