Why Finland and Sweden Have Not Sought Full Membership of NATO - Essay Example

Why Finland and Sweden Have Not Sought Full Membership of NATO INTRODUCTION People form groups with a goal in mind. The goals are specific to the group. Countries could come together and form unions such as trade unions, or even groups to protect them from a common rival or enemy. Some European countries and the United States formed NATO on 4th April 1947 to provide security in the North Atlantic area, which was to be achieved through military and defense means. However, not all members fully joined the group. This paper seeks to examine the reasons why Sweden and Finland have not sought for full membership in NATO despite being part of the North Atlantic area and faced some threat of attack. Some of the reasons why Sweden and Finland have failed to seek for full membership of the NATO are because of change of national policies. Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2000, p.3) claims that they changed their national security, defense, and foreign policies after the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, in response to changes in their environment. Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, which led to elimination of military threat and to their national independence (Keep 1995, p.6). The faster waning of the cold war and the growing attractiveness of European integration meant that the previous wish for Finland and Sweden to seek full membership of the NATO was replaced with desire to work together with European and other transatlantic partners to respond to the challenges of security facing them. Finland and Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995 (Ingebritsen 2006, p.33), as a result of which they became members of EU Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) (Sjursen 1998, p.8). Consequently, CFSP was established under the 1991-1992 Maastricht Treaty while Common Security Defense Policy (CSDP) was established in 1999-2000 (Grieco 1995, p.21). Involvement in creation of the policies has enabled them to shape the security policies adopted across Europe. In addition, both nations joined the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) in the 1990s and the cooperation has been an important part of their defense and foreign policies. According to Rosamond (2004, p.168), both nations have even taken part in the NATO military peacekeeping and civilian crisis management tasks in the 1990s and 2000s. These involvements have influenced them not to seek for full membership since the Cold War era has ended, hence leading to a change of defense, national security, and foreign policies. The relationship Finland had with the Soviet Union after the Second World War could not allow her to seek full membership (Holsti 1964). Finland was very vulnerable to attacks from the Soviet Union because of its proximity to the Soviet Union and had to reassure it that no threat to it would come from Finland. Maeander (1991, p.33) confirms an agreement called Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) was signed in April 1948 between the Soviet Union and Finland. The treaty committed Finland to defend itself militarily in the event of an attack, as well as to seek for military assistance from the Soviet Union if necessary. The agreement also enabled the Soviet Union to curtain Finland movement in relation to the West nations. When the NATO was formed in 1949, Finland had already committed itself to a policy that did not include other parties (Majander 1991). Maintaining her political independence, territorial integrity, and fear of provoking the Soviet Union were the main pillars of her security and foreign policies and could, therefore, not seek for full membership because it would break the relationship it had with the Soviet Union. In addition, Finland has failed to seek membership of the NATO because of the regulations limits demanded by the Soviet Union. According to Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2000, p.11), Russia had set limits to Finland’s relationship with the western nations’ political and economic institutions. Finland did not have any possible integration with the West nations, but only with East nations, which made it not to seek for full membership of the NATO – which was dominated by West nations. The participation of members of NATO as well as its policies is selective. It has a common defense planning military process, which has an effect on the members’ force levels, organization and recruitment but the degree, and decisions of member states towards the NATO are limited. Some countries have even disassociated themselves from the NATO policies and decisions, for instance, France’s withdrew from the NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 (Hunt 1966, p.1-3). Finland does not accept any direction to decide its force levels, organization, and recruitment and this discourages it not to seek for full membership of the NATO. Swedish has a defense policy that mainly focused on widening international cooperation with other partners (Tunander 1999, p.169-172). Its defense industry has maintained high global standards because of the belief that a neutral defense policy requires a country to have its own defense industry. The Swedish defense industry has undergone extensive process of incorporation and increased cooperation with allies in other countries. This neutral policy approach has made seeking full membership of the NATO a hard choice because it would mean having to change its policy which has been in existence for over 20years (Nunlist & Trachsler 2013, p.3). Sweden had already formed a military partnership with Denmark and Norway in 1949 (Lassinantti 2001) when NATO was established. This had been formed due to the fear of attack of the Soviet Union as it had expanded after the Second World War to some parts of Poland and East Germany. Sweden was well aware of her vulnerability and ability to obtain external assistance in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union. It teamed up with Norway and Denmark in order to protect them in case of attack. Since this partnership with Norway and Denmark was in existence when the NATO was established, it could not seek full membership of the NATO. Later when the partnership collapsed in 1952, Sweden maintained its neutrality by keeping good terms with the Soviet Union. This wish to remain neutral made it not vulnerable to attacks by the Soviet Union and therefore did not seek for full membership of the NATO. Sweden and Finland joined Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP was established by the NATO in 1994 (Inan &Yusuf 1999) and had been neutral but decided to join it instead of seeking full membership of the NATO. Finland and Sweden joined PfP in 1994 and chose to cooperate with the NATO through PfP. This is because joining PfP enabled members to remains neutral and not to commit to security guarantee and other defense policies of the NATO. Pourchot (1997, p.160) confirms that governments had advocated for joining PfP and cooperating with the NATO because it was seen as to address security challenges, cooperating, engaging in peacekeeping and in the development of armed forces. However, Sweden and Finland choose not to seek full membership because they felt PfP better served them. Sweden and Finland are actively taking part in the processes of the NATO. Bastian, and Wallace (2004, p.166-168) supports that Sweden and Finland have been gradually participating in the operations of the NATO which makes them to be military partners. They joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 and started PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995 (Vaahtoranta and Forsberg 2000, p.16). The second part of the PARP process was initiated in 1997 and a large number of new interoperationability objectives were set for the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. They take part in PfP exercises, courses, seminars and also organize and host them. In 1997, Sweden established a PfP Training Centre offering training in civil defense. It has resulted to Finland and Sweden being almost interoperable with the NATO. Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2000, p.16) further states Sweden and Finland have participated in multinational peacekeeping in the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia and the KFOR operation in Kosovo from the start. Finland has also participated in the Intensified Dialogue with the NATO since 1996. Both countries also joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997, Finland having been an observer of NACC since 1992. Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2001, p.75) further affirms that Finland and Sweden also established diplomatic missions to the NATO and have officers and civil servants working as Partner Staff Elements in staff structure of the NATO. Michel (2004, p.6) supports both countries have also been developing military through cooperation with the NATO through PfP exercises, the PARP process, several European and Baltic regional cooperation and mutual ties with the NATO. Sweden and Finland have taken part in the NATO led air force training exercise involving the Baltic States (Giegerich & Wallace 2004, p.169). This has seen Sweden and Finland to behave as if they are part of the NATO member states making them not to seek full membership of the NATO. Finland and Sweden have inadequate political support for the NATO (Giles & Eskola 2009, p.11-13). There has been political debate in both countries over the membership issue since the end of the Cold War, but it has not been enough to mobilize the required majority. There has been some political support in both countries such as the Moderate Party and the Liberal Party in Sweden, and the Swedish Peoples Party and the Centre Party in Finland seeking full membership of the NATO (Lassinantti 2001, p.92). However, they are not in a position to mobilize a governing majority and are unwilling to press the issue without broader nationwide agreement. Furthermore, some political leaders in Finland claim that history of the country proves that they cannot rely on others for their own internal defense and seeking full membership of the NATO would lead to weak national defense programs (Vaahtoranta and Forsberg 2000, p.28). This has made the desire to seek full membership of the NATO unpopular and cannot therefore seek for full membership. The NATO has not approached Sweden and Finland for membership. Art (1998, p.383) affirms that the NATO has a policy of open membership for any European democracy. Both Finland and Sweden qualify for membership but NATO does not want to influence the decision of any country. Cottey (2013, p.464) further states that it could also be because of the many agendas NATO has, such as the agenda on Afghanistan. This failure to approach Finland and Sweden makes them to fail to seek for full membership. In addition, relationship between Finland and the NATO is good and seeking full membership would provide little additional benefits but could add significant responsibilities (Rühle and Williams 1995, p.86). It would also distract the goal to achieve intra-European defense cooperation through the European Union. It also sees as very easy to apply and gain full membership of NATO if their security environment were to worsen since it has open policy membership and making Finland and Sweden not to consider full membership. Sweden has been at peace for about 190years since the last war in 1814. It used neutralism during the Cold War, which has influenced its security policy and adopted a policy of military non-alignment. Dalsjo (2006, p.1-2) confirms its leaders believed that the West nations would come to her assistance if it was attacked by the Soviet Union. The government also undertook several measures to ensure military cooperation with several NATO nations such as the United States, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom in the 1950s. Sweden has also expanded bilateral defense ties with some NATO states in order to improve its military capabilities that have made them not to seek for full membership of the NATO. Tertrais (2004) affirms that Finland and Sweden have also abandoned the idea of seeking full membership of the NATO because the threats facing it are no longer military in nature. Rieker (2004, p.373) suggests that the existing threats are transnational crime, terrorism, environmental pollution, human rights abuse, and illegal immigrations which require new ideas and security policies to tackle them. Therefore, these threats can only be managed through continued cooperation by all states in both Western and Eastern Europe. Lassinantti (2001, p.92) suggests that Sweden and Finland had proposed that defense and security policies should entail the Petersburg Tasks, which include peacekeeping, conflict resolution, crisis management and humanitarian issues. This approach would involve more countries not just the members of NATO making Sweden and Finland not to seek full membership. Sweden and Finland believe that the European Union can better serve the work of the NATO (Yost 2000, p.113). They believe that the EU is the only organization that is in a position to prevent and manage crises, and could achieve this through such instruments as economic cooperation, diplomacy, trade, development cooperation, and peace military mission (Lassinantti 2001, p.92). This was because the EU has prevented armed conflicts in parts of Europe and the need to strengthen the community to enhance security in the continent makes them not to seek full membership of NATO. Sweden believes that crisis management offers a better tool in preventive efforts (Ingebritsen 2006, p.50). NATO has mainly resorted to military action and has little view on crisis management actions in their working. This would involve military forces for peacekeeping at a later stage. The NATO advocated for common territorial defense system that is different from the Swedish view of prevention. Sweden felt that conflict prevention action at an early stage could be used and would involve using instruments such as development collaboration, trade accords, peacekeeping forces, and demands for respect of human rights. It would also involve stationing diplomats to prevent and manage conflicts and involvement of civil and military advisers to give advice and plan mission (Lassinantti 2001). Enlargement of the NATO to include the United States has discouraged Sweden and Finland from seeking full membership. Finland is wary of fully joining the NATO because of the belief that the United States has much power and influence in the alliance and including it could bring risk the danger of destabilization (Bjereld & Ekengren 1999). Cottey (2013, p.451) supports that Finland fears wielding of power by the United States which is not part of Europe. It views that this could lead to engagement of activities that could tarnish its reputation and pose a risk to its national security. It has therefore always advocated of military non-alignment and only participates in the activities of NATO as a partner. Vaahtoranta, and Forsberg (2007, p.16) declares that Finland is also worried about the possible negative impact that NATO growth can have on Russian progress and policy and implication on the security of the Baltic States. Finland and Sweden fear that its inclusion could deteriorate the relationship between Russia and the Baltic states affecting security in the whole Baltic Sea region. Therefore, the best policy would be to try to influence Russia without any of the states seeking full membership of the NATO. Both countries want to have broad cooperation with NATO without joining the common defense. Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2007, p.18) asserts that they also do not want to have NATO’s security guarantees because they believe that non-alignment is a means and keep the choice of changing security policy in their own hands. It is their understanding that the policy of military non-alignment is the best choice for them in the future (Ojanen 2000). Finland and Sweden wish to have choice in the way they commit themselves to European security and military cooperation. Finland and Sweden are also against further bringing together of national defense structures. Ojanen, (2000, p.6) claims that Finland believes that bringing together of the defense can only be applied in peacekeeping armed forces, which makes them not to seek full membership of the NATO. Sweden and Finland have also failed to seek full membership of the NATO because of their interest in maintaining stability and promoting positive development in Russia. Lane (1997, p.295) states that the two countries want promotion, stability and positive development in Russia. NATO association is seen to potentially ruin the relationship between Russia and the countries in Europe’s North and therefore, they are wary of seeking full membership of the NATO to avoid ruining the stability in the Europe’s North. The capture of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia triggered clashes between Ukraine and Russia. The capture has triggered debate in Sweden and Finland, questioning whether the two should join NATO. The chain of events taking place in Ukraine reinforces the side in favor of NATO membership, but overall consensus about the change is still from the two countries (Nordenman 2014). The shift would indicate a major change from the strategy of Finland to that of Sweden, which majors on avoiding military alliance with Western countries, as a way of avoiding conflicts with Russia. However, in the case that the Ukrainian crisis worsens and the strength of Russia in the Baltic increases, the attitudes of the public in Finland and Sweden might shift considerably, in favor of NATO membership. More importantly, the two countries may need to reinforce their regional cooperation and strengthen the respective national defenses before joining NATO (Atlantic 2014). The deepening crisis is stimulating the debate in support of joining NATO. Sweden and Finland are member states in the EU, and that has qualified them to have strong institutional and economic linkages to the West, but they have avoided joining NATO. The support to join NATO membership has increased for both Sweden and Finland. However, apprehension remains, about Finland’s future; taking into account that Russia is both a major trading partner and a security threat. Trade Map shows that Russia was the second-largest export and import market to Finland in 2013, after Sweden. Russia is less likely to use its military power to restrain Finland’s membership in NATO, but it is likely to adopt policies that will affect Finland’s economy adversely. Finland and Sweden are likely to organize the forces needed to foster joining NATO, but their membership is less possible, before defense policy reviews have been made (Lithuania 2014). The talks related to the defense policies of Sweden and Finland are gaining grounds, mainly due to the Ukrainian crisis. New issues are emerging, regarding whether the governments of Finland and Sweden should channel more attention to border protection after cutting their defense budgets and foreign engagement over the years. More importantly, before making the shift, the two countries need to develop stronger defense partnerships in the region, with the remaining Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway and Iceland. In the recent years, the pursuit for the formation of a stronger defense partnership in the region has triggered a revival, taking the shape of Nordic Defense collaboration (Lithuania 2014). In conclusion, despite the risk of attack Finland and Sweden faced, they have had enough reasons not to seek for full membership. They believe that NATO in its current state has not achieved some goals and has not supported inclusion of all members. They also feel that the NATO is an organization that has been overtaken by events of the Cold War and should be inclusive of all the nations instead of just a few of them in Europe. Further, the two countries would not want to see have a conflict with their neighbors especially Russia. Despite the end of the Cold War, they still have reasons that they mainly attribute to their security and foreign policies that have shaped their history. Had they joined, there could have been some implications. 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