Cross-Party Consensus on the Defence Policy Breakdown - Case Study Example

To what extent and with what result did the cross party consensus on British Defence Policy breakdown of the 1980’s? i. Introduction In our history, Great Britain’s foreign policy is a “three overlapping circles”.1 This is Winston Churchill’s term to distinguish the Britain’s roles as post-imperial power with an assortment of tasks and secure connection with the United States (though only acting as a minor super power) and its role as a member of the European Community. These roles are mostly associated with the pressure and assumptions of the cold war and the belief of a more or less enduring Soviet threat. During the 1960s and 1970s under the governments of Wilson, Heath, and Callaghan, there was a noticeable shift of prominence towards the country’s European role. The commonwealth replaces the empire and naval policing and distant land-based commitments were phased out. In fact, Britain took the initiative to withdraw from East of the Suez Canal and later joined the European Community in 1973 while keeping its distance from the United States and taking common position with other West European allies. These were the times when the British defence policies are still a bipartisan issue where nuclear deterrent, British role in NATO, the outline of military spending, and the future of British defence industries were all subject to stern party and public debates. However, in the 1980s under the Mrs. Thatcher’s government, this propensity was inverted and suddenly it has been “politicized” and the old cross-party consensus was decisively broken”2 .Along with the United States, Mrs. Thatcher’s 1Jonathan Shepard, 2006, Byzantium’s Overlapping Circles, Oxford University, United Kingdom, p.1 2Michael Smith et. al., 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816, p.84 government fervently embraced the new cold war resulting to the massive increase of defence expenditure and all out support for the deployment of cruise missiles. The British government started to purchase American Trident missiles and was able to reawaken the populist notions of Britain’s position as a great power. The extent and the result of the traditional cross-party consensus on the defence policy breakdown of the 1980s is rather momentous as it is apparently an abrupt, radical, and complete digression on the British defence policy and beyond the principle of international diplomacy thus a review of this significant event is indispensable. ii. Overview This paper will investigate through literature review the different rationale of the 1980s British cross-party consensus on defence policy breakdown. It will find the details, extent, and result of the implications of such severe and radical change in the British foreign and defence policies. It will put fourth a short discussion on the relevance and repercussions of nuclear weapons and increased military spending to Britain’s local economy and international relation. Finally, this will conclude with the summary and overall assessment of the topic. iii. Extent of the cross party consensus on the defence policy breakdown 1980s Nuclear weapons were at the centre of the British debate in the 1980s about the European security and this is the same issue (American Trident and Cruise missiles) the precipitated the breakdown of the British political consensus. Furthermore, the emergence of Gorvachev, the departure of Ronald Reagan, and the end of the Cold War have had significant implications for the politics of nuclear weapons in Britain and Europe3. The absence of cross-party consensus and the sudden shift in Britain’s defence policy exerted pressure to the foreign policy as well which can be characterized as an attempt to bend the process to meet the needs of what Mrs. Thatcher’s called “conviction in government”. Consequently, the Conservative in government and the Labour Party who is hypothetically the opposition took the same side in pursuing an ideological stance while the Liberal and SDP alliance, instead of presenting an alternative to the politics of ideology, found themselves advocating a radical defence policy4. These radical and committed domestic policies may have important consequences on foreign policy hence the “seven power summit” or the “group of seven” (G7)5 which were an annual feature since 1975, transforms and underwent a change of character after 1980. This is due to the adoption of monetarist economic policies by the right wing governments in Britain, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany6. Monetarism according to British economist is a “terrible curse, a visitation of evil spirits, with particular unfortunate, once could almost say devastating consequences on our own country, Britain”7. The onset of severe economic recession during the 1980 and 1981 that was due to the Thatcher 3Colin McInnes, 1992, Security and Strategy in the New Europe, Published 1992 Routledge, ISBN 0415071208, p. 179 4-6Michael Smith et. al., 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816, p.84 5Peter Hajnal, 1995, The G-7 Summit and Its Documents, Government Information in Canada, Vol. 1, No. 3.3. (1995), p. 1 7Nicholas Kaldor, 1981, Origins of the New Monetarism, Published 1981 at Cambridge University, p.1 government’s commitment to the search for new military strength in support to NATO’s increasing defence spending is enough to bring home the problem even to the committed re-earners. “Mrs. Thatcher’s governments were unquestionably radical and challenging” 8 and if there was indeed a fundamental transformation of British policy in the international arena in 1980s then it would be depressing. However, according to Croft (1991)9, British policy with a few exceptions was widely largely similar before since pro-nuclear attitude and great reliance on special relationships already exists then and these faults were part of the post-war bipartisanship in foreign and defence policies. Nevertheless, he added, it would be unfair to criticize Mrs. Thatcher’s administration for not breaking the consensus, when in so many areas of domestic policy she has been criticized for being very willing to break the bipartisanship. Since then the debate on nuclear weapons and the role of the Americans in Europe security were entangled since the presence of Cruise and Pershing II missiles along with ill-considered statements of the American leaders gave the impression that Europe was becoming a prospective nuclear battlefield that would not affect mainland Soviet Union and the United States. Ultimately, the intense argument and opposition to Cruise and other aspects of NATO strategy and American policy almost led British to abandon NATO10. Many advocate of alternative defence also believes that to attain peace and Europe requires the dissolution of the two blocs (US/Soviet Union) but an immediate 8-9Stuart Croft, 1991, British Security Policy: The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War, Published 1991 Routledge, ISBN 0044458207, p.215 10Colin McInnes, 1992, Security and Strategy in the New Europe, Published 1992 Routledge, ISBN 0415071208, p. 1188 British withdrawal from NATO might result in a dangerous destabilization or even precipitating a more hazardous realignment than at present11. In 1981, Defence Secretary John Knott introduced a Defence Review document optimistically entitled “The Way Forward” which is a plan to cut military expenditures particularly the Royal Navy. The review appears to mark the end of any residual pretensions to a global role of Britain and it stirred strong opposition from the “navy lobby”. However, the Falkland War removed some the review’s harsher proposal but the mismatched of commitments and resources remains12. Through the 1980s there were growing unease with the established concept of security that many believes only privileged the states and the military. There was a persistent call for broadening or reconsidering the idea but nothing has changed except the inclusion of individuals and the world community in the original and traditional concept of security13. iv. Result of the cross party consensus on the defence policy breakdown 1980’s “Ideology is always difficult to translate into action and foreign policy is an area which time again blunts ideological fervour in favour of a more cautious pragmatism”14. The radical shift of commitment on foreign and defence policy of major British political parties has led to significant consequences that reduced considerably the scope of joint and detailed economic 11-13Colin McInnes, 1992, Security and Strategy in the New Europe, Published 1992 Routledge, ISBN 0415071208, p. 189/4 12-14Michael Smith et. al., 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816, p.109/84 planning. The 1980s cross-party consensus on the defence policy breakdown resulted in military spending way beyond the British traditional defence policy. Since the military is the instrument to which a state can both counter, certain type of threats and pursue wider milieu goals, the British Defence policy now includes acquisition, management, and development of military capabilities and promotes a specific international order, which is favourable to the country’s security. For the most part according to Smith (1988)15, this means protecting the western capitalist rather than the British way of life. In comparison with other advance industrial states, Britain spends more on defence and maintains a larger professional military. They consistently spent more than their NATO allies did and as the financial cost of weapon systems elevate inexorably, the availability to maintain a practicable independent defence industry is endangered. Meanwhile, large anti-nuclear protests were mounted throughout Britain and Western Europe and the Labour Party in resistance adopted policies, which resulted to a rejection of the basic doctrine of the British security policy. “No nations can avoid defence economic problems”16. From 1955, UK defence spending fell and remained constant throughout the 1960s. However, from 1980, the defence spending for the United Kingdom rise and peaked in 1985-1986 marking the end of NATO’s commitment to rise spending by 3% per annum. UK defence budget was mostly allocated to equipment and personnel, and once again, the equipment share of the defence budget was at peak 15Michael Smith et. al., 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816, p.102 16Keith Hartley, 2002, UK Defence Policy: An Economists Perspective, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, England, p.1 in 1985-1986 contributing to almost 46% of the then large defence budget. After 1986, the defence budget has fallen followed by job losses and plant closures and jobs in the defence industry from 1986-1998 declines by 45% or 330,000 jobs lost17. These figures clearly indicate the enormous military budget allotted after the political consensus breakdown and it was only reduced considerably after the restructuring in the early 1990’s. The political consensus breakdown apparently caused by the supposed “threat” imagined by the U.S. administration and the eagerness of Thatcher’s government resulted in economic and political chaos. v. Discussion According to some Smith (1988)18, the series of incremental cuts on the UK defence budget during the early and mid 1960s and the withdrawal of UK forces in Suez Canal were a genuine turning point in the British Defence policy. Furthermore, it marked the end of the attempt to maintain a permanent military presence in Asia and in the wake of oil crisis and economic turmoil in 1973, the Labour government of 1976 to 1979 further reduced their spending on the operational programs. The widespread perception in the late 1970s that the Soviet threat was growing and that the increase in defence spending is essential to counter the threat, NATO members agrees to increase spending by 3% per annum. This was back by then newly elected government of Margaret Thatcher that eagerly embraced the notion of building military strength in the region and very 17Keith Hartley, 2002, UK Defence Policy: An Economists Perspective, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, England, p.2 18Michael Smith et. al., 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816, p.109 willing to break the political or bipartisan consensus. Along with its special relationship with the United States, this administration ignores the potential political and economic consequences of purchasing nuclear weapons and deploying them in Europe including the common consensus that Europe is will become a nuclear battlefield. More importantly, bipolarity and the growth of alliances, and the advent of nuclear weapons in Europe has made the risk of confrontation so great that the uncertainties of Soviet threats has now become the trepidation of a nuclear attack. The Thatcher government is unaware that an arms race between superpowers is an almost automatic tendency on both sides to research, develop, and procure new weapons systems to counter the challenge of the ever-growing threats. This competition will certainly creates a dilemma to subordinate members of the alliance as they must either attempt to maintain the effectiveness of their military forces or watch them deteriorates. This also poses a bleak choice even with NATO members since they will only have two options: purchase sophisticated military hardware from the U.S. or develop them on their own. Unfortunately, either way, the political, economic, and industrial costs will be too great. However, in the face of the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, the Thatcher government still attempted to maintain that there was no need fundamentally to rethink United Kingdom’s security, defence, or arms control policy. In her view, changes in Europe were too uncertain to provide a basis for defence cuts. However, these changes prompted a defence review- “Options for Change”19. 19Stuart Croft, 1991, British Security Policy: The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War, Published 1991 Routledge, ISBN 0044458207, p. 84 This March 1990 defence white paper claims that some old certainties had disappeared but it was far from clear what was emerging. Although some cuts is possible, it have to recognize that the Soviet is still a major military power. Moreover, there will be no need for United States presence in Europe and the out-of-area capabilities would become progressively more significant. Nevertheless, any saving from equipment cancellation would need to be distributed within the military to raise standards and maintain capabilities. In general, the UK government has taken the stand that its too early for a full scale restructuring thus cuts in military spending will be gradual and small. Finally, in the overall defence effort of the United Kingdom, the factors of bipolarity, alliance embarrassment, and the arms competition defines the “contour of the mould from which Britain’s contemporary defence attitude has been cast”20. In terms of defence commitment where successive British governments abandoned imperial ties as decolonization took affect, and have reformed defence policy in an excruciating acknowledgment that all of her defence interest only that of concerning “European security” was and will remain irreducible. 20Michael Smith et. al., 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816, p.105 vi. Conclusion The extent of the cross-party breakdown on the defence policy of the 1980s mainly contribute to the sudden shift of Britain’s defence and foreign policy that has affected and transform even the G7. The Thatcher’s conservative government stance to the search for new military strength in support to NATO’s increasing defence spending has resulted to the onset of severe economic recession in the homeland. The radical and challenging nature of the conservative government at the time contributed to the depressing transformation of British international relation and considerably reduced the scope of joint and detailed economic planning. Furthermore, the advent of nuclear weapons and its special relationship with the U.S. gave the impression that Europe will be use as a nuclear battlefield for the benefit of the United States. In the face of economic recession and nuclear attack, there were growing discomfort and persistent calls for change resulting to large organize anti-nuclear protest in Britain and Western Europe that started the gradual reduction of military spending. Overall, the political consensus breakdown apparently caused by the supposed “threat” imagined by the U.S. administration and embraced by Mrs. Thatcher’s government in early 1980s resulted in nothing but economic and political chaos. vii. References CROFT Stuart, 1991, British Security Policy: The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War, Published 1991 Routledge, ISBN 0044458207 HAJNAL Peter, 1995, The G-7 Summit and Its Documents, Government Information in Canada, Vol. 1, No. 3.3. (1995) HARTLEY Keith, 2002, UK Defence Policy: An Economists Perspective, Centre for Defence Economics, University of York, England KALDOR Nicholas, 1981, Origins of the New Monetarism, Published 1981 at Cambridge University McINNES Colin, 1992, Security and Strategy in the New Europe, Published 1992 Routledge, ISBN 0415071208 SHEPARD Jonathan, 2006, Byzantium’s Overlapping Circles, Oxford University, United Kingdom SMITH Michael, Smith Steve, White and Brian, 1988, British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Transformation, Published 1988 Routledge, ISBN 0043270816 Read More