Is Foundationalism a Plausible Theory of Epistemic Justification - Essay Example

Is Foundationalism a plausible theory of epistemic justification Introduction Philosophers have always been in pursuit of truth and knowledge. From the times of Plato- the Greek philosopher, knowledge has been defined as 'justified true belief' (Holt, 1). Accordingly knowledge may be understood as some belief that has a justification and the latter is true, then it is taken as knowledge; anything that does not satisfy this condition that is, anything that does not have a justification that is true, or anything that one does not believe in, cannot be called knowledge. This imperative constituent of knowledge, i.e. the ways and manner in which true belief s can be plausibly converted to 'justifications,' is what epistemology is all about. Foundationalism is a view, a perception that is founded on theory stated above, on how the structures of justification or knowledge is to be developed. This essay shall briefly state the concept of 'foundationalism' with an example, and analyze some criticisms against foundationalism. The essay shall argue that foundationalism presents itself as a very weak and debate-able theory of epistemic justification for it to be accepted as plausible. The essay shall cite appropriately from researchers and other works, to support its argument. Foundationalism As can be deduced form its very name, 'foundationalism,' is a view that as states that, some beliefs become the foundation for others. It is worthwhile to enter into a discussion of the theory of foundationalism, because, only if one understands clearly what foundationalism is, can one understand why it presents a weak and debate-able theory for plausible epistemic justification. As stated earlier, is rooted in the idea that knowledge is 'justified true belief' (JTB). This means that all our knowledge has to be based on some sort of justified belief that is true. This concept of a chain of justified beliefs, one based on another and that based on another, leading to innumerable regress of justified beliefs, appeared unconvincing to some thinkers, and the foundationalists sought to solve this problem by introduction of basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs or 'inferentially justified beliefs'. For example, one knows that 1) plants are living things and 2) all living things need oxygen, then one can deduce from this, that 3) plants need oxygen. Statement three (plants need oxygen) then becomes the new, justified belief, which is inferred from the justified beliefs of the statements 1) and 2). This is called 'inferentially justified belief' while the first two are 'non-inferentially justified beliefs' and foundationalists hold "that there must be a kind of justification that does not depend on the having of other justified beliefs" which then becomes the foundation of all our beliefs and knowledge (Fumerton, 1). In other words, "if one has a non-basic belief, then-at rock bottom-it owes its justification to at least one basic belief" (Howard-Snyder, 1). Interestingly, foundationalists state that some beliefs need no further explanation; for example, when one is in pain, or feels a sense of pleasure - this needs no further justification because one knows that it is true. It is based on personal knowledge or empiricism. Similarly, there may be another belief that one cannot sleep because of the pain. This is derived form the belief that one is in pain, or derived belief. Relationships like the one mentioned, between basic and derived beliefs, in terms of justification, are more basic than others, since in "they cannot be justified by reference to other beliefs (call them the 'Derived Beliefs') whereas derived beliefs can be justified by reference to basic beliefs" (Fumerton, 1). Types of Foundationalism and Their Criticisms Descartes may be cited as "the paradigm of a classical foundationalist" (Fumerton, 1). Classical foundationalism holds that the basics or the 'foundations of knowledge' must be absolutely protected, and that they must be invulnerable to skepticism (University of Reading, Foundationalism webpage). Therefore, basic beliefs have particularly worthy epistemic property, which is that they are 'infallible;' infallible belief has to be non-inferentially justified and these infallible beliefs will put an end to the problem of innumerable regress. Critics of 'classical foundationalism' have rightly pointed to it being idealistic rather than something that does have existence; furthermore, it holds empirical experiences to be "non-inferentially justified" by virtue of being "infallible" (University of Reading, Foundationalism webpage). For example, Fumerton (p.1) cites Lehrer to give the following definition of 'infallible belief - S's belief that P at t is infallible if S's believing P at t entails that P is true" (1974, p. 81) where t is time, and P is a proposition. The relevant point here, as pointed to by Lehrer and others is that, the relevance of "infallible belief" with regards to understanding "of the epistemic concept of non-inferential justification" is quite obscure (Fumerton, 1). Mainly, the problem revolves round 'entail[ed]' truths, since each proposition is necessarily entailed to hold one truth, belief in a necessary truth P, entails that P is necessarily true. And from the above definition, even though it may be far too complex for one to prove it, the proposition P becomes the truth, in which one believes only out of one's fancy (Fumerton, 1). In other words, according to some critics, the concept of infallible belief or a basic belief does not make any sense; as Fumerton puts it "a foundation of knowledge and justified belief restricted to infallible beliefs (as defined above) would arguably be far too flimsy to support any sort of substantial epistemic edifice" (p.1). Furthermore, Fumerton (p, 1) validly states that, as regards 'infallible belief', and 'infallible justification', of foundationalism, there is hardly anything that leads to the basics of knowledge; "Most classical foundationalists reject the idea that one can have non-inferentially justified beliefs about the past, but the present disappears into the past in the blink of an eye"- this Fuemrton is hardly envisaged of one who aspires to regain gigantic portions of epistemic knowledge (p, 1). Coherentists' Criticism of Foundationalism Unlike foundationalism, coherentism claims that all beliefs derive their justification from inferential relationships to some other beliefs (Klein, 1). Strong defenders of the coherence theory are Keith Lehrer's - Knowledge (1974) and Laurence BonJour's - The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (1985). Harold H. Joachim, the philosopher who put forth the 'coherence theory of truth' states that in his view, human truth is incomplete, for there can be no absolute truth unless the whole system of knowledge could be completed. Whatever is true not only is consistent with a system of other propositions but also is true to the extent that it is a necessary constituent of a systematic whole" (Chap 29, 1). Briefly, coherentism agrees with foundationalism in that, infinite regress is invalid justification; however, it disagrees with foundationalism in that, "justification depends on having an inferential chain of reasons with a suitable stopping point" (Kvanvig, 1). As regards the criticism of the coherence theorists of foundationalism, the former, refute the latter's presupposition that justification is linear. They state that every belief is taken as justified by its very nature of "coherence with the rest of what one believes but one avoids the appearance of vicious circularity by insisting that one needn't first have justification for believing the other propositions in one's belief system" (Fumerton, 1). Laurence BonJour one of the better known coherentists, objected to all forms of classical foundationalism, with what he called access 'internalism'. Briefly, the access internalist holds that, "a feature of a belief or epistemic situation that makes a belief non-inferentially justified must be a feature to which we have actual or potential access" (Fumerton 1). Furthermore, even accepting that the justified belief of the internalist is non-inferentially held, the arrival at such justification should have been as the result of deep and detailed reflection. Reflection is always based on referential justifications and truths which again can be only inferential. Sellars in his work "Does empirical knowledge have a foundation" differentiates between the set of basic truths of empirical foundationalism and rational foundationalism, by stating that the basic truths in the former is not as sound and valid as that in the latter; for example, "This van is blue" is not the same as the basic belief in arithmetic 3+3 = 6. He states: "I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only non-inferential, but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact that knowledge which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts must be inferential. (Sellars, p. 8) Arbitrariness in Foundationalism Probably, one of the more valid criticisms against foundationalism is that, there are some beliefs according to foundationalism which do not need any external justification. Simply because these beliefs are already justified and therefore, do not need any further justification. However, each one can hold that his or her beliefs are true and need no more justification. As Tim Holt explains, "The choice of basic beliefs is entirely arbitrary, but directly impacts which of our other beliefs are justified. As the foundation of our belief sets is arbitrary, though, then so must be whole structure of our beliefs; foundationalist justification is therefore worthless" (Objection to Foundationalism: The Choice of Basic Beliefs is Arbitrary web page). Conclusion Philosophers have always been intent on the discovery of knowledge and truth. The three part theory of knowledge holds that knowledge is justified true belief. The theory of foundationalism is based on this very theory of knowledge. It is rather a view that converts the beliefs into justifications. However, the theory places extreme importance on basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs as this leads to the question as which beliefs are to be taken as basic and which are derived. Other problems like foundationalism being rather empirical in knowledge, leads to certain confusion as to which is to be as justified. Furthermore, some philosophers have pointed out that there are hardly any non-inferential beliefs possible. Foundationalism offers little by way of refutation of the criticisms and hence it can be possible deduced that foundationalism as a epistemic justification seems a weak plausibility. List of works Cited BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1985). Fumerton, Richard. "Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification" First published Mon, Feb 21, 2000; substantive revision Wed Mar 23, 2005. Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ Holt, Tim. "Tripartite Theory of Knowledge" in Theory of Knowledge .info Retrieved November 15, 2007. http://www.theoryofknowledge.info/tripartite.html Holt, Tim. "Objection to Foundationalism: The Choice of Basic Beliefs is Arbitrary" in Theory of Knowledge .info Retrieved November 15, 2007. http://www.theoryofknowledge.info/basicbeliefsarbitrary.html Howard-Snyder, Daniel. "Foundationalism and Arbitrariness" Dept. of Philosophy Western Washington University. Electronic article retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.ac.wwu.edu/howardd/foundationalismandarbitrarinessppq.pdf Joachim H. Harold. "Chapter 29. "Coherence Theory of Truth" in Reading for Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction to Philosophical Thinking ver. 0.21;(2004). An Open Source Reader Electronic article Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/introbook2.1/x7995.html Klein, Peter. D. (1998, 2005). Epistemology. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/P059 Kvanvig, Jonathan. "Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification" First published Tue Nov 11, 2003; substantive revision Tue Sep 18, 2007. 'Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.' Electronic article Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/ Lehrer, Keith. 1974. Knowledge. (p. 81) Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sellars in his work "Does empirical knowledge have a foundation" Electronic article Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm8.html University of Reading. "Foundationalism" Electronic article Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.rdg.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/jmp/Theory%20of%20Knowledge/Foundationa lism.htm Read More