What Impact Did The Boeing - Airbus Dispute Have On The European Union - Essay Example

[Supervisors What Impact Did The Boeing - Airbus Dispute Have On The European Union European Union (EU And World Trade Organization (WTO) The European Union (EU) is one of the acme players in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is for the reason that the European Union has a general trade policy, where the European Union Commission discusses on behalf of the European Union 's 25 Member States. As such, the European Union is one of the powerful forces after the present round of polygonal trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization. (Pierre-Henri & Marc, 1998, Pp 14-15) The main purpose of the New Round is to put growth at the heart of the world trade structure in a way that will help them battle inflation. The World Trade Organization was recognized in 1995 as a consequence of the Uruguay Round of polygonal trade discussions (1986-1994). It is an international organization that sets universal rules of trade among nations. The central part of the World Trade Organization system, understood as the multilateral trading system, its Members take up the World Trade Organization agreements, which lay down the permissible ground rules for international trade as well as the market-opening obligations (Boeing And Airbus, Online, P1). The World Trade Organization is collection of governments and political bodies (such as the European Union) and is a member-driven organization with conclusions mainly taken on an accord basis. Membership entails a stability of rights and obligations. By October 2004, 149 countries had connected the World Trade Organization, with approximately twenty-five negotiating to sign up. (Boeing And Airbus, Online, P1). The main and most complete unit is the European Union with its twenty-five Member States. Certainly, while the Member States organize their places in Brussels and Geneva, the European Union Commission only speaks for the European Union at more or less all World Trade Organization conferences. Super Jumbo's - Boeing And Airbus The Boeing Company is the most important American aircraft and aerospace producer, its headquarter is in Chicago, Illinois, with its chief manufacturing capabilities in Everett, Washington, on 30 miles north of Seattle, Washington. It is also the second-chief defense supplier in the world, and the main civil aircraft producer in the world in terms of aircraft orders after long straggling Airbus for the past five years, and the main exporter in the United States. Airbus, which first transported additional planes than Boeing in 2003, will preserve that escort for 2005 as it anticipate to sell 370 planes in contrast with 290 (Fisher, 2002, P 1). Boeing's two major sections are Boeing Integrated Defense Systems (IDS), responsible for military and space products, and Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA), accountable for civil airliners. Boeing has long been the principal in the world aviation industry. Having lived the unstable seminal years of the industry, Boeing's first achievement was as a manufacturer of military aircraft during and after World War II. In the commercial aircraft division, its first achievement happened in the 1950s with the expansion of the 707, which became the world's first victorious jetliner. Boeing then congealed its leading place in the commercial market in the 1970s with the growth of the 747. Airbus most commonly known as simply Airbus only, its foundtion in Toulouse, France, is the globes main commercial aircraft producer. It was built-in 2001 under French law. Airbus was priorly known as Airbus Industries and is merely just named Airbus. Airbus is mutually held by European Aeronautic, Defense, and Space Company (80%) and BAE Systems (20%), European Union two principal military suppliers and producers. For 2005, its CEO is Gustav Humbert. Airbus utilize around 52,000 people in numerous European Union countries. Manufacturing takes place at Toulouse France, Hamburg Germany, Barcelona Spain, and Chester UK. The foremost opponent of Airbus is Boeing, with which it fights an strong business and political combat. Presently there are approximately 3,850 Airbus aircraft at work, with Airbus captivating more than fifty per cent of aircraft produced for orders in current years. But Airbus creations are still outclassed six to one by in-making Boeings (there are more than 4,000 Boeing 737's solely at service). This is anyhow indicative of past success - Airbus made a delayed admission into the recent jet airliner market. Airbus succeeded a superior share of making-orders and transported more jumbo jet in 2003 and 2004. Airbus has pursued a very diverse path to fame. In numerous ways it is an extremely doubtful project, having started from scrape as the consequence of an accommodating effort among disreputably nationalistic and self-governing European Union governments. When Airbus was shaped in 1970, the Commercial Aircraft Industry was approximately completely restricted by U.S. firms, and there was much disbelief as to whether Airbus could do well. However, enormous government subsidies to Airbus facilitated it to become a main participant, and it is now posing a physically powerful confront to Boeing's supremacy. The extraordinary achievement of Airbus is indication to the premise of planned trade policy. According to this assumption, proportional benefit can be shaped through subsidies and other forms of defense from opposition granted to favored industries, or "national champions," that likely would not flourish in an aggressive market. This idea of managed trade is in bleak difference with the free-market direction that is normally followed by U.S. firms and authorized by U.S. policymakers. This report takes the situation that U.S. supremacy in the Commercial Aircraft Industry was loosen partially because of a conviction in the traditional belief that following a policy of free trade, even when one's trading associates do not, on equilibrium is still helpful. U.S. devotion to the attitude of free trade, while efficiently recognizing and accepting the advancement approved by the European Union, allowed Airbus the time it needed to become firmly recognized in the industry. The accomplishment of Airbus, with its business model of heavy government subsidization without recoupment of costs, posed a particular threat to U.S. airplane manufacturers. Moreover, it formed a broad threat to a U.S. economy then in the center of stagflation and depression. Those governments deeply funded airbus, founded in 1969 by state-owned aerospace companies in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Among its advantages was a pleasant-sounding aviation industry recognized by the United Kingdom and France while generating Concorde. Though its early market share was diminutive, Airbus rapidly grew with the help of heavy expansion subsidization. In addition, with center-left governments in power in European Union countries all through the 1970s, possible nationalistic allegation for Airbus' success could be seen. While Boeing was a privately recognized and financed organization, although one with noteworthy participation with United States defense contracts, European Union chains aerospace companies were government creations, and from the start of the jet age were completely government financed and maintained. When Airbus was created in the late 1960s, the Concorde was still under production by European Union governments in spite of astounding costs. Boeing, for now, was nearly broken by its progress of the original jumbo, the 747. (Fisher, 2002, P 1) Boeing was forced to dismiss thousands of workers and to supply private sector airlines with encouraging purchase terms in order both to safe much needed deposits and to create the order base to urge further growth and production. Though ultimately the U.S. government did make available negligible support, mostly in the form of hopeful negotiations between Boeing and major airline customers, it provided basically nothing in the way of straight financial support for the 747. This is in distinction to European Union chains civil aircraft expansion, which was almost completely government funded. US - EU Conflicts When united with the growing fame of the planned European Union Army, the possible gains in European Union technological abilities, particularly in the aerospace sector, pretense a possible threat to U.S. national security on numerous levels. A boost in European Union technological power could escort to a European Union chain whose security objectives vary from those of the United States, with the capability to execute its goals through its new technological and military power. Points of disagreement would not only be specific cases such as interference in the Balkans, but rather conflicting worldviews between the two blocs, with major blaze points coming in such places as formerly Soviet-controlled space and the Middle East. In the post-World War II world, nearly all disagreements between European Union and U.S. foreign policy ideas have been determined in favor of the United States. European Union chain would have less inducement to subsidiary its goals to those of the United States in a world in which European Union and U.S. authority was close to equivalence and in which European Union chains had achieved an important degree of technological and military liberty. In economic terms, the United States and European Union chains are close to equivalence already. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the European Union was approximately $7.8 trillion in 2000, as compared to $10 trillion in the United States. The population of the European Union has already outpaced that of the United States. The proposed succession to the European Union of rising Central and Eastern European Union countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, will further close the gap. The likelihood of argument between European Union chains and the United States, two powerful blocs with different sources of power and geopolitical goals, is a classic ancestor to global disagreement on an economic and systemic, if not a military, level. The possible danger intrinsic in such a disagreement authorization that tremendous care is given to build up a solution, and existing trade cure processes heretofore used may be inadequate. Problems - Boeing, Airbus Business And Political Issues The commercial aircraft industry is significant to the United States for equally economic and political motives. Economically, commercial aviation has been the key player of the military-industrial complex and a constructive actor on many other segments of U.S. industry. Politically, Boeing has guaranteed the lead of the United States in the aviation industry and aviation exports, which have a helpful effect on the capability of the United States to export geopolitical control (Ross, 1998, Pp 146-147). Aware of this beneficial effect of a winning aviation industry on the United States, European Union chains created and financed Airbus as a straight competitor to Boeing, hoping it would participate the same role for the European Union that Boeing has played for the United States. Current events, particularly the proposed A380 super-jumbo jet and the proceeding expansion of the European Union Army, place Airbus at the crossroads of European Union technological advance and military incorporation, and make Airbus achievement vital to that of the European Union Project (Nigel, 1996, Pp 139-140). Whether looked at through the lens of hard power, soft power, or economic power, the success and maintenance of Boeing's manufacturing capabilities and market success is of vital interest to U.S. national security, just as European Union chains has recognized the importance of Airbus in protecting the security of European Union chain. The corollary is also true: those outside forces that threaten Boeing, especially by utilizing extra-market methods of protection with which Boeing cannot legally or practically compete, pose a danger to U.S. national security. Past subsidies offered to Airbus Industrie by various European Union Member States, and especially the subsidies currently being contemplated to assist in the development of the A380 super-jumbo jet, are an example of such dangerous forces. (Ross, 1998, Pp 151-152) These European Union actions require that the United States attempt to halt the subsidies through the various international dispute resolution systems available. If the available mechanisms seem unable to handle a dispute of this potential magnitude, extra-judicial measures, such as diplomacy, must be used. Airbus actions seem likely to necessitate a complete reformulation of U.S. national security with respect to its industrial base and relations with the European Union. This is especially true in light of other developments, such as the creation of the European Union Army and increasingly divergent foreign policy goals of the European Union and United States in the post-Cold War world. Some political figures and economists argue that the economies of the United States and European Union chains are so intertwined that substantial policy shifts might have potentially destabilizing second-order effects. Nevertheless, the recent policy of Airbus and the European Union has been to rely more on European Union suppliers and sub-contractors and to use Airbus to build the European Union aircraft industry, and to further aid the integration of European Union chains. (Nigel, 1996, Pp 133-134). This seems likely to continue as European Union chains asserts its emerging power and independence. Development Of The A380 By Airbus Airbus continued to proceed with its plans and development, albeit in a low profile manner, despite the breakdown of cooperation with Boeing and negative reports by aviation analysts. From 1997 to 2000, the company continued to talk to potential partners and customers about the need for a super-jumbo, and became convinced that its future depended on having its own top of the line super-jumbo. It appears that Airbus' decision to develop the super-jumbo was not strictly a business decision, but was also motivated, at least in part, by strategic considerations. Airbus announced tentative plans to proceed with the A380 in mid-2000, contingent upon receiving forty to fifty orders from airline customers. The orders were received, and in December 2000 Airbus officially announced the launch of the 500 to 900 seats A380, to be delivered sometime around 2006 (Robbie, 1999, Pp 56-58). The reaction of Boeing and the U.S. government was swift and predictable. Both parties claimed that, despite the conversion of Airbus from a French holding company to a joint stock company in mid-2000, the program was unfairly and perhaps illegally subsidized by European Union governments, and that Airbus' actions could start a trade war. Boeing claimed that it had not proceeded with its plans for a super-jumbo because of the potentially prohibitive cost, and that for Airbus to develop such a plane with the backing of European Union governments would be a violation of world trade conventions. Airbus responded that everything it was doing was within the letter of the agreements signed by the European Union and United States, and that it would proceed as planned. United States And The European Union takes Boeing, Airbus dispute to World Trade Organization U.S - Increasing a high-elevated trade combat, the United States and the European Union filed a duel authorized complaints at the World Trade Organization, accusing each other with spraying unlawful subsidies on The Boeing Company and The Airbus. The U.S. criticism claims European Union governments methodically ignored an accord that allowed them to guarantee one-third of the cost of making new Airbus aircraft. Altogether, the criticism approximates that Airbus acknowledged over $15 billion in government loans from the time since 1967. The European Union right away proposed an opposed-complaint, arguing that Boeing reimbursement from even more liberal and unlawful subsidies. Among the more offensive aid, the European Union supposed, was the $3 billion package of tax breaks Washington State presented Boeing to influence it to build its new 7E7 airplane in the Seattle region. Washington State pursued Boeing with many other motivations, sorting from a new training center to modifications in its joblessness and workers' recompense systems. All in all, European Union representatives intended that Boeing acknowledged $23 billion in government help ever since 1992. "The U.S. complaint is obviously an attempt to divert attention from Boeing's self-inflicted decline. If this is the path the U.S. has chosen, we accept the challenge", (Boeing And Airbus, Online, P1) said European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said. After sprawling Boeing for decades, Airbus took the escort in the marketable aerospace business, transporting 305 commercial planes, while Boeing made 281. In the trade brawl between these two, some lawyers thought the U.S. case is simpler to confirm than the European Union 's because the form of financial aid to Airbus has been straighter than support to Boeing. (Boeing And Airbus, Online, P1) Deen Kaplan, a partner who specializes in World Trade Organization subsidy issues at the Washington, D.C., law firm of Hogan & Hartson, said a "World Trade Organization dispute brings significant risks for both Airbus and Boeing. "It's entirely conceivable that Boeing thinks it can win, but can it be equally successful in defending itself" Kaplan asked. "It's not clear that Boeing will be the net winner." The grievance was recorded after discussions between the United States and the European Union to amend the agreement, which was unsuccessful. Response to the result was deafening and consistent by lawmakers and influentials from the center of Boeing's Commercial Aircraft Operation and the basis of tens of thousands of highly payable jobs. Boeing has complained for years about Airbus government financial support. Few months back European Union governments blocked giving Boeing's rival truckloads of cash openly for new airliner programs. It was also stressed out that Boeing is prepared to talk about all matters, but a new accord must end launch-aid for new Airbus jets further than its super jumbo A380, at present in progress. Expansion aid is a chiefly responsive issue these days, since Airbus is weighing whether to build up a jet to challenge Boeing's 7E7, a plane positioned to come into service in 2008. Even despite the fact that the action made wide support in the United States, forecasters alleged that it would take months to decide the case. And it will spotlight attention on U.S. programs that maintains Boeing at the expenditure of Airbus and other contestants. Under the contract, European Union governments can sponsor one-third of the cost of any new airplane Airbus build-ups. If the plane is victorious, Airbus must pay back the loan. If it's a collapse, the advance is written off. The Controversy Over Subsidies From the initial days of it's being, Airbus was the recipient of straight subsidies in the form of government loans for airplane expansion. These loans, amounting to between 70 and 90 percent of an airplane making cost, conceded below-market interest tariffs. Somewhat than paying back the loans according to a prearranged schedule, as usually would take place in a competitive market, the Airbus firms reimbursed the loans from profits expected as new aircraft were transported. Furthermore, debt clemency was ordinary, a practice that would not expected to happen in an aggressive marketplace. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. trade officials and airplane producer's complained that these subsidies dishonored International Trade Agreements and gave Airbus unjust competitive compensation. The United States declared that the subsidies allowed Airbus to price its jetliners at 10 percent or lower cost. Perhaps the more significant spot is that Airbus would perhaps never even have gotten off the ground without this substantial government hold up. In brief, U.S. officials preserved that European Union rope's action of Airbus was equivalent to an industrial policy of subsidizing Airbus to make certain its competitiveness, and in the course and European Union relative benefit in the jetliner industry was unnaturally formed (Moore & Briscoe, 1998, Pp 110-111). Subsidies were desirable to offer Airbus with some gasping space until it could stand on its own, but both Airbus and the governments understand that huge direct subsidies could not carry on forever. The serious goal for Airbus was to detain at least 30 percent of new making orders. Airbus bureaucrats considered that after that high point had been achieved, the project could persist on a more self-sufficient basis and depend less deeply on direct government support. In the pro tem, government subsidies permitted Airbus the lavishness of not having to base its decisions to begin new models solely on-predictable profits or losses. Airbus protected its subsidies by arguing that U.S. Commercial Aircraft producers also profited from government help, though this aid was more oblique. Organizations such as NASA, which is financed by taxpayer dollars, sustained aeronautics and force research that is shared with U.S. aircraft manufacturers. In addition, research supported by the U.S. military yields vital technological spillovers for the U.S. Commercial Aircraft Industry; most remarkably in airplane engines and airplane design. The European Union governments saw the agreement as a success and sustained on their course. The boundaries on subsidies referred to in the agreement applied to subsidies that would have the result of damaging the competitive situation of industries in other signatories' countries. Since U.S. firms subjugated the commercial aircraft market, the European Union situation was that subsidies to Airbus could not probably cause substance harm to the competitive position of U.S. producers and were consequently allowed by the agreement. In 1992 representatives in both the United States and the European Union finally settled on a mutual lessening in subsidies and signed what has come to be known as the "Airbus accord." The most important element of the accord was a cap on how huge a subsidy the U.S. and European Union aerospace business could obtain for product development. Such launch aid was restricted to 33 percent of the total manufacturing cost of an aircraft, and the loan would have to be reimbursed with interest in seventeen years. In addition, the indirect subsidies (spillover profits from military agreements) would be restricted to 4 percent of a firm's profitable aircraft revenue (Moore & Briscoe, 1998, Pp 128-129). European Union -US Links In The Aeronautics Division Many European Union companies contribute in US programs and vice versa, e.g. Airbus A380 - US suppliers Eaton Hydraulic systems General Electric Engines Goodrich Main landing gear; evacuation systems; interior lighting Honeywell Avionics Northrop Grumman Navigation equipment Parker Hannifin Fuel; flight control; hydraulic & pneumatic systems Boeing 7E7 - European Union suppliers Cobham (U.K.) Pumps & valves Dassault Systemes (France) Software & tools Finmeccanica (Italy) Airplane elements GKN (UK) Materials technology development Groupe Latecoere (France) Structural development work Rolls-Royce (UK) Engines (Boeing And Airbus, Online, P1) Since the agreement officially legitimized the utilization of subsidies, the accord can be out looked in many ways as a conquest for Airbus. The breakdown of the U.S. aircraft industry and the U.S. government to take official action on the subsidies issue during the 1970s and 1980s, on the foundation of contravention of then-existing trade agreements, had given Airbus the time it needed to set up itself as a force in the market. By 1992, Airbus had attained its objective of capturing 30 percent of new making-orders. The A320 was advantageous, and the newly launched A330 and A340 production were showing immense assurance. The agreement thus came at a time when Airbus was fetching less reliance on subsidies and could work contentedly beneath the 33 percent cap. There seems to be little hesitation that Airbus would not be in a situation of such fame today without the enormous direct subsidies that the association has received. Moreover, U.S. policymakers and aircraft manufacturers believed that these subsidies dishonored trade agreements and gave Airbus an unjust benefit. Why, then, did the United States not push the issue more vehemently There might have been a number of reasons. One is that it may not have comprehended how active the subsidies were going to be in making Airbus a feasible competitor long-standing. Instead, U.S. negotiators paid attention on subjects such as government financing of export sales, which was a short-term thought. Second, some divisions of the U.S. Aircraft Industry, such as engine producers and other airline companies, had a vested curiosity in seeing Airbus do well, and thus did not maintained taking action alongside Airbus. Third, U.S. airframe manufacturers dreaded a loss of business in European Union rope if they pushed too energetically on the subsidies issue. Fourth, at serious times during the 1980's the U.S. representatives required apparent focus and path, since there was no united and well-defined situation in their negotiating stance. For a while, it was not clear whether the Commerce Department or the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative should take the escort in the discussions. Finally, the very achievement of U.S. manufacturers served to weaken the U.S. negotiating position. Since U.S. producers subjugated the industry, it would have been complicated to persuade negotiators from other countries that U.S. manufacturers should obtain more defenses from competition. Additionally, other countries such as Japan or Brazil might have wanted to leave the door open for government aid of their own aircraft industries in the future, so it is improbable that they would have helped the U.S. situation. Implications for Competition in the New Millennium The enmity between Boeing and Airbus has many insinuations for the aggressive environment in the future. First, the expansion of the global marketplace will need that many firms be bigger and leaner. As blockades to international trade persist to drop and as firms progressively more see the world as their marketplace and themselves as global, keen levels of contest, with the consequential reduction in pricing power, are forcing firms to cut costs and or else increase competence. Recent domestic and cross-border mergers between industry gigantics (Exxon/Mobil and British Petrol) in the oil industry, Daimler-Benz/Chrysler and Ford/Volvo in the automotive industry, Travelers/Citicorp and NationsBank/Bank of America in financial services, and Rhone-Poulenc/Hoechst and Zeneca/Astra in the drug industry) are only a few of the recent consolidations in a drift that started early in the 1990s. These superior firms have the possibility to accomplish economies by uniting information handing out, marketing, distribution, and a countless of other functions, and otherwise eradicating replication of effort at all stages of the firm. Higher levels of yield also allow for greater economies of degree and scope, and larger market share brings with it additional political and financial thump. Firms that had been protected from competition in the past, by protective governments or little market size, are discovering that continued existence is now harder. The age of more untied economies and speedily increasing information and communication technology is providing the chances to attain even greater economies of scale and scope, and with them the probability of larger attentiveness ratios in many industries. Second, government support for commercial ventures will likely lessen in the future. The victory of Airbus - indeed, its very real - is attributable chiefly to the massive direct subsidies it received. An enterprise like Airbus likely could not be created in the same way today anywhere in the world. The evolution toward a more globally competitive private marketplace has been accompanied by a trend toward the streamlining and downsizing of government as well. Hundreds of billions of dollars in privatizations have taken place worldwide during the past two decades. In addition, European Union governments have been reducing their budget shortages, primarily by cutting spending, in order to attain or preserve fulfillment with the meeting criteria for monetary union. The Japanese government is previously loaded with quickly rising liability as it attempts to jumpstart its declining economy, and up-and-coming Asian and Latin American nations are following concretionary financial policies in reply to the global financial crisis. Bilateral trade agreements, in addition to more common trade-enhancing agreements approved through the World Trade Organization in current years, also militate against the height of government subsidization expected by Airbus. Governments and firms similar will certainly be more watchful and more violent in the future with consideration to the likelihood that governments somewhere else will attempt to generate an artificial relative benefit in a particular industry through subsidization, as was the case with Airbus. Third, heightened rivalry will force firms to react more rapidly to varying conditions. Mostly by accident, Airbus exposed its own version of incline production simply through the way in which it was prepared. Various components of each aircraft are built all through European Union rope and the United States, and then shipped to France, where large machines piece them together. In the process, a dissimilarity of just-in-time record control is absolutely applied. Boeing has been wedded to more of a mass-production, assembly-line procedures, and as an outcome the employees-to-aircraft-produced ratio is around 220 for Boeing, as compared with only 143 for Airbus. Boeing was attempting to update its manufacturing process when it radically expanded its production three years ago and encountered many production blockages. In retrospect, it is obvious that either Boeing should have turned behind some orders and accepted only what it could sensibly handle, or it should have known much earlier that its industrial model was outmoded and started to make the essential changes earlier and in a more arranged fashion. Boeing's collapse to do either resulted in its not meeting manufacturing limits, acquiring considerable cost overruns, and selling the planes at noteworthy discounts. Unluckily for Boeing, it did not learn from what turned out to U.S. auto manufacturers in the face of strong competition from Japanese producers in the 1980s or believed that it was immune to similar competitive forces created by Airbus. Market power appears to have led to satisfaction in Boeing's case. Finally, amplified market authority of business will necessitate governments to be more watchful in endorsing competition. As attentiveness ratios increase in many industries, existing firms will have larger and greater pricing control and political whack. The combat between Airbus and Boeing for market share has exposed once again just how disastrous unrestrained price competition can be, and firms in alike situations in other industries may be more cautious about engaging in such a policy in the future. In the lack of head-to-head struggle between industries gigantic, though, there may be a propensity toward implicit price conspiracy or grasping price competition against minor and weaker competitors (Robbie, 1999, Pp 119-120). Works Cited Boeing And Airbus: http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2004/200400137.htm Boeing And Airbus: http://jpn.cec.eu.int/union/showpage_en_union.external.wto.php Fisher I. Daniel; "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for the Geopolitical Future, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Volume: 35. Issue: 3, (2002). Pp 1. Moore Lynden, Briscoe Lynden; Britain's Trade and Economic Structure: The Impact of the European Union, Routledge (UK), (August, 1998), ISBN: 0415169208. Pp 99-135 Nigel Girmwade; International Trade Policy: A Contemporary Analysis, Routledge (UK), (January 1996), ISBN: 0415068789. Pp130-146. Olienyk John; Competition in the World Jetliner Industry, Challenge. Volume: 42. Issue: 4. (1999). P 1. Pierre-Henri Laurent, Marc Maresceau; The State of the European Union, Volume 4: Deepening and Widening, ISBN: 1-55587-720-6, (1998). Pp 13-25. Robbie Shaw; Boeing 737-300 to 800, Zenith Imprint, (May 1999), ISBN: 0760306990. Pp 8-124. Boeing And Airbus: http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/194149_tradewar07.html Ross F. L. John; Linking Europe: Transport Policies and Politics in the European Union, Praeger Publishers, (February 1998), ISBN: 0-275-95248-7, Pp 140-156. Read More