The Global Aspect: International Terrorism - Essay Example

The Global Aspect: International Terrorism Terrorism has become one of the most controversial topics and issues in the international and domestic scene. ‘Terrorist’ or ‘terrorist acts’ have caused many problems to many governments, political leaders and observers. It has also been classified according to the identity of actors involved or according to the nationality of people involved. Scholars have come up with the term international terrorism in order to denote the type of terrorism that involves actors from different nations. This type of terrorism is further categorized into two modes – interstate and transnational terrorism. Interstate terrorism involves more than one nation, and the government controls the acts of terrorism. On the other hand, transnational terrorism still involves more than one nation, but the acts of terrorism are not controlled by the government. Interstate terrorism “involves terrorist activities administered, planned, and sponsored by a government against targets in other countries” (Course Reader: Political Science Y200B, n.d). In effect, interstate terrorism is legitimate as far as government support is concerned. It is orchestrated by a sovereign power against another country and their citizens, and sometimes political enemies or subversives. It is used to “weaken the resistance or diminish the intransigence of states, as the cost of such antagonism is made plain” (Combs, 2003, p. 81). After such acts of terror, weakened states or subversives usually become more willing to bargain with the terrorist group or state. This mode of terrorism is very much exhibited in Iran’s support of Jihad and Muslim extremists in other countries; government-sanctioned Mossad operatives’ acts of hunting down Palestinian terrorists; Pakistani government’s training of Kashmir rebels (Course Reader: Political Science Y200B, n.d); and Libya’s acts of tracking down and eliminating dissidents (Combs, 2003, p. 83). These acts are government-supported and, in some instances, government-led and orchestrated terrorist activities against their ‘enemy’ or ‘rival’ nations. By contrast transnational terrorism “involves terrorist activities conducted by non-state actors (i.e. terrorists not sponsored by a government who operate in other countries or against foreigners in their own countries)” (Course Reader: Political Science Y200B, n.d). Oftentimes, this mode of terrorism involves the collusion of insurgents from different countries. A classic example for this mode of terrorism is the September 11 Al Qaida bombing of the World Trade Center which was not actually authorized by the Afghan government. The terrorist activities of the Hamas group in Palestine and against Israel and the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) can be classified as transnational terrorism (Hudson, 2002, pp. 182-183). Their activities are not sanctioned by the PLO or by any other legitimate government, and their acts are being carried out in order to pressure Israel and the PLO to grant independence to Palestine. The Hizballah (a.k.a. Islamic Jihad) group based in Lebanon is also a transnational terrorist group. Its activities are not supported by the Lebanese government; they are largely anti-West and anti-Israel and their aim is largely about being the “savior of oppressed and dispossessed Muslims” (Hudson, 2003, p. 177). It is very complicated to deal with international terrorism. First and foremost, the kind of terrorism must first be accurately identified. The manner of retaliation depends very much on the kind of terrorism involved. The act of identifying the perpetrator alone is complicated because the international community is often reluctant to express their support for a country trying to identify a specific nation or group responsible for terrorist activities. The international community fears that they might in turn be targets of terrorist activities should they point any fingers against any particular nation or terrorist group. Being positively identified as guilty of terrorist activities implies punishment or prosecution. In some instances, decisive counterterrorist actions are undertaken against terrorists, and if nations are actually involved, there is a grave danger of disastrous international incidents breaking out. Even when investigators actually come up with information linking terrorist activities with specific terrorist groups or states, “a significant lack of verifiable data exists to link states that were thought to have logical policy reasons for supporting such groups with actual instances of substantive support” (Combs, 2003, p. 83). It is difficult to point fingers at specific targets when there is no firm proof to back one’s allegations. In order to assist designations in the issue of identifying states supporting terrorism, the United States passed the Export Administration Act of 1974. This act authorized the secretary of state to list the countries which support international terrorism. This act identified several so-called rogue states like North Korea, Sudan, Cuba, and the Taliban group as supporters of terrorism. This act enabled economic and trade sanctions as well as prohibitions of entry into the United States borders (Pillar, 2001, p. 158). Sanctions of the U.S. against Cuba were further reinforced by the Helms-Burton Act which basically extended the embargo against foreign companies trading with Cuba. This act fueled the anger of Cuba against the U.S., and in a way, further united their cause against the United States. In the case of the Berlin disco bombing in 1986 which killed two U.S. Marines, the United States saw this as an interstate attack carried out by Libya. As a result, the United States government authorized attacks on the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi which killed several Libyans. Months later, a Syrian terrorist was apprehended at the Heathrow airport in London for trying to smuggle explosives onto an Israeli plane. Upon his interrogation, it was revealed that he was actually a trained operative of the Syrian intelligence; he also later claimed that the Berlin disco bombing was actually carried out by Syria, not Libya. This incident was treated by Britain as interstate terrorism and they retaliated by expelling Syrian diplomats from Britain. On the part of the United States, they chose to treat the Heathrow incident as a case of transnational terrorism – blaming the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and not placing any blame on Syria for their act of terrorism. In understanding the type of terrorism, retaliating nations must be very prudent about how they label terrorist acts. An act of retaliation against a nation is different from an act of retaliation against a terrorist group. There is greater friction that can be expected when nations butt head against each other. The U.S. reaction to the Heathrow incident and the Berlin disco bombing can be analyzed in terms of political caution and calculation. Some analysts claim that the U.S. is cautious about facing off with Syria because of the latter’s close ties with Russia. Syria is also known to have anti-aircraft capability. Libya on the other hand, is a more convenient target. Immediately after the Berlin bombing, the U.S. public was clamoring for justice and retaliation against the persons responsible for the bombing. This prompted U.S. authorities to act quickly against possible perpetrators; in this instance, they chose an easy and identified, albeit, unproven target. In the end, the U.S. was able to quickly neutralize the Berlin disco bombing; however, it later paid for its error because Libya retaliated against the U.S. by sponsoring the Pan 101 bombing (Course Reader: Political Science Y200B, n.d). In this sense, applying the concept of an ‘eye-for-an eye’ in dealing with terrorist acts is not an advisable means of dealing with terrorists. Sooner or later, nations which are sanctioned for their terrorist acts (rightly or wrongly) will find ways to retaliate against sanctioning countries, as seen in the above-mentioned case of Libya and the U.S. The efficacy of sanctions against terrorism has now become largely embroiled in the international network of supporting nations. Experts claim that terrorist acts will not cease with the defeat of its leaders like Bin Laden or even with the break-up of the USSR. The support of Bin Laden or the USSR is “clearly not critical to the survival or the networking of many groups” (Combs, 2003, p. 111). It may be recalled that the USSR largely supported terrorist activities against the United States through its participation of the Baddawi Conference. This conference established an alliance of terrorist organizations supported by the PLO and other terrorist groups in the Europe and other Third World countries. The Cold War era was indeed a time of great concern for the West and for Israel. At present, terrorist groups have become self-sufficient, having made successful investments throughout the years. They are not anymore easily crippled by attacks on their known physical locations because most of them have now become organized corporations with entrenched economic interests with the government and in the business world. Sanctions against them are difficult to implement because of the increased sharing of information and contact with other terrorist groups. “Terrorists operating in a foreign country, if they are able to avail themselves of the local expertise of indigenous groups, can carry out more efficient operations” (Combs, 2003, p. 111). Hence, by targeting one person who may be responsible for terrorist attacks, other leaders and groups are still out there, ready, able, and willing to support more acts of terrorism. After the September 11 bombing, the U.S. created a taskforce aiming to seek out and disrupt terrorist funding. This taskforce however potentially cut off funding for some Islamic charities like the Nada Management which are legitimate charitable organizations aiding Muslims in their business ventures. American and Italian operatives cracked down on some personalities managing the Nada Management. They were later released after questioning. These actions potentially created a situation where these personalities, along with their organization, would likely consider supporting Muslim subversives just to get back at the Americans and Italians who detained them. Hence, it is important for sanctioning nations to consider their options for retaliation and against whom they would choose to retaliate. There is however some merit in suspicions against money changing hands in support of terrorist activities. Since the September 11 attacks, reports have come in about hawala brokers lending money to terrorists; as a result, this activity has been deemed illegal by some U.S. states and other countries. A zero-tolerance policy against terrorism is also one of the principles driving sanctions against terrorism. And yet, the parameters of this zero-tolerance policy are not fully defined by states adapting this policy. The parameters are usually often defined by the intelligence gathered against the terrorist state or group or the state sponsoring the terrorist activities. And even when terrorist presence in the sponsoring country is established, experts question whether such presence is enough to come within the purview of terrorist support (Pillar, 2001, p. 167). States which sponsor terrorist activities and which are considered as such under the Export Administration Act bear with them the risk of becoming ‘failed states’. With all the sanctions and embargos brought upon them by the Act, they run the future risk of becoming “incapable of meeting even minimum needs for public order” (Pillar, 2001, p. 175). And this situation may instead turn it into an even bigger haven for international terrorism and terrorists. Domestic terrorism (terrorism from above and terrorism from below) is similar with international terrorism in terms of government control. Terrorism from above and interstate terrorism is supported and controlled by the government, whereas, terrorism from below and transnational terrorism is not supported by the government. International terrorism is also similar with domestic terrorism because of the fact that both modes of terrorism are “indiscriminate, arbitrary and [do] not play by the rules and conventions of war” (Course Reader: Political Science Y200B, n.d). As a result, they do not compromise when it comes to achieving their ultimate goals. The actors of domestic and international terrorism are different from each other. The perpetrators of terrorist acts in domestic terrorism come from one nation only, and their acts often do not cross the borders of their nations. In international terrorism, the actors come from more than one nation; often these nations are known rivals or enemies. However, it is not just about a terrorist group acting against his international target, but also his acts of terror against foreigners in his own country. Iranian students’ hostage takeover of the US embassy in Iran is considered international terrorism despite the fact that the terrorists never set foot outside their country. What makes international terrorism unique and different from domestic terrorism is the fact that it is used as a weapon against the Western nations’ encroachment of weaker developing nations. In domestic terrorism, especially in terrorism from below, violent and insurgent acts are perpetrated by weaker and oppressed citizens against the oppressive, the wealthy and the powerful. Such noble intent is also seen in international terrorism, but on a bigger and global scale. Insurgents fight for their independence, against political and economic influence. Although international terrorism seems to be done on a bigger scale, it cannot actually be counted on to bring about a global change in the international scene. It can serve to temporarily disrupt the seeming order between and among nations, but they are not so disruptive as to cause massive chaos. The list of reasons for the proliferation of international terrorism in recent years is not complete. Religion, race and culture can also be considered as causes of international terrorism. World War II Hitler’s march across Europe resulted to thousands of Jews, Poles, and Gypsies massacred and terrorized because of their religion, their culture and their race. Muslim fanatics who resort to suicide bombings and other violent attacks against the U.S. and its allies also fall under the category of religion as a reason for the proliferation of international terrorism. The reasons listed are not obsolete. Some of these reasons may seem obsolete, but in some context, they are still very much applicable and may be viewed as a current reason for international terrorism. However, it may be noted that since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Western societies are no longer as open as before. Security has been tightened in airports, railroads and other points of entry into their borders. Strategic targets – military and non-military are now well-guarded and well-secured against possible terrorist attacks. There is a degree of truth in Wilkinson’s predictions about potential threats being borne out by subsequent events. Many international terrorist groups have developed significant networks in order to aid each other in their terrorist activities. The 1960s saw antiwar and anti-colonialists bonding with each other and finding common ideals. Their support of each other’s causes eventually turned to financial and physical support. These groups soon realized that they could accomplish more through networking and by helping each other. These groups have also come up with more sophisticated gadgets and weapons in order to accomplish their terrorist activities. Weapons like backpack nukes (bombs fitted in suitcases developed during the Cold War era), dirty bombs (radioactive bombs combined with conventional bombs), and more sophisticated terrorist tactics training are weapons that keep terrorism updated and within the modern loop. However, the end of the Cold War era cut off potential Soviet support for many terrorist groups. When the Al Qaida group emerged, international terrorist groups found a new champion. And now international terrorists have become even more deceptive and cunning individuals. They have mastered the art of blending in with the crowd, looking like ordinary citizens (are now known as sleepers) (Combs, 2003, p. 120), and then causing massive damage to their chosen targets. They have become organized, well-connected, and well-supported by a larger network of international terrorists. Works Cited Combs, C. (2003) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Hudson, R. (2002) Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government report on Profiling Terrorists. Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press Course Reader: Political Science Y200B. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Duplicating Services Read More