Kim Jong II and His Leadership - Essay Example

Kim Jong II Kim Jong II has been referred to as an unpredictable and eccentric personality, who is also arrogant, shrewd and manipulative. (www.exclusive-analysis.com). He is known as a megalomaniac who suffered from a desire to overcompensate through arrogance and a need to be constantly the center of attention due to the insecurities suffered during childhood. Jong is known as a powerful, energetic and charismatic leader, who is also calculating and ruthless. His ruthlessness, calculating nature and the unwillingness to compromise with other nations are traits that do not work in North Korea’s favor since they create the impression of a dictatorial state that is not amenable to diplomacy and therefore cooperation with the world comity of nations. Kim Jong’s unpredictability and his mental imbalances also work against the nation because it leads to dangerous actions such as testing nuclear weapons. In order to mitigate these effects, it is necessary for Jong to rely more upon the experienced and balanced advice from senior leaders in his country who are skilled in the art of diplomacy. Jong also needs to tone down his cruelty and unpredictability and introduce some elements of justice and fairness into his Government and leadership of the country. He must be less egoistical and impetuous and look to the interests of his country rather than resorting to vindictiveness when he is not the centre of attention. 2. This leader’s core values have been shaped by the totalitarian background that his father had created, which has also been the base from which Kim Jong has originated. The indoctrination under his father has produced three core values within him (a) to adhere to the family motto of breaking enemies instead of bending to them, as a result of which Kim Jong tends to adopt a confrontational rather than a conciliatory approach in dealing with perceived enemies (b) a strong support of the Communist party principles which therefore encourages a dictatorial and dominating approach in dealing with the people of his country. It also suggests that the country is unlikely to employ the capitalist economy under his leadership, since the communist agenda is so strongly advocated and enforced in his country. Lastly, Kim Jong also follows the Confucian principles, which state that any moral obligations that are owed to those who have come forward to assist in the time of need must be fulfilled. As a result, North Korea has been prepared to allow some concessions to the United States in return for the favors received form that country when Clinton was the President in the form of humanitarian assistance and condolence s upon the death of his father. 3. Kohlberg has suggested six distinct developmental levels of moral reasoning. The first stage precedes actual moral development and is the stage of obedience and punishment orientation, where the child’s belief systems center around the notion that authorities above hand down a set of rules which they must obey unquestioningly. Later this view is further differentiated as children realize that there may be different authorities, each with different points of view about the moral consequence of their actions. This is stage two – individualism and exchange (Crain, 1985). This is the stage where Kim Jong may be placed, where children who are faced with a moral problem tend to apply a relative approach in their analysis of the moral aspects of the problem. The fact that morality may be different for different individual and is therefore only a relative matter means that every person is free to pursue his or her own individual self interest; hence what is morally right will be determined by what works in favor of their interests. At the higher levels of Kolhberg’s moral development scale, adolescents begin to perceive the good of society as playing a role in moral decisions, unlike those on the lower stages of moral development, who view morality purely as a function of individual interest. Good and moral behavior deals with having good motives and good interpersonal relationships based upon feelings of love, empathy and trust. This is the stage that Kim Jong has not yet reached because it may be noted that his view of morality is still simplistic and individualistic with his notion of moral and immoral behavior being conditioned by whether or not the decision that is taken works for his own self interest and is therefore adjudged to be right. Those individuals who are at Stage Two of Kohlberg’s scale of moral development speak as isolated individuals rather than as members of an integrated society where people are motivated by feelings of caring and empathy for each other. Kim Jong can be cruel, autocratic and has been known to exert cruel and unjustified punishment, he has been known to be motivated by his own selfish interests and inner desires as opposed to desiring the common good of society. For example, his promiscuous habits and the fact that he is sexually permissive and lecherous shows that his views of morality are conditioned by the gratification of his own selfish desires. Kim Jong is a man who is an isolated individual and has been known to punish even his closest friends with cruel and intolerant behavior – and such behavior is immoral and directly opposed to love and fellowship, tolerance and empathy which characterizes individual who have reached the third stage of development. In making moral decisions, Therefore Kim Jong appears to fit best at the second level of moral development. Although critics have alleged that Kohlberg’s moral reasoning scale does not take into account cultural differences, the author has argued that his theory is based upon the manner in which people reason rather than their actions and therefore, is equally appropriate in any culture. For example, some of Kim Jong’s unpredictable actions such as kidnapping a movie director or ordering assassinations of South Korean leaders indicates that his reasoning process is geared towards achieving his own ends irrespective of whether they are socially responsible acts or not and therefore this indicates that he has never progressed to the third stage 4. The four unique roles of principle centered leadership are: (a) empowerment (b) alignment of principles (c) path finding and (d) modeling for others and for oneself. On this scale of four distinct roles, Kim Song falls into the role of empowerment, which signifies the internal dimensions of leadership, which indicate the presence of passion, discipline and vision, which are geared towards the amassing of powers of the leadership position. The fact that Kim Jong has engaged in provocative behavior such as launching nuclear test missiles despite the force of negative public opinion shows that the leader is desirous of empowering himself as the leader of his nation and to achieve power in the comity of nations. The very basis of principle centered leadership is the realization that all humankind is governed by certain natural laws which are the governing principles operating in this world, irrespective of whether people are aware of this and whether or not they accept such a principle. Therefore, the effectiveness of a leader lies in the extent to which they are able to align their actions and conduct in line with these inviolable, underlying principles and motivating others to follow in the same path. Kim Jong’s assumption of power therefore rests upon this very realization and the ability to use it to empower himself to motivate others to follow in his wake. 5. This leader has used Bandura’s justification for moral behavior in the context of manufacturing and testing nuclear weapons. As stated by Bandura, people do not generally engage in immoral conduct until they have justified to themselves the underlying moral cause for their actions, whereby cruel or unacceptable immoral conduct where pain and suffering will be inflicted upon others may be rendered acceptable in the interest of some socially moral purpose. (www.pixnaps.blogspot.com). Kim Jong II applies this same principle as his father did before him, in continuing to build North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, wherein the moral justification that is offered for carrying on potentially crippling and maiming nuclear weapons buildup is the non-existent threat from the United States, which apparently continues even after the end of the War (Litwak and Weathersby, 2005). Therefore, even as the world works towards nuclear disarmament, North Korea has indicated its militant and aggressive posture, thereby subtly vying for a position of greater power through the unspoken threat issued to the United States about the dangers that it poses in order to gain significant leverage for itself in terms of aid and consideration. 6. Kim Jong appears to be motivated by an inner drive and desire to control and manipulate people and situations to his advantage. He appears to feel a compulsive need to remain in the limelight and to be able to satisfy his desires and goals through exerting control over others rather than by working in cooperation with them. This leader appears to be led by the intrinsic theory of motivation, which may largely explained by his childhood. The locus of control that motivates Kim Jong’s actions and decisions is internal and it is this internally controlling thought or feeling that impels Kim Jong and pressures him to behave in a certain way (Plant et al, 1985: 435-443) To some extent, this also deprives him of the choices that may be made through rational thought, and Jong’s public self consciousness is related to his internally controlling regulation, therefore he feels the pressure to perform for the public based upon his inner motivation and impulses. In his actions, Kim Jong appears to be led by his own internal impulses rather than by any consideration for what may or may not be morally right and acceptable within the context of wider society. Another motivation theory that is relevant in the context of this leader is the Achievement theory which has been developed by David McClelland. He proposed that one of the basic motivational needs is the need for achievement, therefore he tends to seek the attainment of realistic and challenging goals. A concomitant aspect of this motivational need is the need for authority wherein a person is driven by the need to be strong and influential in the lives of other people. Kim Jong appears to have a strong need to remain at the centre of attention and enjoy public acclaim and tends to become vindictive if he is deprived of this attention, thereby indicating that he may be motivated by the inner need to attain authority and powerful influence in the lives of other people through his achievements. 7. Vroom’s Expectancy theory is based upon three salient beliefs: (a) valence (b) expectancy and (c) instrumentality. Valence: refers to the emotional outlook that a person hold towards outcomes or rewards. Therefore Kim Jong is motivated to seek rewards from his countrymen and in order to satisfy the craving for attention and adulation that are the rewards he seeks, he is motivated to be the leader of North Korea so that he can build upon the reputation and respect enjoyed by his father to seek that reward of admiration and respect from the people. Expectancy: is the level of confidence that a person has in his/her abilities and the expectancies held from jobs, such as the kind of resources, training and facilities that are available to help them do their jobs better. Therefore, in Kim Jong’s case, his perception of himself as the leader of his people makes his expectancy lean in the direction of leading his people and using his own natural cunning and skill to elevate himself in their eyes. Instrumentality is a measure of the perception of employees as to whether management is actually providing what they want. In Kim Jong’s case, the management would refer to his inner team of advisors, and this leader has been known to arrange for the assassination of even those people who are closest to him when he perceives them to be lacking in providing him what he needs in running his country and when he perceives that they are not motivated to the same goals he has for the country. According to Vroom, all these three factors that are the manifestation of an employee’s expectations must be calculated in such a way that they are able to bring about a motivational force that will ensure maximum pleasure to the employee. It is possible to calculate this motivational force using the formula: Motivation = Valency x Expectancy (Instrumentality) This mathematical formula can also be used to predict things about an employee, such as how long he will stay on the job, the extent to which he will be hard working and his job satisfaction. Therefore, in Kim Jong’s case, it may be noted that since the rewards sought by this leader are largely power and influence and the ability to execute his own will and desires, such goals can best be achieved by assuming the leadership position where he will have complete and unrestricted power and this is what motivates him to be the leader. 8. One of the most important ethical challenges that Kim Jong will face will be the nuclear issue and the question of retaining nuclear capability and launching in the face of the worldwide clampdown on nuclear weapons, North Korea is also not amenable towards reducing emissions or thereby contributing towards reduction of global warming, because it harbors ambitions of becoming a developed nation first. The threat from the United States and the need to assume a leadership role among the south east Asian nations since it is one of the consistent and strong opponents of American policy over the years will be another challenge, which may however be perceived as being opposed to democracy in other parts of the world. Political reforms within North Korea may be another ethical challenge the leader will have to face as Communism increasingly is yielding to democratic institutions being implemented in most dictatorships across the world, including Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to continue to command the respect and admiration of his people, Kim Jong must show himself to be more in line with democratic values that are espoused by the western nations. The people of North Korea are increasingly being exposed to the Western way of thinking and the push towards world peace and democracy and the strongly individualistic policies of North Korea may prove harmful to its interests in the long run. Therefore, Kim Jong needs to refine his leadership style to be less autocratic and unpredictable. He must eschew the policy advocated by his father to break opponents and not bend to them. In the new global world, cooperation and diplomacy are of the utmost importance if North Korea is to take her place among the world comity of nations. As pointed out by Hughes et al(2002), “Leadership is a complex phenomenon involving the leader, the followers and the situation.”(p 6). Therefore leadership cannot be assumed to be a position, rather it is a process of interaction between a leader, followers and the situation. Accordingly, Kim Jong must also take into account the situation, which is North Korea’s position in the world and his followers and refine his process of interaction in order to improve his leadership skills. 9. Kim Jong can be categorized more as a transactional leader rather than as a transformational leader, since he is not so heavily concerned with morals or ethics, neither is he overly concerned with brining about deep down changes within the existing system and orienting himself and his country towards long term goals (www.bgfl.org). Rather, he is preoccupied with power and position, politics and perks and is more concerned with getting the job done in the immediate present, more oriented towards short term goals and the treatment of symptoms of problems rather than their underlying causes. Theory X and Theory Y systems of motivation in management was proposed by McGregor. Kim Jong would fit the Theory X role better than the Theory Y kind of leader because he is virtually a dictator in his own country, hence his underlying assumption in his leadership and managerial practice appears to be that those who work for him and political leaders in subordinate positions have little desire for responsibility, they are inherently lazy and non motivated and are likely to work hard only if coerced into the role and responsibilities that are expected of them. Accordingly, he has adopted a dictatorial style of leadership which seeks to direct people as if they had little initiative and creativity of their own. References: * Crain, W.C., 1985. Theories of Development. Prentice-Hall. pp. 118-136 [online] available at: http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm * Hughes, Richard L, Ginnett, Robert C and Curphy, Gordon C, 2002. “leadership: Enhancing the lessons of experience.” McGraw Hill * “Kim Jong II: A Psychological Profile.” [online] available at: http://www.exclusive-analysis.com/kim-jong-il/ * David McClelland’s motivational needs theory.” [online] available at: http://www.businessballs.com/davidmcclelland.htm * “Leadership” [online] available at: http://www.bgfl.org/services/leaders/files/leadship.pdf * Litwak, Robert S and Weathersby, Kathryn, 2005. “The Kin’s obsession” Washington Post , June 12, 2005: B01 * Plant, Robert W and Ryan, Richard M, 1985. “Intrinsic motivation and the effects of self consciousness, self awareness and ego involvement: An investigation of internally controlling styles.” Journal of Personality, 53(3): 435-443 * “Philosophy et cetera” [online] available at: http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/08/immorality-of-moral-justification.html INTERNET PAGES USED: 1. http://www.exclusive-analysis.com/kim-jong-il/ Kim Jong-Il: A Psychological Profile Egotistic and self-indulgent, described as a “problem child”, Kim Jong-Il suffered from insecurity which developed into a strong need for self-assertion, verging on arrogance. This can be attributed to a number of factors during the formative years: his father’s abuse of mother, her untimely death, his father’s remarriage, and Jong-Il’s partial responsibility, through active negligence, for his younger brother’s death by drowning at an early age. KJI’s short stature has also been a source of frustration (he wears high-heeled shoes in order to appear more imposing) and potentially contributes to his need for overcompensation in other areas. His wilful and insolent temperament was in evidence throughout an education which suffered from a lack of stability, spanning six different elementary schools. Later, KJI continued to lack motivation in his studies, preferring parties, movies, and fast cars (an obsession which culminated in a serious accident in 1975). Defectors tell of self-indulgence which is manifested in KJI’s notorious debauchery, illegitimate children, and pleasure teams of women. He owns eight mansions (one for each North Korean province), various villas in resort areas, and went through a phase of lavish expenditures on personal film-making projects in the 1970s, for which he kidnapped a famous South Korean director. His megalomania, encouraged by absolute sycophancy on the part of his subjects, has been displayed in the construction of various impressive but useless buildings: the tallest hotel in the world; a huge triumphal arch; and the immense Juche-Ideology tower, among others. Given the critical state of the national economy such spending appears particularly profligate. Unpredictable and eccentric, if North Korea has the reputation of being a ‘renegade’ state, the spontaneously odd actions of Kim Jong-Il have been more than partly responsible. He has consistently and unnecessarily antagonized the West. This unpredictability is reflected in KJI’s personal affairs, where he tends to swing from one extreme to the other. According to his ex-bodyguard, he can be extremely generous when pleased (for example, he awarded a medal to the captain of the ship on which he traveled on his last visit to Russia, simply because he found the boat-ride enjoyable), but furious when feels that he is not the centre of attention. This unpredictability is also related to an independent streak manifested in a kind of eccentricity. On the aforementioned visit to Russia, KJI categorically (and fairly rudely, by diplomatic standards) refused to stay in the luxurious hotel rooms offered by his hosts, preferring to remain on the transport train. In an equally eccentric twist, the officially atheist Kim was apparently so entranced by his visit to an Orthodox church, that he was inspired to cross himself, and remained there for so long that his bodyguards, standing rigidly by, grew tired and dropped their weapons. Charismatic and dedicated publicly, Kim Jong-Il is acclaimed as a charismatic leader. Propaganda has purposely been circulated to this effect, including a variety of apocryphal tales surrounding his birth and the course of his life. These myths serve to justify his succession to the quasi-deified Kim Il-Sung, and to trace the transmission of leadership qualities from father to son, perpetuating a hereditary personality cult. The grain of truth in all of this is that long years of indoctrination under his father’s tutelage have instilled in Kim Jong-Il at least three principles: first, an adherence to the family motto “Break [presumably opponents], not bend [to them]” (which bodes ill for the achievement of any future international compromises!); second, a strong dedication to the Party and its ideology (which may interfere with potential economic reforms); and lastly, a deference to Confucian tradition, which has been cited as the reason why he acceded to participation in negotiations with the US and South Korea. (That is, he acknowledges moral obligations owed to Clinton, who had expressed condolences upon Kim Il Sung’s death, and also offered humanitarian assistance during natural disasters). Konstantin Poulikovsky, a Russian official who wrote an account of his month-long travels with Kim Jong-Il, characterised him as powerful and energetic. Poulikovsky was first and foremost impressed by KJI’s extensive knowledge of political affairs, and specifically of the situation in Primorsk, down to the details surrounding the deposition of the region’s previous governor. This implies that KJI is not as ignorant as some would claim (see below). Incompetent or calculating? At the time of KJI’s accession to power, critics outside North Korea expressed fears regarding his “buffoonery”, his unpreparedness and incompetence as a future leader. His background was not encouraging - he had purportedly been expelled after only three months from the East German aviation school where his father had sent him to train as an airforce pilot. He then received a university degree in Politics and Economics but his thesis, although widely praised, was not published until 20 years after its supposed date of composition! Since then he apparently wrote numerous other texts, including one ‘immortal classic’ on Juche ideology, but strangely enough none of these was ever brought to light or even discussed until the 1980s, when KJI’s status as heir apparent was officially announced. Kim Jong-Il has benefited from the experience of a long political career, beginning at 22 years of age. At 31, he was elected Party Secretary, essentially gaining the status of co-ruler of the country. However, his wilfulness was again demonstrated in frequent clashes with senior government officials and dignitaries, in the denouncement of family members and by his constant interrogation of others as to their dedication to the regime. KJI appears to demonstrate a shrewd capacity for pragmatic calculation. The defector Hwang Jang-yop, a high-level official formerly very close to the president, describes the younger Kim as a “ruthless leader” who learned early on how to manipulate those around him, including his father. Once in a position of power, he astutely began to introduce his own supporters into the upper echelons of the Party, gradually ousting his father’s cohort, and later monopolizing information contained in important reports. Poulikovsky confirms that KJI is distinguished by “a heightened ability to ‘manage’ people”. If in doubt, KJI is not afraid to stand alone. Even his closest advisors have not escaped his suspicion and retribution. Kim Yong-sun, a particular favourite, who headed the North-South negotiations and acted as party secretary in charge of international affairs, was unexpectedly arrested during North-South talks in 2000, and subjected to questioning regarding his party loyalties. Coincidentally, KJI also disappeared from the public eye during this period. Commentators speculate that he wished to keep tabs on the proceedings from a discreet distance. Finally, his calculating nature can easily take on a ruthless tone. There have been reports of unusually cruel punishments of transgressors, and Kim himself, during his visit to Russia, spoke proudly of the fact that drug dealers and addicts in North Korea face execution, and encouraged his Russian counterparts to undertake similar treatment of any North Korean nationals discovered to be involved with the drug trade on Russian territory. Deductions In the end, the degree of secrecy surrounding this reclusive leader makes it difficult to forecast his behaviour with confidence. However, EA sources indicate a volatile mixture that makes for a highly unpredictable personality. On the one hand, KJI’s actions are detached from reality and are based on personal calculations behind which the reasoning is often obscure. He often acts out of a sense of honour, fear, duty, or simply to make a grandiose statement. The combination of egoism and impetuosity may lead to rash and unfounded decisions. On the other hand, Kim has been circumspect enough to surround himself with knowledgeable and pragmatic advisors, technocrats with more or less progressive ideas, on whom he nevertheless keeps a watchful eye. This pragmatism implies that his penchant for spectacle is unlikely to overstep the bounds of good political strategy, except in the most extreme circumstances. Kim Jong Il knows his own mind, and who will stubbornly stand by whatever decision he has made. From GRF 8 Jan 02: North Korea, once again world affairs are determined by men of doubtful mental stability. The predictive science of political analysis needs to draw on psycho-analysis and in doing do must acknowledge the reduced reliability of the resulting forecasts. (EA has a detailed psycho-analysis of Kim Jong Il (KJI) available on request) Little is known about Kim Jong Il who has traveled little. There was a meeting with Madeleine Albright and KJI made a long train journey across Russia accompanied by Putin’s Special Representative who then wrote a book about him. KJI took over from his father, Kim Il Sung, for whom he had previously been Minister of Culture. His father was a hard man with an impressive war record as a guerrilla whereas Jong Il is pasty-faced, overweight and fond of the pleasures of life. He won his fathers affection by staging mass extravaganzas and set-piece demonstrations. He retains a love for spectaculars, particularly those with him at the centre. He travels everywhere with a film crew to record his every move. He is a showman. He is no fool, however, though he was not diligent as a student. He follows events on the internet and is well informed about Western culture and events. He understands the US well enough, although his dialogue is the unsubtle language of threat and power displays. His former bodyguard says he is ‘touchy, vindictive and paranoid especially when he is not the centre of attention. Many are in Labour Camps on his instructions. Given the length of his fathers service and his own lack of legitimacy it is likely that he is dependent on some of the powerful ministers surrounding him. Which one(s) and what influence they have over what issues is not well understood, at least not by EA. The conclusion from this is that there is danger he will prefer a showy outcome, which will include a film with him in it. A missile test, such as that conducted when the test-fired missile passed over Japan, or possibly, but less likely, a nuclear test, are both assessed to be HIGH. An invasion of South Korea is LOW probability since those around him know it would spell the end of the regime. There is every indication that North Korea wants a negotiated outcome. Indeed its recent declaration to the UN said as much. A North Korean delegation had talks with an old interlocutor of theirs, former UN ambassador Bill Richardson, now governor of New Mexico. Military operations from the US are HIGH risk. There is no change to EAs initial assessment that this crisis will be resolved diplomatically and that the greatest immediate danger arises from maritime confrontation. The main risks are to local shipping entering Seoul since they pass very near to disputed waters. International shipping tends to go to Inchon which does not require passage through North Korean waters. The chances of a missile test are raised to HIGH and of a nuclear test MODERATE. From GRF 2 Jan 03 North Korea. The US now has two global security crises to manage at once. North Korea and Iraq are both part of the ‘Axis of Evil’; both are ruled by despots. The parallels end there and the crisis management avenues in Washington will be quite different. Unlike Iraq, North Korea has no realistic regional ambitions and already has a nuclear, or near nuclear capacity. (The CIA says it has two warheads and the missiles to reach Japan, Alaska and of course South Korea). But the most important difference is that the main regional power, China, is not dependent on US security guarantees in the way that Saudi Arabia is. Both Russia and China have vested interests in a non-nuclear Korean peninsular. China, particularly, wants to limit US influence in the region and Russia would like to demonstrate its ability to control rogue states like North Korea. Therefore, US military options carry very high risks, but there are many diplomatic avenues. For North Korea a nuclear capability is probably not the sine qua non it is for Iraq. Rather the reopening of the plutonium producing reactor is a device to get items essential for immediate regime survival, namely food and fuel. These will clearly not now come from the US, but the South Koreans, who are themselves staging anti-American demonstrations, may well oblige. If not them the Russians or the Japanese who would each prefer regional diplomacy to US intervention. China, who presently supplies 39% of North Korean imports may also oblige. However, their relationship has cooled after North Korea somewhat ineptly appointed a Chinese businessman, and citizen, to head a North Korean economic zone which would compete with Chinese equivalents. The Chinese promptly arrested the man and signalled to North Korea that they should accept Chinese patronage and disciplines. US military destruction of North Korean nuclear reactors is unlikely, although they have the capability to do so – even while prosecuting a war in Iraq. North Korea will likely run the nuclear plant for long enough to gain some additional plutonium, but eventually the avoidance of pariah status will prove more useful. Meanwhile, it is highly likely that North Korea will test a Taepodong missile to remind neighbours of its military power. EA is much less sanguine about the risks to shipping in the region and in particular ships entering Seoul. It is already clear the US will use naval forces to restrict North Korean weapon exports. The North Korean response will very likely be to harass shipping flagged to South Korea. They will probably start by harassing Korean fishing vessels and local craft. The main uncertainty is the mental state of Kim Jung Il himself. He spends much of his time indulging his own obsessive behaviour and his actions are unpredictable. However, it is certain that his priority is regime survival. This will moderate his actions and renders doomsday scenarios such as an all-out attack on South Korea, unlikely. http://pixnaps.blogspot.com/2005/08/immorality-of-moral-justification.html PHILOSOPHY ET CETERA Wednesday, August 10, 2005 The Immorality of Moral Justification [The following is a guest post by Vera Bradova, whom some readers will recognize from recent discussions. I will respond in the comments section below.] Moral philosophers have spent lifetimes developing and defending systems of moral justification. Should we justify by reference to higher authority, social mores, or the greatest good of the greatest number? Yet no one, not one person I have been able to find, has questioned or analyzed within the context of ethical theory the concept of justification itself, or its validity. Ethics dictionaries and encyclopedias ignore it virtually completely. Everyone asks how to justify. No one asks whether to justify. My contention is that moral justification does not work. It does not give people tools for ethical decision-making. On the contrary; it facilitates moral irresponsibility and so undermines the entire moral enterprise. Moral justification is, simply put, a process whereby a person who is evaluating a morally questionable act attempts to make it seem right. This person looks for a way to shine a favorable light on such an act in order to maintain a clear conscience. In other words, it is a kind of alchemy whereby unsavory actions are transformed by persuasive argumentation into something acceptable, if not outright positive. Lead into gold, evil into good! As they say, if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But this nifty trick has fooled people for hundreds of years, and the philosophers keep on riding the same worn rail, oblivious to any problems with this fundamental assumption. The first problem with justification is that it favors the cunning. People are amazingly good at justifying their questionable actions, particularly to themselves. For clever people good at analysis or manipulation, such a stratagem is childs play. If justification favors the clever and the glib, it should give philosophers pause. Secondly, moral justification is, up close, a search for rationalizations. The only difference is the greater sophistication of the justificatory arguments. Is this what we want to encourage people to do when they are morally uneasy? Do we want them to spend time looking for loopholes and ways to whitewash or to sweep under the rug that which their conscience tells them is not quite right? Moral justification is a way to get oneself off the hook, morally speaking. As has been so well described by Albert Bandura in his paper Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, it is a ploy used to silence moral qualms. (He says: "Cognitive restructuring of harmful conduct through moral justification, sanitizing language, and exonerating comparisons is the most powerful set of psychological mechanisms for disengaging moral control.") It is one of the key strategies followed by people who later commit atrocities in the service of some noble goal. And it is a process followed by any of us on a daily basis as we commit the little lies, cruelties, and injustices of our everyday existence. A kid lies to mom? Well, he really did it to spare her the worry. People steeped in the culture of justification are not likely to say to themselves, Im a bloody liar, she deserves better, Ive got to make this right. The habit of moral justification encourages people to say to themselves instead, I really did it for her own good, and that makes my lie just fine. Bandura says: "People do not ordinarily engage in harmful conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. In this process of moral justification, detrimental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes. People then can act on a moral imperative and preserve their view of themselves as a moral agent while inflicting harm on others." As an antidote he recommends better social safeguards. But he stops short of examining the role of moral justification in formal ethics. With moral justification as a given, it is no wonder that these days, conservative people who care about firm principles and who were raised with precepts such as "two wrongs dont make a right" and "ends dont justify means" are defending president Bushs lies as "technicalities" and "mere stretching of the truth," and in any case as deception well justified by the removal of a nasty dictator. No one is immune from the morally corrosive influence of justificatory habits. Banduras work has been received favorably, and there are efforts underfoot to model different behavior to bullies and other violent people. But as long as we use moral justification ourselves, why shouldnt the bully? And if moral justification is a bad idea in one context, shouldnt we examine its role in moral guidance overall? posted by Richard @ 12:42 PM Perma-link · 62 comments http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100179.html The Kims Obsession Archives Show Their Quest To Preserve the Regime By Robert S. Litwak and Kathryn Weathersby Sunday, June 12, 2005; Page B01 The anger and irony dripped from the mouth of North Koreas foreign minister: "The Americans have a large stockpile, and we are forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons?" The question was put to a Soviet ambassador more than 40 years ago -- in August 1962 -- but it sends a powerful message today to U.S. officials grappling with the acute security challenge of North Koreas mature nuclear program. Weve learned of that decades-old diplomatic encounter -- and others that reveal much about the North Korean mindset regarding nuclear weapons and what motivates the father-son regime that has ruled that country for more than a half-century -- through a remarkable set of documents recently collected from the archives of North Koreas former Soviet-bloc allies by researchers associated with the Woodrow Wilson Centers Cold War International History Project. They involve contacts between North Korean officials and their Soviet and East European counterparts from the 1950s to the 1980s. Perhaps no other nation remained as closed to Western eyes as North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, who ruled the country from 1948 until his death in 1994. Since then, his son, Kim Jong Il, has engaged in an on-again, off-again series of diplomatic negotiations with the United States and others. The countrys scant diplomatic history with the West has often left analysts in the noncommunist world operating largely in the dark in assessing North Koreas intentions. The documents have come to light at a particularly sensitive and important time in the discussions over North Koreas nuclear ambitions. The Bush administration has adopted a get-tough stance in its effort to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program; six-party talks, which include China, have been stalled for a year. Just last week, North Korea issued a statement suggesting that it is willing to resume negotiations. But as is often the case, Western diplomats arent sure on what basis: In late March, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman said the agenda must include "the nuclear threat posed by the United States." Of all the revelations in the documents, two seem especially telling: North Koreas effort to acquire nuclear weapons has been driven by deep-seated fear of both a U.S. military attack and abandonment by the communist great powers. Whats also telling, if less explicitly, is how the regimes near-obsession with its own survival colors its political decision-making. The papers make clear that, as far as the Pyongyang regime is concerned, the Korean War has never ended. After the uneasy ceasefire reached in 1953, Kim Il Sung expected a renewed American and South Korean attack. The North had sustained three years of heavy U.S. bombing and had been threatened with the use of atomic weapons. This experience initially produced an unrealistic confidence that North Korea could survive a nuclear attack. In February 1963, Kim Il Sung told the Soviet ambassador that "geographical conditions . . . give a certain advantage to [North Korea] in case of an atomic war, for the mountains ward off the explosions to a substantial extent. A lot of such bombs would be needed to wreak large-scale destruction in the country." By the 1980s, both U.S. nuclear weapons technology and Kims views had evolved. Still charging the United States with sinister ulterior motives on the Korean peninsula, Kim said to East German leader Erich Honecker in May 1984, "It is very plain that we are not militarily superior to them. But they use the pretext that we are stronger militarily [on the Korean peninsula] to build up their weapons even more. . . . This is all just a pretext for them to continue to occupy South Korea. South Korea is nothing more to the Americans than a colony. [They] never intend to leave." But Kim appeared more resigned than defiant, suggesting that the U.S. nuclear policy of deterrence was working. Speaking again to Honecker two years later, in October 1986, Kim stated that North Korea "does not intend to attack South Korea, nor could it. More than 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads are stored in South Korea, ostensibly for defense, and it would take only two of them to destroy the [country]." For most countries, a record of conversations from decades past would be regarded largely as history -- fascinating in its own right, but not necessarily valuable in todays diplomatic world. No one would dream of analyzing the thinking behind the Bush administrations current foreign policy by looking at what was said during Dwight Eisenhowers time or even the more recent administration of Ronald Reagan. American journalists might talk of Bush 41 and Bush 43, but as often as not, they do so to contrast the policies of father and son. North Korea, however, has been ruled by only two men, Kim I and Kim II, and the archival records reveal a striking continuity on security issues and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. North Koreas efforts to acquire nuclear know-how from its Soviet-bloc allies began in the early 1960s but were consistently rebuffed. In 1963, the East German ambassador informed his Soviet counterpart that the Koreans were seeking "any kind of information about nuclear weapons," while Soviet uranium specialists working in the North reported that the Koreans, "despite all odds, want to develop the mining of uranium on a broad scale." The Kim Il Sung regime repeatedly pressed for the construction of a nuclear power plant, which the Soviets suspected would be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. In 1976, angered that the Soviets had rejected yet another request for nuclear technology as "inopportune," the North Korean deputy premier charged the Kremlin with not making appropriate "allowances" for his countrys "front-line situation." The Soviet leadership even tried to convince Kim Il Sungs regime that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was in its interest. According to a 1969 cable by the Hungarian ambassador to Pyongyang, Soviet diplomats asked the North Koreans about Japan obtaining nuclear weapons. In this particular case, the Koreans found ample justification for nuclear nonproliferation, though it was not something they generally favored in other contexts. The archives provide fascinating insights into Kims complicated relationships with the two great communist powers. During the Korean War, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin sharply restricted the role of the powerful Soviet air force as Kims country suffered devastating bombing from U.S. forces. Yet, according to the archival records, Kim clearly preferred to rely on Soviet aid rather than accept direct military involvement by the Chinese. Even though China was then a fraternal communist country and had aided Kim in the Korean War, Kim acted as a Korean nationalist highly sensitive to his countrys history of occupation by imperial China and fearful of Beijings potential for domestic interference. This wariness toward China in the heyday of international communism is particularly significant given the current pivotal role that China plays in the Bush administrations strategy to induce, or coerce, North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Kim had another reason for concern: We learn from Russian documents that Nikita Khrushchev tried to extend his sweeping de-Stalinization policy to North Korea. Kim survived a serious political challenge instigated by the Soviet leader, which stalled only when the Hungarian uprising in October 1956 distracted the Kremlin. A feeling of betrayal, fed over the years by events such as the Sino-American rapprochement and the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist rule in Eastern Europe, led the Pyongyang regime to conclude that it could not rely on any other country -- even a communist one -- for protection.Do these documentstruly portray perspectives and attitudes that continue to shape North Korean policies? A strong case can be made that they do. The conditions that define North Koreas strategic position -- external isolation and internal economic crisis -- remain unchanged since Kim Jong Il took over in 1994. Kim Il Sungs cult of personality (once criticized as "idolatry" by a Soviet party official) was extended to his son and perpetuated through inheritance. That transfer of power is perhaps the most conspicuous sign of how North Koreas past resonates in the present. Has North Korea made an irreversible decision to acquire nuclear weapons? The new information does not answer that fundamental question. But it does help explain the core motivation behind Pyongyangs nuclear saber rattling: Regime survival. Almost 50 years ago, Kim Il Sung complained bitterly about U.S. intentions. So it comes as no surprise that his sons first reaction to President Bushs rhetoric about North Korea -- that its part of an "axis of evil" -- would be fear and belligerence. The Bush administration appears to be wrestling with the mixed message of its North Korean policy. Do we want to change the regime, or do we want to change merely the behavior of the regime? The statements of U.S. officials can be read both ways. During the Iraq war, Kim Jong Il evidently believed that the United States was also planning decapitating air strikes against his regime and disappeared into a bunker for 50 days. The new archival materials strongly suggest that the North Koreans would perceive and respond to a U.S. attack on their nuclear infrastructure not as a limited "counterproliferation" action but as the beginning of a general war on the Korean peninsula meant to bring down the regime. The Bush administration cannot ground its negotiations with North Korea on the assumption -- or vain hope -- that the regime is in danger of imminent collapse. Despite economic implosion and famine, that regime has proved far more durable than anyone expected. However unpalatable we may find the prospect of this regimes survival, the documents suggest that the crux of any nuclear deal may be a credible assurance from the United States that the regime itself is not in danger. Authors e-mails : litwakro@wwic.si.edu weathersbyk@wwic.si.edu Robert Litwak, a National Security Council staff member in the mid-1990s, is director of international studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. Kathryn Weathersby is a senior associate of the centers Cold War International History Project and coordinator of its Korea Initiative, which obtained the documents cited in this article. The documents have been translated and posted online athttp://wilsoncenter.org/cwihp. http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm W.C. Crain. (1985). Theories of Development. Prentice-Hall. pp. 118-136.   CHAPTER SEVEN KOHLBERGS STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT   BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION An outstanding example of research in the Piagetian tradition is the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg has focused on moral development and has proposed a stage theory of moral thinking which goes well beyond Piagets initial formulations. Kohlberg, who was born in 1927, grew up in Bronxville, New York, and attended the Andover Academy in Massachusetts, a private high school for bright and usually wealthy students. He did not go immediately to college, but instead went to help the Israeli cause, in which he was made the Second Engineer on an old freighter carrying refugees from parts of Europe to Israel. After this, in 1948, he enrolled at the University of Chicago, where he scored so high on admission tests that he had to take only a few courses to earn his bachelors degree. This he did in one year. He stayed on at Chicago for graduate work in psychology, at first thinking he would become a clinical psychologist. However, he soon became interested in Piaget and began interviewing children and adolescents on moral issues. The result was his doctoral dissertation (1958a), the first rendition of his new stage theory. Kohlberg is an informal, unassuming man who also is a true scholar; he has thought long and deeply about a wide range of issues in both psychology and philosophy and has done much to help others appreciate the wisdom of many of the "old psychologists," such as Rousseau, John Dewey, and James Mark Baldwin. Kohlberg has taught at the University of Chicago (1962-1968) and, since 1968, has been at Harvard University. PIAGETS STAGES OF MORAL JUDGMENT Piaget studied many aspects of moral judgment, but most of his findings fit into a two-stage theory. Children younger than 10 or 11 years think about moral dilemmas one way; older children consider them differently. As we have seen, younger children regard rules as fixed and absolute. They believe that rules are handed down by adults or by God and that one cannot change them. The older childs view is more relativistic. He or she understands that it is permissible to change rules if everyone agrees. Rules are not sacred and absolute but are devices which humans use to get along cooperatively. At approximately the same time--10 or 11 years--childrens moral thinking undergoes other shifts. In particular, younger children base their moral judgments more on consequences, whereas older children base their judgments on intentions. When, for example, the young child hears about one boy who broke 15 cups trying to help his mother and another boy who broke only one cup trying to steal cookies, the young child thinks that the first boy did worse. The child primarily considers the amount of damage--the consequences--whereas the older child is more likely to judge wrongness in terms of the motives underlying the act (Piaget, 1932, p. 137). There are many more details to Piagets work on moral judgment, but he essentially found a series of changes that occur between the ages of 10 and 12, just when the child begins to enter the general stage of formal operations. Intellectual development, however, does not stop at this point. This is just the beginning of formal operations, which continue to develop at least until age 16. Accordingly, one might expect thinking about moral issues to continue to develop throughout adolescence. Kohlberg therefore interviewed both children and adolescents about moral dilemmas, and he did find stages that go well beyond Piagets. He uncovered six stages, only the first three of which share many features with Piagets stages. KOHLBERGS METHOD Kohlbergs (1958a) core sample was comprised of 72 boys, from both middle- and lower-class families in Chicago. They were ages 10, 13, and 16. He later added to his sample younger children, delinquents, and boys and girls from other American cities and from other countries (1963, 1970). The basic interview consists of a series of dilemmas such as the following: Heinz Steals the Drug In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick womans husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $ 1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and Im going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the mans store to steal the drug-for his wife. Should the husband have done that? (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19) Kohlberg is not really interested in whether the subject says "yes" or "no" to this dilemma but in the reasoning behind the answer. The interviewer wants to know why the subject thinks Heinz should or should not have stolen the drug. The interview schedule then asks new questions which help one understand the childs reasoning. For example, children are asked if Heinz had a right to steal the drug, if he was violating the druggists rights, and what sentence the judge should give him once he was caught. Once again, the main concern is with the reasoning behind the answers. The interview then goes on to give more dilemmas in order to get a good sampling of a subjects moral thinking. Once Kohlberg had classified the various responses into stages, he wanted to know whether his classification was reliable. In particular, he. wanted to know if others would score the protocols in the same way. Other judges independently scored a sample of responses, and he calculated the degree to which all raters agreed. This procedure is called interrater reliability. Kohlberg found these agreements to be high, as he has in his subsequent work, but whenever investigators use Kohlbergs interview, they also should check for interrater reliability before scoring the entire sample. KOHLBERGS SIX STAGES Level 1. Preconventional Morality Stage 1. Obedience and Punishment Orientation. Kohlbergs stage 1 is similar to Piagets first stage of moral thought. The child assumes that powerful authorities hand down a fixed set of rules which he or she must unquestioningly obey. To the Heinz dilemma, the child typically says that Heinz was wrong to steal the drug because "Its against the law," or "Its bad to steal," as if this were all there were to it. When asked to elaborate, the child usually responds in terms of the consequences involved, explaining that stealing is bad "because youll get punished" (Kohlberg, 1958b). Although the vast majority of children at stage 1 oppose Heinz’s theft, it is still possible for a child to support the action and still employ stage 1 reasoning. For example, a child might say, "Heinz can steal it because he asked first and its not like he stole something big; he wont get punished" (see Rest, 1973). Even though the child agrees with Heinz’s action, the reasoning is still stage 1; the concern is with what authorities permit and punish. Kohlberg calls stage 1 thinking "preconventional" because children do not yet speak as members of society. Instead, they see morality as something external to themselves, as that which the big people say they must do. Stage 2. Individualism and Exchange. At this stage children recognize that there is not just one right view that is handed down by the authorities. Different individuals have different viewpoints. "Heinz," they might point out, "might think its right to take the drug, the druggist would not." Since everything is relative, each person is free to pursue his or her individual interests. One boy said that Heinz might steal the drug if he wanted his wife to live, but that he doesnt have to if he wants to marry someone younger and better-looking (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 24). Another boy said Heinz might steal it because maybe they had children and he might need someone at home to look after them. But maybe he shouldnt steal it because they might put him in prison for more years than he could stand. (Colby and Kauffman. 1983, p. 300) What is right for Heinz, then, is what meets his own self-interests. You might have noticed that children at both stages 1 and 2 talk about punishment. However, they perceive it differently. At stage 1 punishment is tied up in the childs mind with wrongness; punishment "proves" that disobedience is wrong. At stage 2, in contrast, punishment is simply a risk that one naturally wants to avoid. Although stage 2 respondents sometimes sound amoral, they do have some sense of right action. This is a notion of fair exchange or fair deals. The philosophy is one of returning favors--"If you scratch my back, Ill scratch yours." To the Heinz story, subjects often say that Heinz was right to steal the drug because the druggist was unwilling to make a fair deal; he was "trying to rip Heinz off," Or they might say that he should steal for his wife "because she might return the favor some day" (Gibbs et al., 1983, p. 19). Respondents at stage 2 are still said to reason at the preconventional level because they speak as isolated individuals rather than as members of society. They see individuals exchanging favors, but there is still no identification with the values of the family or community. Level II. Conventional Morality Stage 3. Good Interpersonal Relationships. At this stage children--who are by now usually entering their teens--see morality as more than simple deals. They believe that people should live up to the expectations of the family and community and behave in "good" ways. Good behavior means having good motives and interpersonal feelings such as love, empathy, trust, and concern for others. Heinz, they typically argue, was right to steal the drug because "He was a good man for wanting to save her," and "His intentions were good, that of saving the life of someone he loves." Even if Heinz doesnt love his wife, these subjects often say, he should steal the drug because "I dont think any husband should sit back and watch his wife die" (Gibbs et al., 1983, pp. 36-42; Kohlberg, 1958b). If Heinz’s motives were good, the druggists were bad. The druggist, stage 3 subjects emphasize, was "selfish," "greedy," and "only interested in himself, not another life." Sometimes the respondents become so angry with the druggist that they say that he ought to be put in jail (Gibbs et al., 1983, pp. 26-29, 40-42). A typical stage 3 response is that of Don, age 13: It was really the druggists fault, he was unfair, trying to overcharge and letting someone die. Heinz loved his wife and wanted to save her. I think anyone would. I dont think they would put him in jail. The judge would look at all sides, and see that the druggist was charging too much. (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 25) We see that Don defines the issue in terms of the actors character traits and motives. He talks about the loving husband, the unfair druggist, and the understanding judge. His answer deserves the label "conventional "morality" because it assumes that the attitude expressed would be shared by the entire community—"anyone" would be right to do what Heinz did (Kohlberg, 1963, p. 25). As mentioned earlier, there are similarities between Kohlbergs first three stages and Piagets two stages. In both sequences there is a shift from unquestioning obedience to a relativistic outlook and to a concern for good motives. For Kohlberg, however, these shifts occur in three stages rather than two. Stage 4. Maintaining the Social Order. Stage 3 reasoning works best in two-person relationships with family members or close friends, where one can make a real effort to get to know the others feelings and needs and try to help. At stage 4, in contrast, the respondent becomes more broadly concerned with society as a whole. Now the emphasis is on obeying laws, respecting authority, and performing ones duties so that the social order is maintained. In response to the Heinz story, many subjects say they understand that Heinzs motives were good, but they cannot condone the theft. What would happen if we all started breaking the laws whenever we felt we had a good reason? The result would be chaos; society couldnt function. As one subject explained, I dont want to sound like Spiro Agnew, law and order and wave the flag, but if everybody did as he wanted to do, set up his own beliefs as to right and wrong, then I think you would have chaos. The only thing I think we have in civilization nowadays is some sort of legal structure which people are sort of bound to follow. [Society needs] a centralizing framework. (Gibbs et al., 1983, pp. 140-41) Because stage 4, subjects make moral decisions from the perspective of society as a whole, they think from a full-fledged member-of-society perspective (Colby and Kohlberg, 1983, p. 27). You will recall that stage 1 children also generally oppose stealing because it breaks the law. Superficially, stage 1 and stage 4 subjects are giving the same response, so we see here why Kohlberg insists that we must probe into the reasoning behind the overt response. Stage 1 children say, "Its wrong to steal" and "Its against the law," but they cannot elaborate any further, except to say that stealing can get a person jailed. Stage 4 respondents, in contrast, have a conception of the function of laws for society as a whole--a conception which far exceeds the grasp of the younger child. Level III. Postconventional Morality Stage 5. Social Contract and Individual Rights. At stage 4, people want to keep society functioning. However, a smoothly functioning society is not necessarily a good one. A totalitarian society might be well-organized, but it is hardly the moral ideal. At stage 5, people begin to ask, "What makes for a good society?" They begin to think about society in a very theoretical way, stepping back from their own society and considering the rights and values that a society ought to uphold. They then evaluate existing societies in terms of these prior considerations. They are said to take a "prior-to-society" perspective (Colby and Kohlberg, 1983, p. 22). Stage 5 respondents basically believe that a good society is best conceived as a social contract into which people freely enter to work toward the benefit of all They recognize that different social groups within a society will have different values, but they believe that all rational people would agree on two points. First they would all want certain basic rights, such as liberty and life, to be protected Second, they would want some democratic procedures for changing unfair law and for improving society. In response to the Heinz dilemma, stage 5 respondents make it clear that they do not generally favor breaking laws; laws are social contracts that we agree to uphold until we can change them by democratic means. Nevertheless, the wife’s right to live is a moral right that must be protected. Thus, stage 5 respondent sometimes defend Heinz’s theft in strong language: It is the husbands duty to save his wife. The fact that her life is in danger transcends every other standard you might use to judge his action. Life is more important than property. This young man went on to say that "from a moral standpoint" Heinz should save the life of even a stranger, since to be consistent, the value of a life means any life. When asked if the judge should punish Heinz, he replied: Usually the moral and legal standpoints coincide. Here they conflict. The judge should weight the moral standpoint more heavily but preserve the legal law in punishing Heinz lightly. (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 38) Stage 5 subjects,- then, talk about "morality" and "rights" that take some priority over particular laws. Kohlberg insists, however, that we do not judge people to be at stage 5 merely from their verbal labels. We need to look at their social perspective and mode of reasoning. At stage 4, too, subjects frequently talk about the "right to life," but for them this right is legitimized by the authority of their social or religious group (e.g., by the Bible). Presumably, if their group valued property over life, they would too. At stage 5, in contrast, people are making more of an independent effort to think out what any society ought to value. They often reason, for example, that property has little meaning without life. They are trying to determine logically what a society ought to be like (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 21-22; Gibbs et al., 1983, p. 83). Stage 6: Universal Principles. Stage 5 respondents are working toward a conception of the good society. They suggest that we need to (a) protect certain individual rights and (b) settle disputes through democratic proc Read More