A Great Philosopher and the Argument of Ethics and Values - Essay Example

Is MacIntyres Critique of Modern Ethics Convincing? Macintyre’s has made tremendous contribution to both political and moral theories that stress on the frameworks of virtues, morality and ethics. This paper seeks to evaluate Macintyre’s critique of modern ethics through an investigation of his works. This paper begins by asserting that Macintyre’s critique of modern ethics is not convincing enough. This notion is supported by acknowledging that his philosophy does not explicitly explore concepts sufficiently in a way that allows for rational frameworks to be developed as a guide of taking moral action and regulating social behavior. It continues to point out to the inconsistencies and the groundless nature of major assumptions made in his philosophies. His argument of superiority of certain traditions is also criticized as well as other inconsistencies in his criteria. In After Virtue, when he says “one has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities,”1 he rejects the concept of individuality in moral issues. Lastly, this paper explores Hegel’s speculative logic of metaphysics as a contrary philosophy to Macintyre’s. MacIntyres Critique of Modern Ethics is not convincing. His claims that the ethical theory and practice are incomprehensible is groundless. The recipients of his criticism are the emotive who believe in the doctrine of emotivism. For them, the value upheld and the metaphysical aspects of people are attributes that are derived from own personal preference as opposed to adherence to objective validity. In this case, considering something to be good is not a root of making a rational moral decision, instead that is only based on personal preference. As such, MacIntyres critique is based on three major pillars as proposed by Aristotle (Brodie 1991). The first pillar considers the moral agent in the amateur person, the second one is the moral agent when one already has comprehension of is telos, and lastly, moral considerations that enhance facilitation between stages (MacIntyre 1999). Modernity fails to uphold the second pillar as the normative concept of telos cannot be used as a determinant of good of bad behavior in the society. In this case, the good traits of an individual has to be eliminated, even if it is highly beneficial to the members of the society. This has to happen so that one can adopt new and alternative forms of norms other than the original one. It is only after such a disconnection that one can say that something about that traditional or society is good or one can qualify to understand the true end of a moral agent (Dworkin 2011). In is critique, MacIntyre claims to provide people with a way out in the analysis of what is morally upright by formulating a way in which people can return back to the situation after achieving a true end of a moral end which is achieved by detaching oneself from the society to be assessed. MacIntyre concept of transformation of a person from a culture in this case does not offer any practicality at all in assessing moral grounds (Anscombe 1958). MacIntyre’s argument that for one to understand the ethical theory and apply it in a particular situation in life, one has to accept the historically embedded traditions and social practices of a culture are completely baseless. He uses several and internally coherent set of traditions to establish rational standards upon which people can base the morality of their actions. In After Virtue, MacIntyre adopts Aristotelianism theory to prove that the theory was more insightful in this case compared to other theories seeking to provide for moral ground to base behavior and social activities on. His rationale in based on the fact that the Aristotelian position in this case is based on telos of both an entire human life and that of practice (MacIntyre, 1984). MacIntyre’s argument in this case implies that people cannot think or act contrary to what the cultural affiliations, furthermore, it is impossible to understand or behave is a perspective that is external to one’s own tradition. This means that the grounds for rationality cannot be accessed when one is at a standpoint that is external to all traditions. This implies that in order to successfully defend an ethical theory in a rational manner and judge the morality of a behavior, one has to be actively embedded in such a tradition. In his position, it is not possible for a culture which practices ritual sacrifice reflects on itself and then promote itself and rational and mature. This argument is not practical and therefore it fails to account for major inconsistencies in determining the morally of an action of behavior as practically, one does not need to belong to the same culture with a person being morally incorrect in order to know that such a behavior account is morally wrong. There are numerous inconsistencies in his criteria despite his insistence of its rationality. In the three works in which MacIntyre explores virtues, morals, ethics and criticism of modernity, he fails to address the questions raised about what or who was the source of the criteria he used to determine the morality of an individual as well as measures of regulation of social behavior. Most of the problems created by his stance are left unresolved as he does not seek to resolve even a single one of them. He fails to explain the ways in which people can reach the absolute truth taking into perspective the socially and historically limited position. His suggestion in this case is irrational as there are no logical grounds to support his claim that one may reach the absolute truth despite being in a socially and historically limited position as paying more attention to history can reveal that cultures are not the same, some are more superior to others when taken into perspective of a specific topic. In this case, one can achieve absolute truth if identification of a culture that is strong is a given topic is correctly done. In Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, he makes claims that history is very important in assessing truth since it has all the answers to make justification on a given topic. This stance almost gets him to acknowledge metaphysical grounding but his position is reached with a lot of assumptions related to major philosophical statement. Nevertheless, his theory gets even more confusing when he concludes by saying, “The concept of truth, however, is timeless”.2 MacIntyre’s argument on ethics, morals and values can be supported by many people as an argument of epistemology. However, when critically analyzed, his argument is biased against some traditions without providing proper ground for it. He posits that all major traditions have their unique underlying assumptions which dictate the method of reasoning in cultures. As such, one cannot claim to have independent reasoning or rational ground in which ethical frameworks can stand on. He makes claims that there has been many cases of failed modern projects because people want to exercise independent rational thinking, which is impossible to achieve successfully. An attempt to access independent appeal to reason is highly discouraged, but at the same time, he does not offer a convincing claim to support transcendence or universality. The only way provided to explain this phenomenon is his particular, socially constructed account of rationality. However, this account only shows a community based on nature of collectivity but lacks clear standards which can steer the community in particular towards achievement of common good. One such grounds that shows lack of standards and frameworks to make guide communities toward as common good can be evaluated by taking into perspective his take on virtues. His definition of virtue fails to rely on and rational or explicit standards, but instead, it is based on his thoughts about communal actions and standards. This means that he ignores the fact that virtue are inherent in systems of different cultures and therefore, can vary from community to community and from time to time. Virtue is supposed to be a socially modifiable and adaptable attribute that helps people to successfully perform the duties of a good moral agent (Horton & Mendus 1994). MacIntyre’s position on virtues is largely criticized by Hegel who presents a completely unique argument that rejects Aristotelian logic by terming it as a formal discipline that is empty. His position is that philosophy is shaped daily by the activities and empirical sciences that require people to use their common sense very chance they get in order to grasp the rationality and purity of thought systems which may not be embedded in the traditions but they exists and may go unnoticed in daily lives. Hegel explores the concept of virtue by application of speculative logic of metaphysics. Hegel is well known for his logical thinking through speculative thinking and logical forms which are used as a form of expression in language. Hegel of language of is time is an intentional thing that allows logic to engage in subjective thinking and thought systems that allow for intense linguistic expression. This shows that he is not incoherent simply because he uses the language of his time. Hegel’s system has been said to contain no ethics at all. Furthermore, virtues in moral philosophy are not embedded in sociology and neither are they an interpretation of the tradition and a collective society. Instead, the principle aim is to overcome philosophical insights that are responsible for social and cultural alienation. People are held as independent being with a logical ability of thinking and coming up with solutions of their own which need not be shaped by the superiority or inferiority of one’s tradition in relation to others. As such, Hegel advocates for ‘the will’ which promotes the freedom to make choices based on metaphysical content. Its philosophy gives people the rights to exercise rational theodicy even in modernity. According to Aristotle’s, virtue is classified into two types; there is the intellectual and the moral categories. He claims that moral values are conditioned by the social environment of an individual. As such, virtues emerge from people’s habits after the inculcation of ethos. In Aristotle’s rhetoric, ethos refers to a set of habits of customs which are inherent in one’s broader society. In this case, an individual exhibiting moral virtues must have some dimension of social relativity (Gracia 2000). This helps people to associate with others in the society since one can claim their identity relative to those of other people in the society. This position is clearly supported by MacIntyre whose stand is more on application of social norms, ethics and values that are mutually acceptable by the entire community. On the other hand, there are intellectual virtues which can either be theoretical or practical. Intellectual virtues are highly merged with the moral virtues and therefore, they are not easily separated. When a person exhibits high level of moral virtues, they are most likely to possess intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are concerned with advocating for better living by supporting good over evil. Macintyre strongly overemphasizes on virtues having socially constructed aspects. His argument of ethics and values almost get him on the relative position as he provides no precise frameworks on how to evaluate such virtues, nor does he provide precise rational standards to guide moral behavior in a society.3 While he keeps emphasizing on how the virtues should be derived from particular tradition, and only a single one, he fails to define aspects of such traditions, thereby making his claims very vague and incomprehensible (Stern, 1994). It is imperative to note that rational standards is a great philosopher who have made major strides of contribution in crucial political and social frameworks such as contests, history, practices an tradition, which are important concepts in sustaining our perceptions, he fails to explain the practicability part, where people get the ideas on how to implement such frameworks into real life. References Anscombe, E., (1958), “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy, 33; 15-33 Brodie, S., (1991), Ethics with Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horton, J., & Susan Mendus, eds. (1994), After MacIntyre, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Gracia, J. J. E., (2000), “Relativism and the Interpretation of Texts,” in J. Margolis and T. Rockmore eds., The Philosophy of Interpretation, special issue of Metaphilosophy, 31, 1-2:43-62.. MacIntyre, A., (1984), After Virtue, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, second edition. MacIntyre, A., (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. MacIntyre, A., (1990), Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. MacIntyre, A., (1999), Dependent Rational Animals, LaSalle, IL: Open Court. Stern, R., (1994), “MacIntyre and Historicism,” in After MacIntyre, 146-175. Williams, B., (1985), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Read More