The Canadian Parliament - Its Role and Reforms - Case Study Example

Running Head: History and Political Science The Canadian Parliament: Its Role and Reforms A Discussion Paper of Submission Introduction Representative government is significantly ordinary that it is surprising to find out that accurate descriptions of it are very uncommon. Indeed, an intense debate about the theoretical and actual representative government remains intact. For example, John Stuart Mill argued that a single government may stand for a country. In contrast, G.D.H. Cole has argued that the representation of an entire nation by a single entity is not possible; he claims, “Parliament represents everybody for everything, and therefore nobody for anything” (Ward, 1950, 3). His answer to this deadlock is to endorse the formation of a seemingly indistinct number of representative assemblies (Ward, 1950). This paper discusses the functions of the parliament and how effectively they may, and should, be performed within the context of Canada’s parliamentary system of government. Several components of Canada’s government, like the regulatory and administrative agencies, the Senate, and the Cabinet, have a representative feature which they have acquired not by direct election. To a number of citizens, the civil service is not as representative as it should be (Eagles, 1998). An American scholar of the British government has remarked of the public service in Great Britain: “In view of its representative character, it has possessed the confidence of the ruling middle class. Because it was both competent and representative, it was an undoubted success” (Ward, 1950, 4). Therefore, representation is apparently a concept vulnerable to opposing understanding. A statement of John Stuart Mill, even though almost a hundred years old, can be mentioned with consent as representation’s description in the Canadian House of Commons (Mill, 2010, 148): The meaning of representative government is, that the whole people, or some numerous portions of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere. As stated by an American intellectual, “the idea is that the people, while not in person present at the seat of government, are to be considered as present by proxy” (Ward, 1950, 4). Functions of the Parliament While in a presidential administration, the employees and authorities of the executive are officially disconnected from those of the parliament, the individual components within parliamentarism are more directly interconnected. The Prime Minister and his/her diplomatic body are designated from Parliament (Seidle & Docherty, 2003). Even though officially assigned by and accountable to the sovereign, they are publicly responsible to the Parliament. Parliament, in legal scholarship, denotes the Crown, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons (Ward, 1950). In actual fact, the Crown serves a mainly traditional function as head of state, whereas the process of legislation takes place within the two Parliament Houses. The more influential of the two Parliament Houses is the lower House, the House of Commons. The House of Commons plays several major roles. First is evaluation of the government. Although governments have a tendency to have the benefit of sizeable parliamentary majorities, consent of the parliament is seldom suspended. Nevertheless, the House of Commons serves a vital function in evaluating the regulations and decisions of the government, in deliberations, inside the powerful cross-party designated agencies, and questions of Parliament (Ward, 1950). Second is legalization. Defined as the House of Commons’ major role, the legalization obligation allows the designated assembly, working for the people, to deny or give its consent for most decisions of the administration, such as budget allocations and policymaking (Seidle & Docherty, 2003). Third are public workers. Even though parliament does not choose the administration, it gives a medium where in potential ministers can show and enhance their political abilities, whereas working ministers can improve or lose their job relying on their presentation at the envelope of the Commons (Armit, 2007). Fourth is representation. According to Wheeldon (2011), members of Parliament, once designated, are obliged to stand for all of their officials. Members of the Parliament could represent ‘issues’ like labor unions, as long as these issues are proclaimed. Most members of the Parliament represent stand for political parties, and normally ballot in accordance to the party line. The distinct characteristic of the upper House, the House of Lords, was that its membership was mainly rooted in birthright. The House of Lords is formally unrepresentative. It has almost the same roles as the House of Commons, particularly in evaluating the executive and offering its current workforce (Wheeldon, 2011). Nevertheless, it is less influential, and its authorities weaken significantly in the 20th century. Traditional policymaking can be carried out in the upper House, but more vital is its function in amending and polishing rules presented in the lower House (Tanguay, 2001). Aside from its evaluating and legislative role, according to Seidle and Docherty (2003), the House of Lords has a major legal duty, as the uppermost court of appeal. Role of the Parliament in Citizen Involvement Involving the public in governmental activities that influence any aspect of their lives is fundamental to fine governance. Parliament is a major instrument of governance, and involving the public is at the center of its duties of supervision, lawmaking, and representation. In all of its roles, the Parliament’s authority has relied upon the concept that Parliament is the foundational demonstration of political representation (Armit, 2007). The citizens, being open, free electorates, choose members of Parliament. Members of Parliament embody varied issues, as diverse as the demographic and geographic structure of their membership. In the contemporary period, this assertion of Parliamentary authority, alongside other administrative bodies, is threatened, as witnessed in weakening voter turnout in elections and reports revealing deteriorating confidence in public organizations (Armit, 2007). In addition, public view of governance and government has transformed. The intricacy and interrelatedness caused by a developing information society have simply heightened the need of citizens for expression or voice. The public aims to take part in the process of governance, in developing projects and policies, in identifying and explaining problems of change, in evaluating decisions, in assessing the success of services and initiatives (Lawson, 2005). They wish to be informed of how public resources are being allocated and what the people are gaining in return. The public is demanding for better accountability and transparency from their administrative bodies. Governments across the globe have acted in response to this demand. Government bodies, as well as Parliaments, are exerting substantial efforts to keep in touch with their citizens, reinforce ties or alliances, and involve the public (Lawson, 2005). In general, the public involvement paradigm has three models, each distinct in purpose, strength or value of interaction with the citizens and impact on the process of policy making (Armit, 2007, 3): (1) Citizen involvement- mutual affiliation, joint venture between the public and the government in each feature of legislation—identifying the issue, evaluation, options, solution. Some of the examples are citizen bodies, consensus forums, and citizen advisory groups; (2) Public discussion- mutual affiliation, looks for opinions, comment on an identified problem or agenda, suggestions recognized, integrated into the process of policy making. Several examples are focus groups and surveys; and (3) Information sharing- mutual affiliation, entails giving access to information and communicating information. Some of the examples are online forums and web pages. Parliamentary systems have been engaged in all these three methods in performing their supervisory, policymaking, and representation roles. Nevertheless, majority of the parliaments are exerting substantial effort in the arenas of public discussion and information sharing. Public discussion by the Canadian Parliament is mainly performed through its Committees (Armit, 2007). This body has far-reaching powers to evaluate policy making, assess government regulation, carry out inquiries and research, evaluate departmental budget plans, form research groups and others on any concern within the scope of the committee. These powers were developed since 1985 when the House of Commons implemented a policy that does not oblige Committees to acquire consent from the House of Commons to carry out public consultations or commission investigations (Eagles, 1998). Consequently, public or legislative investigations became a more popular instrument of involvement for parliamentary systems. Committees started to conduct conferences in various methods-- different arrangements were used—forums, roundtables, aside from the traditional legislative format, it discussed more widely, asking for the participation of interest groups and professionals, seeking the views of public service authorities and ministers (Seidle & Docherty, 2003). A good case of a developed Committee discussion procedure is the standard pre-budget discussions carried out by the Standing Committee of Finance. This discussion has currently been established as component of the budget planning process in the government. A number of local legislatures have used this procedure as well (Armit, 2007). Parliamentary groups have also integrated new techniques of communicating with the public by using advanced information and communication technologies. The SubCommittee on the Status of Persons with Disabilities, for instance, made use of the Information Superhighway to merge ‘traditional’ and electronic discussions with the citizens of Canada on the issue of Canada Pension Plan Disability (Armit, 2007). The people were asked to take part by participation in a poll, responding to questions on the main concerns confronting the CPP Disability system, by conveying their own experiences and by putting forward their solutions. Bill Young, the Parliamentary Librarian, remarked that (Armit, 2007, 4): The e-consultation resulted in the largest number of participants (almost 2000) in a parliamentary consultation; the most widely-spread information about a subject of parliamentary consultation (170,000 page requests on the internet site); the highest level of public satisfaction imaginable (90% of the participants said they would do it again) and it gave a sense among parliamentarians involved that they could do their job better. The relationship of the parliament with the public has also been reinforced by the application of media technologies. The Cable Public Affairs Channel (CPAC), the channel of the parliament, gives live broadcast of different house discussions, such as committee investigations. This provides the citizens a direct experience with how the parliamentary system functions, how parliamentarians embody their interests, how different political groups conduct themselves (Armit, 2007). The live broadcast has had unfavorable and favorable consequences, but in general, the resulting public discussion has been useful. For example, the thorough broadcast of hearings of the Public Accounts Committee of a range of accounts of the Auditor General have resulted in public demand for better transparency and accountability in government, which consequently became a thrust for the Accountability Act of the new government (Armit, 2007). Information dissemination remains the core condition for stimulating public involvement in the process of governance. The function of the Parliament is not restricted to guaranteeing that there are laws for freedom of information, but that the parliamentary system itself has corresponding processes and rules that promote transparency and accountability (Williams, 2005). For instance, hearings exposed to the citizens, earlier information to the citizens on the case ahead of parliament, are traditional ways of articulating these principles. Public education and parliamentary programs are also instances of democratic system which enhance public participation (Wheeldon, 2011). A lot of parliamentary systems, such as Canada, according to Seidle and Docherty (2003), have strong awareness and information agendas, learning resources and supervised trips for schools on how the parliamentary system functions. Role of the Parliament in Foreign Policy The Canadian parliament has at times been discounted as an agent of foreign policy because, although its weaknesses are often emphasized, its concrete efforts have usually failed to gain a great deal of attention from scholars or the media. That may be beginning to transform. For instance, Embassy, the weekly diplomatic periodical of Ottawa, which started circulating copies in 2004, allocates thorough standard broadcast of parliamentary affairs and opinions (Schmitz, 2005). Several years ago, the parliamentary domain to some extent ironically was not reviewed thoroughly in the 1995 Canada Among Nations report on the issue of Democracy and Foreign Policy. Although citations were included on the proceedings of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, and the article of Kim Nossal did appear to endorse more significant parliamentary participation in attaining what he referred to as the ‘elusive’ objective of democratization, much of the focus was removed from the parliamentary procedures and opinions as such but to the participation of civic actors and NGOs with regard to the reliability and competence of public discussion processes in general (Schmitz, 2005). Not merely should Canadian citizens be vigilant on what they demand for, but others also condemn what they view as an inclination to replace more and more hopeful expressions of Canadian principles for legitimate discussions around the actual alternatives confronting legislators in representing the interests of the Canadian people overseas. It would seem one can assume that it is on these alternatives that Parliament has to voice its concern if it desires to gain more attention and importance. The uncertain, or at times nonexistent, figure of parliamentary systems indicates that there is much foundation to be built in order for them to create an evident strong image as the ‘voice of the people’ in the domain of foreign policy debates (Schmitz, 2005). Historian John English underlined several of the limitations and weak points of parliamentary functions that may serve as a restraint on the input of policymakers to those evaluations (Schmitz, 2005). As he narrated an event from the National Forum of 1994 that came before the assignment of the parliamentary groups formed to carry out the defense and foreign policy discussions (Schmitz, 2005, 5): Someone asked the chair: “Who are those people at the back?” She replied sternly: “They are Members of Parliament. They may stay but they cannot speak.” Even though scholars and representatives of NGOs were assertive, the elected legislators of Canada were suppressed (Tanguay, 2001). The vagueness of public representation was evident. Parliament, at best, is a partaker in the process of decision making, a force and entity that can make a difference. Despite of the broadening of parliamentary-oriented tasks since that was agreed upon, views of slight legislative control and errors have carried on in this domain traditionally defined by the privilege of the executive body. Suggesting an even more limited sphere of influence, as stated by Schmitz (2005), James McCormick has mentioned an ongoing parliamentary governance of foreign policy. Making Canada’s Parliament Effective The most important challenge in making Canada’s parliamentary system effective is the fact that Canada’s structure of accountable parliamentary government has functioned for hundreds of years now based on unwritten values and rules, called the ‘constitutional conventions.’ The effectiveness of these constitutional conventions has relied a lot on their recognition by Canadian legislators and the incidents of 2008 propose an abandonment of the time-honored interpretation of the rules that have guaranteed the democratic functioning of the country’s parliamentary entities (Wheeldon, 2011). Discontinuation in these conditions was proposed with no apparent example, theoretical foundation, or the form of discussion or debate one may think would be needed to legitimize such a major abandonment of Canadian parliamentary institution. Although constitutional, precedents or else, should by no means be approved as sacred, the argument that constitutional conventions are merely useful as guidelines for proper behavior when the important individuals acknowledge that they are obliged to comply with them is an issue. It permits core ideals of parliamentary democracy to be taken for granted, even thrown out, for temporary political influence and without any form of democratic mechanism to reconstruct the governance structure of Canada (Wheeldon, 2011). Hence, the following reforms are proposed: (1) Electoral Mandate The ability of the prime minister to conduct a ballot vote at any time is claimed by many as one form of authority that should be controlled. A prime minister approaching an ‘out of favor’ administration may unjustifiably postpone an unavoidable outcome. In various ways the privilege to hold an election may be viewed as a major advantage at the prime minister’s disposal. Nevertheless, it could be possible to maintain vital features of the current structure, according to Tanguay (2001), still, at the same time trim down the privilege of the executive body in not holding an election until the final phase of a mandate or, on the contrary, holding a premature election when it seems favorable to call it. (2) Parliamentary Caucus Apparently, the parliamentary caucus is very important at this point, because it is most expected to be in a situation to manipulate policymaking and the prime minister. Supervising caucus and giving attention to the issues and suggestions of caucus are obligations that prime ministers take for granted at their risk. Hence, the dominant party should review how the function of the parliamentary caucus in relation to the prime minister could be legitimized or broadened. According to Seidle and Docherty (2003), relaxing the ties of party discipline, wherein government policy-making would need the complete assistance of the members of the parliament, would be effective, not because it grants members of the parliament a more dynamic function within the lower house but because it reinforces the position of caucus in relation to the prime minister. Ultimately, it should be considered that several of the issues confronting the Canadian government, the inflexible conformity to party discipline, the absence of an important function for members of the parliament, are based on forces that transcend modification of the policies of the House of Commons. Leslie Seidle and David Docherty (2003) has given a lot of substantiations that the absence of parliamentary experience is an important aspect clarifying the vulnerability of the members of the parliament to party discipline and their lack of capacity to evaluate and in effect critique the decisions of the government. Furthermore, the absence of parliamentary experience can result in incompetent performance of cabinet ministers (n.a., 2001). Hence, without electoral change that would produce higher incumbency levels (n.a., 2001), only a few can be carried out to address this problem by playing with the Parliament’s rules. Conclusions The Canadian parliamentary system obstinately opposes reform, fervently claiming that the foundation will remain intact and strong. Political institutions are not interested in watching over their own collapse and they are most likely to protect themselves. Nevertheless, if political parties keep on welcoming the estrangement of the public and contempt for current political systems with refusal and indifference, Canada will in the end become an authoritarian government. References n.a. (2001). “Take Whips Off MPs to Reform Parliament” Canadian Speeches, 15(2), 75. Armit, A. (2007). “Public Participation in Canada—The Role of Parliament” Parliamentary Centre Canada-China Governance Workshop, pp. 1-6. Eagles, M. (1998). “Political Ecology of Representation in English Canada: M.P.’S and Their Constituencies” American Review of Canadian Studies, 28(1-2), 53-79. Lawson, R. (2005). “Understanding Alienation in Western Canada: Is ‘western alienation’ the Problem? Is Senate Reform the Cure?” Journal of Canadian Studies, 39(2), 127+ Mill, J.S. (2010). On Liberty and Other Essays. New York: Digireads.com. Schmitz, G. (2005). “Foreign Policy White Papers and the Role of Canada’s Parliament: Paradoxical but Not Without Potential” International and Defence Policy Review, University of Western Ontario, London. Seidle, F.L. & Docherty, D.C. (2003). Reforming Parliamentary Democracy. Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Tanguay, A.B. (2001). “Reforming Canada’s Political Institutions for the Twenty-First Century” Journal of Canadian Studies, 35(4), 5+ Ward, N. (1950). The Canadian House of Commons: Representation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Wheeldon, J. (2011). “Actors, Targets, and Guardians: Using Routine Activities Theory to Explore the 2008 Decision to Prorogue Parliament in Canada” Canadian Journal of Sociology, 36(1), 59+ Williams, A. (2005). “Canada’s System of Representation in Crisis: The ‘279 Formula’ and Federal Electoral Redistributions” American Review of Canadian Studies, 35(1), 99+ Read More