The Impact of the Changing Strategic Environment on the Delivery of Land Power - Essay Example

The impact of the changing strategic environment on the delivery of land power. I. Introduction Nation-states are currently facing dramatic changes brought about by the increasing internationalization of the world, which raises questions about the role of the military in pursuing strategic objectives. In recognition of the problems and opportunities facing the land forces that entail with this development in the global landscape, this paper was undertaken to examine the elements that affect the modern military as well as its utility. Specifically, this paper will examine the following: the role and utility of military force in achieving strategic objectives; the impact of globalisation on operation; international and domestic constraints and pressures on operations; the causes and consequences of conflict; Changing conception of victory; the unique characteristics of land power both as a strength and weaknesses in obtaining strategic objectives; and the changing nature of war on land For purposes of this study, strategy will be defined as the overall objectives and means of a nation. At this level strategy would address the relative priority of national security as well as other national objectives, such as providing social welfare by improving the quality of education, infrastructure, economic growth and so on. Strategy would also cover the combining of various means of promoting national security including defense, diplomacy, trade, aid and arms control. Furthermore, military or the army that would be referred to in this paper would consist the military organization including military technology and weaponry. This paper will largely use the United States’ case in the examination of the relationship between the military and the achievement of strategic objectives. II. The role and utility of military force in achieving strategic objectives Writing for the Brookings Institution, Ashton Carter and David Schwartz (1984), defined the vital role of the military in peace as well as in war: 1) to deter adversaries from taking actions that are inimical to US interests (such actions can be political as well as military); 2) to assure friends and allies of protection, thereby cementing alliance ties, and; 3) to defend the United States or friendly nations if deterrence fails to prevent war.1 The utility of military force rests on the principle that it is used to achieve military and political objectives. In the words of the US Joint Chief of Staff or JCS, the use of military force and military strategy is an art and science that is concerned with employing the armed forces of a nation “to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”2 Military power is fundamental in order to defeat an enemy in the battlefield. It is an integral part of military strategies and what national security experts call as “grand strategies” – those that incorporate the military, political, economic and psychological powers of a nation in order to secure national objectives.3 The conventional and prime purpose of the military is to win the a nation’s war. The concept behind blitzkrieg or lightning strike, for example, demonstrates how the military is used to achieve certain objectives. By following the blitzkrieg strategy, an attacker attempts to defeat the opponent’s army by “achieving strategic penetration during which the former may pierce the defender’s front and then drive deep into the defender’s rear, severing his lines of communication and destroying key junctures of his network.”4 In light of this, a nation with a weak military could not successfully use this strategy. However, there are cases wherein a weaker state was successful in employing this strategy to achieve limited gains. The military strategy of Israel during the 1967 war resembles this. According to Paul, elements of blitzkrieg have tactical utility if the capability in armor and aircraft and the terrain allow the weaker side to concentrate its forces at decisive points and achieve strategic penetration. 5 We also have the concept behind the deterrence strategy to show how the military plays a role in achieving objectives. The basic objective of deterrence remains what it has since its conception at the peak of the Cold War, that is to influence the behavior of nations so that they do not undertake against the United States and the American interests across the world. Here, the military system and technologies with their users are accorded an intrinsic deterrence value.6 A common argument, for instance, is that the prevention of a full-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War has shown that deterrence works. The sheer might of the military organization and its capabilities is widely seen as a deterrent for other countries to avoid conflict and hurting the interest of this country with this superior armed forces. The discussion of the deterrence strategy leads us to a broader strategy of defense wherein the military is a primary player. The defense strategy reconciles the defense objectives as well as commitments with the available and projected defense resources that is why, at this level, the definition of national objectives and the assessment of the role of the military power in meeting those objectives take precedence.7 Moreover, in the defense strategy the numerous military instruments are balanced such as in regard to the allocation of number and resources for nuclear and nonnuclear forces, strategic and nonstrategic forces and so on. With the idea that a country’s stability is not defined as the status quo, but rather through order, security and peace, the military’s utility is of paramount importance both during wartime and peacetime. It is an essential element in promoting the strategic objective of a nation. Here, we are provided an example with the US civil-military operations (CMO) strategy, which is crucial in achieving strategic objectives in the war for political legitimacy. For the United States, the civil-military operations is a fundamental element in the US military’s doctrine of foreign internal defense. According to John Whylen De Pauw and George Luz (1992), they encompass military civic action programs, civic assistance activities, population and resource control, civil defense, public information and psychological operations.8 In this area, the military’s combat power is used to support the achievement of strategic objectives and that it is not a principal method in the struggle. Today, the changing landscape in world’s geopolitical and economic landscape calls for a certain degree of flexibility or adaptation in regard to how a nation’s military comes to grips with the ever-changing dimensions of war and conflict. Countries have to deal with the new threats of upheaval, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the failed states, including the interconnection among them which can endanger the stability and security of other nation-states. This raises fundamental questions such as: how should the military be utilized? What is the most effective way to use the military in implementing a national policy? To cite an example, one has the successful use of military force by the Chinese government against the students of in Tiananmen Square. What happened was that the Chinese government in quelling an unrest retained a legitimate authority over the army? In citing an opposite, we have the case of the Soviet Union, a weakened empire, which no longer held authority over either its military or its people. It disintegrated easily amid both the political and military pressures domestically and internationally. In history, one would find that if conflicts were essentially about force against force, the side with most skilled and the best-equipped military almost always wins the battle. The principle at work here is that there is an understanding in the approach about the need to persuade people to act with you instead of merely standing aside or being spectator in the conflict. The point to remember here is that the people who operate and control military and the military technologies can successfully impose their will on a people. In the case of the United States, there is an accepted notion that it must be prepared to act decisively across the conflict spectrum, from operations other than war to nuclear war and war into the twenty-first century and what is labeled as asymmetrical conflicts. This is particularly outlined in a roadmap for military services as spelled out in the Joint Vision 2010. To quote: “Focused on achieving dominance across the range of military operations through applications of new operational concepts… This vision of future war fighting embodies the improved intelligence and command and control available in the information age.” 9 The vision also emphasized the development of four operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. 10 III. The impact of globalisation on operation Globalization is characterized by the closer interaction and cooperation among countries and the creation of world bodies that govern the behavior of nations. Presently, it has become more and more difficult for a country to unilaterally launch military operations against another because of the growing integration and regulation of the community of nations. An important prominent trend that emerged during this period is the increasing alliance, coalition and membership in world bodies that, in effect, require the military to cooperate with other military from other nation-states in joint operations. To demonstrate this we have the mandate of the UN to deploy its own enforcement operations and the emergence of the so-called joint operations among countries. Through the years, the UN has successfully intervened in conflicts with its own forces that are supplied by its member states. One sees this in the peace-keeping missions of the UN in Africa, Asia and the Americas and the US-led operation in Haiti. These operations led the way in a new age of successful United Nations intervention supported by focused diplomacy. A fundamental element in the successes of these operations was the ability of the diverse forces to coalesce in joint-operations setting. This trend had to deal with the ambiguities of political nuances in the process of integrating military units that are united and effective in order to achieve specific UN strategic goals. Presently, UN sponsored operations can be classified into two: The operations that are characterized by consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense (e.g. traditional peace-keeping force and the wider or expanded peace-keeping force such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia); and, the operations that involve the use of force beyond self-defense and could include peace-enforcement and war-fighting operations such as those in Korean War and the Gulf War.11 In peace-keeping operations, tactics there is less involvement for the military and that sometimes their role is relegated to the supporting one. For example, the military may be tasked to provide security for human rights monitors, electoral teams, police and monitor a country’s administration. The deployment and employment of an armed force are still fundamental in achieving military and political objectives. However, the dynamics of this role in changing in our modern society. Today, the global community is constantly on guard for deployments – whether these are appropriate. The models that have achieved victory during the interstate wars are no longer applicable today. A case in point is the deployment of military forces in Haiti in 1994. Here, the political objectives were not achieved by toppling a junta through military means. Instead the objectives were realized through diplomacy. Then, there is also the US-led on-going war against terrorism. This battle does not require a large-scale military force or a long conflict. There is an emphasis on the strategic utilization and employment of military force in order to deal with the new form of enemy which exploits the “tactics of the weak, or a war method that undermines an enemy’s power, exploitation of his weaknesses, and asymmetrical operations to achieve victory.”12 Another example that demonstrates the effect of globalization and its effects can be seen in the process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO transformation that is aimed at tackling the more diverse and distant threats not just for the member-states but it is now increasingly moving beyond its borders. In August 2003, NATO was tasked by the United Nations to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) primarily to provide security in Afghanistan after the Taliban government was ousted. Initially, ISAF was intended to operate inside Kabul and the outskirts, but it has now taken responsibility for security across the whole country and commanding ground forces which numbers approximately 32,000 soldiers.13 The work of NATO, which the US is a member, is different from the American objectives in Afghanistan. While the US-led operation called “Enduring freedom” was tasked to focus on counter terrorism, the NATO-ISAF addresses the area of stability and security. Because of the different missions between the US troops and the NATO-led ISAF forces and the cooperation between them, both the military deployment on both sides are successful in terms of their objectives and goals in the country. The shift of NATO out of its boundary signifies a global engagement that is outlined by the alliance’s Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer during the Riga Summit. He said: “From providing territorial defence to Europe, shifting to a more international security orientation, NATO with its new capabilities is therefore able to face challenges and meet the demands required to ensure stabilization and security, and provide immediate assistance.” 14 IV. International and domestic constraint and pressures on operations During the death throes of the Cold War, there are already new threats that have emerged after the Soviet Union disintegrated. However, these were not immediately acknowledged and it was only the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US when military leaders became fully aware of the emergent threats. An excellent example of how the on-going trends affect the military establishment, is the case of the changing objectives of NATO, the creation of the Homeland Security Office in the United States, the coalition behind the war on terror, the UN-led monitoring of states suspected of producing weapons of mass destruction, among others. As previously mentioned, the modern landscape limits the role of military forces in conflicts. The experience in Bosnia and Kosovo, for instance, is a glaring example wherein a limited military force were employed in order to wrest control from the enemy a string of towns, villages, roads and other infrastructure and important installations. These aspects also characterized a number of modern conflicts such as the Iraq War, the no-fly zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other conflicts. As what the British House of Commons Defence Committee pointed out, the role of military force seems to be reduced from the battlefield to limited specific combat today. 15 In this environment, there is a specific requirement for a sound intelligence gathering, because we know that terrorists are found roaming and living with the populace as demonstrated by the tragic events of the September 11 2001 terrorist attack in the US. The blunder about the combined US and UK intelligence reports on Saddam Hussein in regard to the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction have highlighted the inadequacies of the intelligence community as well as their falling credibility. The US Army is presently undergoing a modernization campaign that is found on the idea that information and its effective use will be a key to the future military success in the battlefield. Under these army modernization initiatives, future battlefields are slated to become large digital networks and that these networks will carry vast numbers of information packets at high speeds from sources such as sensors and processors to commanders and soldiers.16 The US National Research Council Committee on Future Technologies for Army Multimedia Communications outlined this goal; one that supposedly would create an explosion of information that must be integrated and communicated almost instantaneously. The objective is to provide and transmit the right data, at the right place and at the right time. This is the reason behind the emergence of commercial multimedia information technologies that are manufactured by the civilian sector. This new trend has been predicted since the 1990s and the study undertaken by the National Research Council, Commercial Multimedia Technologies for Twenty-first Century Army, was commissioned by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology as a recognition of the emergent trend and to primarily examine the applicability of commercial multimedia communication to Army command, control, communications, and intelligence needs.17 Going back to the deterrent strategy mentioned earlier, changes have also occurred. The range of nations and other groups that were sought to be deterred with the military systems and technologies have expanded enormously since the Cold War. Today, the United States is facing a daunting task because current US security concerns must include the defense of the US homeland and the protection of its allies with whom the country has a treaty obligations guaranteeing mutual security. These factors represent a broad range of interests that must be guarded because they affect the US national security directly and indirectly. These concerns are now articulated more than ever. These range from “free use of the seas, the airways, and space for international commerce and security-related activities through protection of sources of key resources and the friendly nations that control and furnish them, to encouraging the growth of democratic nations.” 18 In regard to domestic constraint, domestic politics is the most prominent hindrance to military operations. For example, in the United States, the constraints that are imposed on its own military operations are more binding than those imposed by its enemies. This circumstance places the country in a severe disadvantage, particularly in coercive battles. If we take a look at the states inimical to the US and its interests, most of them are authoritarian regimes. They exercise control over all the branches of their government as well as the civilian sector – the legislature, the judiciary, and the press. Challenges to the authority of these regimes are quelled via a combination of political repression, threats of incarceration, exile and even death. While these regimes impose closed societies that exploits political freedom of action and minimize accountability for leaders and decision makers, the US must contend with the domestic political constraints on its leadership such as the separation and sharing of powers among the three branches of its democratic government, the constitutional guarantee for the freedom of the press and the continuous requirement for the President to explain and justify military actions. Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Eric Victor Larson (1999) outlined specific constraints that adversely impair the US military efforts: 1) restrictive objectives and mission statements; 2) restrictive rules of engagement; 3) public articulation of an exit strategy, including a “date certain” by which time US forces will be withdrawn; 4) the use of only the least vulnerable – but not necessarily the most appropriate – combat forces in the US inventory for a particular mission; 4) US participation limited to a support rather than combat role; 5) imposition of casualty-minimizing or force-protection measures; 6) US preferences to act in a coalition; 7) limited availability of concessions that can be offered to an adversary.19 V. The causes and consequences of conflict An understanding of the causes as well as the consequences of conflict is key to fully grasp the magnitude of the military’s role in achieving strategic objectives. In this regard I would like to use the two world wars and the War on Terror to explain the causes and consequences of conflicts. World War I The imperialism that led to World War I was itself a result of expanding demands that are confronted by shrinking resources, a combination that have put too much strain on the international system, overloading it so that it became impossible to settle tension through peaceful adjustment. Like all the wars that came before it, World War I began as a purely regional conflict that arose out of the conflicting ambitions and mutual fears of neighboring countries. The war was caused by long-term rivalries among the European powers and that these were worsened by a series of crises between 1905 and 1913, then finally culminating during the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz-Ferdinand in June 1914. World War I was fought largely in European soils. However, huge number of combatants came from soldiers from all continents. The war cost the lives of approximately seven million combatants and roughly the same number of civilians. On its own, this First World War was the first true industrial war wherein modern technology as well as the modes of production were utilized by an insatiable war machine. That this first world war would be so terrible and the aftermath so catastrophic, was the result not so much because of its global scale or of the combination of military technology and the culture of the people who fought it. Karl von Clausewitz had written in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars that a war is a trinity composed of the policy of the government, the activities of the military, and the passions of the peoples.20 Each of these three have to be taken into account so that war and conflicts could be understood: Why did it happen and why it took the path that it did. World War II The Second World War, on the other hand, is considered as the most wide-spread and destructive conflict in history. However, it was markedly different from its predecessor in several ways. First, the conflict was truly world-wide both in scope and scale. Then, the nation-states that were in the frontline like Japan, Germany and Britain, were obliged to divert every available resources, human, moral and material. In addition, the Second World War was not fought for material aggrandizement or for power-political advantage because it, fundamentally, was fought because of political ideas – ideologies.21 But as with the previous war, the Second World War started in Europe after the political extremism in postwar Germany catapulted Adolf Hitler to power. The WAR was triggered as Hitler intended to lead his country and the German people in a war of conquest found on the principle that the German race is inherently superior. He sought to demonstrate such superiority by destroying Germany’s ideological rivals and leading Germany to take reins of a unified Europe. This ideological dimension to the war underpinned the causes for the large scale fighting and, certainly, it also exercised a tremendous effect on the way the war was fought. Up to August 1939, the Nazi Germany had achieved many of her initial, territorial and political ambitions through a strategic combination of threat and belligerent diplomacy. But after this, Hitler felt sufficiently confident to abandon diplomacy and employ the military force to overwhelm Germany’s eastern neighbor, Poland. It was this act that finally precipitated the Second World War. War on Terror The War on Terror demonstrates an entirely new dynamics on war fighting extending beyond the causes and consequence of the previous interstate wars as well as in regard to how they were conducted. In September 11, 2001, the United States was rocked by several terrorist attacks. After gathering intelligence information that linked the terrorists to the Al Qaeda group based in Afghanistan, the Bush administration made the decision to send the military to attack the country and oust the Taliban government, which supported and harbored the attackers. The swift military victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan proved that the United States is willing to take a decisive stand militarily when it mattered, reinforcing the confidence of both the allies and the American public in the president and his policies.22 The United States’ unilateral attack and military-political actions constituted what is now called as the Bush doctrine. This doctrine was fully elaborated during Bush speech in June 2002. Explaining that America faces a threat with no precedent, Bush focused narrowly on the threat of the weapons of mass destruction: “The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology… Our enemies have been caught seeking these terrible weapons… We will oppose them with all our power.”23 The Bush doctrine rests on the principle of preemption wherein America would act against emerging threats – both states and non-states – before they are fully formed as a an act of self-defense. This doctrine departs from the previous American policies since the end of the Second World War when much of the policy was tied to formal alliances and the belief that security is better achieved if countries work together against a common enemy.24 The Bush doctrine would be the basis for the decision to go to war with Iraq. It is important to note that, here, the US launched its campaign without the backing of the international community. VI. Changing conception of victory The classical theory in regard to victory, as William Martel put it, is that it is, first and foremost, a tactical concept whose dimensions were defined in terms of the outcome of battle: Victory was the product of using military instrument to prevail in tactical engagements.25 This definition would be modified or improved on through the years and in the various perspectives of theorists, philosophers, war tacticians and leaders. For instance, Karl von Clausewitz, one of the most significant military strategists the world has ever seen, connected victory to an underlying political objective. In arguing that the greatness of a victory depends on the greatness of the masses over which it has been gained, he observed that the importance of the victory depends on the importance of the object which it secures to us.26 But, in Clausewitz assumptions, one could still understand the message that the leading principle of war is the destruction of the enemy’s force, which is principally effected by means of the military engagement. This theory requires an all-out war and a total victory as well. This has been the theory that has governed the way that the US conduct its wars. Henry Kissinger posited that in the American doctrine of all-out war, victory resides in the full development of America’s military and industrial potential and that military strategy is equated with the ability to mobilize industry and to outproduce the opponent.27 This doctrine has guided the US successes during the two world wars and the Cold War. The case of the Vietnam War, on the other hand, introduced the concept of Limited War for the United States, a situation wherein a war is waged in a confined area of the world with conventional weapons.28 VII. The unique characteristics of land power both as strength and weaknesses in obtaining strategic objectives Land power has several distinct tactical strengths and weaknesses than say, air or maritime power. To illustrate: ground forces providing protection for national homelands cannot refuse combat without leaving open to enemy seizure some part of which they are tasked to protect. This is not so in regard to maritime combat because an enemy fleet that has prevailed over a sea battle holds nothing of significant value: it protects the ability to move, no more, no less.29 A hostile army that has prevailed over the armed force that is on the defense can seize, hold and exploit the natural resources of the occupied territory. The occupying force can also deny the logistic base of the defending force, and generally render the continuation of hostilities close to impossible, if not pointless.30 These variables explain why the ground forces have the most number of distributions of personnel, weaponry, technology and machines. Then, there is also the difference between the environments wherein land force, maritime and air force operate in. Maritime and the air forces operate in a featureless and weather-variable surroundings. Ground forces, on the other hand, operate in human-altered and natural variety of lands. This variable has its own advantages and disadvantages for the land power in achieving its objectives. An important point in the discussion about land power is that it does not significantly differ with both the maritime and air forces in regard to operational objectives. Most importantly, the changing landscape of war on land increasingly requires the support and cooperation with the maritime and air forces in order to successfully achieve strategic objectives. VIII. The changing nature of war on land There are writers who are raising a growing number of questions in regard to the need for a reformed army because of the land-based military’s inability to be effective during joint operations overseas such as in Kosovo and Afghanistan. This is because unlike the US air force, the Marine Corps, the navy and other special operations units, the land-based army is perceived as being not interested in or capable to ride the sound of the guns in the battlefield. Douglas A. Macgregor observed that “at the moment, any proposal to organize or deploy the army that diverges from the operational patterns of World War II and the Cold War – seemingly revalidated during Desert Storm – is rejected.” (p. 14) Recently US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfield stressed that the American armed forces or the American approach to war will change exclusively because of new technology. According to him in a speech delivered at the National Defense University the acquisition of new technologies or the use of existing technologies “have been operative concepts of how transformation might come to be reality, as evidenced by some operations in and over Afghanistan.”31 Rumsfeld believes that the reform in not about weapon systems but instead, it is about new operational concepts and new philosophies of leadership. An interesting suggestion being put forward today is for the military to adopt a business model in order to be effective. The idea is to adopt a leaner and more independent tactical units that are more lethal but designed to be deployed rapidly and with overall enhanced mobility and ready and effective during joint forces operations. Specifically, the armed forces of the future, Marie-Claude Smouts (2001) writes, will adopt the model of decentralized business organization “where the middle echelons are disappearing, with prime place accorded to information, compressed and sophisticated enterprises and reversing the relationship between the armed forces and business.”32 Sarkesian and Connor pointed out that the utility of military force differs in less than major conflicts and that when two conflicts occur at the same time. They wrote that the military is to be prepared for any variety of conventional and unconventional wars and operations other than war, as well as nuclear and international terrorism. 33 Clearly, there are particular methods of employing the military organizations that are totally unsuited to particular forms of strategic objectives. This has been a perennial problem and its importance lies on the fact that the outcome may not be successful. The military and its combat power, write De Pauw and Luz, can contribute to losing a war in two ways: First, the application of combat power without regard to civilian sensibilities will alienate the populace, which alone has the power to provide the government victory in the war for political legitimacy; Second, the failure to provide security to the government and the people incapacitates the government’s ability to deliver basic services and weakens its political legitimacy. 34 Finally, there’s the increasing battles waged against non-state entities such as the Al Qaeda terrorist group, crime syndicates, pirates, gangs and networked tribes, which are stepping into the breach to lay claim to areas that are in sole control of states. According to John Robb, it is this conflict – the war between states and non-states – that is the basis for the first epochal or long war of this century and possibly in the future.35 The ability of non-state entities to wage war against states is not a new phenomenon. George Washington and Mao Zedong are just two of the examples. But the wars that they have waged were over the control of a state. In regard to the emergent non-state actors, they are fighting over who controls the power a state exercises. For example, Al Qaeda, does not want to govern Iraq or Saudi Arabia. Instead, it wants to collapse them and exercise power through feudal relationships in the vacuum created by their failure.36 IX. Conclusion With the changes in modern geographical, political and economic landscape, the land forces play a very important in achieving strategic objectives. The dynamics have changed as factors such as globalization and the international and domestic pressures that they entail - constrain the emergence of interstate conflicts. But this does not render the military’s role as less paramount than ever before. As stated by this study, the military is accorded an intrinsic value in regard to deterring aggression from other nation-states. Also, there are numerous, besides its utility in armed conflict that the military plays a part in achieving strategic objectives. For instance, the military plays a part in civilian activities that contribute to the stability and order of a nation-state. It plays a part in securing infrastructure, installations and resources that are vital in the survival of the global economic system. Finally, the contemporary period has seen emerging threats besides other states as represented by the non-state entities that are increasingly undermining the authorities of states and legitimate organizations. Quelling terrorism is currently the most important strategic objective, not just of the United States, but all the other countries as well. Essentially, the world is at war with this threat and that the military – land-based power – of a nation is essential in achieving victory over the enemy. Bibliography Byman, Daniel, Waxman, Matthew and Larson, Eric. Air Power as a Coercive Instrument. (Rand Corporation, 1999) Carter, Ashton and Schwartz, David. Ballistic Missile Defense. (Brookings Institution Press, 1984) Cleva, Gregory. Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy. (Bucknell University Press, 1989). Deibel,Terry. Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft. (Cambridge University Press) De Pauw, John Whylen and Luz, George, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action. (Greenwood Publishing, 1992). Goldstein, Lyle. Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis. 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