An Alternative To Rawls Difference Principle - Essay Example

An Alternative To Rawls Difference Principle I. INTRODUCTION Since the ancient period the ideas of justice, fairness, and equity have received treatment and elucidation as it has captured humanity’s attention, but until now its exact meaning remains vague (Denier, 2007). Nonetheless, though the situation seems to be far from what scholars and philosophers want – a clear and definitive meaning and an objective conceptual analysis for justice, fairness and equity - humanity’s history is filled with discourses trying to untangle the myriad of concepts underlying these ideas. As such, though the vagueness remains, human beings do not grapple in the dark as they embark on conceptual analysis primarily intended in finding principles and formulations which may be utilised in apprehending justice, fairness and equity. John Rawls, one of the greatest contemporary philosophers, has provided an answer to the question what is justice? Not discounting the importance of the various types of justice such as particular justice, universal justice and legal justice (Pojman, 2002), John Rawls has given much attention on the elucidation of distributive justice which is primarily concern with the distribution of social goods. Distributive justice “refers to fair, equitable and appropriate distribution of goods and burdens, determined by justified norms that structure the terms of social cooperation. Its scope includes policies that allot diverse benefits and burdens, such as rights and responsibilities, property, resources, taxation, privileges and opportunities” (Denier, 2007). In this regard, this paper aims to look into Rawls’ difference principle and will also try to provide a conceptual analysis of the said principle. Furthermore, it will attempt to provide other viable alternative/s to Rawls’ difference principle. Being such, this paper will address the following questions. First, ‘Is Rawls’ right to claim that individuals would choose the difference principle in the original position? And second, ‘Is there a better alternative to Rawls’ difference principle? In lieu with this, the paper will be divided into three parts. The first part will be the introduction where the aims and questions to be addressed by the paper will be presented. The second part will contain the discussion regarding Rawls’ difference principle. And the third part will be attempting to work out if there is a better alternative to Rawls’ difference principle. And hopefully in the end, this paper in its own little way, add to the clarification of the concept of justice. II. RAWLS’ DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE: IN FOCUS Rawls’ theory of justice attempts to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, perfectionism and intuitionism. It is against utilitarianism for Rawls presupposes that the concept of ‘good’ which is interpreted as happiness, pleasure, utility or preferences in this paradigm cannot be used to interpret justice because of the inherent subjectivity in the understanding of good in this context (Rawls, 1971). Moreover, following the Kantian dictum that persons should always be treated as an end in themselves and never as means. As such, persons possess inviolable dignity and they may not be sacrificed for the benefit of some and even of the whole society (Rawls 1971). It is against perfectionism, since Rawls’s theory of justice recognizes the reality of pluralism in the contemporary world as exemplified in religion, morality and philosophical discourse itself (Denier, 2007). Thus, it can be maintained that since there exists plurality of ideas, there is no one objective concept of good which all citizens hold. Finally, his theory is against intuitionism in the sense that it denies the existence of priority among the rules but what is perceptible is a lexical ordering of the principles of justice(Rawls, 1971). Knowing now that Rawls responds against utilitarianism, perfectionism and intuitionism, what is his alternative? Before laying down his answer to the basic question of his book which is ‘what is justice?’ Rawls has provided the framework with which he will be building his theory. As stated earlier, his primary concern is that of social justice which is taking the basic structure of society as primary subject of justice (Rawls, 1971: 7). Bearing this in mind, social justice then deals with the economic, political, and social structures or systems of the society. These systems will lay down the foundation with which the distribution of burdens and benefits within the society will be undertaken. And since these structures permeates into the very experience of life of people as it distributes burdens and benefits in the society, it is of utmost importance that people may find how they can attain human flourishing within the basic structures of the society. So much so, that discussion regarding life prospects and chances can be concretely understood in terms of “what people can expect to be and how people can hope to do” (Rawls, 1971: 7). Addressing these concerns, Rawls’ has listed the primary social goods that will be allocated in the society. These are rights, liberties, opportunities, and powers, income and wealth, and the social basis for self-respect (Denier, 2007). This broad list has been modified into five categories. These are: 1. A basic set of rights and liberties, including freedom of thought and association, freedom defined by the integrity of the person and so on. These are the background institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the capacity to decide upon, revise and rationally pursue a conception of good. Similarly, these liberties allow for the development and exercise of the sense of right and justice under political and social conditions that are free. 2. Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against the background of diverse opportunities. These are required for the pursuit of final ends as well as to give effect to a decision to revise and change them, if one desires. 3. Powers and prerogatives of offices as well as positions of responsibility in the political and economic institutions of the basic structure. They are needed to give scope to various self-governing and social capacities of the self. 4. Income and wealth understood broadly as all purpose means of achieving directly or indirectly a wide range of ends whatever they happen to be. 5. The social bases of self-respect . these are those aspects of basics institutions that are normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as moral persons and to be able to realise their highest –order interests and advance their ends with self-confidence Source: Political Liberalism (1996) These categories are considered as the primary goods which are deemed as necessary in the persons’ status as free and equal citizens (Denier, 2007). They are also viewed as social primary goods since these goods are connected with the basic social structure of the society. After stipulating the categories of goods, Rawls now claims that there are two principles of justice which is to be applied lexically. When talking of the lexical application of the principles of justice, it entails that before one can satisfy the second category of good, one has to satisfy first the first category. And if the first category is already fulfilled or satisfied, it is only then that one can move to the second. And when the second is satisfied to the third, then, down the line. In other words, lexical application of the principles connotes no jumping in the application – first will have to be the first satisfied, no change in the order. In lieu with this, the two principles of justice are: 1. Each person has an equal right to fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions of fair equality; and second they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged of members of the society. The first principle is to be applied to nos 1 and 2 of the categories. And these rights are equally guaranteed and enjoyed by everybody. The second principle contains two underlying principles. These are the principle of fair equality of opportunity which is applied to categories nos 3 and 4; while other principle is the difference principle, which, is to be applied on the last category which is an economic good. The presentation of the categories and the principles that Rawls utilise in order to explain his concept of justice is laid down in order to present to the reader that for Rawls, 1. There is a lexical ordering of rights and liberties (Rawls, 1971, 1993). 2. That basic rights and liberties are guaranteed and inviolable which shows that for Rawls human beings have intrinsic dignities as human persons (Rawls, 1971). Thus, the dignity of a person is attributed to him or her in her being a human person. There are no other requisites in the attribution of rights and liberties to persons as persons (Denier,2007; Lamont, 1994). 3. That for social goods, what is necessary is fair opportunity implying that persons should be given the chance to pursue what he deems and thinks is his/her good (Buchanan, 1976). And 4. The difference principle is to be applied only to economic goods (Denier, 2007). This is rooted from the fact that there is an inherent inequality in the distribution of the material goods. This material reality is undeniable; not everybody is as rich as Bill Gates even if everybody wants to. In this regard, what Rawls is presenting is that since the human world is living in the realm of material inequality and that it is seeming illusion to think that inequality can really be levelled out, what instead should be done is to formulate policies and rules wherein the least advantaged members of the society is still benefited (Wolff, 2002, 2007). Working in this framework, is Rawls’ right to claim that people will choose the difference principle in the original position? The answer, after the long introduction is YES. Rawls utilized the reflective equilibrium wherein what is real is juxtaposed with could be real. Under the scheme of what can be thought of, he has created the original position which is ahistorical. He claims that the original position is that which is characterized by the circumstances of justice in which human beings are moderately selfish and the resources are limited if not scarce. The parties in the original position are rational and free. And that they are under the veil of ignorance which is an idea that they are not aware of their race, gender, sex and other factors that may influence their decision making. Then finally, whatever it is that they will agree upon, the difference principle, is something that is realizable. Why will people in the original position do that? First, though the original position is ahistorical (Rawls, 1971), what makes it significant is that it is anchored on the supposition that human nature is such that they are free and rational. And that although they are driven by self-interest, their self –interest is not only limited to material forms but it includes the need to assert itself as a rational and free human person (Rawls, 1993;1971). As such, it transcends the negativity of selfishness. Second, these desire to present ourselves as rational and free beings is part of human beings’ nature (Rawls, 1971, 1993). Third, no conception of right in the original position (Lamont, 1994) is known. However, this is the big problem of the theory, how can difference principle be connected with the original position? (Poggi as cited in Lamont, 1994) In fact, this is a misunderstanding of the whole connection between the original position and difference principle. Since, according to Daniels et al (2000), the inequality is not tolerated nor perpetuated. What it intends to do is that the benefits flow down to the most disadvantaged member of the society. It does not intend for the goods of the society to remain stuck in the upper echelon but that aims to bring it down the ladder of the social strata. As such, as a principle it has to go with the other two principles namely equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity (Denier, 2007). On its own, it cannot account for fairness. Fourth, it manifest clearly that persons should be respected of persons regardless of their attributions. There is a common humanity that is shared regardless of color, gender, race and economic status. Fifth, it presupposes that the categories given are objective. Objective not because there is a transcendental truth that affirms it. Rather, it is objective because rational and free persons have come to an agreement that they will implement such principles and ideals in order to attain human flourishing (Daniels,2000). The consensus that binds the rational and free persons is not a result of an arbitrary decision but is a result of a deliberative undertaking with the ideal of the good of everyone since all human persons have dignity befitting that of a human person is the primordial ethos of the consensus. But Rawls’ difference principle is plagued with holes. Rawls’ difference principle is not enough basis or working space for justice. Why? First, the inadequacy of wealth and income as indices of the well-being of people. Take for example the case of two persons who are earning the same amount of money however one of them is in a wheelchair. “the person in the wheelchair maybe of the same in income and wealth with the person of ‘normal’ mobility and yet be unequal to move from one place to another” (Nussbaum, 2000). Second, income and wealth are good proxies for what is truly relevant – human dignity and human flourishing (Nussbaum, 2000).Third, the primary goods that are to be distributed in the society are multivariate. Thus, it is not commensurable in terms of any single quantitative standard (Nussbaum, 2001).Fourth, it suggest that the relevant resources are items that can be distributed to individuals. As such, people who are permanently or even temporarily incapacitated are not included in the original position. Thus, the question why exclude them from the original position? remains unanswered. Martha Nussbaum (2001) said that there are three reasons why Rawls had to exclude people who are physically impaired from his original position. First, is his doctrine of primary good? By admitting people with physical impairments and related disabilities into the calculation of needs for primary goods, Rawls would lose a straight forward way of measuring who is the least well-off in society. This becomes more pronounce since Rawls has to maintain the difference principle and understand it in a single and linear way using income and wealth as the reference. Second, the public space is arranged in such a way that it caters to the impairments of the ‘normal case’ (Nussbaum 2001). Society has created the concept of normalcy and projects it as something natural. As such, society looks differently on those who are differently abled (Vehmas, 2004). This concept bear tend to highlight the fact that public space is an artifact of ideas about inclusion (Nussbaum 2001) and it is seemingly unfortunate that what we have included in our public sphere are only those who are normal and fully cooperating members while postponing for the meantime the inclusion of people who are impaired. In fact, Rawls himself do not give much concern over this fact since these people who are impaired, he designates as ‘scattered individuals’. This is heart rending since it assumes that they are not the majority anyway so why bother about them. And yet the theory is based on human dignity which is then based on rationality. Thus, allowing it to speak of justice as fairness. III. ANARCHY AN ALTERNATIVE Nozick’ s concept of entitlement serves as an alternative to Rawls’ difference principle. This is claimed based on the following premises. First, Nozick’s concept of entitlement is anchored on the supposition that a rational and free individual has the sole authority over the work of his hands (Nozick, 1974). This is also known as the principle of justice in acquisition (Nozick, 1974). This principle does not counter rationality and freedom in fact it affirms since it is the natural consequence of one’s efforts (Hevia & Spector, 2008). Besides, this principle only binds under two conditions: first, it pertains to unheld resources or those which do not fall under any ownership on anybody. And second that it does not hurt or impugned on any other people’s space or rights. Thus, it checks the selfish interests of the individual and protects the each and everyone against each other (De Gregori, 1979). Second, the other principle that supports Nozick’s concept is the principle of justice of transfer which claims that “A person who acquires a holding from someone else entitled to the holding, in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, is entitled to the holding” (Nozick, 1974). This principle holds that as a person has a right to do whatever he/she wants with the material possession she has acquired, the owner also has a right to transfer his property as she sees fit. (Nozick, 1974; Hevia & Spector, 2008) Third, Nozick’s clearly reflects autonomy (Hevia & Spector, 2008). It asserts the individual over and above any other else (Barber, 1977). Fourth, transactions are voluntary. Being such, it envisions a society that becomes responsible not because it has too but because it voluntarily puts upon itself to be responsible. Nozick’s position highlights the importance of the individual, of the self, of self –ownership (Wolff, 2007). His theory brings back the human person at the center of the discourse on justice. In the end, at the heart of all conceptual analysis of justice is the concrete experience of human life. Much is still to be done in understanding equality and justice in world that is rift between the rich and the poor, the North and the South (Kymlicka, 2002). REFERENCE: Barber, B.J. (1977).Deconstituting politics: Robert Nozick and philosophical reductionism, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 39, 1 – 22. Buchanan, J. (1976). A Hobbessian interpretation of the Rawlsian difference principles, KYKLOS, Vol. 29, 5 – 25. De Gregori, R. (1979). Market morality: Robert Nozick and the question of economic Justice, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 38, No 1, 17 – 32. Denier, Y. (2007). Efficiency, Justice and Care. International Library of Ethics, Law and New Medicine. The Netherlands: Springer. Hevia, M., & Spector, E. (2008). The bizarre world of historical theories of justice: Revisiting Nozick’s argument, Social Theory and Practise, Vol. 34, No 4, 533 – 552. Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction.2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lamont, J. (1994). Pareto efficiency, egalitarianism and difference principle, Social Theory and Practise, Vol. 20, No 3, 311 - 327. Norman, D., Kennedy, B., Kawachi, I & Sen, A. (2000). Is Inequality Bad for Our Health? Boston: Beacon Press Nozick, R. (1974). Anachy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell Ltd. Nussbaum, M.C. (2000). Women and Development. Chicago: Chicago University Press. ____________. (2001).Ethical Choices in Long Term Care: What does justice require? Pojman, L. (2002). The Quest for Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice: How Fair is Being Fair? Massachusetts: Harvard University of Press. _______. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Vehmas, S. (2004). Dimensions of disability. Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care. 13, 34 – 40. Wolff, J. (2007). Equality the recent history of an idea, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Read More