British Defence Policy - Essay Example

In 1998, the British government conducted a Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Three years later, the entire world got a very clear picture of what calamities terrorists could bring about, when the al-Qaeda network destroyed most of the World Trade Center in New York City. Because the United States had previously been such a welcoming country for incoming students, terrorists were able to get trained as pilots at American institutes. Because United States airport security had previously been somewhat more trusting, those same terrorists were able to use box cutters to intimidate passengers and airline employees, gaining entry into the cockpits of three passenger planes. The passengers on the fourth plane rose up and fought their oppressors, but the price was fatal. By the time that military responses could be coordinated, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had already been hit. Paradigm shifts like this were part of the rationale behind the writing of the Defence White Paper entitled "Delivering Security in a Changing World" in 2003. The British government recognized a number of factors that necessitated changes in the ways that government agencies handled domestic security. According to the introduction to the white paper, it was "evident that the successful management of international security problems [would] require ever more integrated planning of military, diplomatic and economic instruments at both national and international levels" (Ministry of Defence 2003, p. 1). In other words, not only would countries have to be able to cooperate in ways that had not yet been possible in meeting the challenges of a common enemy, agencies within the same government would also have to work in concert swiftly to meet the challenges of terrorism, and there are many countries in which this interagency cooperation would prove more of a challenge than finding common ground with other countries. The improvement in military technologies was also a factor, which led those writing the paper to "look at how.new technologies [can] deliver military effects in different ways[including] flexible forces able to configure to generate the right capability in a less predictable and more complex operational environment" (Ministry of Defence 2003, p. 1). The goal of the white paper was to "move away from simplistic platform-centric planning to a fully 'networked enabled capability' able to exploit effects-based planning and operations, using forces which are truly adaptable, capable of even greater levels of precision, and rapidly deployable" (Ministry of Defence 2003, p. 1). Clearly, some paradigm shifts were underway in the restructuring of British security. Although the British government conducted another SDR in 2002, after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, there were other international events and factors that led to the writing of this white paper. The first one mentioned was the large number of small crises that were occurring all over the globe, including Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, Congo, and Iraq - all at once. Constructing a military to face two or three theaters, at most, would be outdated in the current security environment. Also, while theaters in past conflicts, such as the Falkland Islands, or even such conflicts that, at the time, seemed protracted (like the Second World War), ended up taking less time to resolve that some of these foreign crises have in the past decade. Also, the structure of NATO has changed, transitioning from a group of large, static forces to smaller response teams that can go outside the NATO territory. Similarly, the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has fragmented the size of response teams even further. Also, a strategic partnership with Russia could present a variety of demands, given the instability that, at times, has plagued Russia's infrastructure, particularly their oil pipelines. The spreading of weapons of mass destruction around the world, and particularly the ease with which individuals and small groups, as opposed to nations, can create and develop these weaponry systems, are of specific concern to the British government. A positive factor that also served to highlight the need for this white paper was the emerging concepts and technologies surrounding such ideas Network Enhanced Capability (NEC) as well as precision weapons (Ministry of Defence 2003, pgs. 2-3). There were a number of specific changes that resulted from the adoption of this white paper. In general, the British goal was to be able to handle three operations that were small to medium, at least one of which was a long-term peacekeeping excursion, along the lines of Kosovo. All three of these forces were expected to be able to act as the lead nation in coalition operations. Also, the British military sought to be able to deploy for a large-scale operation while running a small-scale operation simultaneously. As far as force-specific changes, those occurred as follows: There were a significant number of reductions in forces and assets. The British Army lost 1,000 soldiers, the Royal Air Force lost 7,000 flyers, and the Royal Navy lost 1,500 sailors. Four battalions were removed from Northern Ireland and distributed to other areas of need. Several artillery batteries were lightened and moved. Smaller infantry battalions were combined into larger regiments. The Lightweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System was purchased for three regiments. Three light-armoured squadrons were created for training on the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES), which is the next generation of armored vehicles. In the Royal Air Force, such older craft as the Nimrod MR-class and Tornado F3 were to be gradually replaced with such newer, more versatile equipment as the Typhoon and the Boeing C-17. The Rapier missile launchers were either blended in with the Army Royal Artillery, instead of keeping its old place in the Royal Air Force, or downsized. In the Royal Navy, such ships as the Type 45 destroyers, Type 23 frigates, nuclear attack subs and countermeasure vessels were downsized, because of the shrinking need for naval capacity in these kinds of conflicts. Most of the work for NATO and other security organizations is land-based only. The military budget was set to increase from almost 30 billion pounds in 2004/2005 to 33.4 billion pounds in 2007/2008, including 3 billion to be spent purchasing newer, more wieldy helicopters by 2015 ("Delivering Security" 2007). Other significant changes dealt more with larger-level restructuring. One of the army's armoured regiments was converted to handling formation reconnaissance. In other words, information became more valuable than tanks. Also, all single-battalion infantry regiments were merged into larger regiments that were either new or already existed. One battalion of the Parachute Regiment was converted into a specialist special forces support battalion. Total infantry battalions in the army were reduced from 40 to 36. New regiments were created of commando engineers and signals personnel ("Delivering Security 2007). As one might imagine, in the politicized era that has characterized post-9/11 international security, particularly the increasingly unilateral forces that remain in Iraq, the changes in the white paper sparked some strong opinions. An editorial in The Guardian pointed out that, while these changes in the British military would make it more capable of responding to a larger number of smaller crises around the globe, it was worth questioning whether or not positioning itself for more overseas battles was the proper goal of military restructuring. While it might be well and good to help put out fires around the globe in the interest of reducing worldwide terrorism, and, hopefully, minimizing the risk of that terrorism entering the United Kingdom, the editorial also asks whether or not the changes in British military policy are sufficiently addressing the needs of what the United States calls "homeland security." While such American legislation as the Patriot Act has changed many aspects of domestic life in the United States, for the purported purpose of keeping terrorism out and maintaining public order and security, there was no such legislation concomitant with the changes in the British military structure. More specifically, the editorial argues that "[w]here the white paper goes wrong is in proposing to further develop 'expeditionary force' capabilities inter-operable with US forces, thus increasing the potential for more all-out wars of conquest like Iraq under US/NATO command" ("We Cannot Have it All," 2003). One could very easily argue that adding to the number of such conflicts that the British Army is involved with could easily add to the risk that terrorists would retaliate by taking out targets in the United Kingdom, thereby giving the restructuring the troublesome effect of worsening internal security. As Mary McGrory wrote, "Blair [has been] essential to Bush's dream of a war. His staunchness has lent plausibility and respectability to the venture" ("US papers back Blair," 2003). So, while the changes may well have streamlined many parts of the British military, and made it able to respond more efficiently to the new challenges of the twentieth-century geopolitical climate, another result has been to make the British government appear complicit with the deeds of the American government. What many people viewed as a proper response to the ravages of September 11, 2001, in the United States, at least at the time, may have drained much of British credibility in the sands of the Middle East. It is too soon to say whether Prime Minister Blair's recent withdrawal of troops from Iraq will save him from the same condemnations that rain down on the head of President Bush. Works Cited British Ministry of Defence (2003). Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper 2003. Accessed 11 March 2007 online at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/UnitedKingdom-2003.pdf "Delivering Security in a Changing World" (2007). Accessed 11 March 2007 online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delivering_Security_in_a_Changing_World "US papers back Blair." BBC News Online. Accessed 11 March 2007 online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2848161.stm "We cannot have it all" (2003). Accessed 11 March 2007 online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,3604,1105095,00.html Read More