Iranian Reform Movement - Case Study Example

Iranian Reform Movement Should have roots in indigenous soil to retain its credibility Operation AJAX – coup détat in Iran in 1953 The relevance ofan indigenous reform movement in Iran can best be understood if the blowback resulting from the reform movement engineered by CIA in 1953 is analyzed in some detail and the extent to which it had impacted the country is observed and appreciated empathically. The term ‘blowback’ incidentally was first used by the CIA while documenting the events and their aftermath in the operation that overthrew the democratically elected Iranian government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953. The term basically means unintended side effects that have surfaced due to any action by the agency which had other objectives in mind while engineering the original activity. In case of Iran, the chain of blowbacks were rather devastating and the series of reactions that were let loose forced the United States of America to pay a very heavy price for decades on end. Mosaddeq had come to power in 1951 riding on the back of a massive support from nationalist elements that were smarting for half a century from the patently unfair revenue sharing arrangement the country had with British government-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that enjoyed exclusive authority over the entire oil reserves of Iran. The revenue sharing arrangement was heavily biased against Iran in as much as it provided for only 16% of the profits from the venture to remain within the country with the rest filling the coffers of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. (Kinzer, 2003) The first step was taken by the Iranian parliament (Majlis) in 1951 when it nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and proceeded to elect Mosaddeq as Prime Minister. This act of defiance by Iranian parliament disturbed the almost half a century old stranglehold that the British government owned company had over the entire oil sector of oil rich Iran. A naturally peeved Great Britain initially contemplated military action to restore status quo but later decided against it and proceeded to organize an international boycott of Iranian oil. (Guardian Editorial Desk, 2003) This was the overt action by Britain while it covertly planned a forcible overthrow of the government of Mosaddeq through a coup détat against the democratically elected government of Iran. As the international boycott had its desired effect and Iran started suffering from economic hardships, United States gradually got embroiled in this struggle between Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Iran as it acceded to the request of British government to help it out in organizing the overthrow of Mosaddeq regime. But it did not get involved purely out of altruistic impulse, rather was totally calculative and coldly professional in extracting its pound of flesh from the entire undercover venture. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company lost its monopoly status in Iranian oil sector and new entrants in the market were Royal Dutch Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles and five other American oil companies. (Wilber, 2009) After ensuring that United States became firmly entrenched in Iranian oil scenario, CIA proceeded with its undercover activities to confirm that what had been plotted by the US and Great Britain actually was converted into reality. The CIA along with British undercover agents spread all over the country and started creating trouble and harassed Mosaddeq sought help from President Truman and World Bank but, quite obviously they were in no mood to help out someone they have already set up as a target. The Iranian president had other worries too. Elections to the Iranian parliament were imminent and with the country rapidly hurtling towards bankruptcy and hundreds of Iranians losing their jobs in petroleum refineries of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Mosaddeq had no other alternative but to arrange for some means or the other to earn foreign exchange by selling oil. He tried to renegotiate the revenue sharing deal with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by putting forward a much more rational and just offer of sharing the revenue from oil equally between the company and the Iranian nation but, quite predictably the company firmly rejected it. British government had other ideas. They wanted to rig the impending presidential elections and ensure an overthrow of Mosaddeq in an apparently legal and non-violent manner. But general sentiment in the country was very much in favor of nationalization with the common populace prepared to face the combined might of both the British and the Americans. Initial attempts to foster a coup détat by forcing the weak and ineffective Shah of Iran to dismiss his Prime Minister proved futile and the Shah fled the country, but Major General Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr. on behalf of CIA persuaded the Shah to return to Iran. The Shah returned, dismissed Mosaddeq and put up Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi in his place with the help of from Col. Abbas Farzanegan to signal the end of a popular democratic regime in Iran. United States stayed firmly in control of the internal affairs of Iran and started training the security forces of Shah. These security forces came to be known as SAVAK and were the most potent tool in the hands of the Shah to perpetuate his reign for an ignominiously long two decades. (Keddie & Gasiorowski, 1990) Prime Minister Mosaddeq, the fountainhead of emerging Iranian national pride was arrested, tried and awarded death sentence that was finally commuted to three years’ solitary confinement in a military prison followed by house arrest till his death. (Chapin, 1987) The immediate aftermath of the coup was a sharp upturn of the Iranian economy with the British government lifting its oil embargo and the United States sending in technical and managerial assistance in large volumes to ensure Iranian oil reserves were exploited to the fullest possible limit. Apparently it seemed that Iran has finally come of age with prosperity finally knocking the doors of that country. Politically however, merciless repression of National Front members, especially the communist Tudeh party, continued unabated while political and administrative power kept on getting concentrated in the hands of the Shah and his henchmen. The United States considered it a marvelous masterstroke of foreign policy where in a single move it got a sizeable share of the oil fortunes of Iran and a firm footing in the troubled Middle East region that put it in an advantageous position vis-à-vis its cold war enemy, the USSR. The situation seemed even rosier to the United States as it already had a NATO ally in the form of Turkey in that region. But only two decades later, leaders of the US had to publicly admit that it was one of the worst blunders that the country had ever committed while conducting its foreign policy affairs. (Iran Chamber Society, 2001) The two decade long misrule of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi The coup that was engineered by American and British governments had, quite obviously, selfish economic and geopolitical interests of these two superpowers as its main concern. There is no doubt that the immediate results of the coup were very encouraging as America could extend its footprint in the troubled Middle Eastern region and encircle its avowed cold war enemy, the Soviet Union. The British government was also happy that it regained its domineering position in the Iranian oil sector and did not quite mind in sharing its monopoly status with the USA. Great Britain followed the policy of prudence where it is always better to forego half of cake if the rest half is assured. As a result none of these two democratic countries had any qualms whatsoever to topple a legally elected democratic government and also had no hesitation in appointing a person tainted with allegations of colluding with the Nazis during the World War II. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, one of the lynchpins of the coup was arrested by the British government during the Second World War on charges of attempting to install a Nazi regime in Iran. That same person was installed by Shah Reza Pahlavi as Prime Minister on August 19, 1953. This was not all. Bahram Shahrokh, an individual trained personally by Joseph Goebbels and appointed as Berlin Radio’s anchor and chief announcer of Farsi programs during Nazi rule in Germany, was made the director of propaganda in the court of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Sharif-Emami, another convicted Nazi who had served time in prison for his Nazi connections was twice made Prime Minister and also occupied the posts of Secretary General of the Oil Industry and President of the Senate. (Kazemzadeh, 2009) With the stupendous oil wealth of Iran at his sole disposal, Shah gradually become more and more drunk with power as it were and started behaving like a megalomaniac with associated streaks of despotic tendencies. Shah’s portraits became ubiquitous and were even shown before film shows in public auditoriums and drama performances in public theatres. Shah started extending his influence in almost all spheres of society and there was hardly a single podium left that was not occupied by either Shah himself or someone or the other from his tight knit coterie of courtiers. An obvious corollary to this attitude was an antipathy towards any form of criticism – however mild or innocuous it might be. This antipathy has only one form of outward expression and that is a marked distaste of multiparty rule. Autocrats all over the world have detested multiparty political system and have always favored a single party rule where the existing party would be nothing but a collection of yes-men and cronies. Shah also did what all other dictators have done before him. He abolished the existing multiparty system and introduced a single party political set up where there was room for only one party – the Rastakhiz Party that was nothing but an appendage of the inner circle of the royal autocrat. The word ‘rastakhiz’ incidentally means resurrection. Resurrection it surely was but not of the Iranian masses but the chosen few favored by Mohammed Shah Pahlavi, the despotic monarch of Iran. (Fischer, 1980) Shah declared that there were only two categories of Iranians, one consisted of those that believed that the coup that installed Shah as the monarch was justified and ethical and hence had complete faith in Shah and trusted him to be the savior of the nation; and, the other category that consisted of people who did not have faith in Shah and considered the coup as unethical and unjustified. Quite obviously, like all autocrats, Shah considered all those that belonged to the second category as antinational and declared that their only place is behind bars. They of course also had the option of leaving the country and Iran would surely not be poorer if such people left as according to Shah they were not Iranians at all. The most obvious extension of such a convoluted logic was a diktat that all true and patriotic Iranians must become members of Rastakhiz Party. Anyone who refused to become a member was, according to Shah, either a member of some illegal organization or a member of the banned communist Tudeh Party. According to prevailing law of the land such individuals were traitors and should be jailed. Thus all Iranians had no other option but to compulsorily become members of Shah’s party. (Halliday, 1979) It would be no surprise to an independent and impartial observer that such a repressive regime would automatically spawn resistance and repugnancy towards the existing power structure and the accumulated grievances against the Shah took the form of violent protests that Iranian military and SAVAK simply could not put down even after unleashing the most virulent form of repression that resulted in the death of thousands of Iranians. Shah had to finally abdicate the peacock throne and leave Iran forever on 16 January 1979. The most popular explanation for this overwhelming rejection of Shah by almost entire Iran is that he was perceived to be a puppet of a non-Muslim, rather anti-Muslim, Western super power. He was widely reviled as being a corrupting influence that constantly ruptured the close knit social, moral, religious and cultural fabric of Iran. There were other more practical issues also that stoked the embers of discontent against the Shah that finally worked up such a conflagration across the length and breadth of Iran that even the mighty SAVAK and the highly efficient royal military were not able to douse. There were issues of shortages, inflation and unnecessary oppression by the ruling class and an overwhelming and all pervading corruption that affected the police in such a way that at times they refused to act against the petty criminals and trouble mongers. The almost pathological penchant for pomp and dazzling elegance of the royal family also antagonized the general public against the Shah. Celebration of the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy in particular drew widespread criticism as it brought into very sharp focus the wide chasm between the rich and poor in Iran and what was most ironic was an almost complete lack of concern about the poor while the rich and those close to the Shah wallowed in ill-gotten wealth. Shah had also antagonized the Muslims by changing all of a sudden from an Islamic calendar to the Imperial calendar where instead of flight of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina being the first day; the birth of Cyrus was considered as the first day. So, in a stroke the year 1355 got converted to 2535. Other than some practical difficulties inherent in such a drastic alteration in the calendar, Iranian Muslims considered it as direct interference in their religious and social preferences. The irony of the whole episode was that given the backdrop of an all pervading dislike and distrust of Shah as he was considered an agent of Western powers without any feel and concern for indigenous issues or real love for the country; all these actions seemed to aggravate the already simmering discontent against the monarch. The Shah was also unfortunate to a certain extent as some of his well-intentioned measures also backfired producing a negative sentiment among the populace. The most glaring example of such a case was the impetus given to education during his regime. Sustained push by the authorities quite obviously increased the number of young people that had education at least till the high school level; the economy was not buoyant enough to absorb this increased supply of educated work force and unemployment levels among the educated very soon surpassed those levels prevailing among the illiterate. These educated young persons were, most naturally, extremely frustrated at not being able to find gainful employment, crossed the fence and joined groups that were busy opposing the Shah and fomenting the uprising. (Abrahamian, 1982) Islamic revolution in Iran The Shah of Iran abdicated his throne in 1979 and Iran entered an all new phase in its history. Though the religious elements were seen at the forefront of the upheaval, it was actually the result of a grand alliance between powerful secular and liberal forces that yearned for a democratic polity and overly religious Shii clerics. The clerics gained an upper hand simply because of their ability to mobilize Shii religious institutions and mobilize masses through sustained focus on issues of mass grievances against the Shah’s regime. (Kazemi, 1997) However, the key issue in this revolution was that it was purely indigenous in nature unlike the coup that engineered Shah’s installation two decades earlier. The revolutions charismatic leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and his lieutenants frequently articulated the goals of the Islamic revolution through print, sermons and media routes during the period of revolutionary struggle. (Brumberg, 2001) After the revolution was successful, these goals were enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the governments domestic and foreign policies, and in statements before international forums and organizations. But, as a result of a host of domestic and international issues, the Islamic Republic experienced a series of institutional and operational reorganizations that reoriented some of the underlying dynamics of Iranian internal politics. From a broad perspective, three distinct regime phases can be identified: the Khomeini era (1979-89), the Rafsanjani phase (1989-97), and the Khatami period (1997-present). These three phases (referred by some as "three republics") exhibit a slow but progressive receding of revolutionary zeal, ideology and rhetoric in many areas of domestic, regional and international policies and at times radical modification in both the domestic and foreign policy arena. They also point to a complex process of evolution, consolidation and centralization in state institutions. Khatamis election platform, for example, was enshrined with the themes of civil society and the rule of law. His election success was assured by the massive support of youth and women, none of which were likely possibilities in earlier regime periods. The fate of reform movement in post revolution Iran also had three different trajectories during these three regimes. The Khomeini period was preoccupied with the consolidation of power, the Islamization of society and its impact on the massive brain drain, the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq War. Rafsanjani spearheaded institutional reform to ensure regime viability and dealt with dramatic population increases and their ancillary problems. In foreign policy, it de-emphasized the necessity of exporting the Islamic revolution to neighboring countries. The Khatami phase is identified with the struggle for political and social reform and the desire to amend the system from within. (Tabar, 2003) The issue to be observed and appreciated once again is though there have been perceptible changes in approach, attitude and emphasis, that has been modulated largely by external forces, in these three regimes, the leaders of the country came up from the ranks of the populace and were not implanted from outside as Reza Shah Pahlavi was a few decades ago. Thus, though Iran has faced internal turmoil on several occasions since 1979, there has always been a general consensus among political adversaries about putting up a united face to western powers. These leaders have their own differences but never for even the briefest interlude are they accused of being a puppet of a foreign power. Fate of reforms in post-revolutionary Iran The regime has failed to deliver on the exalted twin goals of social justice and economic self-sufficiency. Even though some segments of the poor have received benefits, their economic well-being has enormous scope of further improvement. Some of these problems can be attributed to the positions adopted by Iran while determining its foreign policy. It is a fact that the trade embargo by the United States has prevented infusion of any significant foreign investment into the country, and that the economy has suffered enormously as a result. But simply blaming the United States does not absolve the leadership of their ineptness in negotiating the complicated situation as it has not been able to suitably modify its foreign policy to create a more amicable relationship with the only superpower in the world. Moreover, the country has not yet been able to climb out of the deep hole it had dug itself into when it instituted a rigid Islamization program that forced a huge influx of well-trained professionals into exile in the West. (Behdad, 1996) If we include US President George Bushs reference to Iran as a member of the "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address in January 2002, it becomes quite apparent that Iran has a long way to go in its foreign policy formulations. Moreover, accusations and hostile words from the United States have encouraged the hard-liners within Iranian society, making the job of pushing through processes of reform even more difficult. A cooperative position between the two countries would be in both US and Iranian interests, as it would help normalize relationships and thereby promote reform. For instance, while the European Union shares similar concerns with the United States over the possibility of Iran acquiring weapons of mass destruction, its conciliatory approach based on increased trade and diplomatic relations seems to have had a greater effect on Iranian politics. If such an attitude could prevail in the future between the United States and Iran, accusations and hostilities could be avoided and reform could stay on track. Although recent events dealt moderates a heavy blow, it is hoped the Iranian reform movement will continue to struggle forward. (Yasin, 2002) The reform has to come from within The thought of a rogue nation armed with nuclear weapons is the most unnerving of all and given the current intransigence exhibited by Iran and its apparent refusal to join in the international mainstream; some hardliners in the United States must have started remembering how a neatly executed coup détat more than five decades ago had apparently solved a host of problems that had assumed alarming proportions at that point in time. But before entertaining any such thoughts, the people in power must also recall the blowback that occurred in the form of Ayatollah Khomeinis revolution and the year-long hostage drama that was enacted at US Embassy in Teheran. The biggest loss from that ill-conceived covert operation, however, was that a large majority of the Muslim nations started thinking of the United States of America as the biggest threat to their independence and sovereignty. This stain is still the biggest hurdle the country has to overcome whenever it negotiates with countries of the Middle East. And, it could not hold on to Iran either as the country got swept away by the Islamist Revolution. So, it was a total loss from whichever angle one wishes to examine the issue. Iran is a country having a history and tradition that is more than four thousand years old. The ramifications in the society have evolved over centuries and have a multi-layered and extremely complex structure that is almost impossible for an outsider to comprehend in their entirety. The scenario has become even more complicated due to the inherently dispersed and decentralized nature of Shii religious authority in both its individual and institutional form. Although clearly united in opposition to the Pahlavi regime, the religious groups also displayed significant divisions and expressed differing perspectives on both the revolutionary process and the desired form of the final polity. Iranian politics can be seen as a mass of confusing cross-currents where alliances and counter-alliances are made and broken readily. Historically, these alliances have been formed and then nurtured by a large set of seemingly contradictory norms. They have either been short-term or long-term, ideological or pragmatic, economic or non-economic, based on foreign policy concerns or domestic issues, religious or secular, and for other less apparent reasons. The picture is even more confusing when one tries to analyze the alliances actual operations. For example, key individuals or groups can share the same view on foreign policy but not on domestic politics, and their positions can often vary over time. Reflecting this, policy preferences have also changed over time but not always in the same direction. (Milani, 1993) Although there is a base line position among individual elites, changes in policy makers positions have been simply too common to allow for simple categorization. The situation is made even more complicated by the superimposed religious veneer that sets the tone of political discourse. Ultimately; religion sanctions public behavior even when it has no direct relevance to the issue. The fissures in the Iranian political system remain large and problematic, and the battle between various factions supporting reform and those opposing it is not over. In spite of all regime attempts to control civil society and undermine institutions of reform, the final outcome is not necessarily determined. The harsh onslaught on reformers has done significant damage to their progressive agenda and has led to widespread disenchantment with politics. (Buchta, 2000) The politics of hope so clearly embedded and enunciated in Khatami campaigns have now been replaced by politics of despair. There is a growing popular sentiment that normal political processes are not effective since they do not respond to legitimate demands for participation in the system. The June 2003 sporadic demonstrations in Tehran and several other cities, spearheaded by students and others asking for reform, once again underline the systems failure to respond to quests for freedom within the system. In such a deeply fractured society it becomes extremely difficult for any indigenous leader to bridge the gaps and provide a trustworthy alternative to the general public. The situation will naturally be even more hopeless for any puppet that might be installed as a stooge of a foreign power. What was possible more than five decades ago is simply not possible now for the United States to repeat. This is especially so because of the decidedly anti-Muslim stance and clash of civilizations approach the United States have now adopted towards issues concerning the Middle East that. The world politics has undergone a quantum change with public awareness reaching new heights. People would now simply not accept any leader planted by any foreign power. 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CIA Historical Paper No. 208 Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran November 1952 - August 1953. Retrieved November 17, 2009, from WebCite: http://www.webcitation.org/5hOKk6ByB Yasin, T. (2002). Knocked off Axis? Iranian Reform Challenged. Harvard International Review, Volume 24, Issue 2 , 12-14. Read More