The Invasion of Sicily - Essay Example

The invasion of Sicily on July 10th 1943 was a combined American, Canadian and British operation. It was the first major Allied attempt to seize a strong grasp on "home turf" territory of an Axis power. Code named "Operation Husky," it followed total victory over Axis forces in North Africa two months earlier1. Operation Husky was undertaken because success in North Africa had made pressing on with the British-backed Mediterranean strategy strategically logical for the Allies. Id. However, the United States War Department expressed regret that operation Husky ultimately delayed the invasion of France for a year, which was the deciding invasion in winning World War II. The invasion of Sicily had been on the agenda ever since the Casablanca Conference of January 1943. The success of the "TORCH" landings in French North Africa the previous November was the incubus of Franklin D. Roosevelt's and Winston Churchill's plan for a seaborne assault as soon as the Axis had been defeated in Tunisia. "TORCH was the first major amphibious assault against the Axis, although, in the Pacific, the marines landed on Guadalcanal on Aug 7th. It had to be staged from Continental US, go almost 3000 miles, through U boat infested waters, land troops on hostile beaches, and then keep the sea lanes open for reinforcements"2. While "TORCH" had been mostly unopposed, Sicily, it was estimated, would be a more difficult conquest because the Italians would be then fighting on their home ground, buttressed by good German troops. That notwithstanding, the allies remained undaunted. A blend of the battle-hardened men of Eighth Army under Montgomery, the profusion of US war ammunition and other materials, and American troops of the Seventh Army under Patton were considered enough to overwhelm the island garrison and bring the war to mainland Italy. Amphibious ships and landing craft were the resource that defined Allied military strategy in 1943-4, and it took six months to assemble enough for the main component of HUSKY, an operation involving 150,000 men and 3,000 ships. The Allied invasion of Sicily also known as "Operation Husky" was a major World War II invasion. During the invasion, the Allies took Sicily from the Axis. The Allies were primarily from the American, British, and Canadian armies. The axis represented Italy and Nazi Germany. The invasion is often referred to as a grand scale airborne and amphibious exercise, supplemented with approximately six weeks of land combat. The invasion of Sicily, documented all over the world, was heralded by Canadian newspapers. The invasion is described as one that was easy with little fatalities3. The reader is encouraged with the impression of the "shock and awe" that Iraq was met by the United States and British forces in the 21st century. Clearly, one reading the tales of control and bravery would never guess that Sicily was seized with worthy resistance. Newspaper accounts regale the at home reader with the "spectacle" of British and Canadian forces entering Sicilian borders with some stubborn resistance, but the tone is one of confidence. Eisenhower himself states: "The enemy's losses in men and equipment since the commencement of the campaign had been enormous. Of his panzer divisions, the equivalent of five had been destroyed and a further six severely mauled. The equivalent of 20 infantry divisions had been eliminated and 12 more (including 3 crack parachute divisions) had been badly cut up. Three divisions were trapped in Brittany and another division was isolated in the Channel Islands. By 25 August the enemy had lost, in round numbers, 400,000 killed, wounded, or captured, of which total 200,000 were prisoners of war"4. While the newspapers report with pride, the accomplishments of the axis, the history books tell a different story. Tales of heroism and outstanding bravery were reported in Canada. Indeed, one officer who rallied his troops by stating "Never mind the Germans, they can't shoot straight!" was awarded the Victoria Cross5. Additionally, the airborne talents of Canadian pilots were found in Canadian newspapers during this time. Notably, the reports took pride in the Canadian seamen. There are several which report that the Canadian navy was virtually unbeatable while Canadian airmen, while caught off guard occasionally, all rose to the occasion impressively6. American magazines present the air strikes in a somewhat different manner. "Allied sea-&-air control had failed to blockade the Germans on Sicily. By air, through the fiercely bombed ports of Messina and Milazzo, and probably through obscure landing points on unoccupied beaches, the Germans brought enough troops to replace losses and actually to increase their front-line strength7". Thus it would seem that the invasion of Sicily was carried out by some of the most cunning and clever warriors of our time. Yet there looms in other writings, an assessment of the opposite kind. Indeed conversely, according to some history books, the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in July 1943 is said to have witnessed some of if not the most astounding examples of friendly fire documented in American history. Operation Husky is frequently cited as a prelude to the Normandy invasion. As one writer notes, "Sicily was essential for Normandy: a real-life live-fire training exercise [in which lessons were learned] in planning and executing amphibious operations, and in joint and combined organization, planning, and command and control.8" Among the lessons was the role of planning branches and sequels. Sadly, failure in this step turned the operation into a hollow triumph9. Operation Husky was not planned within the context of leading to an overarching strategic objective. At Casablanca the Allies chose Sicily not because of anything inherent to Sicily but because, as Samuel Morrison concludes, "Something had to be done in the European theater in 1943," and "it was entered upon as an end unto itself; not as a springboard for Italy or anywhere else.10" (4) The choice "was a strategic compromise conceived in dissension and born of uneasy alliance--a child of conflicting concepts and unclear in purpose.11" There was no operational sequel planned after Sicily. Sicily was a victory, but it had been related that there was a cloud on the title of victory because there was no master plan for the conquest of Sicily. Nothing had been worked out beyond the limited beachhead objectives.12" This planning lapse was critical. Just hours before the Allies reached Messina, the last Axis troops boarded ships for Italy. Some have theorized that mass hysteria seemed to be the problem. Others have noted that there were invasions which were small and successful, but also wasteful which left the allies wondering precisely whom was in charge13. Indeed, it has been posited that allied planners decided that the airborne attack on the island should consist of four separate and distinct airborne strikes. Each strike was slated to be conducted by night. The recklessness of this plan however, what that many of the American paratroopers had no night "jump" experience whatsoever14. Additionally, perhaps in keeping with the assertion that there was no post landing planning by the allies in Sicily, incessant recordings of death by friendly fire mounted. "For days after the initial invasion, the bodies of paratroopers were washed up at Gela. During the initial drop, 33 out of the original 144 C-47s were shot down in minutes, while another 60were so badly hit that they would never fly again. A total of 318 paratroopers were killed or wounded, over one in five of the men involved in the operation. And all were victims of friendly fire"15. Captain Adam Komosa later described his experiences as the most uncomfortable feeling knowing that "our own troops were throwing everything they had at us16". Planes were reported as dropped out of formation and crashed into the sea. In conclusion, it is not too difficult to imagine why there is such a dichotomy in reports that were related by newspapers and those in history books. If one were to try to imagine themselves in Canada awaiting news of the Canadian Navy, what would be stirred up in the masses of Canada by hearing that the Allies were shooting themselves down Who benefits from learning that the invasion of Sicily may have been nothing more than a superfluous act Moreover, what good would it do for the morale of all of the allied militia to learn that they were killing themselves Bibliography Dougherty, Kevin (2002).Invading Sicily a tale of branches and sequels - Operation Husky - Brief Article. Joint Force Quarterly. Summer, 21-27 Hanson Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won: Great Campaigns of World War II (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 193. Invasion of Sicily. (n.d.). The Oxford Companion to Military History. Retrieved March 17, 2008, from Answers.com Web site: http://www.answers.com/topic/invasion-of-sicily Mosher, B. (1997). The story of the USS Wilkes DD441. Retrieved March 17, 2008, from USS Wilkes Web site: http://www.geocities.com/wilkesdd441/441action.html Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 160. Orr, K (2002). Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia. New York, N.Y.: Wiley Regan, Geoffrey (1995). Blue on Blue, A History of Friendly Fire. New York, N.Y.: Avon Books Uldric Fiore, "Sicily: An Essential Exercise in Futility," Military Review, vol. 73, no. 7 (July 1993), p. 64 Time Magazine (1943, Aug. 9). A Matter of Days. Read More