Homeland Security: Preparedness & Prevention - Assignment Example

Homeland Security - Preparedness & Prevention Abstract The paradigms of security for nations, businesses and public services have drastically changed since 9/11. Terrorism threats can now come from anyone anywhere and are not limited to those emanating from countries as in the cold war period and earlier. This paper reviews how anti-terrorism measures are planned, who are the key stakeholders in the process, a discussion on the methodologies followed, and what are some of the impediments to implementing these plans. Homeland Security - Preparedness & Prevention Introduction 9/11 was a watershed event in US and global history. Prior to 9/11, countries, and particularly the US, had their focus pinned on a global security strategy based on other countries and regions that competed for global or regional influence.. For example, during the long Cold War period, the Soviet Union and other communist countries were considered the prime threat for the US and its security policies were driven accordingly. 9/11 and ensuing events showed that terrorism and security threats had morphed into a cross-national and non-state character. The threat could now come from anyone anywhere and target US interests or installations globally. It also showed that fringe elements in the Islamic world were capable of planning and executing large terrorist strikes in any country of the world. These fringe elements were not state armies or governments but extremists who found sanctuaries in weak countries with a poor record of governance. Fertile grounds for developing these terrorists were also available where countries were slow in curbing extremist ideological thought within them. The very nature of these terrorists groups and their cross-boundary methods necessitate building a government, public and private capacity which can plan for and respond to globally coordinated larger terrorist attacks like the 9/11 or smaller localized attacks like the Bali bombing (9/11 Commission Report, 2004: p. 365). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States have written a comprehensive report on 9/11 tragedy. While this report deals with several areas, its discussion on devising a global strategy has been useful looking at the broader picture while writing this paper. The Justice Management Division (JMD) of the Department of Justice created a sample Crisis Management Plan (CMP) that would act as a blueprint for future refinements. Similarly, Crisis Incidence Protocol developed by Department of Justice in partnership with University of Michigan lays down guidelines for developing responses to “critical incidences” which include terrorist attacks (Jones et al, 2000: p. 4). Finally, a sample methodology presented by Federal Transit Administration is discussed in this paper. Developing Counter Terrorism Plans Policy and planning for counter terrorism measures are required at all levels where government and government agencies set the tone and direction at the highest level. The need and implementation of similar plans then filter down to individual organization level resulting in a mesh of coordinated response plans through the landscape of public and private entities. Recognizing the need to respond effectively to the global threat of terrorism, the 9/11 Commission Report (2004: p. 363) gave a broad outline for this response as: “attack terrorists and their organizations prevent continued growth of Islamic terrorism protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks” (2004: p. 363) While action on the first two items can only be taken by government agencies and policy, the last item, protection against and preparation for terrorist attacks, is meant to be taken up by all public and private entities who may be vulnerable to attacks. The most important aspect of developing a crisis management plan is to first define the crisis itself, assess risks and its ramifications (Jones et al, 2000: p. 10), the goals of the plan (US Department of Justice, n.d.: p. 1), and to constitute a team that is responsible for managing the process of firstly mitigating the crisis and, second, in the event of an attack, to coordinate the recovery. Equally important is to recognize all the stakeholders who could be affected by an attack or who could offer assistance to coordinate emergency operations (Jones et al, 2000: p. 4). Special communication protocols are set up for internal as well as external communication. Protocol for internal communication establishes a procedure and equipment to coordinate between designated internal crisis teams during emergency operations while protocol for external communication sets up easy and readily accessible ways to contact emergency services such as the police, fire services, and federal protective services (US Department of Justice, n.d.: p. 3). Though it is not possible to predict any terrorist attack with certainty, the best crisis management plan is the one which takes most of the decisions “prior to an actual crisis” and ensures clarity in responsibilities, resource availability and actions to be taken at the time of an attack (Jones et al, 2000: p. 14). It is therefore necessary to keep a liaison with other organizations and agencies that develop counter terrorism plans and keep learning from their observations and analysis on the best means to handle an eventuality. Also, responsibilities need to be defined, assigned and jointly discussed across the spectrum of government resources, city or state resources, and private organizations. The emergency response itself must comprise of easy to access instructions and checklists for all individuals affected, and familiarity with procedures to be followed. This familiarity can be facilitated by holding regular training exercises which should be considered less as a test of preparedness but more of an effort to build team integration, comfort with procedures and identify and fill gaps that may be identified (Jones et al, 2000:p. 20). Finally, a counter terrorism plan would be incomplete without identifying steps to mitigate a disaster and to ensure recovery if one does take place. Internationally, the 9/11 Commission recommended that while existing terrorist sanctuaries were identified and must be targeted, it is equally important to implement plans to support education, economic recovery, development, non-proliferation of nuclear technology, and a counter strategy in ‘battle of ideas” in Islamic countries and regions where potential breeding grounds for future terrorists exist (9/11 Commission Report, 2004: p. 374-378). Domestically, mitigation strategies would include placement of barriers and surveillance to stop terrorist access, and other steps such as protection of businesses by placement of offline disaster recovery data centers. Methodology As referred to earlier, the 9/11 Commission gave a broad outline to identify threats and attack terrorists, prevent growth of Islamic terrorism and to prepare for and respond effectively to an attack. These three guiding principles can be adapted to suit most organizational requirements. The government’s adaptation of these principles has already been discussed. For a smaller, yet critical organization these guidelines can be molded to situations relevant to it. For example, one of the major potential targets of terrorism is the transportation sector (Federal Transit Administration, 2003: p. 14). The Federal Transit Authority has developed a methodology for counter terrorism around the same principles and defines its core goals as the recognition and prevention of potential terrorist incidents, and to “enhance response capabilities” for them (Federal Transit Administration, 2003: p. 14). The benefit of a methodology is that it provides a framework which allows modification and improvement of processes over time. Which is why, one of the goals is to “enhance” response capabilities as it is a continuous process. The Transit Authority’s methodology (2003: pp. 17-20), the System Security and Emergency Preparedness (SSEP), is based on integrating effort and coordination in four areas of deterrence, detection, delay and response. Participants in counter terrorism plans The 9/11 Commission described terrorism as a set of “tactics by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy” and the obvious response as a war effort (9/11 Commission Report, 2004: p. 363). The Commission (2004: p. 364) goes on to suggest that, this being a war, a coordinated response must be prepared and would include involvement of “diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy and homeland defense”. Considering that most of terrorists in recent past have come from Islamic extremist background, it is also important to make the effort to engage and include Muslim countries as partners so that terrorists do not find safe havens in those countries. Cooperation from these countries could be sought at various levels including intelligence, monitoring travel etc. Domestically too, it is important to involve all stakeholders while preparing counter terrorism plans. The Critical Incidence Protocol (Jones et al, 2000: pp. 3-4, 6) describes why it is essential that a public private partnership is essential for the success of any such plan. Private entities need the assistance of public emergency services in any case and can also learn ongoing refinements in counter terrorism strategy that public administration has access to. Public administration can also benefit the community by extending its net of participation by including the private sector. Finally, it is also important to include media in the preparation process as it gives them the comfort of where to get accurate information and how. Media can play a major role in public information and any ambiguities or misunderstandings during an emergency can be dangerous. These can be avoided by setting up and practicing proper protocols of how information sharing would work. Impediments to planning Denial, lack of trust, misinformation, and lack of capacity to coordinate joint efforts are some of the impediments that come in the way of developing counter terrorism plans and strategy. Denial is perhaps the single most dangerous roadblock. While developing the Critical Incidence Protocol, all participants agreed principally that denial of the “potential of for a critical incident must be eliminated, for it is not if but when disaster will strike.” (Jones et al, 2000: p. 4). Even countries remain in denial. Prior to terrorism coming full circle to affect Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s own society, they seemed to treat this as a US problem (9/11 Commission Report, 2004: p. 373). As discussed in the introduction of this paper, the security agencies of US were not fully geared for a non-state terrorist attack on its soil, their focus being a legacy of the cold war period. The divide between foreign and domestic agencies is stark and cooperation has been low to the detriment of national security facing new threats and a joint intelligence command is essential (9/11 Commission Report, 2004: pp. 399-401). Mistrust is another element which significantly hampers counter terrorism efforts. For example, in public-private cooperation, sensitive information from private sector can be shared that could otherwise come under the domain of a regulatory framework. This could discourage the private business to engage fully in counter terrorism planning and must be assured that the public entity would by no means use such information for regulatory fines (Jones et al, 2000: p. 7). Role playing exercises increase familiarity as well as build mutual trust (Federal Transit Administration, 2003: p. 6). Conclusion Developing counter terrorism plans is an on going process and must be kept updated on newer developments and risks. Even existing risks must be continually re-assessed and classify them according to their threat levels compared with the benefits of mitigating or responding to them with a complete plan. Partnerships, clear and accurate communication, and a sense of ownership is critical. References 9/11 Commission (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. Retrieved June 16, 2010, from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf Federal Transit Administration (January, 2003). The Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide. Retrieved June 16, 2010, from http://www.transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/publications/security/planningguide.pdf Jones. R.W., Kowalk, M.A., Miller, P.P., Cools & Currier, & Tarrant, R. (2000). Critical Incident Protocol: A Public and Private Partnership. Retrieved June 16, 2010, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/cip.pdf US Department of Justice (no date). Crisis Management Plan Sample. Retrieved June 16, 2010, from http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ps/epm/tab10.pdf Read More