Philosophy of Science and Value - Essay Example

Answers to Philosophy of Science Questions By Answers to Philosophy of Science Questions Science and Value Does value really have any role and significance in science? Philosophers of science are sharply divided on this issue. While some philosophers of science believe that value has an important role in science, some other philosophers are of the contrary view that value has no role in science. The traditional dominant view in this issue has been that science is absolutely value free. The common modern view on this issue, however, is that value plays an important role in science. The following is an argument that seeks to demonstrate that values play an important role in science. In order to be able to give an objective view on this issue, it is important to critically review the main arguments advanced in support of the traditional view that science is value free. In the history of philosophy of science, the main proponents of the traditional view of the reliance of values in science were the logical positivists. For the logical positivists, empirical sciences are based on observations and verifications and for that reason any discipline that does not involve observation and verification does not fall under the domain of science. The guiding principle of the logical positivists was that observation was a pre-requisite of verification. The logical positivists, therefore, contended that, since values lack observational basis, values, therefore, are not verifiable, and for that reason values have absolutely no role in science. Some extreme logical positivists like Canarp viewed values as emotional responses, and for that reason they argued and concluded that values are not verifiable because they are purely subjective and lack verifiable basis. In contrast to the traditional view of the relevance of values in science, modern views of the relevance and the role of values and science agree that values are indeed quite relevant in science. The proponents of the modern view of the role and the relevance of values in science view science as being value laden. For the proponents of this view, it is simply impossible to pursue or to study science without making some value judgements. The advocates of this view go on to argue that, since all human actions are motivated and influenced by one’s beliefs and values, science pursuit, as a human endeavour, must involve some form of value judgements. The advocates of this view cite the choice of scientific values and hypothesis as an area of science pursuit that requires value judgments. For better understanding of the modern view of the role and the relevance of values according to the modern view, it is important to look at the views of Rudner, who was one of the main proponents of the modern view of the relevance of values in science. Rudner conceived value judgments as being endemic to science. Rudner argued that, in the choice of scientific hypothesis, it is not possible to give a complete verification, or a complete falsification. For this reason, therefore, Rudner concluded that the choice of scientific hypothesis must involve some value judgments. In opposition to the Rudner’s views on the importance and the relevance of values in science, McMullin held that, although values are indeed quite important and relevant in science, science does not involve value judgments at the level of the choice of hypothesis, as Rudner had contended, but at the level of the choice of scientific theories. According to McMullin, since the aim of science is theoretical knowledge, science proceeds through theories, rather than through hypothesis as Rudner had argued. Having objectively analysed the traditional and the modern views of the role and the relevance of values of in science, let us critically look at the two views so as to find out which of the two views is plausible and the correct account of the role and the relevance of values in science. A critical comparison of these two theories shows that the modern view of the relevance of values in science is the correct account of the role and the relevance of values in science. This is because a critical analysis of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science shows that the traditional account is incorrect. This is because, from an epistemological point of view, it is unrealistic an untrue to claim that values have, absolutely, no role in the choices of scientific hypotheses or scientific theories. A critical analysis of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science shows that, although science, of necessity, involves observation and verification as the proponents of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science had contended, at the epistemic level, however, the choice of scientific values and hypotheses involve value judgments. For this reason, therefore, the modern view of the role and the relevance of values in science is more plausible account of the role of values in science. Although Rudner and McMullin were not agreed on exactly how scientific methods involve value judgments, the two scholars, however, were agreed that, at epistemic level, scientific method involve value judgments. For this reason, therefore, the common modern view of the role of values in science is that scientific method involves value judgments. Meaning of Science and the Demarcation Problem The demarcation problem in the philosophy of science rises due to the fact that it is not easy to give a holistic criterion on what distinguishes science from non-science disciplines; for this reason, therefore, giving an holistic definition of science that captures the essence of science is a controversial and a debatable issue in the philosophy of science. In an attempt to give a holistic definition of science, various philosophers of science have proposed various definitions of science. A critical review, however, of the various definitions of science that various philosophers of science have proposed shows that none of the definitions of science demarcates science from non-science disciplines; a critical analysis of the various definitions of science offered by the various philosophers of science shows that none of the definitions offers an unambiguous criterion of distinguishing science from non-science in all cases. Let us critically analyse some three definitions of science offered by philosophers of science, so as to find out whether or not the definitions provides a sufficient demarcation criterion. Firstly, let us look at Klemke’s conception of science and scientific method. For Klemke, the demarcation criterion of science lies in the scientific method according to which scientific investigations proceeds. For Klemke, scientific investigations proceed through the following steps and these steps demarcate science from non-science disciplines. For Klemke, scientific method start with making accurate observations, records the observations, organizes the observations into categories, abstracts general principles from the observation using induction, deduces more principles from these general statements using deduction, and lastly makes scientific theories that explain scientific laws. According to Klemke, therefore, these steps, according to which scientific investigations and formulation of scientific theories proceeds sets science apart from non-science disciplines. A critical look, however, at this Klemke’s demarcation criterion shows that the demarcation criterion is problematic because it does not offer a holistic demarcation criterion of science from non-science discipline. Klemke’s demarcation criterion is problematic because it does not take into account all the disciplines that people generally agree fall under the domain of science. This is because there are many disciplines that do not proceed according to Klemke’s conception of scientific method, and yet these disciplines are regarded as scientific. A critical look at the history of the history of science shows that Klemke does not offer a holistic definition of science. This is because science in the past did not proceed according to Klemke’s criterion, but was based on speculations, and it was regard as science. For this reason, therefore, Klemke’s demarcation of science criterion is an inadequate criterion of distinguishing science from non-science disciplines. Unlike Klemke, Karl Popper, on the other hand, based his demarcation criterion method on what he called the falsification method. Karl Popper conceived science as proceeding and growing through conjectures and refutations. For Popper, the criterion of demarcating science from non-science disciplines lies what he called the falsification principle. Popper’s falsification principle holds that scientific knowledge must be falsifiable. For Popper, therefore, any knowledge in which there is no possible method of proving it false is not a scientific knowledge. A critical analysis, however, of Popper’s falsification principle shows that the falsification criterion is an inadequate in demarcating science from none-science discipline. If Popper’s criterion of demarcating science from non-science disciplines were correct, many scientific theories would be ruled out as being non-scientific. This is because, in the history of philosophy, there are many theories that are not falsifiable and yet they are regarded scientific. For instance the theory of evolution is not falsifiable and yet the theory is regarded scientific. For this reason, therefore, Popper’s falsification criterion is a shallow criterion because it does not offer a holistic way of demarcating science from non-science disciplines. On his part, Thomas Kunh saw the puzzle solving tradition as the criterion that sets science apart from non-science disciplines. According to Kuhn, science has a puzzle solving tradition, while non-science disciplines do not have a puzzle solving tradition. In refuting Popper’s falsification method, Kunh argued that science does not proceed through conjectures and refutations as Popper had argued, but it proceeds through a tradition of puzzle solving. For Kuhn, when scientists make new discoveries, they do not refute the former scientific theories, but they build the new theories on the existing scientific theories. For Kuhn, therefore, any discipline that a puzzle solving tradition is a scientific discipline, while any discipline that does not have a puzzle solving tradition is a pseudoscience. The main limitation of Kuhn’s demarcation criterion lies in the fact that Kuhn’s demarcation criterion is too broad and includes almost every discipline of study. This is because, generally, every discipline of study has a tradition of how it attempted various challenges that human beings face in life. For this reason, therefore, Kuhn’s demarcation criterion is too broad, and for that reason it is not an effective demarcation criterion. The Scientific Method and the Scientific Theories The observational- theoretical distinction refers to the distinction that is made between the observable and the theoretical entities. The observational- theoretical distinction debate seeks to answer the following two questions. The first question is, is it possible to divide our language into theoretical and non-theoretical entities? And the second question is, is it possible to categorize entities and events into observable and unobservable entities or events? In response to these two questions on the observational-theoretical distinction debate, philosophers of science have given different views. Two of the main scholars on philosophy of science who have given positions on this issue are Maxwell and Fraaassen. Let us critically review the views of these two scholars on the observational-theoretical distinction debate. According to Maxwell, the distinction between the observational and the theoretical entities is merely a fiction. Maxwell argued that, in reality, it is not possibly possible to divide our language into observable and theoretical entities and to categorize our language into observable and observable and unobservable entities. To support this position, Maxwell advanced the following argument. Firstly, Maxwell observed that it is possible to describe a range of what is observable. Secondly, Maxwell argued that there is no non-capricious point in this range where one can demarcate between what is observable and what is not observable. Thirdly, Maxwell contended that in most cases, what determines this point is situation and purpose driven. Maxwell went on to argue that the problem is that this means that on one distinction, entities might be see real, while on another instance the entities might be seen unreal and fictitious. For Maxwell, it is also possible to arrange empirical entities according to their sizes and scale. Maxwell went on to argue that, just as the distinction on observational range is capricious, so also is capricious to argue that large molecules are observable and real, while small molecule are unobservable and unreal. In conclusion, therefore, this for Maxwell means that there is no, in principle, any distinction between the observational and the theoretical. In his views on the observational-theoretical debate, on the other hand, Fraassen was of the view that, just as Maxwell had rightly observed, theoretical-observational distinction in language is a fictitious distinction. Unlike Maxwell, however, Fraassen argued that observational-theoretical distinction should involve two levels of distinctions. The first level of distinction is the linguistic level, while the second level of distinction is the epistemic level. For Fraassen, the theoretical non-theoretical distinction is false because language is laden with theories. Fraasen, however, argued that the distinction between the observable and the unobservable entities is real. For Fraassen, observable entities are the entities that are directly perceived by our senses, while the unobservable entities are the entities that are not perceived by our senses, although they may exist (Brown, n.d.). Fraassen, therefore, was of the view that the observational-theoretical distinction is fictitious on the linguistic level, while it is a reality on epistemological level. In science, the main role of observational-theoretical distinction is to reconcile language with reality. The observational-theoretical distinction helps in finding out whether or not our languages denote reality. The observational-theoretical distinction, therefore, is quite relevant in science because it helps us to find the relationship between our languages and reality. In my opinion, the observational-theoretical distinction can be solved because it is possible to find out critically on whether or not our languages denote reality. The Scientific Process Thomas Kuhn conceived scientific process as a non-cumulative developmental episode in which an incompatible rival paradigm replaces the prevailing paradigm; the replacement for Kuhn is either complete or partial. In his analysis of the structure of scientific revolution, Kuhn contended that the main goal of scientific revolution is to bring about a paradigm shift; the paradigm shift leads to the creation of a new better theory that will be able to effectively overcome the challenges that the older theories were unable to overcome. Kuhn explains his views on scientific revolutions as follows. For Kuhn, paradigm shifts are occasioned by problems in the older paradigms. According to Kuhn, problems arise in scientific paradigms whenever the existing scientific theories are unable to overcome the new challenges that the paradigm face. Whenever such challenges arise in a scientific paradigm, Kuhn argues that there is a need for a paradigm shift so as to come up with a superior theory that is able to effectively overcome the new challenges. Kuhn also argued that the paradigm shifts are aimed at changing the institutions or status quo, and for that reason they are vehemently resisted by the status quo forces. Kuhn, however, contend that, due to the inefficiency of the older paradigm to overcome the new challenges that organizations face, paradigm shifts are inevitable in organizations, irrespective of the forces of opposition by the status quo. Another important observation that Kuhn makes in relation to scientific revolutions is that scientific revolutions are invisible. By this, Kuhn means that since science grows through a tradition of puzzle solving where new scientific theories build on the older scientific theories, it is not easy to see a scientific revolution because it is a continuation, or a modification of the older scientific theories the changing the paradigm shift. For this reason, therefore for Kuhn, since the new paradigm brought about by scientific revolutions resembles the older paradigms closely, scientific revolutions are invisible. Also, by saying that scientific revolutions are invisible, Kuhn means that as the principles that underlie or drive paradigm shift, scientific revolutions must be invisible. We, however, have evidence that scientific revolutions do exist, despite the fact that scientific revolutions are invisible as Kuhn holds. Although we do not see scientific revolution when they happen, we however, see the changes brought about the scientific revolutions; this is actually the main evidence that we have of the existence of scientific revolutions. For that reason, therefore, although we do not directly see scientific revolutions, we, however, see its results and the results are the evidence of the existence of scientific revolutions. Reference Brown, C. “Realism vs. Constructive Empiricism: Notes on Maxwell and van Fraassen”. Web.https: //www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&uac> Read More