Changes in the Philosophy of Science since the Heyday of Logical Positivism - Essay Example

The main changes in philosophy of science since the heyday of logical positivism Student Name Course Name Tutor Date The main changes in philosophy of science since the heyday of logical positivism Introduction Logical positivism also known as neo-positivism or logical empiricism is a school of philosophy that coalesces empiricism, the thought that observational evidence is crucial for the knowledge of the world with a version of rationalism integrating logico-linguistics and mathematical constructs and deductions in epistemology. Logical positivists refuted the reliability of traditional philosophy and metaphysics; they emphasized that several philosophical problems are in fact meaningless. Until 1950, logical positivism was the dominant scientific philosophy and up to date its effect persists especially in the manner of undertaking philosophy, in the large attention offered to analysis of scientific thinking and in the positively attained results of technical investigations on the formal logic and theory of probability1. Philosophy of science; Positivism and beyond Logical positivism dominated much of the mid twentieth century. The logical positivists were successors to the classical empiricist tradition in philosophy of science and knowledge theory, believing that every enquiry must be based in observation and that scientific work is fundamentally that of containing the existing observations whilst accurately predicting novel ones2. They also considered that one core model of scientific enquiry is enumerative initiation. Much intellectual endeavor was expended in efforts to validate our inductive performances and in debate of the difficulty of under determination of hypothesis by data3. Philosophy of science has been carried out in a comparatively a priori style with numerous references to actual scientific exemplar, admittedly, but generally with scientific philosophers merely thinking on what scientists should do, other than on what they actually do. The Upshot of the logical positivism theory of science The positivist theory of science was used for two functions. It provided a philosophical foundation or grounding for scientific knowledge, therefore verifying its soundness and provided a theory of denotation which is gratis from metaphysics and reducible to sense date and logic. The anti metaphysical attempts of positivists are strongly connected to their attempt to synthesize empiricism and rationalism as exemplified by science. It is an extension of abstraction of 17th century science and an advance towards universalism initiated in 18th century enlightenment. The move started by the centering the nature through science and persisted through adoption of idealization in science and mathematisation of nature. It is also linked to the disenchantment phenomenon. Through riding the nature of spiritual and magical forces, and looking it in purely abstract terms via the means of scientific theories, one creates a portrait of nature which is neutral with regard to every preferred metaphysical belief. The positivists strengthened this inclination by their philosophical notion of science grounded on the principle of rationalism through logic and empiricism4. Both mathematics or logic and empirical statistics are regarded universal and would win general consent when petitioned to, because the human race shared the supposedly universal cognitive characteristics. Therefore it isn’t astonishing that logical positivists addressed the union of human beings through novel scientific conception of nature. They pointed that one of the issues that separated human race is their loyalty to diverse metaphysics grounded on their cultural legacy and traditions. When science is recognized as a probable option to these culturally bound and thus discordant metaphysics, then the way to unity is paved. In regard to offering a philosophical foundation for scientific knowledge, the logical positivists efforts of providing a philosophical grounding for science is connected to the query of certainty within a secular community. If religious faith and scripture could not guarantee certainty of belief and knowledge then it cannot serve another purpose5. The 18th century epistemological enquiries which coincided with the enlightenment had wanted to search for and offer these very options. The concern for faith is old age and doesn’t seem to persist. Scepticism is a rival of both the secular and the religious. The secular option is to base belief and knowledge in empirical foundations and rational principles, an endeavor inaugurated by Kant in 18th century. The endeavors of logical positivists in terms of offering a universal theory of knowledge which offers epistemological refuge to science, and logical analysis of certain scientific theories to explicit their philosophical soundness are designed to offer epistemological conviction to scientific knowledge , inside the older structure of epistemological enquiry which views knowledge as validated, true belief. Historical and naturalistic turns As Kuhn and his fellows noticed, when an individual studies history of science, he realizes that the actions of real sciences usually do not conform to the standards of scientific process established by scientific philosophers6. For instance, when scientist’s knowledge of data contradicts with their hypothesis, they don’t instantly discard these theories and begin again. At times they attempt to explicate away the obstinate data whilst they continue to uphold onto their hypothesis; but as usually as not they merely disregard it and continue with the activity of establishing their preferential theoretical approach. This contributes to the rise of dilemma for a priori scientific philosophers. They may either assert that the real activity of scientists has been inappropriate or illogical, in which case the vast scientific success is rendered totally mysterious7. At about the same period, the historical twist in scientific philosophy majority of philosophy was undertaking a naturalistic turn. This occurred in epistemology and philosophy of mind commonly and particularly in philosophy of science. Majority of philosophers begun to admit as a solemn limitation on their theorizing, that both individual mental process and human modes of knowledge acquisition are natural and happens in accordance to causal laws as do any other event in nature; and that philosophical attempts to accomplish an appreciative of nature of these courses must be viewed as incessant with scientific enquiry. This led to a surplus of informal theories of epistemic and mental phenomena, with the creation of casual theories of reference, of perception of knowledge, of justification and of memory. In fact, the principal theory of the general of the mind, which emerged climbed into superiority during this time, was functionalism, which views mental events and states as individuated through their distinctive casual roles8. It becomes significant, then, to view science as a natural occurrence, that in some way recruit a wide range of natural mechanisms and processes to social and cognitive to attain its results. Scientific philosophers started to look, not on history only, but also to cognitive psychology in their explore for the understanding of scientific actions. Science and the social With philosophy of science in the last decade, like science itself, is possibly progressing and getting somehow closer to the truth. One out growth of historical turn in scientific philosophy was a type of social constructivism together with relativism on science. On this outlook, scientific theories are suggested, rejected, or accepted in accordance to a wide range of social and political forces which do not need to have any association with reality or truth nor with consistent standards of verification and rationality. In fact, on this version the idea of reality a thing set against or over our several socially constructed perceptional demonstrations is unintelligible. The only actual sense which may be made out of a theory being worse or better than another is on basis of its political social effect. Whereas social constructiveness has not yet gained wide recognition among scientific philosophers, it has played a helpful function in highlighting the social aspect of science and scientific work9. The recent work has combined aspects from social constructivism position with the overall practicality about science, which has allowed science to progress via a varied social relation amongst scientists, whilst supporting that these relations can facilitate rises in knowledge about the world. The major philosophical principles of logical positivism According to logical positivism, there are two sources of knowledge, namely empirical experience and logical reasoning. Logical reasoning is analytic a priori, while empirical experience is synthetic a posteriori; therefore synthetic a priori do not exist. The essential theory of modern empiricism consists in refuting the probability of synthetic of a priori knowledge. Logical knowledge entails mathematics, which is reducible to formal judgment while empirical knowledge includes psychology, physics, and biology. Experience is the sole judge of a scientific theory10. Nevertheless, logical positivists were conscious that scientific knowhow does not solely emerge from experience but scientific hypothesis are real assumptions that go beyond the experience. A statement is has a meaning if and only if it can be verified false or true , at least in principle, trough experience and this assertion is referred to as the verifiability principle. The significance of a statement is its means of verification. This implies that we know the implication of the statement if we are aware of the conditions under which this statement is false or true. Metaphysical statements are therefore prohibited and they are meaningless. In addition traditional philosophy is certainly meaningless and the sole function of philosophy is the elucidation of what statements mean11. According to Schlick, philosophy is the action through which meaning of a statement is defined and clarified. A scientific theory is an axiomatic scheme that attains an empirical explanation via appropriate statements known as rules of correspondence, which ascertain a correlation amid real processes or real objects and the conceptual notions of the theory. The language of the theory involves two forms of terms; theoretical and observational. The statements of the theory are split into two groups, namely synthetic and analytical12. Observational phrases denote properties of objects that can be directly measured or observed, whereas theoretical terms signify properties or objects that cannot be measured or observed but can be inferred from direct observations. Analytical statements are a priori and their reality is grounded on rules of language, while synthetic statements are dependent on experience and their reality may be acknowledged solely through experience. This perception on the structure of scientific theories is possibly the most robust principle of philosophy of the logical positivism. The main points in logical positivism is distinction between theoretical and observational terms, distinction between analytical and synthetic terms, distinction between rules of correspondence and theoretical axioms and deductive nature of scientific theories13. The four points are connected. Correspondence rules are analytical and grant an empirical meaning to theoretical terms whereas theoretical axioms are synthetic and articulate the observational part of the theory. The distinction between theoretical and observational terms depends on verifiability principle. A statement has a meaning only if it’s demonstrable but in scientific theories, there are several statements that are not demonstrable, for instance, statements dealing with relativistic gravitational fields and quantum fields. These statements are very intangible for a direct examination, implying that they are meaningless. In order to prevent such a result, two diverse approaches were proposed. According to Schlick, the principles of a scientific theory aren’t statements, but rules are rules of inference, therefore the difficulty of their meaning doesn’t rise. Schlick argued that scientific laws aren’t legitimate statements, because they are not wholly verifiable are rules used to make predictions14. The sole way of validating scientific laws is the constituency of forecasts, since law only expresses the likelihood to make a forecast. Schlick asserted that quantum physics has proved a limit to such probability. This is not as a result of malfunction of human knowledge or to a deduction the human viewer cause on the physical scheme. If quantum method verifies the unfeasibility of a simultaneous measurement of momentum and position, thus according to Schlick, simultaneous momentum and position don’t exist. Schlick pointed out that science is not described by internal coherence, and therefore scientific statements should be tested in accordance to the known experience15. The other remedy was proposed by Neurath; the terms which fit in to the conceptual language of a scientific hypothesis are overtly definable through a restricted language whose terms explain objects that can be directly observed. Therefore, a distinction amid theoretical and observational terms arose. But soon, Carnap recognized that the theoretical terms aren’t definable by observational one16. He suggested a partial reducibility of theoretical to observational terms. Later, he proposed that all theoretical terms to be removed from a scientific theory. This hypothesis was endorsed by two results of formal logic, the Ramsey statement, and Craig theorem. Linguistic theory of science The positivists also embarked on analysis of linguistics which they thought can depict pseudo difficulties , therefore dissolving or resolving other then solving them. Instead of enquring if a statement is false or true, they enquire about a more elementary question, that is, if the statement is meaningless or meaningful. For the logical positivists, a meaningful statement may only be either a synthetic or an analytical statement. All statements that are not synthetic or analytical are regarded meaningless, in the cognitive logic. Carnap went further to construct a logical meta- language which could be discerned from object language17. However, confusion arises when we baffle the two linguistic levels, like when we employ meta- language to speak about object language but offers the notion as if we are applying object language to refer to truths about the globe. All these tools are intended to verify the nature of evocative dissertation, and to expose or exclude discourse believed as non cognitive in nature of meaningless. In this manner, the logical positivists wanted to make philosophy scientific, therefore instating what Reichenbach called the rise of scientific philosophy. Through this, their work can be viewed with a meaning, and as what comprises meaningful discourse. For the positivists, meaningful, genuine discourse can only be on the empirical and the logical. The linguistic study of knowledge and speech is intended to clearly bring out the empirical and logical constituent of discourse. The sentence structure of language is supposed to be elucidated by logic and the words which are intended are unpacked or explicated in empiricist terms. Words that are not reducible to sense date are considered to be meaningless. Neurath suggested a linguistic theory of science, on which scientific statements are not evaluated through empirical evidence, but they are confirmed based on all other statements and in this case true is therefore replaced by coherence18. According to Neurath, the harmony of science can be gained via the union of language. He considered the language of physics as the sole objective and legitimate language which wholly avoids the difficulties produced by a phenomenalistic language. In scientific language, there is no space for ethical terms, implying that ethics is meaningless. Psychological concepts are also prohibited and we should therefore replace them with physical concepts. He proposed an international portrait language, the Isotype19. This visual language was grounded on a mixture of graphics, diagrams, maps, and charts. The innovative project of international encyclopedia included a never recognized visual thesaurus in numerous volumes written in Isotype and we can wholly appreciate the usefulness of visual representations based on graphics or icons, and therefore we can also understand Neuraths prophetic perception of a global visual language. Architecture and iconic language; Evidence for Universalist thesis The work of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap are evidence to illustrate the universalist pretentions and intentions of logical positivists. The Spartan, sparse and modernist architecture of Bauhaus, is the complement of logical constructions in Aufbau by Carnap. Just as the way knowledge and science generally is shorn off its metaphysical content, architecture is in the same way shorn off its decorative qualities. Through Carnap we get sense data functioning as blocks building knowledge, thus being constructed up into more intricate intangible structures via logical constructions20. Also in the Aufbau architecture we get simple geometric shapes that form the building blocks or fundamental units, from while entire buildings are structured. The association is not simply analogical or metamorphical. Although in a logic one might say that they are universal demonstrations of an identical spirit, the concepts of Aufbau are however influential or supportive of Bauhaus architecture. The modern architecture in Bauhaus is apparent, with its Spartan outlooks and rectangular or square geometrical figures with pointed edges, unlike conventional architecture which are ornamental and have more curves. This contemporary architecture was later to influence the entire world and was greatly adopted. It was the wish of Carnap and other logical positivists that a similar occurrence had happened within the epistemological field21. The major scientific and philosophical outcomes that influenced the rise of logical positivism The theory of relativity wielded an immense influence on logical positivism, because it’s scientific significance and also for philosophical proposals that Einstein’s job contains. The initial published work on special theory of relativity starts with a discussion on length and simultaneity which is one of the most comprehensive appliances of the verifiability principle. In addition one of first works by Carnap was a thesis on the theory of space published in 1922. The expansion of formal logical wielded a lot of influence on logical positivism. Carnap focused much on logic and was directed by Gottlog Frege, the father of contemporary logic. From a philosophical position of view, Gottlob affirmed that every arithmetic statement is analytic a priori, and therefore refuted the subsistence of synthetic a priori statements in arithmetic. Gottlob geometry is synthetic a priori because it isn’t reducible to logic. Thus, in Gottlob view, analytic statements are the one that are logically true22. The Italian mathematician Giuseppe had an indirect influence on the logical study of logical positivists. He developed a logical symbolism which was adopted by Russell, which is widely used in modern days. He proposed the five axioms as a description of the natural numbers set. Gödel verified the incompleteness theory based on the axiomatization by Giuseppe. The mathematical logic of Russell wielded a key influence on the logical positivism. Russell affirmed that the analytic character of whole mathematics23. He attempted to clarify this presumption in his tasks principia mathematica and principles of mathematics. Principia mathematica is a dexterous application of the logic to mathematics which gave rise to the endless technical and philosophical research. Logical positivism and application of knowledge Although this epistemological framework is presumed to generally apply to knowledge, it is particularly appropriate for scientific knowledge which comprises of a mixture of empirical facts and mathematics. The Berlin group which was headed by Reinchenbach, conducted their logical analysis on particular scientific theories like quantum mechanism and relativity theory. These analyses were significant and led to what was later called a receiver view regarding scientific theories. Therefore the logical positivists’ analysis could evidently illustrate why the scientific discourse is a meaningful discourse because it gratifies the nature of scientific knowledge using empiricism and logic. In addition, there exists the principle of verification which science excellently fulfills. Apart from trying to eradicate metaphysics from science via logical analyses, the positivists also wanted to place scientific knowledge on strong foundations, for instance, through axiomatisation. In this way they were motivated by the endeavors of logicists like Russell in the philosophy of mathematics, who attempted to place mathematics on a logic ground24. The logical positivistic theory of science is in fact a foundationalist theory of science. Its foundationalist in both sense of the term, that is, by using empirical data s its foundation and its rationalization approach via logic and empiricism. In regard to logical positivism, it is evident that scientific knowledge can’t be constructed as propagandistic or ideological, but it reveals the epistomelogico- cultural function played by the logical positivist philosophy of science. Through explicating and explaining the nature of science knowledge, and through showing how this should act as a model for real knowledge, they were proposing for a superior socio-culture function for science, not simply as a handmaiden of knowledge, asset of formulas or facts, but that which lays down the standard of genuine knowledge and therefore sources of power should be. Conclusion Logical positivism is an absolutist manner of looking at statements and determining whether they are meaningless, true, or false. It refuted statements about aesthetics and ethics as being unverifiable and hence not a portion of solemn philosophy of thinking. Logical positivists asserted that in order for a given statement to have meaning, it should be connected to either analytical truth or empirical data. Therefore, logical positivism was a major step of linking philosophy more closely to science and it persists to have influence on modern philosophy of science and plays a crucial role in the formulation of philosophical thoughts throughout the twentieth century. References Stephen F., (2005). The legacy of logical positinism; studies in the philosophy of science. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. Putnam, B., (1957). Religion, philosophy and science; an introduction to logical positivism. New York: Philosophical library. Jules, A., (1959). Logical positivism. New York: Free Press. Gustav, B., (1954). The metaphysics of logical positivism. New York: Longmans Green. Ramon, C., (1994). Carnap and the Vienna circle: empiricism and logical syntax. Amsterdam: Oxford Berg. Sachindranath, G., (1967). Logical positivism as a theory of meaning. New York: Allied publishers. Barry, G., (1987). Logical positivism in perspective: essays on language, logic, and truth. New Jersey. Barnes and Noble Books. Allan W., & Ronald N., (1987). Origins of logical empiricism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Oswald, H., (1981). Logical positivism. Oxford: Blackwell. Victor, K., (1953). The Vienna circle; the origin of neo-positivism, a chapter in the history of recent philosophy. New York: Greenwood Press. Sahotara, S., (2000). The legacy of the Vienna circle: modern reappraisals. New York: Garland. Alan, R., (1997). Carnaps construction of the world: the Aufbau and the emergence of logical empiricism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sahotara, S., (1996). Logical empiricism at its peak; Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. New York: Garland. Rudolph, J., (1985). An examination of logical positivism. London: Kegan. Federik W., (1998). A research for the consequences of the Vienna circle philosophy for ethics. Utrecht. Kemink. Read More

Through riding the nature of spiritual and magical forces, and looking it in purely abstract terms via the means of scientific theories, one creates a portrait of nature which is neutral with regard to every preferred metaphysical belief. The positivists strengthened this inclination by their philosophical notion of science grounded on the principle of rationalism through logic and empiricism4. Both mathematics or logic and empirical statistics are regarded universal and would win general consent when petitioned to, because the human race shared the supposedly universal cognitive characteristics.

Therefore it isn’t astonishing that logical positivists addressed the union of human beings through novel scientific conception of nature. They pointed that one of the issues that separated human race is their loyalty to diverse metaphysics grounded on their cultural legacy and traditions. When science is recognized as a probable option to these culturally bound and thus discordant metaphysics, then the way to unity is paved. In regard to offering a philosophical foundation for scientific knowledge, the logical positivists efforts of providing a philosophical grounding for science is connected to the query of certainty within a secular community.

If religious faith and scripture could not guarantee certainty of belief and knowledge then it cannot serve another purpose5. The 18th century epistemological enquiries which coincided with the enlightenment had wanted to search for and offer these very options. The concern for faith is old age and doesn’t seem to persist. Scepticism is a rival of both the secular and the religious. The secular option is to base belief and knowledge in empirical foundations and rational principles, an endeavor inaugurated by Kant in 18th century.

The endeavors of logical positivists in terms of offering a universal theory of knowledge which offers epistemological refuge to science, and logical analysis of certain scientific theories to explicit their philosophical soundness are designed to offer epistemological conviction to scientific knowledge , inside the older structure of epistemological enquiry which views knowledge as validated, true belief. Historical and naturalistic turns As Kuhn and his fellows noticed, when an individual studies history of science, he realizes that the actions of real sciences usually do not conform to the standards of scientific process established by scientific philosophers6.

For instance, when scientist’s knowledge of data contradicts with their hypothesis, they don’t instantly discard these theories and begin again. At times they attempt to explicate away the obstinate data whilst they continue to uphold onto their hypothesis; but as usually as not they merely disregard it and continue with the activity of establishing their preferential theoretical approach. This contributes to the rise of dilemma for a priori scientific philosophers. They may either assert that the real activity of scientists has been inappropriate or illogical, in which case the vast scientific success is rendered totally mysterious7.

At about the same period, the historical twist in scientific philosophy majority of philosophy was undertaking a naturalistic turn. This occurred in epistemology and philosophy of mind commonly and particularly in philosophy of science. Majority of philosophers begun to admit as a solemn limitation on their theorizing, that both individual mental process and human modes of knowledge acquisition are natural and happens in accordance to causal laws as do any other event in nature; and that philosophical attempts to accomplish an appreciative of nature of these courses must be viewed as incessant with scientific enquiry.

This led to a surplus of informal theories of epistemic and mental phenomena, with the creation of casual theories of reference, of perception of knowledge, of justification and of memory. In fact, the principal theory of the general of the mind, which emerged climbed into superiority during this time, was functionalism, which views mental events and states as individuated through their distinctive casual roles8.

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