New Riddle of Induction and Nelson Goodman's Approach to the Problem of Induction - Essay Example

New riddle of induction Name Course Institution Professor Date New riddle of induction The problem of induction implies to question of philosophy regarding whether knowledge that is understood from a classic philosophical sense perspective is as a resultant of inductive reasoning (David & Mary 2002, p. 76). The reason behind what the question implies is but due to the fact that it has its focus on the need for justification for either; assuming that a series of future happenings will take place as it has always been in the past for instance as it is with the laws of physics not changing holding the same observations as they have always had, or generalizing in relation to the properties of characteristics of objects within a class basing the generalization on a number of observations of occasions relating to that particular class the problem of induction questions all claims made empirically or rather through scientific methods in life each and every day (Howson 2000, p. 44). Possibly this problem is understood to date back to the mid 18th century. It was introduced by David Hume in the school of pyrrhonism of ancient philosophy. Nelson Goodman came with a different approach to the problem of induction. In his book the “fact, fiction and forecast” he titles it “the new problem of induction” presenting a totally different description from what Hume provided. “grue” is the new predicate proposed by Goodman. He asserted that something is grue if only their observations are made to be green prior to some definite time or rather blue after that time (Douglas 2005, p. 31). This forms the foundation of the description of the new problem of induction in that due to the fact that all emeralds that have ever been observed are both grue and green then why the supposition that after some certain time if the emeralds are observed they will indicate green instead of grue? The response to the new problem of induction as put forth by Goodman from a standard scientific approach calls upon the Occam’s razor which is the principle that urges one to choose a hypothesis which has least assumptions among many competing hypothesis. However it is pointed out by Goodman that a lot of complexity arises in relation to the predicate “grue” in comparison to the “green” predicate. This complexity emanates from the definition of grue in terms of both green and blue. If one’s thinking was shaped from the beginning to only regard “bleen” which is blue prior to some time T, or green after that time and “grue” one would unquestionably consider ‘green” as to be a complex predicate (Goodman and Putnam 1983, p. 102). The belief by Goodman was that favor to scientific hypothesis would be dependent on the predicates that have been well established in one’s language. As Goodman sets out to describe the new riddle of induction he defines the set of laws that make up inductive assumptions that are valid and those that are not valid. Goodman’s approach has its foundation on Hempel’s work putting it that the new problem of induction is but coming up with a definition in line with the relationship between Q1 and Q2 and if to any degree Q1 verifies Q2 (Goodman and Putnam 1983, p. 52). From this assertion by Goodman it may be understood from a natural point of view that anything that verifies a statement, verifies as well whatever comes after the statement. However with this the issue is that not all outcomes from a statement verify it but with the outlined rules by Goodman any statement is capable of verifying all statements. Due to this issue Goodman is advocating for the strengthening of the rule. Hempel puts it that a hypothesis may be verified not by what the hypothesis entails but by the restrictions directed upon the entities stated within the statement. In line with this Goodman presents that the issue lies not as to how the problem is being justified but rather on how it is being defined. It is from this point that Goodman presents what he thinks about what really is the new problem of induction. He says that the issue is not simply the exclusion of cases that are unwanted and that have been acknowledged by a definition of verification (Douglas 2005, p. 78). As already described he makes use of emeralds as either all are green or rather all are grue in a bid to give an illustration of the problem. Goodman puts it that the actual problem of induction relates to definition of the manner in which hypotheses should be similar. From a different point of view the implication is that the hypothesis that electricity may be conducted by all irons should not be an enhancement of the idea that a desk would act as a conductor of electricity (Chart 2000, p. 35). Goodman presents that an approach to deal with this problem is to point out that a hypothesis that is syntactically universal exhibits properties of a law on condition that the predicates in the hypothesis are entirely qualitative (Goodman and Putnam 1983, p. 53). There seem to be a problem with this solution as presented by Goodman. The issue is that one cannot be able to know how to tell whether a predicate is either positional or qualitative. The extraordinary cases which Goodman considers are rarely encountered but they are a continued demonstration of the problem of induction. In accordance with Goodman relating to the problem of induction is that the issue in question is that anything is capable of following upon anything else (Douglas 2005, p. 42). Goodman attempted to come up with a different definition to confirm the same which in the process resulted to the understanding of the new problem that any statement is capable of confirming any other statement. Even after Goodman attempts to modify of the definition the same problem is reflected. This indicates that there has to be a way through which an acknowledged hypothesis can be put under control or else the definition would not be in a position to indicate any differences between inductive assumptions that are valid and those that are not (Jon and Etchemendy 2000, p.90). It is argued by Goodman the actual problem with Hume’s approach to the problem was not on how he described it but the fact that the description was not precise. I do not agree with Goodman’s points of view in regards to the problem of induction and what he thinks it shows. He makes it seem as though one has to make a choice as to what as to what is grue or rather green prior to some certain time T (Douglas 2005, p. 42). The fact is there exist no basis for the possibility for such a choice to be made prior to the time T. Goodman tries to make the complex argument seem true by putting forth names that are similar to names of colors. He even derives them from other names of colors. If in reality there existed a color known as “grue” it would most probably be different from either blue or green. If this were the case then it would be quite reasonable if one would raise the question of whether something is colored grue or green. Additionally, if really a “grue” color existed it would most probably seem very weird by chance at some time T, for something that is grue in color to transform into another color (Friend, Goethe and Harazinov 2007, p. 65). The same understanding would apply if green were the color in question. In other words it is a quite peculiar for something that has been green for some time to unexpectedly change in to blue. Goodman may claim that he does not presuppose that something changes its color at some time T that is arbitrary (Goodman and Putnam 1983, p. 87). An in-depth interpretation of what Goodman claims basically indicates that his claim is in fact what is understood if grue is observed to be a color. It is quite true that his argument would not at all be viewed as being reasonable if he had not framed it relation to a color adjective that does not exist. This color “grue” enables him to present his thinking about the problem of induction in the form of a complex abstract condition which he asserts to be true. In conclusion, the new riddle of induction by Goodman seems to be quite complex and unable to be proven through deduction in the approach that things will retain their characteristics unless there are some factors either internal or external affecting them making them to change. Asking whether something is colored green or rather whether it is actually grue is the same as asking how one may be in a position to know that something green in color now would not change if not affected by some external or rather internal developments (Wittgenstein and Ludwig 2001, p. 53). There seems to be no difference with how induction was viewed by Goodman and the previous philosopher’s points of view which he apparently was against. It may be viewed as rightful thinking to conclude that Goodman’s thinking of what the problem of induction shows does not offer any new insight different from how it was viewed in the past. But instead his approach seems to presents an illustration that seems to be filled with complexities thus an answer to the problem is yet to be discovered. References Chart, D. (2000). ‘Schulte and Goodman's Riddle’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 34-56. David, F. and Mary J. eds. (2002). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Douglas, K. (2005).Grue! The New Riddle of Induction. New York: Open Court Publishing Friend, M. and N. Goethe and V. Harazinov eds. (2007). Induction, Algorithmic Learning Theory, and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer Goodman N. and Putnam H. eds. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard: Harvard University Press Howson, C. (2000). Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief: Oxford: Oxford University Press Jon, B. and Etchemendy J. (2000). Language, Proof and Logic. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Wittgenstein, K. and Ludwig, F. (2001). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 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