What is the foundationalist response to the Pyrhhonian sceptical challenge - Essay Example

What is the foundationalist response to the Pyrhhonian sceptical challenge? The general argument is that knowledge needs justification (Striker, 72). However, the Pyrhhonian skeptical challenge presents a totally different opinion, which in itself does not reject that knowledge requires justification, but rather offers that the only true way is to remain non-judgmental (Casey, n.p.). Thus, it can simply bee said that the Pyrhhonian sceptical challenge was inspired by ethical concerns, which holds that it is not right to judge that a person does not know, since such a person may not even that he does not know, and thus he might know something after all (Burnyeat, 133). The fundamental principle of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism is that in matters of opinion, observing quietude is noble, while in matters concerning things that are unavoidable, adapting moderate feelings is the most appropriate approach. The essence behind this principle of Pyrrhonian Skepticism is that; a person, who spends his entire life giving opinions regarding anything that is in nature as either good or bad, spends his entire life in a disquiet state (Striker, 77). The disquiet in the life a person who keeps categorizing the things off nature as either good or bad emanates from the fact that such a person keeps avoiding the things he considers to be bad in life, while at the same time chasing the things he considers good, yet spending all his energy in trying to avoid losing the goods he considers good, which he has already achieved (Burnyeat, 135). On the contrary, a person who neither opines on anything as either good or bad does not shun or pursue anything eagerly, which then means such a person is unperturbed in life (Striker, 71). This argument as raised by the Pyrrhonian Skepticism has become the foundation of the classical Skepticism, which advocates for a non-judgmental approach. However, the foundationalist response would be to contrast and to criticize the position held by the Pyrrhonian Skeptics, by holding that the search of tranquility as the ultimate goal of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism constitutes some of form of anti-rationalism (Casey, n.p.). This is because, according to the foundationalist, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics abandons the search for truth in favor of remaining non-judgmental. Thus, the Pyrrhonian Skeptics holds the truth as irrelevant, and for that reason chooses to live life through accepting everything that happens without an attempt to challenge it. According to the foundationalist, this constitutes the determination of truth as futile, and for that reason, Pyrrhonian Skepticism cannot chart any new ways of life based on the prevailing truth, because it simply has to accept everything that happens in life. The Pyrrhonian Skepticism are perceived to hold truth as incompatible with life, such that they have turned to the argument that there is no need to argue and fall back to reason on anything pertaining to life, due to the fact that everything in life always fall into place, without the need to be tainted by the influence of reason (Striker, 41). However, the Pyrrhonian Skepticism has held that the foundationalists have failed to understand the concept of non-judgmental approach that is advanced by the Pyrrhonian Skeptics fully. Pyrrhonian Skepticism argues for non-judgmental approach, through holding that the principle of non-judgmentalism is compatible with the principle of reason, since the recommendation by the Pyrrhonian Skeptics that people should suspend judgment in all matters is particularly meant to satisfy the demands of reason (Casey, n.p.). Most fundamentally, the Pyrrhonian Skepticism holds that; as opposed to either side of extremes held by the foundationalist; that they have found the truth under positive dogmatism, or that truth cannot be found; as argued under negative dogmatism, Pyrrhonian Skepticism is the essence of reason, since it stands for non-judgmental approach; which is reason in the process of searching for truth (Casey, n.p.). This position is contested by the foundationalist response, which holds that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with the principle of reason, since it stands for the achievement of tranquility through the suspension of judgment (Striker, 44). The foundationalist response holds that even if Pyrrhonian Skepticism is in the process of searching for truth, the truth will be just but a means to achieving tranquility, which is the fundamental principle advanced by that Pyrrhonian Skepticism. The foundationalist response further argues that if truth is a means to achieving tranquility, then it is only better that the Pyrrhonian Skepticism gives up on the search for truth, owing to the fact that even if they would end up discovering the truth, it can never be any meaningful to them, since truth can never lead to tranquility but rather to more perturbation. Therefore, since the argument is that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is a process of truth, and due to the fact that it cannot make use of the truth since it is incompatible with the non-judgmental approach to attaining tranquility, then, the foundationalist response holds that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is not a philosophy after all (Casey, n.p.). The foundationalist response further questions why the Pyrrhonian Skepticism is arguing to be standing for the process of searching the truth in the first place. The foundationalist response holds that the reason why the Pyrrhonian Skepticism seek for truth is simply because they are distressed by the need to know the truth, and thus realizes that tranquility, which is the esteemed state of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism, cannot be achieved, unless truth is first achieved (Casey, n.p.). In this, the Pyrrhonian Skepticism holds that they are interested in the truth just for its own sake, and that it explains not the distress, but the need to avoid the distress is what constitutes the desire for tranquility. In this respect, it follows that the Pyrrhonian Skepticism are interested in the truth both for its own sake and also as a means to tranquility (Burnyeat, 136). It is in this respect that the Pyrrhonian Skepticism cannot be held to be presupposing that the truth cannot be found. Nevertheless, the foundationalist response is that the search for truth, which the Pyrrhonian Skeptics hold to be compatible with the principle of non-judgmental approach in search for tranquility, in fact amounts to investigation. Further, the foundationalist response holds that the assertion for the search of truth by the Pyrrhonian Skepticism also amounts to the avoidance of any form of falsehood (Casey, n.p.). This being the case, the achievement of tranquility as the fundamental objective of the Pyrrhonian Skepticism then becomes elusive, since as they endeavor to search for truth and avoid falsehoods, they eventually discover that there are more values related to the truth and falsehoods that needs to be investigated. This subsequently leads the Pyrrhonian Skeptics back to being distressed, while their initial goal was to avoid distress through sustaining a non-judgmental approach and maintaining tranquility (Casey, n.p.). Therefore, the foundationalist response to the Pyrrhonian Skeptics can be summarized as being that; the source of distress is not any belief related to the things of nature being good or bad, but rather ignorance (Striker, 79). This simply means that the foundationalist response holds the Pyrrhonian Skeptics as advocating for ignorance, at the expense of advocating for the principles that would lead to the attainment of tranquility, owing to the fact that remaining in the state of ignorance is in itself an obstacle, not a means to achieving tranquility (Casey, n.p.). Therefore, the foundationalist response offers that it is right for Pyrrhonian Skeptics to argue for suspension of judgment as a means to achieving tranquility, but the need to satisfy certain rational requirements will always work against the suspended judgment, and in favor of the investigation of truth. In this respect, the suspension of truth by itself then becomes an obstacle, as opposed to a means through which tranquility can be achieved (Casey, n.p.). Why is the problem of easy knowledge a problem for foundationalists? The problem of easy knowledge, according to the foundationalists, is the issue associated with certain theories, which allows us to come into a very quick conclusion that certain hypotheses are false, and in that sense, makes us to believe that the way things seem, is the most reliable indicator of the way things are (Black, 2). It is this form of knowledge that the foundationalists perceive to be misleading, and thus proposes the application of animal knowledge as the means to overcoming easy knowledge. According to the foundationalists, animal knowledge is not based or even closed under any logical entailment, which then means that such knowledge cannot be applied to take us too easily to closure that certain hypothesis are just false (Cohen, 61). Therefore, the application of epistemological contextualism has been proposed as a way of addressing the problem of easy knowledge by the foundationalists. This proposition stems from the fact that; contextualism eliminates the chances of both knowing and knowing too easily occurring together (Black, 5). The consequence is that we fail to know under the context where the epistemic standards are set to high, but get to know, however not too easily, under conditions where the epistemic standards are more flexible (Cohen, 67). This way, the problem of easy knowledge is resolved, owing to the fact that through the application of the epistemic contexts, only knowing or not knowing at all remains, but there is no option for foreclosure that is caused by knowing too easily. However, while the foundationalists have proposed the application of epistemic contextualism as the solution to easy knowledge, the solution does not seem to be satisfying, owing to the fact that it stands for either skeptical or non-skeptical cases, without offering any uniformity in creating a resolution (Markie, 412). The application of this proposed solution in fact hinders the chances of applying reflective knowledge, even when it is known that reflective knowledge is capable of being reliable. Thus, to overcome the shortcomings associated with the proposal for applying epistemic contextualism as the solution to addressing the problem of easy knowledge, the Single Source Closure principle has been advocated as the most suitable solution, owing to the fact that it bridges between the extremes of either skeptical or non-skeptical cases that are created by epistemic contextualism (Black, 28). The Single Source Closure provides that the application of basic truth, for example the perceptual effect, does not eliminate the chance of the negative hypothesis applying in the same case. For example, the perception of a table as red and then applying that knowledge to determine that indeed the table is red and not white table illuminated by a red light, does not eliminate the negative hypothesis that the table might be white, but illuminated by red light (28). Through applying the Single Source Closure, the basic knowledge only offers that the table is red, and thus leaves out the negative hypothesis that the table might be white, for further investigation. This way, the problem of easy knowledge is effectively resolved. Works Cited Burnyeat, Frede. The Original Sceptics: A Controversy. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997. 133-8. Print. Black, Tim. “Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge.” Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008): 1-29. Print. Casey, Perin. The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Oxford UP, 2010. 69-130. Web. February 25, 2015. Accessed: < https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24473-the-demands-of-reason-an-essay-on-pyrrhonian-scepticism/> Cohen, Stuart. “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.” Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999): 57-89. Print. Markie, Peter. “Easy Knowledge‘, hereafter EK.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70 (2005): 406-416. Print. Striker, Gisela. "Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2001): 1-122. Print. Read More