Changes of the Washington Administration towards US Policy in the Asia-Pacific - Essay Example

Changes of Washington Administration towards US Policy in Asia-Pacific Introduction The United s has always regarded itself as a global patronof politically, economically, and militarily struggling countries. History is in fact a great witness to its Asia-Pacific conquests at the time when old-world conquistadors and colonizers were beginning to lose their influence on their colonies. Since then, the US policy on the Asia-Pacific region has often changed during the colonial and post-colonial eras. One of the driving forces behind these constantly changing policies is the change of administration, whereby the Presidents decide according to the dictates of his party’s principles his own political will, or the present international scenario. If the heads of state had come from similar parties it is easier to ensure continuity of policies. Otherwise, the chances of continuity are slim unless the next president is not one for party politics such as Obama’s case. So as to have a clearer view on how administration changes tend to affect continuity in the Asia-Pacific area, this essay henceforth aims to scrutinize the ways in which the change of political leaders may affect policy continuity. How Administration Changes Affect Policies at the Asia-Pacific Region Administration changes can affect policies whenever party politics take precedence over continuity. It has been known that Democrats and Republicans have contrasting values. While the former espouses liberal views and political methods, the latter’s beliefs on and approach to policy debates is conservative and traditional. Party affiliation in the US has a “predominant influence” on the President and his administration. Jim Leach, former chairman of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, considers “the interplay between the Republican and Democratic parties and within each of these parties” as responsible for adding another coat of complexity to the US system and its policies in Asia-Pacific. For comparison’s sake, the Democratic administration of President Bill Clinton was markedly different from that of his successor Bush Jr. Though rocked with scandals irrelevant to policy-making (i.e. Monica Lewinsky affair), there was at least a shortage of war. As Rozoff (2009) quipped in his write-up, “when Clinton lied no Americans died.” On one hand, the Bush Presidency had enough Republican policies on war to sacrifice thousands of American soldiers. The Democratic Policy Committee condemned such policies as “misguided” for having “severely tarnished Americas reputation in Iraq and around the world” and undermined “U.S.-led reconstruction efforts” in the Muslim country (Dorgan, 2008). Party politics is also accompanied by other factors such as difficulty in reconciling opposing political systems (i.e. Communism versus Democracy), “changes in US party politics, and public fears on globalization.” What Leach said of the US-China relations was revealing: “China and the United States view the world in profoundly different ways.”  While the former has embraced an “economics first” policy as its self-proclaimed “doctrine of non-interference rooted in the notion of equality of nations,” American foreign policy… underscores political issues and ethical values entrenched in the belief of “equality of the individual” (cited in The East-West Wire, n.d.). US-China relations have been swinging like a pendulum over the years since the Communist regime gained international recognition. There have been a string of US leaders who have not dominated China policy compared to others. Jimmy Carter and Richard Nixon were able to negotiate relationships with China. Yet over time, American priorities gradually changed to a more pluralist tone as the Cold War atmosphere began to dissolve. The post-Cold War administrations of Bush Sr. and Clinton treated China policy differently. Clinton “move China policy as far away from himself as he could,” unlike his forerunner Bush Sr. who had closely managed Sino policies as if he were the “government’s desk officer for China” (Lampton, 2001, pp.314-319). Bush Jr., like his father, espoused a China policy that “was comparatively successful” during most of his stay at the White House (deLisle, 2009). Although there were a few setbacks, such as the $232.5 billion US-China trade deficit caused by China’s undervalued currency, which pushed the American Congress to make legislative repairs through imposing trade sanctions, the tensions became “distant memories” and had not resulted to a cycle of sanctions that could have harmed the global economy. Nevertheless, the Bush-era China Policy had certain strengths which the Obama administration could build on. Indeed, it is a matter of party politics once more. China believes that persistent Republican rule would probably disturb the way things are between China and the US. Chinese sources were amenable with technocrats from the Clinton administration appointed to deal with foreign policy, and of course China policy, in the Obama administration. The appointments assured that “experienced, steady hands and continuity with another era of generally positive U.S.-PRC relations” will ensue. The leaders of China saw Obama, and not his then political rival John McCain, as the one to maintain the China policy of the Bush-era. Obama’s China policy includes economic, security and human rights concerns and is focused on “continuity rather than change” (Panda, 2009). A change in administration means that there is also a change in the personality leading that administration. Such a personality may have a different set of visions, follow a divergent ideology, or employ a different mindset from his predecessor. This in turn affects the policies initiated or planned by the previous administration either because the successor seeks to prioritize other policies or tends to misinterpret his successor’s intentions or methods of implementation. The effect of personality on policy continuity has already been affirmed by an unnamed White House official who stressed out that “personalities matter… in the conduct, formulation, and implementation of [foreign policy]” (cited in Lampton, 2001, p.313). This implies that Obama, as the central personality that determines foreign policy and a Democrat to boot, goes beyond party politics as he plans to continue the policy legacies of his Republican antecedent. Some administration changes are caused by fortuitous events and therefore beyond anyone’s immediate control or influence. This goes to show that changes are also dependent on the existing conditions of the time. Indeed, policies on war and diplomacy will not be prioritized in a period where transnational and international conflicts are non-existent in the Asia-Pacific region. US presidents carefully consider the prevalent international condition, which is why changes often come with every new administration, regardless of party affiliation. Prevailing fortuitous events also explain why administration changes in the White House affect policy continuity (deLisle, 2009). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), thought to be “an odd beast among trade agreements” because it has never developed from a “traditional reciprocity-based framework,” was a case in point. “Concerted unilateralism,” was at the core of APEC operations whereby each member state was anticipated to embark on free trade “at its own pace and by its own path.” The Clinton administration tried to propose and install a multi-sector reciprocity-based trade liberalization framework in the APEC system, but failed when met by a Japanese-led opposition. Clinton’s big push was plainly wrong timing for it came at the heart of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, where Asian economies suffered the biggest setback since their 1960s take-off. To save face, the Clinton administration neglected APEC, claiming that it had never considered trade liberalization seriously. When it was the turn of the Bush White House, the fortuitous 9/11 terrorist attacks pushed APEC trade liberalization initiatives into the background of foreign policy. Bush mostly ignored the crucial economic position of the APEC and transformed his administration into a bustling “vehicle for anti-terrorist activities.” The administration also advocated for security as a regional priority. Not until 2006 were there overdue attempts to initiate new regional free trade agreements by Bush trade officials. The Free Trade Agreement for the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) was established as an off-shoot of the long ignored worries of the APEC framework. The initiative was received politely and passed on to study groups. With terrorist networks still on the loose and eating the pride of the Bush administration, the negotiation powers vested in US trade officials were kept low (Barfield, 2009). Making premature assessments on the Obama administration’s foreign policy and scope of influence in Asia-Pacific will make this paper highly inaccurate, since the President is barely half-way there and has completed but a year of service. It is safe to say, however, that when the Obama administration started, there were already sweeping changes in East Asia brought about by a boom on bilateral Free Trade Agreements. During President Obama’s trip to define the US role in Asian economic integration, the administration is somehow unprepared to move ahead on key proposals. As Barfield (2009) advised: “[The Obama administration] should make a trans-Pacific vision for regional integration a clear and central U.S. priority.” His administration should reestablish US leadership in shaping the economy of the Asia-Pacific region, but of course it has first to overcome the consequences of the global financial crisis which ironically began with the US economy itself. At present, Asia-Pacific policies of the Obama administration does not “depart too significantly from” the previous administration’s policies. So as to avoid hasty generalizations, some scholars assessed Bush’s policy of engagement and functional cooperation with China as resembling that of Obama’s and signified by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to China, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. This is a reassurance that the region is central to the present administration’s strategic agenda and has not been neglected in its foreign policy priorities. Asia, with its large population surpassing that of the West, is definitely a US asset, and Obama’s administration must learn from the “pitfalls” of its predecessor by engaging in bilateral and multilateral partnerships and avoiding “bilateral supremacy” (Tow & Loke, 2009, pp.443-444). Conclusion Administrative changes can have good or bad outcomes depending on the situation at hand. A problematic administration that has jeopardized its Asia-Pacific relations will be able to redeem itself through the next administration, provided that this administration performs well. However, if the next administration is no different from the previous one, then problems will only increase, or give birth to new ones, instead of getting resolved. The next administration could also learn from the one before it, whether by maintaining its policies or improving on them. Although policy continuity will always be affected with every change in administration, these policies will thrive longer if leadership personalities, party politics, misunderstandings, and the unpredictability of the international situation do not get in the way. Reference List Barfield, C., 2009. APEC: the keystone to US Asian policy. [Online] The American, The Journal of the American Enterprise Institute. Available at: http://www.american.com/archive/2009/november/apec-the-keystone-to-u-s-asian-policy [Accessed 27 January 2010]. DeLisle, J., 2009. China policy under Obama. [Online] Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Available at: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200902.delisle.chinapolicyobama.html [Accessed 27 January 2010]. Dorgan, B. L., 2008. The Bush republican oversight failure in Iraq. [Online] Washington: Democratic Policy Committee, Senate Office. Available at: http://dpc.senate.gov/dpcdoc.cfm?doc_name=fs-110-2-173 [Accessed 25 January 2010]. Lampton, D. M., 2001. Same bed, different dreams: Managing US-China relations 1989-2000. Berkeley: University of California. Panda, R., 2009. Changing perception of US policy towards China under Obama. [Online] Mainstream. Available at: http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1828.html [Accessed 27 January 2010]. Rozoff, R., 2009. White house and pentagon: Change, continuity, and escalation. [Online] Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalization. Available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12812  [Accessed 25 January 2010]. The East-West Wire, n.d. U.S.-China crisis brewing? [Online] Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center. Available at: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/us-china-crisis-brewing/ [Accessed 26 January 2010]. Tow, W. T. & Loke, B., 2009. Rules of engagement: Americas Asia-Pacific security policy under an Obama administration. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63 (4), pp.443-457. Read More