NATO as peacekeeping force in KOSOVO - Essay Example

Kosovo3 Order#: 341797 Topic: NATO as peacekeeping force in KOSOVO - implications for the alliance and its future: Introduction: Every war is a new war. Every war creates new situations. Every day of the war is a new experience for the fighting forces. The circumstances leading to the war are varied. The politicians guiding the war, and the generals conducting the war and the soldiers fighting the war, do their jobs as per guidelines in the war manuals studied by them and in the best interests of the political compulsions and the ground realities. The objective of NATO is to secure peace. It fires with the fond hope of extinguishing the fire. The pages of human history daubed in bloodshed on account of wars and violence in the name of religion, race, color and territorial aggrandizement, ask the crying question. How to make this Planet Earth haven-like and establish world peace? The answer is simple and straightforward. Eyes full of understanding, hearts full of love and the life that refuses conflicts-enough, these alone are enough! Normally in any war, the objective is to win the war. Will this war conducted by the NATO Alliance and the reconstruction processes now initiated succeed in establishing permanent peace in Kosovo and in the neighboring countries? Whether one likes it or not the presence of NATO forces in Kosovo is the harsh reality. Before that “the United States and its European partners sought to defer making difficult decisions, preferring instead to muddle through in the hope that somehow and someway a solution would present itself that would at once end the violence, provide a firm political basis for settlement, and avoid confronting the international community with a need to the massive force.”(Daalder 2001, p.27)Its implications for the alliance and its future are full of uncertainties. “On March 24, 1999, NATO initiated Operation Allied Force as a means to compel Slobodan Milosevic to cease ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to pull Serbian forces out of the disputed province. Although initially expected to last a few days, the operation did not conclude until June 10, 1999--78 days later--when Milosevic agreed to NATOs terms. Operation Allied Force marked a watershed in the Alliances history and a significant departure from NATOs exclusive Cold-War focus on the defense of its members borders.”(Operation Allied Force…) Kosovo campaign opened new horizons for the Alliance, not in its designated operational objectives. NATO’s direction is to protect the overall interests of the countries that are signatories to the NATO treaty, but their subsequent brief touched the areas and objectives not anticipated earlier. They took in their stride the responsibility of crisis response and crisis management in the entire continent of Europe. Even when the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the NATO members was not affected directly, the Alliance force had to intervene, when challenged. The shadow of the political compulsions of the member countries of NATO will always tell on the Alliance Commander. Operation Alliance Force was one such experience to the United States and Europe and important lessons have been learned as for initiating future coalition operations. “This question is the focus of a new RAND study, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation. The research team, led by John E. Peters, found that, despite the success of the campaign, the experience of Operation Allied Force reemphasized the growing gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe.”(Operation Allied Force…) When the military capabilities and the economic strength of the member countries are not equal, and the gap is very wide, practical difficulties arise between the relations of the big brother, and the not-so strong countries. In NATO operations political consultations, before and during the operations gets highest priority. That which is in the best interest of a particular country, may adversely affect the political/ economic interest of another country. Such situations lead to wars of argument and that affects the actual war in the front. If the commander of the forces needs urgent orders in a dire situation and if the same is not forthcoming, the situation becomes confusing and it may end-up in military debacles. The logistics of political decisions and military discipline are different. Lessons of Operations Allied Force: The equation is simple and an issue of commonsense. For example, in a cricket, football or volleyball team, more or less all players need to possess excellent physical fitness and matching playing skills. Even if one member is weak, it affects the performance of the entire team, and such a team may have to face defeat. The RAND study concluded its findings on similar lines. It said, United States will continue to play the major role in future coalition operations. But it definitely expects other members to improves their defense capabilities, both for deploy ability and sustainability. NATO has designed training exercises and that gives an opportunity for the Alliance members to improve the skills of their forces and how to perform and work under a unified command, whose commander has the advantage of knowing the modern technological advances in the military hardware. The constraints of the Kosovo Operations: All the 19 members of the NATO supported the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo that lasted for 78 days. France made the highest contributions from the European countries as for deployed aircraft assets. Thirteen countries contributed military aircraft for the combat. The United States owned the lion’s share of the war-effort. Enemy air defenses were jammed by Germany and Italy. British, French and the United States conducted joint operations to deliver precision-guided munitions. The comparative limitations and shortcomings of technology between the member countries came to the fore, as the allies as a whole lacked the level of precision and all-weather capabilities and night missions were hampered. The share of United States amongst 1055 aircraft deployed was 700. Politics intervened. The expected happened. Obstacles and differences of opinions surfaced, seriously hampering and stalling the war efforts. The air campaign was deliberately slow. USA preferred high tempo and quick solutions. It wished to deploy an overwhelmingly levels of force. But the demands of politics were entirely different. The slow warfare was to accommodate consultations amongst the member-countries. Preparing proper ground to secure popular and international support was another factor. The concern of the member countries was to restrict the civilian causalities. Everything related to the war effort was cut to size-the pace, size, amount of force deployed in the campaign and the targets. The problems were many folds. Important among them were legal issues and those related to trust. The entire gamut of planning the NATO alliance was put to severe test when an important war situation confronted them. The theory and the practicalities of war clashed. Unified approach and the common agenda were lacking throughout the operation. Since there was no immediate and direct threat to allied territory or traditional interests, the war effort turned tardy. Three important issues came to the fore and did rounds across the negotiating table. They were, if a “gradualist’ approach to the air warfare was appropriate and had the chances of success, why certain sensitive information was the exclusive privilege of USA, and whether the ground forces should be introduced. After detailed discussions the option of ground forces was given up, anticipating difficult and unpleasant issues. US had its unassailable arguments. Its main concern was the potentiality of leakage if all information was shared between all the 19 member countries. This overbearing control was resented by other countries. The pivotal point was the legality and the justification of the operation. With no authorization of the United Nations or the OSEC (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the legal ground for the offensive was in question. United States defended the action stating that the NATO Treaty had ample justification for the Alliance to give the befitting answer to the enemy when its interests were in jeopardy. The future prospects for the coalition operations: Kosovo war taught many things about the problems and solutions related to the future. Many individual as well as collective responsibilities were defined. Capability improvement was the main issue. Emphasis is laid on training exercises to make the forces of the participating countries more effective. In light of the experience gained in Kosovo, alliance members must resolve several important issues to prepare for future coalition operations. The RAND report discusses key steps that can be taken by the United States and the European countries individually, as well as by the Alliance as a whole, to improve their capabilities for future coalitions. Refinement in the process of consultations and deliberations has been accorded high priority. In any action USA has to continue as the leader. It will play the role of the integrator in future operations. Its military dominance is unquestionable and it will exercise maximum leverage in designing military operations. The plea of United States for more vigorous action may find many supporters. Lingering the war, gives rise to undesirable possibilities. Fast and quick actions are the prime factors in any war. From the point of view of allies, areas of deployment and sustainability need to be paid more attention. Kosovo war has provided insights as for the strength and weakness of the alliance partners. Six major issues are identified that needed immediate attention. They are command structures, defense capabilities initiative, alliance-based assets, system for operational decisions, doctrine and military practices and consultation process. The shape of things to come in coalitions: This is the era of in technological and internet revolutions. The advancement of technology is fast in some of the member countries of NATO. The economic and military capabilities are widely different. There is the necessity to define the role of each member country. This is the challenge both for the political as well as military leadership. To put it in the satirical style, the politician has to turn military-minded. The military general has to take some hard lessons from the current world political scenario. No section of the leadership can afford to think and act in isolation, without understanding and caring for the problems at the other side of the fence. Not the war-training, but the science of ergonomics (finding proper individuals/nations for the proper job), will assume importance in the time to come. Not all member countries need to participate in the war. Some may take care to mend the unpleasant consequences of the war. The countries that are financially and from the military point of view weak, can take up humanitarian functions in the post-war or during the war scenario. Some member countries need to be given the latitude of not participating in the operations. In the inaugural address on Friday, January 20, 1961 President John F. Kennedy said, “We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”(Inaugural address….) This could be the situation in future war-like situations. When the military strength of the contending forces is evenly matched, and in this age of nuclear weapons, the option of military action may take the back seat and political and diplomatic efforts may carry the day. Military leverage needs to be evident even when the diplomatic initiatives are in progress. Preparation-wise, every area must be perfect with the latent capacity to strike at the shortest notice, when called for. The lessons learnt from the previous wars are the future manual of instructions. Each war will serve as a model for the officers and generals. Peace-time multinational exercises are important to ensure interoperability of the coalition partners. NATO should continue with coalition building process in a well-defined manner. Command issues should be sorted out. The direct responsibility for Kosovo issue, vests with the NATO alliance, nevertheless two other main agencies were associated with the crisis—UN and the EU. One prominent issue has come to the fore in majority of the conferences and symposiums held on the subject of Kosovo war. It is the need to revise the current ways of thinking and the action needed, should there be a Kosovo-like conflict in future. Humanitarian intervention is favored much. Alliance and its unchecked powers: They are two sides of the same coin-the internal co-ordination and conflicts of the Alliance and the need to check the aggressive actions of the Alliance, which may boil into an international conflict, threatening world peace. The wings of the UN are fettered. “The United Nations is also seen as the chief agent for globalization; it has done much to pursue that cause. However, it has very little actual power of implementation without the approval of the United States, Russia, and China—in that order, it seems.”(Rezun 2001, p.4) The issue is not about the power of the UN to intervene; how effective would be the intervention, without adequate funding. When countries like America and Britain are the members of NATO, it is futile to expect that they will fund UNO forces to fight against their own interests. That was the precise issue about the UN intervention in Kosovo. “….in terms of post-crisis involvement, there were unrealistic expectations about what the UN could achieve in Kosovo, where they had been deployed at short notice, without either the time to prepare properly, or adequate funding. It was unacceptable that countries which had committed huge resources to the military operation in Kosovo were not now prepared to ensure that the UN had the funds it needed to carry forward essential peace building programs which would provide the basis for a lasting peace in the region.” (Kosovo…) In NATO, after the experience of 78 days Kosovo war, the commanders and planners of operations are convinced that every military move had the political significance. In a democracy, political checks on the exercise of military power have to be accepted. Such checks, even during the thick of the war, are welcome, but the grouse of the military officials merits consideration--the delays and restrictions that do not allow the commanders to initiate actions on the lines they desire. When one mentions about the importance of Public relations, one recalls the contribution of Paul Garrett, when the big industrial empires in USA were reeling under the pressure of maintaining appropriate contacts with the awesome growth of consumers for their products on the one hand and on the other hand controlling the employees whose strength was also in several thousands. The process of soul search in the organizations began. Perhaps, Paul Garrett was born for the cause of public relations. He was quick to act and soon realized the tremendous potential of this exercise in the cause of the betterment of the organization on all fronts. “By the end of 1931, Garnett reported, the company was receiving more than five thousand letters of appreciation a week. He distributed multiple anthologies of “typical excerpt” from these letters to a long list of executives.”(Marchand 2001, p.231) But in the actual war conditions, the military general thinks for the hour and plans for the day, within the scope of war plans that one has mastered years in advance. Both the military general and the public relations man work with an immaculate foresight. NATO has to cope up with the same situation that once engulfed the industrial world. Another Paul Garrett has to take a fresh look to give the PR touch to NATO operations “…. in addition to its military operations, NATO needed to be able to handle the public relations demands of transparency in a new media environment. Modern communications meant that military commanders were pressed for comment almost as soon as their operations had taken place. Finding a balance between transparency and credibility had proved difficult. It had not been easy to withhold comment until information could be verified. But there was no retreating behind a screen of confidentiality. A close observer of the NATO scene suggested that the Alliance also needed a rapid reinforcement capability on the PR front, and that this capability needed to be exercised from time to time in the same way as the military exercised their operational plans.”(Kosovo: implications….) Freedom for Kosovo-what it means to the future of Alliance: Since 1999 NATO is present in Kosovo, whether one likes it or not. At present over 14,000 troops from the NATO-Led Kosovo Force (KFOR) are deployed in Kosovo. “Following the declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, unless the United Nations Security Council decides otherwise. In June 2008, NATO agreed to take on new tasks in Kosovo to support the development of professional, democratic and multi-ethnic security structures.”(NATO -) So, the votaries of the humanitarian approach have won. The 78-day air campaign tendered forth many objectives. To reverse the catastrophe that had engulfed Kosovo, urgent humanitarian assistance was needed. A part of the Alliance force and commanders are getting the practical experience about the peace-keeping operations in Kosovo. They are exposed as to how to establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; relocation of displaced persons and refugees; providing medical assistance; take care of the ethnic minorities; check smuggling of weapons and drugs across the borders; destruction of seized weapons. Support the judicial and penal system; protection of heritage sites; supervise distribution of donations of food, clothes and other rehabilitation supplies. The commanders have realized that the peace-time operations of reformation and rehabilitation are as difficult as the war-time efforts. He basic difference is war leads to destruction; peace-time operations lead to construction.But the men of the Alliance are in a peculiar country. “For, in Kosovo, history is not really about the past, but about the future. That is not to say, however, that outsiders cannot build a picture of the past, which does not pander to the nationalistic bents of either side. It is just that it is more difficult to do here than it is in other parts of Europe.”(Judah, 2000, p.2) Conclusion: From the point of view of NATO Alliance, each intervention is most undesirable, because when the intervention happens, it means that peaceful negotiations have failed. For the alliance partners, the experience in Kosovo has thrown up many challenges. Mr. Winston Churchill put it even more succinctly in his speech in the House of Commons on July 5, 1946. “It is better to have a world united, than a world divided; but it is also better to have a world divided, than a world destroyed. Nor does I follow that even in a world divided, there should not be an equilibrium from which a further advance to unity might be attempted as the years pass by. Anything is better than his ceaseless degeneration of the heart of Europe. Europe will die of that. (Bulletin of…)This division leading to the creation of Kosovo must be allowed to have a peaceful existence—this is perhaps the working philosophy of the Alliance forces now. *********** Bibliography Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - May 1950 - Google Books Result30 pages - Magazine Mr. Churchill put it even more succinctly books.google.co.in/books?id=2A0AAAAAMBAJ...accessed on 11 December 2009) Daalder, Ivo H (Author) O’ Hanlon, Michael E. Winning Ugly: Natos War to Save Kosovo. Brookings Institution Press. 2001 Inaugural Address of John Fitzgerald Kennedy Inaugural Address. (accessed on 11 December 2009) Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press. April 2000 Kosovo: implications for the international system (accessed 2 December 2009) Marchand, Roland. Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business. University of California Press; 1 edition, April 23, 2001 NATO Topic: Kosovo, NATOs role inToday, …. (accessed 2 December 2009) Operation Allied Force: Lessons for Future Coalition Operations…. (accessed 2 December 2009) Rezun, Miron. Europes Nightmare: The Struggle for Kosovo. Praeger, 2001 Read More