The Ethical Principles of Science - Assignment Example

Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science Section I Question 3 Falsifiability of a hypothesis, theory, or ment, is an inherent likelihood that proves it to be false. A statement is referred to as falsifiable if it is likely to conceive an argument or an observation that proves it to be false (Oosterlinck, 1999). Thus, in this sense, we can consider falsify as synonym to nullify, implying not to commit any fraud, but simply prove to be false. Some philosophers argue that science is falsifiable. Karl Popper, for instance, argues that anything that defines scientific method is a falsification rather than verification. Popper simply meant that any exceptional status, which science may have derives itself from the physical and social value of the results of science instead of its specific method (Longino, 1983). The philosopher based his philosophy on the hypothetico-deductive method, arguing that enumerative induction is mainly invalid and for sure does not in fact take place (Oosterlinck, 1999). Popper presented his proposal as a method of drawing the line between theories that belong to the empirical science and all other theories, whether or not they are of metaphysical or religious character or merely pseudoscientific (Longino, 1983). It was both a criterion for differentiating between pseudoscience and science and an option to the rational positivists’ verification criteria (Oosterlinck, 1999). According to scientists, falsification has a number of problems that stem from its logical situation and also historical backgrounds. Problems that arise from logical situations include: (1) when experimentation and observation offer evidence, which contradicts the predictions of some theories of laws, it might be the proof that is at fault instead of the theory or law; and (2) a realistic scientific theory will comprise of a complex statement instead of one statement such as, “all dogs are German shepherds” (Longino, 1983). In addition, if a theory is to practically be tested, then much more effort will be used rather than those statements, which put the theory under test. From a historical basis, there are various problems such as Newton’s law of gravity being completely falsified by observations of the moon’s orbit and Bohr’s hypothesis of the atom, being falsified by Lakatos (Oosterlinck, 1999). Another example is the Kinetic theory and the advantage falsification has on theory of birth, which has only been acknowledged by its originator. Other problems of falsification include: (1) legitimate parts of science appear not to be falsifiable; (2) falsification is not falsifiable itself; (3) Popper failed to account for people’s expectations about the future; (4) the degree notion of falsifiability is problematic; and finally (5) scientists, at times, overlook falsification (Longino, 1983). Philip Kitcher Popper’s falsification is naïve in his Believing Where We Cannot Prove. Here, Kitcher defends his evolutionary science from various criticisms leveled through proponents of creationism and articulates a view of what is good science to prove why those criticisms are unnecessary (Longino, 1983). In place of naïve falsification, Kitcher means that Popper merely envisioned science as a progression through the rejection of falsified theories, instead of falsified statements (Oosterlinck, 1999). Falsified theories are to be substituted with theories, which can only account for the phenomena, which falsified the earlier theory, i.e. with greater explanatory power. Naïve falsification regards scientific statements personally. Therefore, Popper means that scientific theories can be formed from groups of such sorts and it is such groups that Kitcher regards as naïve. Scientific theories can, at all times, be guarded by the addition of ad hoc theories (Longino, 1983). As Popper puts it, a decision is needed on the part of the scientist in order to reject or accept the statements, which normally make up a theory and/or that may falsify it (Oosterlinck, 1999). During some point, the weight of the ad hoc theories and ignored falsifying observations will become so great that it becomes unreasonable to endorse the base theory any longer and the choice will be made in order to decline it. Kitchers task in this essay is twofold (Longino, 1983). Section II Question 2 Observational-theoretical distinction means the verifiability principle in science. A statement is mainly meaningful if it is verifiable, but in scientific theories, there are a lot of statements that cannot be verified, for instance, assertions coping with quantum relativistic or particles gravitational fields. Observation and theory are mainly abstract concepts linked to the discovery of objective truth (Oosterlinck, 1999). However, as scientists argue, none of them are entirely independent from the other in their process, and despite the overlap, there are tangible distinctions between the notions. Theory and observation both have exceptional applications, functions and uses and have be comprehended as individual concepts prior to one analyzing how both of them work together in the field of science (Proctor, 1998). These two concepts of observation and theory are both connected to the uncovering of the truth (Longino, 1983). They are both important methods of uncovering objective reality and, because of this, are used to develop the rules of a society in addition to the prevailing idea of that societys inhabitants. Observation is normally utilized in the coming up with laws, to determining likely loopholes (Oosterlinck, 1999). Likewise, laws are utilized in the theorizing process in order to conclude what is and what is not possible. Theories, for instance, are utilized widely by scientists in observations in order to test new theories (Oosterlinck, 1999). The distinction marks a marks a huge difference as to why people are justified in believing two kinds of any statement. This is observation statements are justified through a straight and direct appeal of someone’s experience, but this is not the same for theoretical statements. Observational statements reach outside one’s body language and link scientific beliefs straight to the world people experience (Longino, 1983). However, theoretical statements are considered as hypotheses that are justified only through believing merely on the grounds of the evidence offered by the observation statements. The observational/theoretical distinction, therefore, signifies the distinction between proof and that which the proof supports, which are normally referred to as theories (Oosterlinck, 1999). Therefore, theoretical statements are use in science only when they can be utilized in deducing directly verifiable observational statements under specifiable situations (Longino, 1983). There are a number of problems that exist with the observational-theoretical distinction such as observational terms never exist. A number of scientists argue that only a distinction between phrases utilized in a specific theory and new phrases used for mainly the first time in a novel scientific theory is likely (Oosterlinck, 1999). For instance, Bohr’s atomic theory comprises of terms such as quantum jump, quantum numbers, steady state, in addition to explaining spectra described with the aid of a wavelength. The term wavelength is considered as an old phrase, whereas quantum numbers is a recent term. Therefore, the abstract concepts of atomic theories are connected to other abstract concepts (Longino, 1983). Another problem is that the meaning of theoretical terms is not defined by analytic statements that are true due to their convention. In reality, each and every statement is dependent on empirical tests. There is a much simpler, influential and intuitive proposal of how to solve the observational-theoretical distinction in a sensible manner: a term t is theoretical with regards to a theory T, or a T-term if it mainly brought in by the theory T at a particular level in the history of science. This method draws the observational-theoretical distinction in a clear and sharp manner through means of resolving the distinction in a specific theory. As expected, the proposal goes in line with the contextual theory of meaning (Oosterlinck, 1999). Remarkably, this criterion of T-theoreticity proposes a strategy, which permits people to recover a global, non-resolved observational-distinction distinction: just take a phrase t to be theoretical if it asserts, for all techniques m of deciding its extension, which m rests upon a number of axiom of some theory T (Oosterlinck, 1999). Section III Question 1 The scientific revolution refers to the emergence of modern, contemporary science, when developments in physics, mathematics, biology, astronomy and chemistry changed view of nature and society. It started in Europe mainly towards the sunset of the Renaissance period and persisted through the late 18th century, persuading the academic social movement referred to as the Enlightenment Age (Oosterlinck, 1999). Whereas its dates are disputed by many historical researchers, the 1543 publication of Nicolaus Copernicus’ referred to as the De revolution orbium coelestium or On the Revolution of our Heavenly Spheres, is normally considered as the start of the scientific revolution, plus its completion is acknowledged to the grand synthesis of Isaac Newton’s Principia of 1687. By the turn of the 19th century, this revolution has offered way to the well celebrated Reflection Age. The scientific revolution concept occurring over an extended period emerged in the 18th century in the Bailly works, who witnesses a two-stage process of sweeping away the aged and developing the new one (Oosterlinck, 1999). The period led to the development of a number of methods of modern science and the fast accumulation of knowledge that has typified the development of science in the 17th century that had never been seen before this time (Longino, 1983). The fresh kind of activity developed only a few nations in Western Europe plus it was limited to that minute region for almost 200 years (Oosterlinck, 1999). Because Kuhn deemed that problem solving is a key element/aspect of science, he considered for a fresh candidate for scientific revolution to be acknowledged in the science community. For and foremost, the new candidate has to prove that he or she can resolve some key issues, which cannot be resolved in another manner (Oosterlinck, 1999). Second, scientific revolution has to pledge to preserve a fairly huge part of the concrete problem solving activity, which has accrued to science through its precursors (Longino, 1983). In essence, Kuhn argued that the scientific revolution has to solve more issues compared to its precursors that entailed the number of freshly solved issues, which have to be greater compared t the solved old issues. Kuhn proved this with a number of experiments in his Structure of Scientific Revolution book which can be consulted (Oosterlinck, 1999). Kuhn argues that revolutions in science are, and must be, invisible. This is due to the fact that paradigm shifts are basically considered not as revolutions, but additions to scientific knowledge, and since, the history of the field is signified in the new texts, which accompany a fresh paradigm, a scientific revolution appears invisible. The vision of a creative scientific activity is hugely developed by a field’s textbooks. Kuhn claims that textbooks are the pedagogic engines for the perpetuation of contemporary science (Longino, 1983). Such texts turn into authoritative source of the history of science and both the practitioner’s and layman’s knowledge of science is rooted in textbooks. A field’s texts have to rewritten in the aftermath of a scientific revolution and once written, they inevitably disguise the role, existence and importance of revolution, which produced them (Oosterlinck, 1999). Because of Kuhn’s arguments, we cannot solidly claim that revolutions exist apart from using different theoretical claims that we found in existence. The historical reconstruction of early theorists and paradigms in the scientific texts merely make history of science seem cumulative or linear, an inclination that also impacts scientists analyzing their own work (Longino, 1983). These misconceptions render revolution as invisible meaning there is no evidence it ever existed. They work as well to deny revolutions as functions and science texts present inaccurate info that science has basically reached its current state through a number of individual inventions and discoveries, which, when amassed together, create the contemporary body of technical knowledge (Oosterlinck, 1999). This fact proves the pattern of historical mistakes and faults, which mislead laymen and students about the nature of scientific revolution. As of now, people only depend on the theory that revolution took place. Section IV According to venerable method of taking into consideration science, as well as its place in society, science is considered as value-free (Price, 1976). Researchers have argued that inductive risk needs scientists to make value decisions in the internal procedures of scientific reasoning, for instance, data interpretation and characterization and deciding whether or not the proof endorses a theory, but that the duty for value judgments must be restricted to an indirect role (Proctor, 1998). Science essentially sets sights on facts alone and is interested in the manner in which the world is apart from inherently subjective issues of interpretation. Scientists argue that science cannot, by any means, learn facts devoid of needing to take a stand on their values (Oosterlinck, 1999). Thus, it does not concern itself with tedious in addition to undecidable arguments about matters and issues of values. However, as Hilary Putnam, a famous philosopher argued, for a number of years, science depends on epistemic values. A good and professional scientist, just like a good detective, utilizes his or her judgment (Longino, 1983). Not each and every possibility is worth taking into consideration, not due to the fact that they are impossible or since the proof at had rules them out, but simply because, provided what people know about how the world generally functions, they appear irrelevant and far-fetched. Thus, it does not bear any significant reason to worry over far-fetched possibilities (Oosterlinck, 1999). Scientists mainly look to predict and explain; they develop theories, which manage a wealth of information and they attempt to do so in ways, which are simple, logical and believable. Science was also considered to offer a path of the truth. While religious thought and other disgraceful branches of speculation mainly referred to as metaphysics were value-laden utterly, scientists finally stuck to what they deemed significant (Longino, 1983). Someone has doubts if anyone ever, in reality held this view of science but it has been suitable to impose it on the logical empiricists, as well as other opponents of a more realistic view of the scientific world. Science, in the end, is an activity that even philosophers have acknowledged to be a far more social context-reliant affair, ever since significant people such as Kuhn and the Strong Program individuals landed on planet Plato and resolutely entrenched themselves and all this might make someone question whether science is value-free (Oosterlinck, 1999). A number of philosophers have established a concept of epistemic values. These are normally defined as factors, which are truth-promoting, meaning that they indicate whether or not theories are true. A standard list, for instance, going back to Kuhn, comprises of accuracy, external and internal consistency and explanatory power (Longino, 1983). External consistency implies that it concurs with other acknowledged theories and internal consistency implies that the theory is consistent only by itself (Oosterlinck, 1999). Other values, for instance, a commitment to environmentalism or feminism or a specific religion, are non-epistemic; the truth that a theory concurs with feminist values does appear to be an indication that it is true or perhaps false. Scientists might need to bear in mind that public discussion of values needs justification, just like any other scientific argument. Sound ethical conclusions are rooted in general ideas--not on one individual’s ideological values, feelings, or lifestyle. Moral has to be openly endorsed (Price, 1976). In turn, ethical principles are derived from specific evidence, careful reasoning and widely shared feelings. The willingness to face the consequences of ones behaviors and the ability to influence a decision are two frequent methods of testing whether or not principles are ethical (Price, 1976). A good criterion for validating an ethical value is a right critic: reasons have to be appropriate and draw on principles general sufficient to convince an individual with an opposing or skeptical viewpoint. References Longino, H. (1983). Beyond “bad science”: skeptical reflections on the value-freedom scientific inquiry. Science, Technology & Human Values, 8(1), 7-17. Oosterlinck, A. (1999). Ethical aspects of scientific progress. European Journal for Education Law and Policy, 3(5), 117–120. Price, D. K. (1976). The ethical principles of scientific institutions. Science, Technology & Human Values, 4(26), 46-60. Proctor, J. D. (1998). Expanding the scope of science and ethics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 88(2), 290-296. Read More