The new role of the European Union as peacekeeper - Essay Example

The New Role of the European Union as Peacekeeper Europe has a rich, long history, and with any entity with a past one will assuredly find conflict. Europe has seen its share of turmoil, but has for decades also seen the purpose and promise of a unified front. In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht (Beginnings) was signed which gave birth to a new form of shared governance and a cooperative spirit amongst the European community. The European Union (EU) was born. Since the moment of its inception it has never looked back. The European Union is unique in that it is not a sovereign nation, rather a legal alliance comprised of many different sovereign states. Yet, through its shared power it has decision making authority to act on behalf of its member states while holding no sovereign or military power of its own. While this may be true, there are also strengths involved in this configuration. Unlike an individual sovereign state which is limited by its own resources and individual structure, the EU can draw on a vast array of resources when necessary from each of its member states. This unique quality through coordinated efforts has the potential of ensuring a powerful tool in the peacekeeping missions required in today’s volatile world (Gourlay 404). As such, delving into the policy making and decision making responsibilities the EU has poses some interesting questions when it comes to international peacekeeping responsibilities. The decisions on how the EU handled international peacekeeping interventions and how it has evolved into a world class example of a peacekeeper will be shown. Additionally on its path through these various initiatives unique challenges faced by the EU and its membership will be discussed as well as a look towards the future face of the EU as a major shareholder in the peace process worldwide. The EU has successfully navigated uncharted water with its original hierarchy. Throughout this essay we will examine how the EU has accomplished some milestones well. There have been bumps in the road but as will be evidenced, the EU keeps moving to the future and a safer more secure world for us all. According to Bono the lines get even further blurred when examining this issue He asks the question, “When analysing the EU’s foreign, security and defence role, should we be focusing on examining the activities of the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament or individual EU member states?” (“Introduction” 396) Most literature assumes that the common approach accepted is via the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), However, Bono points out that there are actually three distinct approaches that can be taken: First, the CFSP and the ESDP are not interchangeable with respect to foreign policy and security; rather it encompasses both. The fundamental difference lies in the EU’s involvement in the peacekeeping mission. A short term approach would entail use of military force while a long term involves use of less obtrusive methods such as aid or financial assistance. (“Introduction” 397) The Second approach is that the EU has no centralized entities that define it in the traditional approach as a single unit. Therefore, analysis must come from examining each individual state’s level or participation and coalitions between individual states and not regard, in this context, the EU separately as it is not by traditional definition a sovereign body. The last approach is even more complex. In examining peacekeeping activities not only must individual states and any coalitions formed be examined, but also the next tier, the collective policy must be evaluated such as the CFSP and the ESDP. Additionally the very top layer the policy of the EU itself as the umbrella body must be examined. Gourlay however presents a more traditionally view of the lines of responsibility to peacekeeping efforts specifically. In Figure 1 below Gourlay presents the hierarchy of the EU in response to crisis management in general under which peacekeeping initiatives fall. Figure 1 Hierarchical Structure within the EU (Gourlay 407) This is an exciting time to be examining these theories as many of the ‘old order’ issues that placed barriers in the way of intervention and peacekeeping are gone. Rule and roles are being redefined. The cold war is over. Communism has all but disintegrated with the fall of the Soviet Union. The opportunities have been immense since that time as many of these fledging countries are struggling to reinvent themselves. The social upheaval as been great and has lead us to devising new methods of dealing with these changes. Lastly, post world 9/11 has lead to further coalition building and defining of roles globally. The United States and many European nations formed bonds to deal with the aftermath resulting from 9/11. The EU must consider these factors as well when undertaking any strategic decision making concerning peacekeeping activities. Currently with the make up of EU this strategic decision making sessions can only occur within EU level strategic headquarters, currently in the UK and France. These EU level headquarters, obviously, also operate as national headquarters within each of the individual member states (Simply, put the capitals of the respective countries). Implementation plans, however, are underway for inclusion of Greece, Germany, and Italy to soon be designated as EU level strategic headquarters. However, in 2003 a joint agreement was reached whereby EU Military staff (EMUS) will be able to set up operational headquarters “where a joint civil/military response is required and where no national headquarters is identified” (Gourlay 410). This will allow for increased flexibility and speed when necessary in the implementation of peacekeeping initiatives. Peace Support Operations (PSOs) emerged in the late 1990’s as the ‘West’s’ attempt to define internal conflict within emerging states and how they could best intervene to control what they viewed as potential security risks. This preemptive approach or peacekeeping stems not just from the desire to reduce the internal strife of countries in crisis. Rather in broader terms to protect interests of their own as well. This new definition of PSO actually encompasses three fundamentally different levels of intervention: peacekeeping, peace enforcement and at the extreme end war itself (Bono “Introduction” 400). The PSO now entails strategic alliance with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to coordinate efforts. Each has their own distinct role within the PSO. According to Bono these additional efforts in the new PSOs also include “civilian policing, institution building, infrastructure reconstruction, humanitarian relief, disarmament, demobilization and national reconciliation” (“Introduction” 400). ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted by the EU in December of 2003. According to Quille, “the EU and its member states will cooperate to tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions (specifically the UN and regional organizations) and the rule of law (upholding the principle of the use of force as a last resort)” (422). As such this strategic plan is comprehensive in scope encompassing a wide range of security possibilities through support of the doctrines ascribed by the United Nations and through addressing root causes of conflict within nations. These may include poverty and political strife brought on by internal turmoil within a country. This holistic approach stresses the role of peacekeeping and peace building as first responses, in all but extreme cases. This mindset is quite diverse from the more preemptive model of ‘security’ adopted by the Unites States whose vision of security is more focused on a unilateral approach. Although the EU and the United States agree in most cases on what is consider being security risks (i.e. weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and failed states to name several). Their theoretical methods of achieving security are quite divergent. The uniqueness of the UE naturally lends itself to multilateralism due to its inherent make-up of numerous independent states while the United States is driven by an individualized focus on its own security (Quille 423). They do share similar vision on some security issues such as how best to increase world security through the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The problem the EU must deal with is maintaining unity amongst the members of EU as some individual members may hold views similar to that of the United States in certain scenarios. A prime example of that was the Iraq invasion where there was much disagreement within the EU on the proper path that should have been followed. The consensus building needs to develop further within the EU to ensure that internal conflict does not drive a wedge between members of the union itself. This must be accomplished according to Quille in order to maintain, in the world’s view, a unified voice capable of taking a major role in international peacekeeping initiatives. Further, as Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) Javier Solana stated in Quille’s paper “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own and in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold war, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (424). EU policy to achieve security encompasses many different tools and methods including peacekeeping and peace building as first lines of defense as opposed to show of military power and force. The new face of the changing world requires new methods to deal with emerging security issues and with its diverse membership and one-ness of purpose the EU is in an excellent position to be a change agent in bridging these theoretical barriers. To that end the EU has adopted three key strategic imperatives to insure security: “to tackle the threats; to extend the zone of security around Europe; to strengthen the international order” (Quille 425) And each of these is accomplished with the minimum amount of intrusion and force necessary. However, as Bono points out the EU has actually been moving towards development of a military doctrine since the inception of the ESDP in 1999. At this point the EU was given “direct access to military structures and military forces” (“The EU’s 440). Other than the obvious fact that the EU is not an independent sovereign nation, the key difference in the EU’s evolving military doctrine is that is focuses on the use of various tools to achieve security during times of security crisis caused by forces from outside while still adhering to the principles of the United Nations and International Law. Figure 2 below graphically depicts this multi faceted approach to international security. Figure 2: The EU’s Unique Approach to Crisis Resolution (Bono “The EU’s” 441) Although the EU as a combined entity of twenty odd nations is not perceived as a military force nor has it made a show of force as a military being, it is only surpassed in military strength by the United States. “For instance, outside the US Navy, there are just 12 aircraft carriers in the world in service or being built. Eight of those ships belong to EU member states. The European states have kept between 50,000 and 100,000 troops continuously deployed in operations abroad since 1999” (Ulriksen 457). However, EU strategy is not to develop traditional methods of military superiority; rather, its focus is on developing its military strength based on its own inherent values, personal strengths, interests and visions. In that vein, the EU continues to move on a more humanistic approach of reasoning and peacekeeping as opposed to brute show of force in its move towards international security. That is not to imply that the EU will never use military force when necessary. That force is there when and if necessary; rather, the EU has deliberately chosen to focus its strategy on as stated numerous times peacekeeping and peace building principles. The EU has undertaken peacekeeping missions to date in places such as the Balkans, Kosovo and Bosnia/Herzegovina. These interventions, however, were in conjunction with NATO. Now, we find that the EU is beginning to act somewhat autonomously. The peacekeeping initiatives undertaken in the Republic of the Congo are the first such done solely as the EU and not with NATO support. A closer look into some of the various peacekeeping missions undertaken by the EU will be interesting to examine in more depth in order to understand the dynamics of this unique, evolving entity. 2003 saw the first test of the EU’s crisis management international peacekeeping operations. During that year two separate initiatives were launched first Operation Concordia in Macedonia, part of the former country of Yugoslavia and Operation Artemis in the Republic of the Congo. Operation Concordia was the first concerted effort where EU-NATO assets were utilized. The entry of the EU into Macedonia was due to its commitment to that state in its journey towards acceptance into the EU. The EU’s entry into Macedonia in its peacekeeping role was due to the internal strife between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The UN had been involved in peacekeeping efforts in the region since 1999 until there sudden withdrawal in 2003 as the country had come to a somewhat stable level. However, in 2003 several factors cause tension to rise again which necessitated the EU peacekeeping forces to enter the country. Neighboring Kosovo was in a heightened state of distress and rebels from that country were moving in and out of Macedonia. Additionally, Macedonia was receiving a mass influx of Kosovo refugees it was ill equipped to handle. These mounting tensions led to the resumption of armed conflict in Macedonia in 2003. With the assistance of outside agencies and the United States, the EU successfully opened dialogue between the warring factions and in exchange for economic assistance and mediation a peace accord was reached. Since that time Macedonia has been working to further stabilize the country so that they can meet the criteria to be accepted into the European Union. In a major victory for the EU peacekeepers. “The signing of the Ohrid Agreement on 13 August 2001 which sought to establish the basis for genuine multi-ethnic democracy in Macedonia, recognized the unitary character of the Macedonian state as inviolable while affirming that the multiethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved and reflected in public life” (Mace 480). In July of 2003 Operation Concordia was successfully completed although the EU did, at Macedonia’s request leave an EU police force in the country for an additional year to assist the new government while it was stabilizing and to add strategic direction as needed. In addition to its peacekeeping victory during Operation Concordia, the EU exhibited that through its shared deployment with NAO it was and is capable o of launching and maintaining a small scale military campaign. This first effort by the EU in its peacekeeping role gave more credence and respect throughout the campaign. “EU–NATO cooperation is dependent on the relationship between the United States and ‘Europe’ and on the role of the UK in bringing the two together. When this relationship is good the EU and NATO have much to offer by cooperating to provide flexible crisis management tools, demonstrating that the Berlin Plus arrangements have enhanced the security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic area” (Mace 486). Lastly Operation Concordia demonstrated that the EU is capable of conducting a peacekeeping mission utilizing a wide array of civilian crisis management tools in rapid succession while not straying from the guiding principles of international law and UN policy. Because of the success of Operation Concordia the EU and the UN have entered into an agreement “What Serbia and Montenegro and indeed the whole of the western Balkans needed after the wars of the 1990s were stability and time to consolidate the democratic process. In this sense, sidetracking the referendum question in Montenegro assisted in keeping things stable at least for a time” (Keane 500). The EU’s stance at the time of their intervention was to maintain unity between Serbia and Montenegro. In reality there were not many differences ethnically or culturally between the two factions and the Balkan region had been devastated by internal conflict and war for a number of years. The EU’s basic bargain tool in this peacekeeping initiative was to convince Serbia and Montenegro that their membership in the EU could be more quickly obtains if they remained one entity and began rebuilding themselves as one cohesive unit. The Belgrade Agreement of 2002 spelled out these requirements. “On 7 March 2003 Serbia and Montenegro elected a new state union president, Svetozar Marovic´ (from Montenegro), replacing former Yugoslav President Kostunica. The Council of Ministers was also elected that day with three ministers for Serbia and two from Montenegro” (Keane 501). The EU’s intent during this process had been to protect its border, recognizing that the greatest threat to the EU’s security lies at present along its eastern fringes. This is where the conflict, turmoil and internal strife was concentrated, and that is what the EU’s strategic peacekeeping initiatives were directed at ensuring - the security of the EU’s member states. By 2004 Montenegro and Serbia where having great difficulty reaching any accord on how to bring to fruition their wish to join the EU. So distant had the two entities moved from one another. If the state itself could not think and speak with one voice how they could possibly expect the individuals within that state to maintain and semblance of one-ness and unity becomes the question. By this time in 2004 The Republics of Serbia and Montenegro have separate foreign policies, separate economic policies in many sectors and different laws on issues relating to human rights. This reality makes it difficult to create a unified SAP process for Serbia and Montenegro. In fact, it is now widely argued – particularly in Montenegro – that it may even be more effective and efficient for the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro to have a separate SAP process with the EU (Keane 501-502). When examining the major downfall of this accord it was noted that it did not encompass the use of follow up crisis management within the borders of that country. Had that occurred, utilizing the many tools afforded to the EU’s peacekeeping mission perhaps things would not be evolving as they are. As it stands according to Keane the unified Serbian Montenegro union will not survive past 2006 due to their unwillingness or inability to reach joint consensus. However the EU intervention has not been a failure. At a time when it was desperately needed the EU’s peacekeeping initiative brought stability to the region albeit temporarily and further exposed both factions to necessary skills for successfully integration towards becoming sovereign nations. January 1, 2003, for the first time, the EU took over responsibility for an international police mission. On that date the EU became the sole entity responsible for maintaining the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The situation in BiH was such that according to EU assessment it met two of the five threats of international security. Firstly, organized crime, and that was coupled with state failure. When a country is in a state of failure, it is in a prime breeding ground for the development of organized crime. As such “restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organized crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organized crime within the EU” (Osland 544) This area of the world is recognized with being terribly enmeshed with organized crime and as such it is a high volatile and dangerous operation. Such peacekeeping and police skills will surely test the abilities of the UE. According to Osland, “90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan . . . Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide” (545). The European Security Strategies (ESS) that was discussed earlier is not just to assist the other state. They are also imperative for the security of the EU as well. As such, the EU involvement in places like BiH, Kosovo and Macedonia may appear altruistic, but they are actually the EU’s method of protecting the EU membership for the outside of this region of Southeast Europe. Their current effort in BiH is not just a necessary peacekeeping effort to stabilize that region and ensure the safety of its citizens. It is also truly a test of the effectiveness and cohesion of the EU itself and a failure would certainly be a blow for the EU’s credibility world wide. This peacekeeping mission requires great delicacy and insight into the dynamics of this region. Supporting the wrong people could lead to disaster for the region. Those who are placed or control ownership of the processes, in effect, control the country. As such, Osland states that: Efforts to develop peace and democracy in a community that has experienced war and conflict will have poor prospects if proper attention is not paid to the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence… Against this background, it is therefore not surprising that security sector reform has been described as ‘the quintessential governance issue’ – both due to the potential within this sector to misuse resources, and because a security sector out of control can have serious consequences for the way in which a country is governed. (Osland 548) The EU has come far in securing this region but it is still a volatile area. The need for the international security force has decreased but has not yet been eliminated. The international police forces in BiH were at an all time high of approximately 45,000 immediately after the conflict. Now the EU has approximately 16,000 peacekeepers in place. According to the EU, they will not exit until their primary goal is achieved: to ensure BiH has an internally integrated police force system and is assured that each citizen of that state can live without fear and is assured his safety and security. A formidable task, but the EU is well on its way to accomplishing this. One of the most difficult tasks the EU faced when launching this mission was obtaining qualified personnel. The EU at that time had never entered into a policing venture internationally and had no qualified candidates within its membership on ‘stand by’ per se for deployment. This extra time that was required to coordinate this garnering and training of manpower provided a powerful lesson to EU in their future planning agenda for readiness issues. Since that time the EU has put in place training sites for volunteers for international peacekeeping missions of this type to improve readiness, but also the standardize training and skill sets within the peacekeeping force. Each deployment is being viewed as an opportunity for improvement within the EU. “EU foreign policy can certainly earn the trust of EU citizens, especially in the civilian crisis management sector. However, this can only be achieved through honest acceptance that we are still very much at the learning stage, that success is sometimes marred with failure and that coherent EU foreign policy is still somewhere between aspiration and reality” (Keane 505 – 506). Democracy has always been viewed as the political structure and modality most conducive to peacekeeping initiatives. The problem or rather challenge in attempting to assist in the peacekeeping process of stabilizing conflict torn states is to find the perfect degree of democratic rule. There is a fine line or divide between too much and too little especially when the areas involved have never known democracy. They have barely begun to comprehend what autonomy is. According to Youngs “the EU has more cautiously supported elite-controlled processes of partial political liberalization. A focus on political liberalization has not been completely absent, but has co-existed uneasily with strategies emphasizing stability, mediation and the role of individual leaders” (527). In reality policy building and peacekeeping are completely separate entities from democracy sharing and that distinction needs to be kept separate from one another. One are within the EU’s peacekeeping initiative that continues to grow is political aid. The budge for this type of initiative has, to date, increase too nearly one billion pounds for democracy and human rights aid alone while in 1999 the same budget was hard pressed to reach 100 million pounds (Youngs 529). The peacekeeping modality of the EU differs from that of a separate, distinct nation differs in several ways. First, and most importantly, is the EU’s strong belief in moving towards a civil society and rights based focus in its peacekeeping missions. The single nation approach generally is focused on establishing a democratic type setting and ensuring an election takes place. With this single mindedness sometimes the underlying causes of the initial problem, be they social or ethnic or some other type, may be overlooked. With this one way sighted vision it becomes very easy to do so – ‘can’t see the forest for the trees’ mindset. Since its inception into the peacekeeping realm, the EU’s budget for electoral reform has declined by nearly 59 percent, displaying how the EU has shifted from a more political stance than that of an interested bystander. Understand the uniqueness of the EU and the influence they can have over maintaining peace and stability within the world has been an enlightening experience. Their approach to ensuring each member’s security while reaching out to assist innocent victims of political strife and social upheaval is being accomplished with the utmost concern and respect for the dignity of each and every person with whom they come in contact with. The sense of almost a brotherhood, for lack of a better term, between the members of the EU appears to lack any personal agendas or politics. I am sure there are problems within the EU as with any organization. However, through conducting this research I really have been impressed by their all encompassing humanitarian policies on ensuring world peace. The rest of the world would be well advised to examine their practices and attempt as well as possible to emulate their approach to international peacekeeping. Works Cited “Beginnings: The History of the European Union.” 2005 EUROPA Website. 29 Dec.2005 . Bono, Giovanna. “The EU’s Military Doctrine: An Assessment..” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 395-403. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Bono, Giovanna. “Introduction: The Role of the EU in External Crisis Management.” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 395-403. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Gourlay, Catriona. “European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management.” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 404-421. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Keane, Rory. “The Solana Process in Serbia and Montenegro: Coherence in EU Foreign Policy.” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 491-507. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Mace, Catriona. “Operation Concordia: Developing a ‘European’ Approach to Crisis Management.” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 474-490. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Osland, Kari. “The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 474-490. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Quille, Gerrard. “The European Security Stranger: A Framework for EU Security Interests?” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 422-438. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Ulriksen, Stale. “Requirements for Future European Military Strategies and Force Structures.” International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 457-473. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Youngs, Richard. “Democratic Institution-Building and Conflict Resolution: Emerging EU Approaches: International Peacekeeping. 11: 3 Autumn 2004: 526-543. Academic Search Premier Database. EBSCO Galileo 29 Dec. 2005 . Read More