Hardings Understanding of the Role of Values - Essay Example

On many occurrences, there are different scientists who bear different opinions on the belief systems of how science works or should work in its values. Consequently, there are two such philosophers who provide differing points of view and understandings; Haack and Harding, who works and opinions/ beliefs form the basis of this essay in comparing and contrasting their understanding of the roles of values of science. Susan Haack has a hard-line stand on the epistemological nature of science, which is named founderherentism and works towards putting as much distance as possible between her and sociological pursuits of science. As such, she argues against metaphysical and sociological subjects, which she cites as having sceptical views and obsessive approaches towards science by being extremely positivist on a logical point of view. This is following the scepticism and rejection of scientific claim made by scientists since sociology bases its findings and works on numerous grounds including plain belief. This is especially so in making alternative beliefs true, whereas there is no epistemological truth in them. She is also of the view that these metaphysical and sociological subjects often question the viability of discovering scientific truths based on proof and evidence, which is due to her background in epistemological views on the role of science. Haack’s views on science and scientific laws are all based on epistemology and they serve to establish a difference between science and religion, where there are conflicting beliefs based on proof for science and lack of it in religion (Forrest 335). Haack calls for following of scientific methodology rather than following belief blindly, where she describes science as not being a body of beliefs, but a federation. This federation is said to be composed of different kinds of inquiry based on philosophical approaches of reasoning and experience. This she views as being that science is composed of different bodies that are then unified by methodology and empiricism and this is received as having no relation whatsoever in relation to going beyond the rule of empirical epistemology. It is going beyond the rule of empirical epistemology that provides room for application of freewill in exercising one’s faith in natural phenomenon without scientific proof (Forrest 370). As a result, Haack’s understanding of the role of values in science is that science is almost solely based on empirical facts, of which religion can never become a part of in the essential understanding of the existence of the universe. Consequently, Haack views science’s role in the universe as explaining the role of man in it and his interaction with it beyond reasonable doubt. This is all while religion goes beyond that which science can prove to offer a super naturalist interpretive framework to explain scientific occurrences (Forrest 333). The above in comparison to Harding’s understanding reveals a difference that even offers a large variation from the understanding of Haack in that Harding dwells a lot on sociology. It is in this case that she calls for inclusion of other science disciplines that are conventionally not recognized in order to fit the western standard of science, in which case this is a fully socialist view. Harding bears an inclusionist’s perspective, which is similar to that of typical feminists seeing that bringing together other ethno sciences is part of her to call to contribute to science. This, as her sociological basis, brings about a strong ground on which to base the comparison between Harding and Haack in their views on the role of science vales. This is also part of Harding's view on objectivity, where approaches to science should be fully objective to allow exploration and not using approaches based on already existing knowledge to come up with EW information. Instead, this is contrary to Haack, in that Haack’s understanding is confined to the scientific world, where scientific methodology remains the only way to prove facts and explain phenomenon. However, Harding focuses on neutrality of philosophy in making approaches towards occurrences that can be interpreted both religiously and scientifically with the exemption of epistemology in the case of those that cannot be explained except through supernatural ideologies. With this in mind, that Harding’s approach attempts to rationalize other ethno sciences that Haack does not approve of due to their sceptical nature. Harding perceives it as an attempt by elitist scientists to personalize science by locking out other possible explanations of phenomena, both natural and unnatural (Harding 314). Further, Harding is thoroughly opposed to traditional philosophical approaches to science, where they serve as a tool, which helps western science in dominating other scientific cultures. This is such that Harding is of contrary belief concerning Haack, in the role and machinations of science in that all scientific disciplines and divisions deserve a chance in making their discoveries and bringing out knowledge. This is what Haack is opposed to, in that Haack calls for systematic organization of scientific methodology to bring out knowledge and information (Forrest 335). Haack’s understanding is anti-multi-ethno science by being in opposition of other scientific beliefs that are created by other people that are not conventionally recognized as scientists. This leads to world dominance of only one ethno-science, which is that supported by conventional philosophy and one that is of a western nature, leaving out other scientific traditions. According to Harding, this is unacceptable as her views are suggestive of the role scientific values being appreciation and bringing together ideas to advance scientific knowledge while Haack’s view is that of an imperialist if not purist (Harding 314). Consequently, Harding views the value of science as being accommodating, as no single scientific discipline that is correct of its own, but sharing knowledge and accepting values from different centres brings about better understanding of scientific and non-scientific occurrences. Harding is also of the understanding that application of conventional laws of science is side lining so that they are not viewed as part of the elitist society of scientists. The sidelined scientists are not integrated ad their contributions are not recognized either, as they are deemed to be independent of empirical epistemology of science. This she views as part of the reason why elitist scientists such as Haack take over ideas from other ethno scientists and label them as their own, considering that indigenous science is not recognized. This way, Harding is an opponent of the ideas of Haack in that Harding proposes feminist values in an approach to the philosophy of science (Harding 312). Following this, her understanding is that other ethno sciences should challenge to existing western self-righteous ethno science based on rationality and critical analysis by being alternatives sources of knowledge and information. This is all the same while incorporating beliefs and objectivity, rather than wallowing in epistemological methodology aimed at putting asunder other scientists and their findings for the earlier mentioned elitist tendencies. As a result, Harding is of the belief that absolutism is not the right approach to scientific phenomenon, “Standpoint epistemology has provided one effective alternative to the field of otherwise only absolutist and relativist "methods” (Harding 317). Altogether, the understanding of scientific values offered by these two scientists indicates a rift in epistemology and integration of relative means of comprehending scientific facts. This is following absolutism and empiricism in Haack’s view, which is different from that Harding, although there is a middle ground in epistemology. This is in which case they both agree to have epistemology to prove facts, but the difference should be in absolutism and relativism, thus there are differences and similarities in their understanding of scientific values. Works Cited Harding, Sandra. "After Eurocentrism: Challenges for the Philosophy of Science." Chicago Journal 2 (1992): 311-319. Print. Forrest, Barbara. "The non-epistemology of intelligent design: its implications for public policy." Sringer 178 (2009): 331-379. Print. Read More