The Guadalcanal campaign, otherwise called the Battle of Guadalcanal, has been the most crucial battle for the Japanese in the World War II as it marked the transition of the strategy adopted by the Allied forces from defensive operations to the offensive attack over the nation. In this strategic campaign, the Allied forces under the leadership of America came victorious over the Japanese troop in the Pacific theatre which had enjoyed supremacy over the region until then. Significantly, the Japanese could have stopped the Americans in the Guadalcanal Campaign if they did not commit some grievous mistakes in the campaign. In a reflective analysis of the grievous mistakes done by the Japanese in the Guadalcanal campaign, it becomes lucid that they could have stopped the Americans if they had acted more wisely. As Murray and Millett report, these mistakes include the Japanese attempt to “conduct major operations simultaneously at Milan Bay [New Guinea] and in the Solomons, and the premature retirement from the Battle of Savo Island.” (Murray and Millett, 2001, P. 211).In fact, these grievous mistakes by the Japanese were partially due to the oversimplification of enemy’s capabilities and partially caused by the excessive reliance on the groundless assurance of the Japanese army. Similarly, the Japanese army was not prepared and expecting a full-blown military strategy by the Allied force and they initially regarded the American landings merely as a raid.