Research Methods In International Politics - Essay Example

1: Introduction This paper critically reviews three core texts in this area, ly Kenneth Waltz’s “Theory of International Politics” (1979);2) Ullman & Wade’s “Shock and Awe Doctrine (1996); and 3) Betts’ “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror” (2002). It is submitted that these three texts present different aspects of the central issues impacting the contemporary world order in terms of the balance of power in the international relations framework, foreign policy and international security. 2: Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics Kenneth Waltz’s “Theory of International Politics” (1979) is often cited as a leading authority in the theory of international politics and effectively redefines what he views as the deficiencies of classic realism in international politics theory. On this basis, in Chapter 1, Waltz addresses pre-existing theory pertaining to the correlation between laws and international behaviour. Whilst he acknowledges that legal compliance and laws may provide a correlation to state behaviour and international politics, Waltz feels that is theory that explains them and to this end attempts to reconstruct classic realism through a somewhat scientific approach. Therefore, Waltz’s book seeks to go beyond the classic realist position of politics in terms of state characteristics and state interaction with each other. Therefore Waltz’s central theory of neo-realism in international politics is underpinned by Waltz’s proposition that the system of international politics is inherently dependent on a system of anarchy. This system of anarchy according to Waltz effectively creates the international order of hierarchy, which is further defined by states who are unitary rational actors on the one hand and rational actors on the other. To this end, Waltz’s discussion of the Cold War highlights his propensity towards viewing the international political order from a systemic perspective as opposed to considering the intentions of individual states and human behaviour, which is arguably the inherent weakness of the book in context of contemporary international politics. For example, in focusing on the international politics as a whole state system as opposed to individual state level factors, Waltz avoids assumptions about human nature and morality and power in international politics. Waltz’s neo-realist paradigm proposes that the central factor in international politics is security and whilst gathering power, often results in destructive effects. Therefore, in propounding the idea that state survival is imperative in international politics, Waltz suggests that gathering power isn’t prominent however the goal of survival necessarily results in power being obtained by default. To this end, Waltz’s theory posits that the international system is the dominant factor, which he reiterates in later work in relation to his support for the deterrence theory in respect of nuclear weapons shaping international relations (Waltz, 1995). If we further consider this in light of the Waltz’s neo-realist “anarchy” presumption, Waltz’s book suggests that states are motivated by security issues, which in turn dictates the power hierarchy in international politics. To this end, Waltz appears to denounce reductionism as explaining the “behaviour of parts” (1979, p.65). In Chapter 4 for example, Waltz (1979, p.66) challenges the concept of international political balance being achieved through variances in state level factors and instead focuses on the impact of the international system as a whole. Accordingly, the essence appears to be the system as the central factor in shaping behaviour among states in international politics (Waltz, 1979, p.74). Additionally, Waltz’s anarchy paradigm suggests that the international system is rooted in self help security and multi-layered. This therefore correlates to Waltz’s balance of power theory. In Chapter 8, Waltz further evaluates how the international system influences alliances and concentrates on the multi-polar and bipolar systems. To this end, Waltz proposes that the central difference between the two is that multi-polar balancing of power creates uncertainty whereas bipolar balancing creates less opposition in the international system. Nevertheless, it is arguable that Waltz’s reliance on anarchy and the survival preservation is inherently limited by the contemporary political framework (Crawford, 2000). For example, Waltz’s book ignores individual factors and arguably the rejection of this notion explains the flaw in the contemporary relevance of the theory of international relations (Kavka, 1996). In conclusion, Waltz’s theory of international relations is contextually relevant in terms of the Cold War backdrop and the international political order at the time. Additionally, the balance of power theory and triggers suggested by Waltz are undoubtedly important and have influenced international relations theory significantly. However, the inherent weakness of Waltz’s theory in the book is the failure to consider the individual perspective and importance of non-state sectors and to this end, Waltz’s book provides a mixed bag of important international relations theory on the one hand, followed by generalisations on the other. This is particularly evident within the contemporary framework with regard to the terrorism phenomenon and the difficulty of distinguishing between state and non state actors. For example, Buzan and Little (1999) argue that the fundamental flaw of Waltz’s international relations’ theory is that it is underpinned by the assumption that the opponent is rationale and mutually vulnerable and that the opponent is in fact a state. Opponents of the deterrence theory also highlight the fact that as a theory, deterrence has not actually been practically tested (Segal, 1988, p.21). 3. Shock and Awe & Rapid Dominance The post September 11 framework significantly reshaped international relations and foreign policy, with the US moving towards a distinctly unilateralist approach (Larres, 2003). This is exemplified by Operation Iraqi Freedom, which highlighted the problem between execution of unilateral foreign policy objectives and public relations within the international political framework (Potemski, 2007). This is highlighted by the US reliance on Ullman & Wade’s shock and awe military doctrine in combat. Ullman and Wade in “Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (1996), spurred by a critical re-evaluation of strategy in Operation Desert Storm suggests the need to consider alternative concepts for structuring mission capability in combat (p.1). In reviewing Operation Desert Storm, the central premise of Ullman and Wade (1996, p.26) is the need to ensure a smooth interaction between control and timing in execution of military strategy in combat. Therefore, they argue that the concept of “Rapid Dominance” and “Shock and Awe” is imperative in ensuring US control in achieving expeditious victory in military combat. For example, Ullman and Wade (1996) posit that: “in Rapid Dominance, the aim of affecting the adversary’s will, understanding and perception through achieving Shock and Awe is multifaceted” (p.20). However, whilst in the short term, the immediate effect of the shock and awe air campaign suggests that from a military perspective, the campaign was a military success; the long term ramifications not only for public relations but for US military capabilities has fuelled debate as to the extent to which Operation Iraqi Freedom can legitimately be labelled a military success (Peltz, 2005, p.1). A central element of this debate is the criticism in some quarters of Ullman and Wade’s assumptions of success under the shock and awe rapid dominance paradigm (Knights, 2005, p.ix). For example, Blakesley (2004) argues that the shock and awe rapid dominance paradigm is a widely misunderstood concept and that “Operation Iraqi Freedom introduced the phrase of Shock and Awe into the general lexicon of US officers and the press like” (p.3). However Blakesley argues that the very nature of the term “shock and awe” is misunderstood particularly with regard to warfare and fails to appreciate the wider ramifications of rigid adherence to Ullman and Wade’s theory, which in turn risks destabilisation within the contemporary framework of international relations and changing nature of warfare (p.4). In supporting his argument, Blakesley (2004) posits that the shock and awe concept is essentially geared towards impacting an enemy’s ability to fight (p.11). To this end, Blakesley (2004) suggests that the US approach to the shock and awe doctrine has been narrow and therefore risks implementation of a flawed military policy. This is on the basis that the shock and awe doctrine itself is rooted in assumptions; namely the control system and command and the existence of rationality on both parts (Blakeseley, 2004, p.12). However, Blakesley (2004) suggests that Operation Iraqi Freedom was caused as a result of far more complex factors, which involved the role of non-state actors and therefore the shock and awe doctrine assumption is rooted in traditional concepts of warfare (p.12). It is evident that military doctrine is clearly changing as evidenced by the rise of military strategy geared towards counter insurgency (Cassidy, 2006, p.19). Therefore it is reiterated that whilst in military terms the short term air campaign may have been a success in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the continuing pressures on the US defence system to address counter insurgency suggests the failures of the shock and awe doctrine to account for the complex socio-political framework within which the military tactics were being applied (Blakesely, 2004, p.102). It is important to note that Blakesley (2004) doesn’t completely denounce the use of shock and awe and argues that shock will undoubtedly continue to play a part in conflict (p.102). However, his contention is that the US military approach focuses on tactics and underestimates long term effects as evidenced by the current situation in Iraq and risk of long term instability (p.103). 3. Betts Betts argues that the fundamental flaw in the responsive strategy for combating terrorism is the failure to understand the interrelationship between the imbalance of power among terrorist groups, US foreign policy and causality for terrorism in considering the interaction between terrorists and opponents (Betts, 2002, p.19). Betts’ arguments also highlight the intrinsic problems under international law in defining terrorism and as a result, Betts argues that the legal lacuna has provided a breeding ground for knee jerk politically motivated responsive measures to 9/11, ignoring the need to consider causality and non-violent responsive strategy. In turn, this fuels a domino effect on terrorism proliferation. Betts argues that one of the central problems in policy addressing terrorism is the failure to understand causality and the definition of terrorism: “in any case, for all but the rare nihilistic psychopath, terror is a means, not an end in itself”. (Betts, 2002: p.20). Moreover, Betts makes the important point that the “war on terror” is effectively a war on political groups, which clearly alters the traditional format of warfare and military doctrines regulating military response measures in international warfare (Betts, 2002: p.20). This is further evidenced by the complex relationship between state and non-state terrorism, which has further muddied the waters in shaping foreign policy post 9/11. Therefore, whilst academic discourse has often focused on the legality of US responses to terrorism after September 11; Betts’ central argument is that the focus should be on evaluating causality in order to address more effective responsive strategies for combating terrorism. It is submitted that such an approach would go further to addressing a more coherent definition of terrorism as a crime at international law level, particularly as Betts highlights the problem of distinguishing between state terrorism and non-state terrorism. Indeed, Becker highlights the point that the lack of sufficient definition under international law regarding terrorism has significantly impeded enforceability and accountability, which in turn has fuelled knee jerk responses from the US as a result of September 11 (Becker, 2006 p.355). This further lends itself to the argument for non-violent responsive measures post 9/11 as put forward by Betts. As such, it is evident that the failure to define terrorism clearly as an international crime lends itself to the obfuscation of a meaningful distinction between state terrorism and non-state terrorism within the international legal framework. This in turn presses the need to consider causality, which is imperative to Betts’ arguments for an alternative strategy in the war on terror. Moreover, with regard to the concept of “state terrorism”, the term “terrorism” has no agreed definition (Poland, 1988, p.34). Furthermore, Jervis highlights the intrinsic complexity of contemporary terrorism regarding motivation and the transnational nature of some terrorist groups, which create challenges for conventional international legal principles (Jervis, 2002, p.40). This further highlights the flaws in the current approach, which is arguably rooted in the historic primacy of America in the international order. To this end, Betts argues that “American global primacy is one of the causes of this war” (Betts, 2002, p.20). Betts’ line of argument is further supported by LaFeber’s proposition that globalisation has cemented America’s primacy, which has perpetuated the potential for conflict (2002, p.2) Therefore, Betts highlights that in addressing the proliferation of global terrorism brought to the fore by the September 11 catalyst, it is vital for the US to look at the political root causes of their actions. Indeed Betts highlights the point that US foreign policy was motivated by primacy in the first nuclear age during the Cold War era however it is the bipolarity of the second nuclear age heralded by the demise of the Soviet Union, which has fuelled the environment for grievances and novel conflicts. To this end, Betts comments that it is precisely the new world order that arguably created the environment and triggers leading up to the September 11 attacks and that this arguably provides the key to the solution going forward (Betts, 2002,p.36). BIBLIOGRAPHY Becker, T., 2006.Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility. Oxford: Hart Publishing Betts, R. K., 2002. The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 117, NO. 1 pp.19-36. Blakesley, P., 2004. Shock and Awe: A widely misunderstood concept. United States Army Command and General College, June 17 2004 Buzan, Barry. & Little, R., 1999. Why International Relations has failed as an Intellectual Project and what to do about it. Millennium, 30 (1): 19-39 Cassidy, R. 2009. Counterinsurgency and the global war on terror: military culture. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing. Crawford, N. C., 2000. The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotions and Emotional Relationships. International Security, 24(4): 116-156. Jervis, Robert. 2002. An Interim Assessment of September 11: What has happened to and what has not? Political Science Quarterly. Volume 117, No.1, pp.37-54. Kavka, G. S. 1987. Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knights, M., 2005. Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the birth of modern US military power. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. Larres, K., 2003. Mutual Incomprehension: US –German Value Gaps beyond Iraq. The Washington Quarterly, Volume 26: pp.23-42. Peltz, E., 2005. Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Battlefield Logistics. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Potemski, P., 2007. State Sponsored Nuclear Terrorism: A new deterrence challenge? Available at: [accessed December 2010] Segal, G. ed., 1988. Strategy and Survival. In Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace. London: Macmillan press. Ullman, H. & Wade, P., 1996. Shock and Awe-Achieving Rapid Dominance. United States National Defense University Press. Waltz, K., 1979. Theory of International Politics. Boston: Addison Wesley Waltz, Kenneth. eds.,1995. More May Be Better. In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Read More